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https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird.git
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7aebdd69dd
Adds a new "private" service mode for the reverse proxy: services reachable exclusively over the embedded WireGuard tunnel, gated by per-peer group membership instead of operator auth schemes. Wire contract - ProxyMapping.private (field 13): the proxy MUST call ValidateTunnelPeer and fail closed; operator schemes are bypassed. - ProxyCapabilities.private (4) + supports_private_service (5): capability gate. Management never streams private mappings to proxies that don't claim the capability; the broadcast path applies the same filter via filterMappingsForProxy. - ValidateTunnelPeer RPC: resolves an inbound tunnel IP to a peer, checks the peer's groups against service.AccessGroups, and mints a session JWT on success. checkPeerGroupAccess fails closed when a private service has empty AccessGroups. - ValidateSession/ValidateTunnelPeer responses now carry peer_group_ids + peer_group_names so the proxy can authorise policy-aware middlewares without an extra management round-trip. - ProxyInboundListener + SendStatusUpdate.inbound_listener: per-account inbound listener state surfaced to dashboards. - PathTargetOptions.direct_upstream (11): bypass the embedded NetBird client and dial the target via the proxy host's network stack for upstreams reachable without WireGuard. Data model - Service.Private (bool) + Service.AccessGroups ([]string, JSON- serialised). Validate() rejects bearer auth on private services. Copy() deep-copies AccessGroups. pgx getServices loads the columns. - DomainConfig.Private threaded into the proxy auth middleware. Request handler routes private services through forwardWithTunnelPeer and returns 403 on validation failure. - Account-level SynthesizePrivateServiceZones (synthetic DNS) and injectPrivateServicePolicies (synthetic ACL) gate on len(svc.AccessGroups) > 0. Proxy - /netbird proxy --private (embedded mode) flag; Config.Private in proxy/lifecycle.go. - Per-account inbound listener (proxy/inbound.go) binding HTTP/HTTPS on the embedded NetBird client's WireGuard tunnel netstack. - proxy/internal/auth/tunnel_cache: ValidateTunnelPeer response cache with single-flight de-duplication and per-account eviction. - Local peerstore short-circuit: when the inbound IP isn't in the account roster, deny fast without an RPC. - proxy/server.go reports SupportsPrivateService=true and redacts the full ProxyMapping JSON from info logs (auth_token + header-auth hashed values now only at debug level). Identity forwarding - ValidateSessionJWT returns user_id, email, method, groups, group_names. sessionkey.Claims carries Email + Groups + GroupNames so the proxy can stamp identity onto upstream requests without an extra management round-trip on every cookie-bearing request. - CapturedData carries userEmail / userGroups / userGroupNames; the proxy stamps X-NetBird-User and X-NetBird-Groups on r.Out from the authenticated identity (strips client-supplied values first to prevent spoofing). - AccessLog.UserGroups: access-log enrichment captures the user's group memberships at write time so the dashboard can render group context without reverse-resolving stale memberships. OpenAPI/dashboard surface - ReverseProxyService gains private + access_groups; ReverseProxyCluster gains private + supports_private. ReverseProxyTarget target_type enum gains "cluster". ServiceTargetOptions gains direct_upstream. ProxyAccessLog gains user_groups.
73 lines
2.3 KiB
Go
73 lines
2.3 KiB
Go
package rest
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"net/url"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
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)
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// ReverseProxyTokensAPI exposes the account-scoped proxy access tokens that
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// self-hosted (bring-your-own-proxy) deployments use to register a
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// `netbird proxy` instance with management. Tokens are bound to the
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// calling account; revoking a token disconnects every proxy that
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// authenticated with it.
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type ReverseProxyTokensAPI struct {
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c *Client
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}
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// List returns every proxy token the calling account has minted, including
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// already-revoked entries. The plain token is never returned — only the
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// metadata (id, name, created_at, last_used, revoked).
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func (a *ReverseProxyTokensAPI) List(ctx context.Context) ([]api.ProxyToken, error) {
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resp, err := a.c.NewRequest(ctx, "GET", "/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens", nil, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if resp.Body != nil {
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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}
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ret, err := parseResponse[[]api.ProxyToken](resp)
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return ret, err
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}
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// Create mints a fresh account-scoped proxy token. The returned
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// ProxyTokenCreated.PlainToken is shown only once — callers must persist
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// it immediately. Subsequent reads will only expose the token metadata,
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// not the secret material.
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func (a *ReverseProxyTokensAPI) Create(ctx context.Context, request api.ProxyTokenRequest) (*api.ProxyTokenCreated, error) {
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requestBytes, err := json.Marshal(request)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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resp, err := a.c.NewRequest(ctx, "POST", "/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens", bytes.NewReader(requestBytes), nil)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if resp.Body != nil {
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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}
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ret, err := parseResponse[api.ProxyTokenCreated](resp)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return &ret, nil
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}
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// Delete revokes a previously-issued proxy token by ID. Revoked tokens
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// remain in List output (with revoked=true) so operators can audit which
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// credentials existed; the plain secret can no longer authenticate any
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// new proxy registration.
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func (a *ReverseProxyTokensAPI) Delete(ctx context.Context, tokenID string) error {
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resp, err := a.c.NewRequest(ctx, "DELETE", "/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens/"+url.PathEscape(tokenID), nil, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if resp.Body != nil {
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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}
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return nil
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}
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