Files
netbird/proxy/server_test.go
Maycon Santos 7aebdd69dd [management, client, proxy] add expose NetBird-only services over tunnel peers (#6226)
Adds a new "private" service mode for the reverse proxy: services reachable exclusively over the embedded WireGuard tunnel, gated by per-peer group membership instead of operator auth schemes.

Wire contract
- ProxyMapping.private (field 13): the proxy MUST call ValidateTunnelPeer and fail closed; operator schemes are bypassed.
- ProxyCapabilities.private (4) + supports_private_service (5): capability gate. Management never streams private mappings to proxies that don't claim the capability; the broadcast path applies the same filter via filterMappingsForProxy.
- ValidateTunnelPeer RPC: resolves an inbound tunnel IP to a peer, checks the peer's groups against service.AccessGroups, and mints a session JWT on success. checkPeerGroupAccess fails closed when a private service has empty AccessGroups.
- ValidateSession/ValidateTunnelPeer responses now carry peer_group_ids + peer_group_names so the proxy can authorise policy-aware middlewares without an extra management round-trip.
- ProxyInboundListener + SendStatusUpdate.inbound_listener: per-account inbound listener state surfaced to dashboards.
- PathTargetOptions.direct_upstream (11): bypass the embedded NetBird client and dial the target via the proxy host's network stack for upstreams reachable without WireGuard.

Data model
- Service.Private (bool) + Service.AccessGroups ([]string, JSON- serialised). Validate() rejects bearer auth on private services. Copy() deep-copies AccessGroups. pgx getServices loads the columns.
- DomainConfig.Private threaded into the proxy auth middleware. Request handler routes private services through forwardWithTunnelPeer and returns 403 on validation failure.
- Account-level SynthesizePrivateServiceZones (synthetic DNS) and injectPrivateServicePolicies (synthetic ACL) gate on len(svc.AccessGroups) > 0.

Proxy
- /netbird proxy --private (embedded mode) flag; Config.Private in proxy/lifecycle.go.
- Per-account inbound listener (proxy/inbound.go) binding HTTP/HTTPS on the embedded NetBird client's WireGuard tunnel netstack.
- proxy/internal/auth/tunnel_cache: ValidateTunnelPeer response cache with single-flight de-duplication and per-account eviction.
- Local peerstore short-circuit: when the inbound IP isn't in the account roster, deny fast without an RPC.
- proxy/server.go reports SupportsPrivateService=true and redacts the full ProxyMapping JSON from info logs (auth_token + header-auth hashed values now only at debug level).

Identity forwarding
- ValidateSessionJWT returns user_id, email, method, groups, group_names. sessionkey.Claims carries Email + Groups + GroupNames so the proxy can stamp identity onto upstream requests without an extra management round-trip on every cookie-bearing request.
- CapturedData carries userEmail / userGroups / userGroupNames; the proxy stamps X-NetBird-User and X-NetBird-Groups on r.Out from the authenticated identity (strips client-supplied values first to prevent spoofing).
- AccessLog.UserGroups: access-log enrichment captures the user's group memberships at write time so the dashboard can render group context without reverse-resolving stale memberships.

OpenAPI/dashboard surface
- ReverseProxyService gains private + access_groups; ReverseProxyCluster gains private + supports_private. ReverseProxyTarget target_type enum gains "cluster". ServiceTargetOptions gains direct_upstream. ProxyAccessLog gains user_groups.
2026-05-25 17:41:50 +02:00

