mirror of
https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird.git
synced 2026-10-27 14:59:09 +01:00
* Bound the SSH session request queue by bytes and stop resizes reaching a loop with no consumer * Give the window change drain loop a body * Avoid an empty case clause in the SSH request filter * Charge only the newest resize to the request queue and classify requests before the byte limit
187 lines
7.8 KiB
Go
187 lines
7.8 KiB
Go
package server
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"testing"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/gliderlabs/ssh"
|
|
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
|
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
|
cryptossh "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// A malformed window-change arriving after a valid one must not cost the valid resize:
|
|
// the valid request stays queued for the PTY, and only the malformed one is refused.
|
|
func TestRequestFilter_MalformedWinchKeepsQueuedValidResize(t *testing.T) {
|
|
f := &requestFilter{}
|
|
require.True(t, f.enqueue(&cryptossh.Request{Type: "shell"}))
|
|
|
|
valid := &cryptossh.Request{Type: "window-change", Payload: cryptossh.Marshal(struct{ Columns, Rows, Width, Height uint32 }{100, 40, 0, 0})}
|
|
require.True(t, f.enqueue(valid))
|
|
|
|
malformed := &cryptossh.Request{Type: "window-change", Payload: []byte{1, 2, 3}}
|
|
require.True(t, f.enqueue(malformed))
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "window-change", valid.Type, "valid resize must still reach the PTY handler")
|
|
assert.Equal(t, refusedRequestType, malformed.Type, "malformed resize must be refused")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A zero-row or zero-column resize parses but would size the PTY to nothing, so it must
|
|
// not displace a valid queued resize either.
|
|
func TestRequestFilter_ZeroSizeWinchKeepsQueuedValidResize(t *testing.T) {
|
|
f := &requestFilter{}
|
|
require.True(t, f.enqueue(&cryptossh.Request{Type: "shell"}))
|
|
|
|
valid := &cryptossh.Request{Type: "window-change", Payload: cryptossh.Marshal(struct{ Columns, Rows, Width, Height uint32 }{100, 40, 0, 0})}
|
|
require.True(t, f.enqueue(valid))
|
|
|
|
zeroRows := &cryptossh.Request{Type: "window-change", Payload: cryptossh.Marshal(struct{ Columns, Rows, Width, Height uint32 }{100, 0, 0, 0})}
|
|
require.True(t, f.enqueue(zeroRows))
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "window-change", valid.Type, "valid resize must still reach the PTY handler")
|
|
assert.Equal(t, refusedRequestType, zeroRows.Type, "zero-row resize must be refused")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The initial pty-req size must fit both the Unix uint16 winsize and the Windows int16
|
|
// ConPty coordinate, so larger values are refused instead of wrapping. Zero stays
|
|
// accepted because the Unix path defaults it to 80x24.
|
|
func TestValidPtyReqPayload_BoundsInitialSize(t *testing.T) {
|
|
ptyReq := func(columns, rows uint32) []byte {
|
|
return cryptossh.Marshal(struct {
|
|
Term string
|
|
Columns, Rows, Width, Height uint32
|
|
Modes string
|
|
}{"xterm", columns, rows, 0, 0, ""})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert.True(t, validPtyReqPayload(ptyReq(80, 24)), "ordinary size")
|
|
assert.True(t, validPtyReqPayload(ptyReq(0, 0)), "zero size is defaulted later")
|
|
assert.True(t, validPtyReqPayload(ptyReq(32767, 32767)), "largest size both platforms take")
|
|
assert.False(t, validPtyReqPayload(ptyReq(32768, 24)), "columns past the Windows int16 range")
|
|
assert.False(t, validPtyReqPayload(ptyReq(80, 32768)), "rows past the Windows int16 range")
|
|
assert.False(t, validPtyReqPayload(ptyReq(65536, 24)), "columns that wrap to zero as uint16")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Sizes that are zero or do not fit the PTY's uint16 dimensions are refused, so they
|
|
// cannot replace a valid queued resize.
|
|
func TestValidWinchPayload_RejectsUnusableSizes(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
columns, rows uint32
|
|
}{
|
|
{name: "zero columns", columns: 0, rows: 40},
|
|
{name: "zero rows", columns: 100, rows: 0},
|
|
{name: "columns wrap to zero as uint16", columns: 65536, rows: 40},
|
|
{name: "rows wrap to zero as uint16", columns: 100, rows: 65536},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, tc := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
payload := cryptossh.Marshal(struct{ Columns, Rows, Width, Height uint32 }{tc.columns, tc.rows, 0, 0})
|
|
assert.False(t, validWinchPayload(payload))
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
assert.True(t, validWinchPayload(cryptossh.Marshal(struct{ Columns, Rows, Width, Height uint32 }{65535, 65535, 0, 0})), "largest uint16 size is usable")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A client that stops the loop from reading must not make the server buffer more than
|
|
// maxQueuedBytes of payload, however few requests that takes.
