Files
netbird/client/server/mdm.go
T
riccardom 2a17bf0d55 [client] Compare service URLs as endpoints, not as strings
Three places in one request path each had their own notion of "same
management URL": the config layer compared the parsed URLs as strings, the
privileged-change gate compared scheme + host + effective port, and the MDM
conflict check compared strings after filling in the default port. Only the
middle one was right.

A string comparison answers the wrong question. "https://api.netbird.io",
"https://api.netbird.io/" and "https://API.netbird.io:443" are one endpoint
written three ways, so a client restating its own management URL with a
trailing slash — a normal way to write it — was still read as a client asking
to be repointed, and the update-settings gate refused it. The MDM check had
the same flaw against the enforced value.

profilemanager.SameServiceURL is now the single comparison: same scheme, same
host case-insensitively as DNS names are, same effective port. The config
layer, the privileged-change gate and the MDM conflict check all defer to it,
so there is one answer to "did this URL change?" instead of three.
2026-09-02 14:31:38 +02:00

391 lines
15 KiB
Go

package server
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/mdm"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
)
// preSharedKeyRedactedSentinel is the value GetConfig returns in place
// of an actual PSK, so a UI that round-trips the field back to the
// daemon (via SetConfig / Login) can be distinguished from a deliberate
// override. Any incoming PSK that equals this sentinel is treated as
// a no-op echo, never as a conflict with the policy.
const preSharedKeyRedactedSentinel = "**********"
// loadMDMPolicy is the indirection used by server handlers to read the
// active MDM policy. Tests override this to inject a fake policy.
var loadMDMPolicy = mdm.LoadPolicy
// conflictCheck is a value-aware comparison between a single field in
// the incoming request and the corresponding MDM-enforced value. It
// runs only when the field was actually set in the request (presence
// already filtered upstream); ok=true reports the policy value, ok=false
// means the policy is silent on the key — both are treated as conflicts
// to be safe (an MDM key declared as managed must hold a value).
type conflictCheck struct {
key string
check func(*mdm.Policy) (match bool)
}
// onMDMPolicyChange is invoked by the MDM reload ticker every time the
// OS-native managed-config store reports a diff vs the last observation.
//
// Restart sequence:
// 1. Cancel the active engine context (terminates connectWithRetryRuns).
// 2. Wait briefly for that goroutine to exit (giveUpChan is closed on exit).
// 3. Re-resolve Config from disk + MDM policy (Config.apply re-runs
// applyMDMPolicy with the freshly loaded Policy).
// 4. Spawn a fresh connectWithRetryRuns with the new context and config.
// 5. Broadcast a SystemEvent so any GUI / CLI subscriber (SubscribeEvents
// RPC) can refresh its cached config view without polling.
//
// The callback runs in the ticker's own goroutine. Ticker has already
// logged the per-key diff before invoking this hook.
func (s *Server) onMDMPolicyChange(_, _ *mdm.Policy) error {
log.Warn("MDM policy changed; restarting engine to apply new configuration")
// Hold s.mutex for the entire restart sequence (cancel + quiescence
// wait + re-spawn). Any concurrent Up/Down/Status arriving while
// MDM is restarting blocks on the Lock until we are done — they
// then observe the post-restart state coherently. This is safe
// because the connectWithRetryRuns goroutine no longer acquires
// s.mutex in its defer (intent vs. goroutine-alive concerns are
// fully separated; see the connectionGoroutineRunning helper).
s.mutex.Lock()
defer s.mutex.Unlock()
if !s.clientRunning {
// The client is not running, so there's no engine to restart.
return nil
}
if s.actCancel != nil {
s.actCancel()
}
// Wait for previous connectWithRetryRuns to exit so we don't end up
// with two goroutines fighting over the same status recorder + engine.
// The teardown engages a fan-out of engine goroutines (peer workers,
// signal handler, route manager, ...). close(clientGiveUpChan)
// happens in the function-scope defer of connectWithRetryRuns, on
// every exit path (ctx cancel, backoff exhausted, panic) — see the
// defer in server.go.
if s.clientGiveUpChan != nil {
select {
case <-s.clientGiveUpChan:
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
return fmt.Errorf("failed to restart the engine due to timeout")
}
}
if err := s.restartEngineForMDMLocked(); err != nil {
log.Errorf("MDM restart failed: %v", err)
return err
}
// publishConfigChangedEvent has already fired inside
// restartEngineForMDMLocked with source="mdm". Emit an MDM-specific
// user-visible toast so the operator knows their IT policy was
// applied (UserMessage != "" triggers the GUI notifier).
s.statusRecorder.PublishEvent(
proto.SystemEvent_INFO,
proto.SystemEvent_SYSTEM,
"MDM policy applied",
"NetBird configuration was updated by your IT policy.",
map[string]string{
proto.MetadataSourceKey: proto.MetadataSourceMDM,
proto.MetadataTypeKey: proto.MetadataTypePolicyApplied,
},
)
return nil
}
// publishConfigChangedEvent broadcasts a SystemEvent informing any active
// SubscribeEvents subscriber (typically the GUI tray) that the daemon's
// effective Config has been replaced and any cached client-side view
// should be refreshed. Callers pass a stable `source` label so the GUI
// can distinguish a startup spawn from a user-triggered Up or an
// MDM-driven restart. Reusing the SYSTEM category keeps the proto enum
// stable; metadata.type="config_changed" routes to the GUI's refresh
// handler. UserMessage is left empty so the system tray does not toast
// for every internal restart; the MDM path emits a separate
// "policy_applied" event (with UserMessage) for that purpose.
