Files
netbird/proxy/internal/tcp/router.go
mlsmaycon 167ee08e14 feat(private-service): expose NetBird-only services over tunnel peers
Adds a new "private" service mode for the reverse proxy: services
reachable exclusively over the embedded WireGuard tunnel, gated by
per-peer group membership instead of operator auth schemes.

Wire contract
- ProxyMapping.private (field 13): the proxy MUST call
  ValidateTunnelPeer and fail closed; operator schemes are bypassed.
- ProxyCapabilities.private (4) + supports_private_service (5):
  capability gate. Management never streams private mappings to
  proxies that don't claim the capability; the broadcast path applies
  the same filter via filterMappingsForProxy.
- ValidateTunnelPeer RPC: resolves an inbound tunnel IP to a peer,
  checks the peer's groups against service.AccessGroups, and mints
  a session JWT on success. checkPeerGroupAccess fails closed when
  a private service has empty AccessGroups.
- ValidateSession/ValidateTunnelPeer responses now carry
  peer_group_ids + peer_group_names so the proxy can authorise
  policy-aware middlewares without an extra management round-trip.
- ProxyInboundListener + SendStatusUpdate.inbound_listener: per-account
  inbound listener state surfaced to dashboards.
- PathTargetOptions.direct_upstream (11): bypass the embedded NetBird
  client and dial the target via the proxy host's network stack for
  upstreams reachable without WireGuard.

Data model
- Service.Private (bool) + Service.AccessGroups ([]string, JSON-
  serialised). Validate() rejects bearer auth on private services.
  Copy() deep-copies AccessGroups. pgx getServices loads the columns.
- DomainConfig.Private threaded into the proxy auth middleware.
  Request handler routes private services through forwardWithTunnelPeer
  and returns 403 on validation failure.
- Account-level SynthesizePrivateServiceZones (synthetic DNS) and
  injectPrivateServicePolicies (synthetic ACL) gate on
  len(svc.AccessGroups) > 0.

Proxy
- /netbird proxy --private (embedded mode) flag; Config.Private in
  proxy/lifecycle.go.
- Per-account inbound listener (proxy/inbound.go) binding HTTP/HTTPS
  on the embedded NetBird client's WireGuard tunnel netstack.
- proxy/internal/auth/tunnel_cache: ValidateTunnelPeer response cache
  with single-flight de-duplication and per-account eviction.
- Local peerstore short-circuit: when the inbound IP isn't in the
  account roster, deny fast without an RPC.
- proxy/server.go reports SupportsPrivateService=true and redacts the
  full ProxyMapping JSON from info logs (auth_token + header-auth
  hashed values now only at debug level).

Identity forwarding
- ValidateSessionJWT returns user_id, email, method, groups,
  group_names. sessionkey.Claims carries Email + Groups + GroupNames
  so the proxy can stamp identity onto upstream requests without an
  extra management round-trip on every cookie-bearing request.
- CapturedData carries userEmail / userGroups / userGroupNames; the
  proxy stamps X-NetBird-User and X-NetBird-Groups on r.Out from the
  authenticated identity (strips client-supplied values first to
  prevent spoofing).
- AccessLog.UserGroups: access-log enrichment captures the user's
  group memberships at write time so the dashboard can render group
  context without reverse-resolving stale memberships.

OpenAPI/dashboard surface
- ReverseProxyService gains private + access_groups; ReverseProxyCluster
  gains private + supports_private. ReverseProxyTarget target_type
  enum gains "cluster". ServiceTargetOptions gains direct_upstream.
  ProxyAccessLog gains user_groups.
2026-05-20 22:46:18 +02:00