|
|
func TestRequestFilter_QueueIsBoundedByBytes(t *testing.T) {
|
|
f := &requestFilter{}
|
|
payload := make([]byte, 32*1024)
|
|
|
|
accepted := 0
|
|
for f.enqueue(&cryptossh.Request{Type: "exec", Payload: payload}) {
|
|
accepted++
|
|
require.LessOrEqual(t, accepted, maxQueuedRequests, "queue must stop growing")
|
|
}
|
|
assert.LessOrEqual(t, f.queuedBytes, maxQueuedBytes, "queued payload bytes must stay under the limit")
|
|
assert.Equal(t, maxQueuedBytes/len(payload), accepted, "queue must hold payloads up to the byte limit")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Request types the session loop only answers with a failure carry no useful payload, so
|
|
// they are refused and cost nothing against the queue.
|
|
func TestRequestFilter_UnhandledTypesDropPayload(t *testing.T) {
|
|
f := &requestFilter{}
|
|
req := &cryptossh.Request{Type: "x11-req", Payload: make([]byte, 32*1024)}
|
|
require.True(t, f.enqueue(req))
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, refusedRequestType, req.Type, "unhandled type must be refused")
|
|
assert.Zero(t, f.queuedBytes, "refused request must not count its payload")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Nothing drains window changes for a subsystem session, so a resize after one must be
|
|
// refused for the rest of the session, even if a shell request follows.
|
|
func TestRequestFilter_SubsystemSessionRefusesResize(t *testing.T) {
|
|
f := &requestFilter{}
|
|
winch := cryptossh.Marshal(struct{ Columns, Rows, Width, Height uint32 }{100, 40, 0, 0})
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, f.enqueue(&cryptossh.Request{Type: "subsystem", Payload: cryptossh.Marshal(struct{ Name string }{"sftp"})}))
|
|
require.True(t, f.enqueue(&cryptossh.Request{Type: "shell"}))
|
|
resize := &cryptossh.Request{Type: "window-change", Payload: winch}
|
|
require.True(t, f.enqueue(resize))
|
|
assert.Equal(t, refusedRequestType, resize.Type, "resize in a subsystem session must be refused")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A loop blocked sending a resize that no handler reads is released by the drain, and the
|
|
// drain ends when the loop closes the channel.
|
|
func TestDrainWindowChanges_ReleasesBlockedSender(t *testing.T) {
|
|
winCh := make(chan ssh.Window, 1)
|
|
winCh <- ssh.Window{Width: 80, Height: 24}
|
|
|
|
sent := make(chan struct{})
|
|
go func() {
|
|
winCh <- ssh.Window{Width: 100, Height: 40}
|
|
close(sent)
|
|
}()
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-sent:
|
|
t.Fatal("sender should block while nothing reads the channel")
|
|
case <-time.After(50 * time.Millisecond):
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
drainWindowChanges(winCh)
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-sent:
|
|
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
|
|
t.Fatal("drain did not release the blocked sender")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A drain that read one window change and exited would release the first sender but
|
|
// leave the loop blocked on the next resize.
|
|
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
|
|
select {
|
|
case winCh <- ssh.Window{Width: 120, Height: 48}:
|
|
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
|
|
t.Fatal("drain stopped consuming after the first window change")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
close(winCh)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A superseded resize keeps its place in the queue so its refusal is answered in order,
|
|
// but must stop counting against the byte limit.
|
|
func TestRequestFilter_CoalescedResizeReleasesQueuedBytes(t *testing.T) {
|
|
f := &requestFilter{}
|
|
require.True(t, f.enqueue(&cryptossh.Request{Type: "shell"}))
|
|
winch := cryptossh.Marshal(struct{ Columns, Rows, Width, Height uint32 }{100, 40, 0, 0})
|
|
|
|
for i := 0; i < 50; i++ {
|
|
require.True(t, f.enqueue(&cryptossh.Request{Type: "window-change", Payload: winch}))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, len(winch), f.queuedBytes, "only the newest resize should be charged")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A large request the loop ignores is refused and its payload dropped, so it cannot close
|
|
// the channel by pushing the queue over the byte limit.
|
|
func TestRequestFilter_IgnoredLargeRequestDoesNotCloseChannel(t *testing.T) {
|
|
f := &requestFilter{}
|
|
for i := 0; i < maxQueuedBytes/len(make([]byte, 32*1024)); i++ {
|
|
require.True(t, f.enqueue(&cryptossh.Request{Type: "exec", Payload: make([]byte, 32*1024)}))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ignored := &cryptossh.Request{Type: "x11-req", Payload: make([]byte, 200*1024)}
|
|
assert.True(t, f.enqueue(ignored), "an ignored request must be refused rather than close the channel")
|
|
assert.Equal(t, refusedRequestType, ignored.Type)
|
|
}
|