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https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird.git
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Adds a new "private" service mode for the reverse proxy: services reachable exclusively over the embedded WireGuard tunnel, gated by per-peer group membership instead of operator auth schemes. Wire contract - ProxyMapping.private (field 13): the proxy MUST call ValidateTunnelPeer and fail closed; operator schemes are bypassed. - ProxyCapabilities.private (4) + supports_private_service (5): capability gate. Management never streams private mappings to proxies that don't claim the capability; the broadcast path applies the same filter via filterMappingsForProxy. - ValidateTunnelPeer RPC: resolves an inbound tunnel IP to a peer, checks the peer's groups against service.AccessGroups, and mints a session JWT on success. checkPeerGroupAccess fails closed when a private service has empty AccessGroups. - ValidateSession/ValidateTunnelPeer responses now carry peer_group_ids + peer_group_names so the proxy can authorise policy-aware middlewares without an extra management round-trip. - ProxyInboundListener + SendStatusUpdate.inbound_listener: per-account inbound listener state surfaced to dashboards. - PathTargetOptions.direct_upstream (11): bypass the embedded NetBird client and dial the target via the proxy host's network stack for upstreams reachable without WireGuard. Data model - Service.Private (bool) + Service.AccessGroups ([]string, JSON- serialised). Validate() rejects bearer auth on private services. Copy() deep-copies AccessGroups. pgx getServices loads the columns. - DomainConfig.Private threaded into the proxy auth middleware. Request handler routes private services through forwardWithTunnelPeer and returns 403 on validation failure. - Account-level SynthesizePrivateServiceZones (synthetic DNS) and injectPrivateServicePolicies (synthetic ACL) gate on len(svc.AccessGroups) > 0. Proxy - /netbird proxy --private (embedded mode) flag; Config.Private in proxy/lifecycle.go. - Per-account inbound listener (proxy/inbound.go) binding HTTP/HTTPS on the embedded NetBird client's WireGuard tunnel netstack. - proxy/internal/auth/tunnel_cache: ValidateTunnelPeer response cache with single-flight de-duplication and per-account eviction. - Local peerstore short-circuit: when the inbound IP isn't in the account roster, deny fast without an RPC. - proxy/server.go reports SupportsPrivateService=true and redacts the full ProxyMapping JSON from info logs (auth_token + header-auth hashed values now only at debug level). Identity forwarding - ValidateSessionJWT returns user_id, email, method, groups, group_names. sessionkey.Claims carries Email + Groups + GroupNames so the proxy can stamp identity onto upstream requests without an extra management round-trip on every cookie-bearing request. - CapturedData carries userEmail / userGroups / userGroupNames; the proxy stamps X-NetBird-User and X-NetBird-Groups on r.Out from the authenticated identity (strips client-supplied values first to prevent spoofing). - AccessLog.UserGroups: access-log enrichment captures the user's group memberships at write time so the dashboard can render group context without reverse-resolving stale memberships. OpenAPI/dashboard surface - ReverseProxyService gains private + access_groups; ReverseProxyCluster gains private + supports_private. ReverseProxyTarget target_type enum gains "cluster". ServiceTargetOptions gains direct_upstream. ProxyAccessLog gains user_groups.
196 lines
5.4 KiB
Go
196 lines
5.4 KiB
Go
package tcp
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import (
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"bytes"
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"encoding/binary"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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)
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const (
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// TLS record header is 5 bytes: ContentType(1) + Version(2) + Length(2).
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tlsRecordHeaderLen = 5
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// TLS handshake type for ClientHello.
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handshakeTypeClientHello = 1
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// TLS ContentType for handshake messages.
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contentTypeHandshake = 22
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// SNI extension type (RFC 6066).
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extensionServerName = 0
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// SNI host name type.
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sniHostNameType = 0
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// maxClientHelloLen caps the ClientHello size we're willing to buffer.
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maxClientHelloLen = 16384
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// maxSNILen is the maximum valid DNS hostname length per RFC 1035.
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maxSNILen = 253
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)
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// PeekClientHello reads the TLS ClientHello from conn, extracts the SNI
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// server name, and returns a wrapped connection that replays the peeked
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// bytes transparently. If the data is not a valid TLS ClientHello or
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// contains no SNI extension, sni is empty and err is nil.
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//
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// isTLS reports whether the first byte indicated a TLS handshake record.
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// Callers can use this to distinguish plain (non-TLS) traffic from a TLS
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// stream that simply lacked an SNI extension or used ECH.
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//
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// ECH/ESNI: When the client uses Encrypted Client Hello (TLS 1.3), the
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// real server name is encrypted inside the encrypted_client_hello
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// extension. This parser only reads the cleartext server_name extension
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// (type 0x0000), so ECH connections return sni="" and are routed through
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// the fallback path (or HTTP channel), which is the correct behavior
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// for a transparent proxy that does not terminate TLS.
