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Adds AgentNetwork.Zone to the management config and passes it to the agent-network manager, alongside the existing plumbing in the combined binary. Nothing reads it yet -- the allocator that stamps it onto new rows comes next -- so this commit is inert on its own.
319 lines
13 KiB
Go
319 lines
13 KiB
Go
package builtin_test
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import (
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"context"
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"net"
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"runtime"
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"strconv"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"google.golang.org/grpc"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/test/bufconn"
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mgmtgrpc "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/shared/grpc"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork"
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agentNetworkTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
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nbtypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_limit_check"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_limit_record"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
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)
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// chainIntegrationFixture wires the BOTH new agent-network
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// middlewares against a live in-process management stack: real
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// sqlite store + real Manager + real gRPC server. The proxy chain
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// framework itself isn't constructed (its dispatcher / accumulator /
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// metadata gate are tested separately); we exercise the middleware
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// pair as the proxy runtime would, by invoking each with a crafted
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// Input and asserting the wire path between them.
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//
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// This is the regression cover for item 16 in the design review:
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// real LLM request → cost stamped → consumption row in the table.
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type chainIntegrationFixture struct {
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store store.Store
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manager agentnetwork.Manager
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gatecase *llm_limit_check.Middleware
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recorder *llm_limit_record.Middleware
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}
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func newChainIntegration(t *testing.T) *chainIntegrationFixture {
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t.Helper()
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if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
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t.Skip("sqlite store not properly supported on Windows yet")
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}
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t.Setenv("NETBIRD_STORE_ENGINE", string(nbtypes.SqliteStoreEngine))
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st, cleanUp, err := store.NewTestStoreFromSQL(context.Background(), "", t.TempDir())
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require.NoError(t, err)
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t.Cleanup(cleanUp)
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manager := agentnetwork.NewManager(st, nil, nil, nil, "")
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server := &mgmtgrpc.ProxyServiceServer{}
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server.SetAgentNetworkLimitsService(manager)
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const bufSize = 1024 * 1024
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lis := bufconn.Listen(bufSize)
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srv := grpc.NewServer()
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proto.RegisterProxyServiceServer(srv, server)
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go func() { _ = srv.Serve(lis) }()
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t.Cleanup(srv.Stop)
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conn, err := grpc.NewClient("passthrough:///bufnet",
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grpc.WithContextDialer(func(_ context.Context, _ string) (net.Conn, error) { return lis.Dial() }),
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grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()),
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)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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t.Cleanup(func() { _ = conn.Close() })
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mgmtClient := proto.NewProxyServiceClient(conn)
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return &chainIntegrationFixture{
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store: st,
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manager: manager,
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gatecase: llm_limit_check.New(mgmtClient, nil),
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recorder: llm_limit_record.New(mgmtClient, nil),
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}
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}
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// chainInput builds a middleware Input that mirrors what the proxy
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// framework would synthesise for a tunnel-peer LLM request. The
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// gate consumes the resolved provider id from upstream metadata
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// (set by llm_router); the recorder consumes the attribution
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// metadata stamped by the gate plus tokens / cost from
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// llm_response_parser + cost_meter.
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func chainInput(account, user, group, providerID string, requestMeta []middleware.KV) *middleware.Input {
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_ = providerID // packed into requestMeta by the caller as KeyLLMResolvedProviderID
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return &middleware.Input{
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AccountID: account,
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UserID: user,
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UserGroups: []string{group},
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Metadata: requestMeta,
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}
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}
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// chainCapPolicy builds a tight token-cap policy fixture for the
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// chain integration tests. Inlined here (rather than imported) because
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// the equivalent helper in the management gRPC package is unexported
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// and this is a different package boundary.
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func chainCapPolicy(id, account string, sourceGroups []string, providerID string, tokenCap, windowSec int64) *agentNetworkTypes.Policy {
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return &agentNetworkTypes.Policy{
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ID: id,
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AccountID: account,
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Enabled: true,
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Name: id,
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SourceGroups: sourceGroups,
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DestinationProviderIDs: []string{providerID},
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Limits: agentNetworkTypes.PolicyLimits{
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TokenLimit: agentNetworkTypes.PolicyTokenLimit{
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Enabled: true,
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GroupCap: tokenCap,
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WindowSeconds: windowSec,
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},
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},
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CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
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UpdatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
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}
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}
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// TestChain_AllowPath_StampsAttributionAndRecordsCounter walks the
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// full happy path: gate calls CheckLLMPolicyLimits → stamps
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// attribution metadata → recorder reads metadata + tokens / cost →
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// calls RecordLLMUsage → counters land in sqlite. Asserting on the
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// store at the end proves every leg of the wire works together,
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// not just each leg in isolation (which the unit tests already cover).
