Files
netbird/proxy/internal/restrict/restrict.go
Maycon Santos 7aebdd69dd [management, client, proxy] add expose NetBird-only services over tunnel peers (#6226)
Adds a new "private" service mode for the reverse proxy: services reachable exclusively over the embedded WireGuard tunnel, gated by per-peer group membership instead of operator auth schemes.

Wire contract
- ProxyMapping.private (field 13): the proxy MUST call ValidateTunnelPeer and fail closed; operator schemes are bypassed.
- ProxyCapabilities.private (4) + supports_private_service (5): capability gate. Management never streams private mappings to proxies that don't claim the capability; the broadcast path applies the same filter via filterMappingsForProxy.
- ValidateTunnelPeer RPC: resolves an inbound tunnel IP to a peer, checks the peer's groups against service.AccessGroups, and mints a session JWT on success. checkPeerGroupAccess fails closed when a private service has empty AccessGroups.
- ValidateSession/ValidateTunnelPeer responses now carry peer_group_ids + peer_group_names so the proxy can authorise policy-aware middlewares without an extra management round-trip.
- ProxyInboundListener + SendStatusUpdate.inbound_listener: per-account inbound listener state surfaced to dashboards.
- PathTargetOptions.direct_upstream (11): bypass the embedded NetBird client and dial the target via the proxy host's network stack for upstreams reachable without WireGuard.

Data model
- Service.Private (bool) + Service.AccessGroups ([]string, JSON- serialised). Validate() rejects bearer auth on private services. Copy() deep-copies AccessGroups. pgx getServices loads the columns.
- DomainConfig.Private threaded into the proxy auth middleware. Request handler routes private services through forwardWithTunnelPeer and returns 403 on validation failure.
- Account-level SynthesizePrivateServiceZones (synthetic DNS) and injectPrivateServicePolicies (synthetic ACL) gate on len(svc.AccessGroups) > 0.

Proxy
- /netbird proxy --private (embedded mode) flag; Config.Private in proxy/lifecycle.go.
- Per-account inbound listener (proxy/inbound.go) binding HTTP/HTTPS on the embedded NetBird client's WireGuard tunnel netstack.
- proxy/internal/auth/tunnel_cache: ValidateTunnelPeer response cache with single-flight de-duplication and per-account eviction.
- Local peerstore short-circuit: when the inbound IP isn't in the account roster, deny fast without an RPC.
- proxy/server.go reports SupportsPrivateService=true and redacts the full ProxyMapping JSON from info logs (auth_token + header-auth hashed values now only at debug level).

Identity forwarding
- ValidateSessionJWT returns user_id, email, method, groups, group_names. sessionkey.Claims carries Email + Groups + GroupNames so the proxy can stamp identity onto upstream requests without an extra management round-trip on every cookie-bearing request.
- CapturedData carries userEmail / userGroups / userGroupNames; the proxy stamps X-NetBird-User and X-NetBird-Groups on r.Out from the authenticated identity (strips client-supplied values first to prevent spoofing).
- AccessLog.UserGroups: access-log enrichment captures the user's group memberships at write time so the dashboard can render group context without reverse-resolving stale memberships.

OpenAPI/dashboard surface
- ReverseProxyService gains private + access_groups; ReverseProxyCluster gains private + supports_private. ReverseProxyTarget target_type enum gains "cluster". ServiceTargetOptions gains direct_upstream. ProxyAccessLog gains user_groups.
2026-05-25 17:41:50 +02:00