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func PeekClientHello(conn net.Conn) (sni string, wrapped net.Conn, isTLS bool, err error) {
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// Read the 5-byte TLS record header into a small stack-friendly buffer.
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var header [tlsRecordHeaderLen]byte
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, header[:]); err != nil {
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return "", nil, false, fmt.Errorf("read TLS record header: %w", err)
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}
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if header[0] != contentTypeHandshake {
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return "", newPeekedConn(conn, header[:]), false, nil
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}
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recordLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(header[3:5]))
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if recordLen == 0 || recordLen > maxClientHelloLen {
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return "", newPeekedConn(conn, header[:]), true, nil
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}
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// Single allocation for header + payload. The peekedConn takes
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// ownership of this buffer, so no further copies are needed.
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buf := make([]byte, tlsRecordHeaderLen+recordLen)
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copy(buf, header[:])
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n, err := io.ReadFull(conn, buf[tlsRecordHeaderLen:])
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if err != nil {
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return "", newPeekedConn(conn, buf[:tlsRecordHeaderLen+n]), true, fmt.Errorf("read TLS handshake payload: %w", err)
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}
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sni = extractSNI(buf[tlsRecordHeaderLen:])
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return sni, newPeekedConn(conn, buf), true, nil
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}
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// extractSNI parses a TLS handshake payload to find the SNI extension.
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// Returns empty string if the payload is not a ClientHello or has no SNI.
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func extractSNI(payload []byte) string {
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if len(payload) < 4 {
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return ""
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}
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if payload[0] != handshakeTypeClientHello {
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return ""
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}
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// Handshake length (3 bytes, big-endian).
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handshakeLen := int(payload[1])<<16 | int(payload[2])<<8 | int(payload[3])
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if handshakeLen > len(payload)-4 {
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return ""
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}
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return parseSNIFromClientHello(payload[4 : 4+handshakeLen])
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}
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// parseSNIFromClientHello walks the ClientHello message fields to reach
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// the extensions block and extract the server_name extension value.
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func parseSNIFromClientHello(msg []byte) string {
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// ClientHello layout:
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// ProtocolVersion(2) + Random(32) = 34 bytes minimum before session_id
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if len(msg) < 34 {
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return ""
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}
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pos := 34
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// Session ID (variable, 1 byte length prefix).
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if pos >= len(msg) {
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return ""
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}
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sessionIDLen := int(msg[pos])
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pos++
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pos += sessionIDLen
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// Cipher suites (variable, 2 byte length prefix).
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if pos+2 > len(msg) {
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return ""
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}
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cipherSuitesLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(msg[pos : pos+2]))
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pos += 2 + cipherSuitesLen
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// Compression methods (variable, 1 byte length prefix).
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if pos >= len(msg) {
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return ""
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}
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compMethodsLen := int(msg[pos])
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pos++
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pos += compMethodsLen
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// Extensions (variable, 2 byte length prefix).
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if pos+2 > len(msg) {
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return ""
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}
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extensionsLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(msg[pos : pos+2]))
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pos += 2
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extensionsEnd := pos + extensionsLen
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if extensionsEnd > len(msg) {
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return ""
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}
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return findSNIExtension(msg[pos:extensionsEnd])
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}
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// findSNIExtension iterates over TLS extensions and returns the host
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// name from the server_name extension, if present.
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func findSNIExtension(extensions []byte) string {
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pos := 0
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for pos+4 <= len(extensions) {
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extType := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(extensions[pos : pos+2])
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extLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(extensions[pos+2 : pos+4]))
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pos += 4
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if pos+extLen > len(extensions) {
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return ""
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}
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if extType == extensionServerName {
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return parseSNIExtensionData(extensions[pos : pos+extLen])
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}
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pos += extLen
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}
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return ""
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}
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// parseSNIExtensionData parses the ServerNameList structure inside an
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// SNI extension to extract the host name.
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func parseSNIExtensionData(data []byte) string {
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if len(data) < 2 {
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return ""
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}
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listLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[0:2]))
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if listLen > len(data)-2 {
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return ""
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}
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list := data[2 : 2+listLen]
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pos := 0
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for pos+3 <= len(list) {
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nameType := list[pos]
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nameLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(list[pos+1 : pos+3]))
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pos += 3
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if pos+nameLen > len(list) {
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return ""
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}
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if nameType == sniHostNameType {
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name := list[pos : pos+nameLen]
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if nameLen > maxSNILen || bytes.ContainsRune(name, 0) {
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return ""
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}
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return string(name)
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}
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pos += nameLen
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}
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return ""
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}
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