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func TestChain_AllowPath_StampsAttributionAndRecordsCounter(t *testing.T) {
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f := newChainIntegration(t)
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const account = "acc-1"
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const user = "user-bob"
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const group = "grp-engineers"
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const provider = "prov-1"
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// Seed a policy with token + budget caps; both halves carry
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// real ceilings so the request stays within headroom.
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require.NoError(t, f.store.SaveAgentNetworkPolicy(context.Background(),
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chainCapPolicy("pol-1", account, []string{group}, provider, 10_000, 86_400)))
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// ── Stage 1 — gate: pre-flight check ──────────────────────
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gateIn := chainInput(account, user, group, provider, []middleware.KV{
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{Key: middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID, Value: provider},
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{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
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})
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gateOut, err := f.gatecase.Invoke(context.Background(), gateIn)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, gateOut.Decision, "fresh policy must allow")
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// Verify attribution metadata was stamped — the recorder
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// depends on these keys.
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metaMap := map[string]string{}
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for _, kv := range gateOut.Metadata {
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metaMap[kv.Key] = kv.Value
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}
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assert.Equal(t, "pol-1", metaMap[middleware.KeyLLMSelectedPolicyID])
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assert.Equal(t, group, metaMap[middleware.KeyLLMAttributionGroupID])
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assert.Equal(t, "86400", metaMap[middleware.KeyLLMAttributionWindowS])
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// ── Stage 2 — recorder: post-flight write ─────────────────
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// Build the response-leg Input the framework would synthesise
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// for the recorder: gate's emitted attribution metadata + the
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// tokens / cost stamped by llm_response_parser + cost_meter.
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const tokensIn = int64(123)
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const tokensOut = int64(45)
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const costUSD = 0.0042
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recordIn := chainInput(account, user, group, provider, append([]middleware.KV{},
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gateOut.Metadata...))
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recordIn.Metadata = append(recordIn.Metadata,
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMInputTokens, Value: strconv.FormatInt(tokensIn, 10)},
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMOutputTokens, Value: strconv.FormatInt(tokensOut, 10)},
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyCostUSDTotal, Value: strconv.FormatFloat(costUSD, 'f', 6, 64)},
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)
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recordOut, err := f.recorder.Invoke(context.Background(), recordIn)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, recordOut.Decision, "recorder always allows; its only side effect is the counter write")
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// ── Stage 3 — assert state in sqlite ──────────────────────
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windowStart := agentNetworkTypes.WindowStart(time.Now(), 86_400)
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userRow, err := f.store.GetAgentNetworkConsumption(
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context.Background(), store.LockingStrengthNone, account,
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agentNetworkTypes.DimensionUser, user, int64(86_400), windowStart,
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)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, tokensIn, userRow.TokensInput, "user counter must hold the input tokens the recorder posted")
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assert.Equal(t, tokensOut, userRow.TokensOutput)
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assert.InDelta(t, costUSD, userRow.CostUSD, 1e-6)
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groupRow, err := f.store.GetAgentNetworkConsumption(
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context.Background(), store.LockingStrengthNone, account,
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agentNetworkTypes.DimensionGroup, group, int64(86_400), windowStart,
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)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, tokensIn, groupRow.TokensInput, "group counter mirrors the user counter — single Record posts both dims")
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}
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// TestChain_DenyPath_GateRejectsAndNoConsumptionWritten covers the
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// negative side: when the gate denies, the recorder is never
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// invoked (the proxy framework short-circuits on Decision=Deny).
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// We assert no consumption row materialises after the gate-deny
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// path, even though the test technically calls the recorder
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// afterwards — the recorder must skip on missing attribution
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// metadata so the framework's short-circuit isn't load-bearing for
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// data integrity.