205 lines
6.3 KiB
Go

package proxy
import (
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"testing"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
)
func TestDebugEndpointDisabledByDefault(t *testing.T) {
s := &Server{}
assert.False(t, s.DebugEndpointEnabled, "debug endpoint should be disabled by default")
}
func TestDebugEndpointAddr(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
input string
expected string
}{
{
name: "empty defaults to localhost",
input: "",
expected: "localhost:8444",
},
{
name: "explicit localhost preserved",
input: "localhost:9999",
expected: "localhost:9999",
},
{
name: "explicit address preserved",
input: "0.0.0.0:8444",
expected: "0.0.0.0:8444",
},
{
name: "127.0.0.1 preserved",
input: "127.0.0.1:8444",
expected: "127.0.0.1:8444",
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
result := debugEndpointAddr(tc.input)
assert.Equal(t, tc.expected, result)
})
}
}
// quietLifecycleLogger keeps lifecycle tests from spamming the test output.
func quietLifecycleLogger() *log.Logger {
l := log.New()
l.SetOutput(io.Discard)
l.SetLevel(log.PanicLevel)
return l
}
func TestStopBeforeStartIsNoOp(t *testing.T) {
srv := New(Config{Logger: quietLifecycleLogger()})
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second)
defer cancel()
err := srv.Stop(ctx)
assert.NoError(t, err, "Stop on an unstarted server must succeed without error")
err = srv.Stop(ctx)
assert.NoError(t, err, "Stop must remain idempotent across repeated calls")
}
func TestStartFailsWithoutManagement(t *testing.T) {
srv := New(Config{
Logger: quietLifecycleLogger(),
ListenAddr: "127.0.0.1:0",
ManagementAddress: "://broken-url",
})
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second)
defer cancel()
err := srv.Start(ctx)
require.Error(t, err, "Start must surface management dial failures")
assert.True(t, srv.started, "started flag is set before any dial attempt so a second Start fails fast")
err = srv.Start(ctx)
require.Error(t, err, "second Start must reject")
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "already started", "error must explain why the call was rejected")
}
func TestStopIsIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
srv := &Server{
Logger: quietLifecycleLogger(),
started: true,
runErrCh: make(chan struct{}),
runCancel: func() {},
}
srv.recordRunErr(errors.New("synthetic"))
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second)
defer cancel()
err := srv.Stop(ctx)
require.Error(t, err, "Stop must surface the recorded background error")
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "synthetic", "error must round-trip recordRunErr's value")
err = srv.Stop(ctx)
require.Error(t, err, "second Stop must still report the same error")
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "synthetic", "idempotent Stop must return the cached error")
}
func TestRecordRunErrPreservesFirstFailure(t *testing.T) {
srv := &Server{
Logger: quietLifecycleLogger(),
runErrCh: make(chan struct{}),
}
srv.recordRunErr(errors.New("first"))
srv.recordRunErr(errors.New("second"))
require.Error(t, srv.runErr, "first failure must be retained")
assert.Contains(t, srv.runErr.Error(), "first", "second call must not overwrite the cached error")
select {
case <-srv.runErrCh:
default:
t.Fatal("recordRunErr must close runErrCh so waitAndStop unblocks")
}
}
func TestStopSkipsShutdownWhenNeverStarted(t *testing.T) {
srv := New(Config{Logger: quietLifecycleLogger()})
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
err := srv.Stop(ctx)
assert.NoError(t, err, "Stop on an unstarted server should not block on the cancelled ctx")
}
func TestRedactMappingForLog_ScrubsSensitiveFields(t *testing.T) {
original := &proto.ProxyMapping{
Id: "svc-1",
Domain: "example.com",
AuthToken: "super-secret-token",
Auth: &proto.Authentication{
SessionKey: "pubkey-not-secret",
HeaderAuths: []*proto.HeaderAuth{
{Header: "Authorization", HashedValue: "argon2-hash-1"},
{Header: "X-Api-Key", HashedValue: "argon2-hash-2"},
},
},
Path: []*proto.PathMapping{
{
Path: "/api",
Target: "10.0.0.1:8080",
Options: &proto.PathTargetOptions{
CustomHeaders: map[string]string{
"Authorization": "Bearer upstream-token",
"X-Tenant": "acme",
},
},
},
},
}
redacted := redactMappingForLog(original)
assert.Equal(t, "super-secret-token", original.AuthToken, "original must not be mutated")
assert.Equal(t, "argon2-hash-1", original.Auth.HeaderAuths[0].HashedValue, "original header hash must not be mutated")
assert.Equal(t, "Bearer upstream-token", original.Path[0].Options.CustomHeaders["Authorization"], "original custom header must not be mutated")
assert.Equal(t, "[REDACTED]", redacted.AuthToken, "auth_token must be redacted")
require.Len(t, redacted.Auth.HeaderAuths, 2, "header auths must be preserved in count")
assert.Equal(t, "Authorization", redacted.Auth.HeaderAuths[0].Header, "header name must be preserved")
assert.Equal(t, "[REDACTED]", redacted.Auth.HeaderAuths[0].HashedValue, "hashed_value must be redacted")
assert.Equal(t, "[REDACTED]", redacted.Auth.HeaderAuths[1].HashedValue, "hashed_value must be redacted for every header auth")
assert.Equal(t, "pubkey-not-secret", redacted.Auth.SessionKey, "session_key (public) must be preserved")
headers := redacted.Path[0].Options.CustomHeaders
require.Len(t, headers, 2, "custom header keys must be preserved")
assert.Equal(t, "[REDACTED]", headers["Authorization"], "custom header values must be redacted")
assert.Equal(t, "[REDACTED]", headers["X-Tenant"], "every custom header value must be redacted")
assert.Equal(t, "svc-1", redacted.Id, "non-sensitive fields must round-trip")
assert.Equal(t, "example.com", redacted.Domain, "non-sensitive fields must round-trip")
}
func TestRedactMappingForLog_HandlesEmptyOrNilFields(t *testing.T) {
empty := &proto.ProxyMapping{Id: "svc-empty"}
redacted := redactMappingForLog(empty)
assert.Equal(t, "", redacted.AuthToken, "empty auth_token must remain empty (no placeholder)")
assert.Nil(t, redacted.Auth, "nil Auth must remain nil")
assert.Empty(t, redacted.Path, "empty Path must remain empty")
}