Files
netbird/e2e/agentnetwork/guardrail_test.go
Claude 7d9f7d0d69 Match the Bedrock e2e inference profile to the configured region
The matrix hardcoded the us. cross-region inference profile while the
upstream host follows AWS_REGION, so any non-US region made Bedrock
reject every request with 'The provided model identifier is invalid' —
including the allowlisted call in TestModelAllowlistEnforced, which
asserts a 200. Derive the profile prefix (us/eu/apac/us-gov) from the
region, default the region to eu-central-1 to match the CI credentials,
and strip whichever prefix was chosen when building the guardrail
allowlist.
2026-07-21 11:26:37 +00:00

178 lines
6.7 KiB
Go

//go:build e2e
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
// catalogModel returns the normalized catalog id the proxy stamps for a
// path-routed provider's configured model — the form the guardrail allowlist is
// compared against (region prefix / @version stripped).
func catalogModel(pc providerCase) string {
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
// Strip whichever cross-region inference-profile prefix the matrix
// picked for the configured AWS region (us., eu., apac., us-gov.).
for _, p := range []string{"us-gov.", "apac.", "us.", "eu."} {
if strings.HasPrefix(pc.model, p) {
return strings.TrimPrefix(pc.model, p)
}
}
return pc.model
case harness.WireVertex:
return strings.SplitN(pc.model, "@", 2)[0]
default:
return pc.model
}
}
// disallowedModel returns a valid-shaped model id for the provider that is NOT
// the configured/allowed one, so the guardrail must reject it before the
// request ever reaches the upstream.
func disallowedModel(pc providerCase) string {
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
// Same profile prefix as the allowed model so only the model name
// differs; the guardrail must deny it before it reaches AWS.
return strings.SplitN(pc.model, ".", 2)[0] + ".anthropic.claude-opus-4-8"
case harness.WireVertex:
return "claude-opus-4-8@20250101"
default:
return "unlisted-model"
}
}
// sendModel drives one request for the given model through the provider's native
// wire shape and returns the HTTP status.
func sendModel(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, cl *harness.Client, endpoint, proxyIP string, pc providerCase, model string) int {
t.Helper()
var code int
var err error
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
code, _, err = cl.Bedrock(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
case harness.WireVertex:
code, _, err = cl.Vertex(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
default:
code, _, err = cl.Chat(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
}
require.NoError(t, err, "request must reach the proxy for %s", pc.name)
return code
}
// TestModelAllowlistEnforced provisions a Model Allowlist guardrail limiting each
// path-routed provider (Bedrock, Vertex) to its configured model, then drives
// requests over the tunnel: the allowed model returns 200 while a model outside
// the allowlist is denied 403 by the guardrail before it reaches the upstream.
// This is the coverage missing for #6751 — the model for these providers travels
// in the URL path, and the allowlist must be enforced there.
func TestModelAllowlistEnforced(t *testing.T) {
var providers []providerCase
for _, pc := range availableProviders() {
if pc.kind == harness.WireBedrock || pc.kind == harness.WireVertex {
providers = append(providers, pc)
}
}
if len(providers) == 0 {
t.Skip("no path-routed provider keys set (AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK / GOOGLE_VERTEX_*); source ~/.llm-keys")
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
grp, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-allowlist"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grp.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-allowlist-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grp.Id},
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
// Providers with their configured (allowed) models; the first bootstraps the cluster.
ids := make([]string, 0, len(providers))
allowed := make([]string, 0, len(providers))
for i, pc := range providers {
req := providerRequest(pc)
if i == 0 {
req.BootstrapCluster = ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster)
}
prov, perr := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, req)
require.NoError(t, perr, "create provider %s", pc.name)
id := prov.Id
ids = append(ids, id)
allowed = append(allowed, catalogModel(pc))
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), id) })
}
// Guardrail allowlisting exactly the configured models.
var gr api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest
gr.Name = "e2e-allowlist"
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled = true
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models = allowed
guard, err := srv.CreateGuardrail(ctx, gr)
require.NoError(t, err, "create guardrail")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteGuardrail(context.Background(), guard.Id) })
enabled := true
pol, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-allowlist",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grp.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: ids,
GuardrailIds: &[]string{guard.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), pol.Id) })
settings, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err, "read settings for endpoint")
require.NotEmpty(t, settings.Endpoint, "agent-network endpoint must be assigned")
proxyToken, err := srv.CreateProxyTokenCLI(ctx, "e2e-proxy-allowlist")
require.NoError(t, err, "mint proxy token via CLI")
px, err := harness.StartProxy(ctx, srv, proxyToken)
require.NoError(t, err, "start proxy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = px.Terminate(context.Background()) })
cl, err := harness.StartClient(ctx, srv, sk.Key)
require.NoError(t, err, "start client")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve agent-network endpoint to proxy IP")
for _, pc := range providers {
pc := pc
t.Run(pc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// The admin's allowlisted model is served end to end.
assert.Equal(t, 200, sendModel(ctx, t, cl, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc, pc.model),
"allowlisted model must be permitted for %s", pc.name)
// A model outside the allowlist is rejected by the guardrail (before
// the upstream), regardless of whether it is a real catalog model.
assert.Equal(t, 403, sendModel(ctx, t, cl, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc, disallowedModel(pc)),
"model outside the allowlist must be denied for %s", pc.name)
})
}
}