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func TestChain_DenyPath_GateRejectsAndNoConsumptionWritten(t *testing.T) {
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f := newChainIntegration(t)
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const account = "acc-1"
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const user = "user-bob"
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const group = "grp-tight"
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const provider = "prov-1"
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policy := chainCapPolicy("pol-tight", account, []string{group}, provider, 100, 86_400)
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require.NoError(t, f.store.SaveAgentNetworkPolicy(context.Background(), policy))
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// Pre-burn the counter to the cap so the gate denies.
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require.NoError(t, f.store.IncrementAgentNetworkConsumption(
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context.Background(), account,
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agentNetworkTypes.DimensionGroup, group, int64(86_400),
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agentNetworkTypes.WindowStart(time.Now(), 86_400),
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100, 0, 0,
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))
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gateOut, err := f.gatecase.Invoke(context.Background(), chainInput(account, user, group, provider,
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[]middleware.KV{
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{Key: middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID, Value: provider},
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{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
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},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, gateOut.Decision, "policy at-cap must deny on the gate")
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require.NotNil(t, gateOut.DenyReason)
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assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.token_cap_exceeded", gateOut.DenyReason.Code)
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// On deny, the gate emits no attribution metadata. If the
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// proxy framework still invokes the recorder (defense in
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// depth), the recorder's "no attribution window = skip" guard
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// prevents a phantom counter increment.
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recordOut, err := f.recorder.Invoke(context.Background(), chainInput(account, user, group, provider,
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gateOut.Metadata, // no llm.attribution_window_seconds stamped
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, recordOut.Decision)
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// The pre-burned 100 tokens are the only counter movement —
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// the recorder must NOT have added a fresh row for the user
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// dimension on this denied request.
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windowStart := agentNetworkTypes.WindowStart(time.Now(), 86_400)
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userRow, err := f.store.GetAgentNetworkConsumption(
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context.Background(), store.LockingStrengthNone, account,
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agentNetworkTypes.DimensionUser, user, int64(86_400), windowStart,
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)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Zero(t, userRow.TokensInput, "user dimension must not gain tokens from a denied request — recorder skip is the safety net")
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}
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// TestChain_CapExhaustTransition exercises the allow→deny boundary
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// the operator cares most about: a request just under cap allows
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// AND records, the next request post-record at-cap denies. This is
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// the same lifecycle 50-grpc-allow-record-deny.sh runs in bash, but
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// against the actual middleware pair rather than the smoke binary
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// driving the gRPC RPCs directly.
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func TestChain_CapExhaustTransition(t *testing.T) {
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f := newChainIntegration(t)
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const account = "acc-1"
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const user = "user-alice"
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const group = "grp-cap-edge"
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const provider = "prov-1"
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const tightCap = int64(100)
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require.NoError(t, f.store.SaveAgentNetworkPolicy(context.Background(),
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chainCapPolicy("pol-edge", account, []string{group}, provider, tightCap, 86_400)))
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// Pre-burn 99 tokens so we're at the very edge.
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require.NoError(t, f.store.IncrementAgentNetworkConsumption(
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context.Background(), account,
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agentNetworkTypes.DimensionGroup, group, int64(86_400),
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agentNetworkTypes.WindowStart(time.Now(), 86_400),
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99, 0, 0,
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))
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// Gate at 99/100 — must allow (one token of headroom).
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gateOut, err := f.gatecase.Invoke(context.Background(), chainInput(account, user, group, provider,
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[]middleware.KV{
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{Key: middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID, Value: provider},
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{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
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},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, gateOut.Decision, "99/100 must allow — one token of headroom")
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// Record one more input token — pushes us to 100/100.
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recordIn := chainInput(account, user, group, provider, append([]middleware.KV{},
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gateOut.Metadata...))
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recordIn.Metadata = append(recordIn.Metadata,
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMInputTokens, Value: "1"},
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMOutputTokens, Value: "0"},
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyCostUSDTotal, Value: "0.000001"},
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)
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_, err = f.recorder.Invoke(context.Background(), recordIn)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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// Next gate call must deny — counter is exactly at cap.
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gateOut2, err := f.gatecase.Invoke(context.Background(), chainInput(account, user, group, provider,
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[]middleware.KV{
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{Key: middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID, Value: provider},
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{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
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},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, gateOut2.Decision,
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"once recorder pushed the group counter to 100/100, the next gate call must deny — allow→deny transition is the operator-visible product semantic")
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require.NotNil(t, gateOut2.DenyReason)
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assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.token_cap_exceeded", gateOut2.DenyReason.Code)
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}
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