328 lines
8.3 KiB
Go

// Package restrict provides connection-level access control based on
// IP CIDR ranges and geolocation (country codes).
package restrict
import (
"net/netip"
"slices"
"strings"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/geolocation"
)
// defaultLogger is used when no logger is provided to ParseFilter.
var defaultLogger = log.NewEntry(log.StandardLogger())
// GeoResolver resolves an IP address to geographic information.
type GeoResolver interface {
LookupAddr(addr netip.Addr) geolocation.Result
Available() bool
}
// DecisionType is the type of CrowdSec remediation action.
type DecisionType string
const (
DecisionBan DecisionType = "ban"
DecisionCaptcha DecisionType = "captcha"
DecisionThrottle DecisionType = "throttle"
)
// CrowdSecDecision holds the type of a CrowdSec decision.
type CrowdSecDecision struct {
Type DecisionType
}
// CrowdSecChecker queries CrowdSec decisions for an IP address.
type CrowdSecChecker interface {
CheckIP(addr netip.Addr) *CrowdSecDecision
Ready() bool
}
// CrowdSecMode is the per-service enforcement mode.
type CrowdSecMode string
const (
CrowdSecOff CrowdSecMode = ""
CrowdSecEnforce CrowdSecMode = "enforce"
CrowdSecObserve CrowdSecMode = "observe"
)
// Filter evaluates IP restrictions. CIDR checks are performed first
// (cheap), followed by country lookups (more expensive) only when needed.
type Filter struct {
AllowedCIDRs []netip.Prefix
BlockedCIDRs []netip.Prefix
AllowedCountries []string
BlockedCountries []string
CrowdSec CrowdSecChecker
CrowdSecMode CrowdSecMode
}
// FilterConfig holds the raw configuration for building a Filter.
type FilterConfig struct {
AllowedCIDRs []string
BlockedCIDRs []string
AllowedCountries []string
BlockedCountries []string
CrowdSec CrowdSecChecker
CrowdSecMode CrowdSecMode
Logger *log.Entry
}
// ParseFilter builds a Filter from the config. Returns nil if no restrictions
// are configured.
func ParseFilter(cfg FilterConfig) *Filter {
hasCS := cfg.CrowdSecMode == CrowdSecEnforce || cfg.CrowdSecMode == CrowdSecObserve
if len(cfg.AllowedCIDRs) == 0 && len(cfg.BlockedCIDRs) == 0 &&
len(cfg.AllowedCountries) == 0 && len(cfg.BlockedCountries) == 0 && !hasCS {
return nil
}
logger := cfg.Logger
if logger == nil {
logger = defaultLogger
}
f := &Filter{
AllowedCountries: normalizeCountryCodes(cfg.AllowedCountries),
BlockedCountries: normalizeCountryCodes(cfg.BlockedCountries),
}
if hasCS {
f.CrowdSec = cfg.CrowdSec
f.CrowdSecMode = cfg.CrowdSecMode
}
for _, cidr := range cfg.AllowedCIDRs {
prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(cidr)
if err != nil {
logger.Warnf("skip invalid allowed CIDR %q: %v", cidr, err)
continue
}
f.AllowedCIDRs = append(f.AllowedCIDRs, prefix.Masked())
}
for _, cidr := range cfg.BlockedCIDRs {
prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(cidr)
if err != nil {
logger.Warnf("skip invalid blocked CIDR %q: %v", cidr, err)
continue
}
f.BlockedCIDRs = append(f.BlockedCIDRs, prefix.Masked())
}
return f
}
func normalizeCountryCodes(codes []string) []string {
if len(codes) == 0 {
return nil
}
out := make([]string, len(codes))
for i, c := range codes {
out[i] = strings.ToUpper(c)
}
return out
}
// Verdict is the result of an access check.
type Verdict int
const (
// Allow indicates the address passed all checks.
Allow Verdict = iota
// DenyCIDR indicates the address was blocked by a CIDR rule.
DenyCIDR
// DenyCountry indicates the address was blocked by a country rule.
DenyCountry
// DenyGeoUnavailable indicates that country restrictions are configured
// but the geo lookup is unavailable.
DenyGeoUnavailable
// DenyCrowdSecBan indicates a CrowdSec "ban" decision.
DenyCrowdSecBan
// DenyCrowdSecCaptcha indicates a CrowdSec "captcha" decision.
DenyCrowdSecCaptcha
// DenyCrowdSecThrottle indicates a CrowdSec "throttle" decision.
DenyCrowdSecThrottle
// DenyCrowdSecUnavailable indicates enforce mode but the bouncer has not
// completed its initial sync.
DenyCrowdSecUnavailable
)
// String returns the deny reason string matching the HTTP auth mechanism names.