func (s *Server) publishConfigChangedEvent(source string) {
if s.statusRecorder == nil {
return
}
s.statusRecorder.PublishEvent(
proto.SystemEvent_INFO,
proto.SystemEvent_SYSTEM,
fmt.Sprintf("daemon config changed (source=%s)", source),
"",
map[string]string{
proto.MetadataSourceKey: source,
proto.MetadataTypeKey: proto.MetadataTypeConfigChanged,
},
)
}
// restartEngineForMDMLocked re-resolves the active profile config
// (re-running applyMDMPolicy via Config.apply) and re-spawns
// connectWithRetryRuns. Mirrors the tail of Server.Start so a runtime
// MDM change behaves identically to a fresh boot under the new policy.
//
// MUST be called with s.mutex held — onMDMPolicyChange holds the lock
// for the entire restart sequence (cancel + quiescence wait + re-spawn)
// so concurrent Up/Down/Status RPCs observe a coherent post-restart
// state.
func (s *Server) restartEngineForMDMLocked() error {
activeProf, err := s.profileManager.GetActiveProfileState()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("get active profile state: %w", err)
}
config, _, err := s.getConfig(activeProf)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("get active profile config: %w", err)
}
s.config = config
s.statusRecorder.UpdateManagementAddress(config.ManagementURL.String())
s.statusRecorder.UpdateRosenpass(config.RosenpassEnabled, config.RosenpassPermissive)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(s.rootCtx)
s.actCancel = cancel
s.clientRunning = true
s.clientRunningChan = make(chan struct{})
s.clientGiveUpChan = make(chan struct{})
log.Info("MDM restart: spawning connectWithRetryRuns with re-resolved config")
go s.connectWithRetryRuns(ctx, config, s.statusRecorder, s.clientRunningChan, s.clientGiveUpChan)
s.publishConfigChangedEvent(proto.MetadataSourceMDM)
return nil
}
// conflictBool builds a conflictCheck for a boolean MDM key. If p is nil
// the field is treated as matching (no override requested); otherwise the
// check returns true only when the policy contains the key and its
// boolean value equals *p.
func conflictBool(key string, p *bool) conflictCheck {
return conflictCheck{
key: key,
check: func(pol *mdm.Policy) bool {
if p == nil {
return true // absent → match by definition
}
want, ok := pol.GetBool(key)
return ok && want == *p
},
}
}
// conflictURL is conflictString for URL-typed keys: both sides are compared as
// endpoints (profilemanager.SameServiceURL), so an implicit default port, a
// trailing slash or a different host case is not read as a divergence from the
// policy. A value that does not parse as a URL falls back to string equality,
// which is the strictest thing left to do with it.
func conflictURL(key, got string) conflictCheck {
return conflictCheck{
key: key,
check: func(pol *mdm.Policy) bool {
if got == "" {
return true
}
want, ok := pol.GetString(key)
if !ok {
return false
}
wantURL, wantErr := profilemanager.ParseServiceURL(key, want)
gotURL, gotErr := profilemanager.ParseServiceURL(key, got)
if wantErr != nil || gotErr != nil {
return want == got
}
return profilemanager.SameServiceURL(wantURL, gotURL)
},
}
}
// conflictString builds a conflictCheck for a string MDM key. An empty
// `got` is treated as "field not set" (no override requested); otherwise
// the check returns true only when the policy contains the key and its
// value equals got.
func conflictString(key, got string) conflictCheck {
return conflictCheck{
key: key,
check: func(pol *mdm.Policy) bool {
if got == "" {
return true
}
want, ok := pol.GetString(key)
return ok && want == got
},
}
}
// conflictStringPtr is conflictString for optional proto fields, where an
// explicit empty value is still a request to change the setting. If p is
// nil the field is treated as matching (no override requested); otherwise
// the check returns true only when the policy contains the key and its
// value equals *p.
func conflictStringPtr(key string, p *string) conflictCheck {
return conflictCheck{
key: key,
check: func(pol *mdm.Policy) bool {
if p == nil {
return true
}
want, ok := pol.GetString(key)
return ok && want == *p
},
}
}
// conflictInt64 builds a conflictCheck for an integer MDM key. If p is
// nil the field is treated as matching; otherwise the check returns
// true only when the policy contains the key and its int value equals *p.
func conflictInt64(key string, p *int64) conflictCheck {
return conflictCheck{
key: key,
check: func(pol *mdm.Policy) bool {
if p == nil {
return true
}
want, ok := pol.GetInt(key)
return ok && want == *p
},
}
}
// resolveConflicts walks the per-field checks against the active MDM
// policy and returns the names of keys whose requested value diverges
// from the policy-enforced value. Keys not present in the policy are
// skipped silently (the gate fires only for keys the admin has
// actually pushed). Returns nil for an empty policy.