func (v Verdict) String() string {
switch v {
case Allow:
return "allow"
case DenyCIDR:
return "ip_restricted"
case DenyCountry:
return "country_restricted"
case DenyGeoUnavailable:
return "geo_unavailable"
case DenyCrowdSecBan:
return "crowdsec_ban"
case DenyCrowdSecCaptcha:
return "crowdsec_captcha"
case DenyCrowdSecThrottle:
return "crowdsec_throttle"
case DenyCrowdSecUnavailable:
return "crowdsec_unavailable"
default:
return "unknown"
}
}
// IsCrowdSec returns true when the verdict originates from a CrowdSec check.
func (v Verdict) IsCrowdSec() bool {
switch v {
case DenyCrowdSecBan, DenyCrowdSecCaptcha, DenyCrowdSecThrottle, DenyCrowdSecUnavailable:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// IsObserveOnly returns true when v is a CrowdSec verdict and the filter is in
// observe mode. Callers should log the verdict but not block the request.
func (f *Filter) IsObserveOnly(v Verdict) bool {
if f == nil {
return false
}
return v.IsCrowdSec() && f.CrowdSecMode == CrowdSecObserve
}
// CheckCIDR runs only the CIDR allow/block evaluation. Use this when
// country and CrowdSec checks don't apply — e.g. requests arriving
// from the WireGuard overlay, whose source addresses live in the
// CGNAT range and have no meaningful geolocation or IP-reputation
// data.
func (f *Filter) CheckCIDR(addr netip.Addr) Verdict {
if f == nil {
return Allow
}
return f.checkCIDR(addr.Unmap())
}
// Check evaluates whether addr is permitted. CIDR rules are evaluated
// first because they are O(n) prefix comparisons. Country rules run
// only when CIDR checks pass and require a geo lookup. CrowdSec checks
// run last.
func (f *Filter) Check(addr netip.Addr, geo GeoResolver) Verdict {
if f == nil {
return Allow
}
// Normalize v4-mapped-v6 (e.g. ::ffff:10.1.2.3) to plain v4 so that
// IPv4 CIDR rules match regardless of how the address was received.
addr = addr.Unmap()
if v := f.checkCIDR(addr); v != Allow {
return v
}
if v := f.checkCountry(addr, geo); v != Allow {
return v
}
return f.checkCrowdSec(addr)
}
func (f *Filter) checkCIDR(addr netip.Addr) Verdict {
if len(f.AllowedCIDRs) > 0 {
allowed := false
for _, prefix := range f.AllowedCIDRs {
if prefix.Contains(addr) {
allowed = true
break
}
}
if !allowed {
return DenyCIDR
}
}
for _, prefix := range f.BlockedCIDRs {
if prefix.Contains(addr) {
return DenyCIDR
}
}
return Allow
}
func (f *Filter) checkCountry(addr netip.Addr, geo GeoResolver) Verdict {
if len(f.AllowedCountries) == 0 && len(f.BlockedCountries) == 0 {
return Allow
}
if geo == nil || !geo.Available() {
return DenyGeoUnavailable
}
result := geo.LookupAddr(addr)
if result.CountryCode == "" {
// Unknown country: deny if an allowlist is active, allow otherwise.
// Blocklists are best-effort: unknown countries pass through since
// the default policy is allow.
if len(f.AllowedCountries) > 0 {
return DenyCountry
}
return Allow
}
if len(f.AllowedCountries) > 0 {
if !slices.Contains(f.AllowedCountries, result.CountryCode) {
return DenyCountry
}
}
if slices.Contains(f.BlockedCountries, result.CountryCode) {
return DenyCountry
}
return Allow
}
func (f *Filter) checkCrowdSec(addr netip.Addr) Verdict {
if f.CrowdSecMode == CrowdSecOff {
return Allow
}
// Checker nil with enforce means CrowdSec was requested but the proxy
// has no LAPI configured. Fail-closed.
if f.CrowdSec == nil {
if f.CrowdSecMode == CrowdSecEnforce {
return DenyCrowdSecUnavailable
}
return Allow
}
if !f.CrowdSec.Ready() {
if f.CrowdSecMode == CrowdSecEnforce {
return DenyCrowdSecUnavailable
}
return Allow
}
d := f.CrowdSec.CheckIP(addr)
if d == nil {
return Allow
}
switch d.Type {
case DecisionCaptcha:
return DenyCrowdSecCaptcha
case DecisionThrottle:
return DenyCrowdSecThrottle
default:
return DenyCrowdSecBan
}
}
// HasRestrictions returns true if any restriction rules are configured.
func (f *Filter) HasRestrictions() bool {
if f == nil {
return false
}
return len(f.AllowedCIDRs) > 0 || len(f.BlockedCIDRs) > 0 ||
len(f.AllowedCountries) > 0 || len(f.BlockedCountries) > 0 ||
f.CrowdSecMode == CrowdSecEnforce || f.CrowdSecMode == CrowdSecObserve
}