func resolveConflicts(policy *mdm.Policy, checks []conflictCheck) []string {
if policy.IsEmpty() {
return nil
}
var conflicts []string
for _, c := range checks {
if !policy.HasKey(c.key) {
continue
}
if !c.check(policy) {
conflicts = append(conflicts, c.key)
}
}
return conflicts
}
// mdmManagedFieldConflicts returns the names of MDM-managed keys whose
// requested value in the SetConfigRequest differs from the MDM-enforced
// value. A field set to the same value the policy already enforces is
// treated as a no-op echo (the GUI tray sends a full Config snapshot on
// every toggle, so most fields in a typical request match the policy
// exactly and must NOT be flagged as conflicts). The redacted PSK
// sentinel ("**********") returned by GetConfig is recognised and
// treated as no-op so the UI can safely round-trip it.
func mdmManagedFieldConflicts(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) []string {
if msg == nil {
return nil
}
// PSK round-trip echo: collapse the sentinel to empty so the
// shared check treats it as "field not set".
pskGot := ""
if msg.OptionalPreSharedKey != nil && *msg.OptionalPreSharedKey != preSharedKeyRedactedSentinel {
pskGot = *msg.OptionalPreSharedKey
}
return resolveConflicts(policy, []conflictCheck{
conflictURL(mdm.KeyManagementURL, msg.ManagementUrl),
conflictString(mdm.KeyPreSharedKey, pskGot),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled, msg.RosenpassEnabled),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect, msg.DisableAutoConnect),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, msg.ServerSSHAllowed),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyRemoteJobsAllowed, msg.RemoteJobsAllowed),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, msg.DisableClientRoutes),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, msg.DisableServerRoutes),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, msg.BlockInbound),
conflictInt64(mdm.KeyWireguardPort, msg.WireguardPort),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyEnableLocalMetrics, msg.EnableLocalMetrics),
conflictStringPtr(mdm.KeyLocalMetricsAddress, msg.LocalMetricsAddress),
})
}
// loginRequestMDMConflicts mirrors mdmManagedFieldConflicts but for the
// LoginRequest surface. Same value-aware semantics: a field set to the
// MDM-enforced value is a no-op echo, not a conflict; only a divergent
// value is flagged. PSK has two proto fields — PreSharedKey (deprecated)
// and OptionalPreSharedKey (current); either route trips the gate if it
// diverges from the MDM-enforced PSK. OptionalPreSharedKey wins when
// both are set; the redaction sentinel ("**********") is accepted as
// a no-op echo.
func loginRequestMDMConflicts(msg *proto.LoginRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) []string {
if msg == nil {
return nil
}
// Collapse the two PSK fields + the redaction sentinel down to a
// single "got" string the shared check can compare against the
// policy: OptionalPreSharedKey wins if set; PreSharedKey (deprecated)
// is the fallback; sentinel echo is treated as "field not set".
pskGot := ""
if msg.OptionalPreSharedKey != nil {
pskGot = *msg.OptionalPreSharedKey
} else if msg.PreSharedKey != "" { //nolint:staticcheck // SA1019: legacy proto field still accepted by Login
pskGot = msg.PreSharedKey //nolint:staticcheck // SA1019
}
if pskGot == preSharedKeyRedactedSentinel {
pskGot = ""
}
return resolveConflicts(policy, []conflictCheck{
conflictURL(mdm.KeyManagementURL, msg.ManagementUrl),
conflictString(mdm.KeyPreSharedKey, pskGot),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled, msg.RosenpassEnabled),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect, msg.DisableAutoConnect),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, msg.ServerSSHAllowed),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyRemoteJobsAllowed, msg.RemoteJobsAllowed),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, msg.DisableClientRoutes),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, msg.DisableServerRoutes),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, msg.BlockInbound),
conflictInt64(mdm.KeyWireguardPort, msg.WireguardPort),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyEnableLocalMetrics, msg.EnableLocalMetrics),
conflictStringPtr(mdm.KeyLocalMetricsAddress, msg.LocalMetricsAddress),
})
}
// rejectMDMManagedFieldConflicts returns a FailedPrecondition gRPC error
// with an MDMManagedFieldsViolation detail when any of the requested
// fields tries to change an MDM-enforced value to something else, and
// nil otherwise. The whole request is rejected on any conflict; non-
// conflicting fields in the same request are not applied either (no
// partial apply).
func rejectMDMManagedFieldConflicts(conflicts []string) error {
if len(conflicts) == 0 {
return nil
}
log.Warnf("MDM rejected request: tried to modify %d managed key(s): %v",
len(conflicts), conflicts)
st := gstatus.New(
codes.FailedPrecondition,
fmt.Sprintf("fields managed by MDM cannot be modified: %v", conflicts),
)
detailed, err := st.WithDetails(&proto.MDMManagedFieldsViolation{Fields: conflicts})
if err != nil {
// Detail attachment is best-effort; fall back to the plain status
// so the caller still gets a usable FailedPrecondition.
return st.Err()
}
return detailed.Err()
}