748 lines
22 KiB
Go

package tcp
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/accesslog"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/restrict"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util/netrelay"
)
// defaultDialTimeout is the fallback dial timeout when no per-route
// timeout is configured.
const defaultDialTimeout = 30 * time.Second
// errAccessRestricted is returned by relayTCP for access restriction
// denials so callers can skip warn-level logging (already logged at debug).
var errAccessRestricted = errors.New("rejected by access restrictions")
// SNIHost is a typed key for SNI hostname lookups.
type SNIHost string
// RouteType specifies how a connection should be handled.
type RouteType int
const (
// RouteHTTP routes the connection through the HTTP reverse proxy.
RouteHTTP RouteType = iota
// RouteTCP relays the connection directly to the backend (TLS passthrough).
RouteTCP
)
const (
// sniPeekTimeout is the deadline for reading the TLS ClientHello.
sniPeekTimeout = 5 * time.Second
// DefaultDrainTimeout is the default grace period for in-flight relay
// connections to finish during shutdown.
DefaultDrainTimeout = 30 * time.Second
// DefaultMaxRelayConns is the default cap on concurrent TCP relay connections per router.
DefaultMaxRelayConns = 4096
// httpChannelBuffer is the capacity of the channel feeding HTTP connections.
httpChannelBuffer = 4096
)
// DialResolver returns a DialContextFunc for the given account.
type DialResolver func(accountID types.AccountID) (types.DialContextFunc, error)
// Route describes where a connection for a given SNI should be sent.
type Route struct {
Type RouteType
AccountID types.AccountID
ServiceID types.ServiceID
// Domain is the service's configured domain, used for access log entries.
Domain string
// Protocol is the frontend protocol (tcp, tls), used for access log entries.
Protocol accesslog.Protocol
// Target is the backend address for TCP relay (e.g. "10.0.0.5:5432").
Target string
// ProxyProtocol enables sending a PROXY protocol v2 header to the backend.
ProxyProtocol bool
// DialTimeout overrides the default dial timeout for this route.
// Zero uses defaultDialTimeout.
DialTimeout time.Duration
// SessionIdleTimeout overrides the default idle timeout for relay connections.
// Zero uses DefaultIdleTimeout.
SessionIdleTimeout time.Duration
// Filter holds connection-level IP/geo restrictions. Nil means no restrictions.
Filter *restrict.Filter
}
// l4Logger sends layer-4 access log entries to the management server.
type l4Logger interface {
LogL4(entry accesslog.L4Entry)
}
// RelayObserver receives callbacks for TCP relay lifecycle events.
// All methods must be safe for concurrent use.
type RelayObserver interface {
TCPRelayStarted(accountID types.AccountID)
TCPRelayEnded(accountID types.AccountID, duration time.Duration, srcToDst, dstToSrc int64)
TCPRelayDialError(accountID types.AccountID)
TCPRelayRejected(accountID types.AccountID)
}
// Router accepts raw TCP connections on a shared listener, peeks at
// the TLS ClientHello to extract the SNI, and routes the connection
// to either the HTTP reverse proxy or a direct TCP relay.
type Router struct {
logger *log.Logger
// httpCh is immutable after construction: set only in NewRouter, nil in NewPortRouter.
httpCh chan net.Conn
httpListener *chanListener
// httpPlainCh feeds non-TLS HTTP connections to a parallel http.Server.
// Set only when NewRouter is called with WithPlainHTTP option (used by
// per-account inbound listeners that accept both :80 and :443 traffic).
// Nil for the host SNI router and for port routers.
httpPlainCh chan net.Conn
httpPlainListener *chanListener
mu sync.RWMutex
routes map[SNIHost][]Route
fallback *Route
draining bool
dialResolve DialResolver
activeConns sync.WaitGroup
activeRelays sync.WaitGroup
relaySem chan struct{}
drainDone chan struct{}
observer RelayObserver
accessLog l4Logger
geo restrict.GeoResolver
// svcCtxs tracks a context per service ID. All relay goroutines for a
// service derive from its context; canceling it kills them immediately.
svcCtxs map[types.ServiceID]context.Context
svcCancels map[types.ServiceID]context.CancelFunc
}
// RouterOption customises Router construction.
type RouterOption func(*Router)
// WithPlainHTTP enables a parallel plain-HTTP channel on the router. When
// set, connections whose first byte is not a TLS handshake are forwarded
// to the plain channel returned by HTTPListenerPlain instead of the TLS
// channel. Used by per-account inbound listeners that share both :80 and
// :443 traffic on the same router.
func WithPlainHTTP(addr net.Addr) RouterOption {
return func(r *Router) {
ch := make(chan net.Conn, httpChannelBuffer)
r.httpPlainCh = ch
r.httpPlainListener = newChanListener(ch, addr)
}
}
// NewRouter creates a new SNI-based connection router.
func NewRouter(logger *log.Logger, dialResolve DialResolver, addr net.Addr, opts ...RouterOption) *Router {
httpCh := make(chan net.Conn, httpChannelBuffer)
r := &Router{
logger: logger,
httpCh: httpCh,
httpListener: newChanListener(httpCh, addr),
routes: make(map[SNIHost][]Route),
dialResolve: dialResolve,
relaySem: make(chan struct{}, DefaultMaxRelayConns),
svcCtxs: make(map[types.ServiceID]context.Context),
svcCancels: make(map[types.ServiceID]context.CancelFunc),
}
for _, opt := range opts {
opt(r)
}
return r
}
// NewPortRouter creates a Router for a dedicated port without an HTTP
// channel. Connections that don't match any SNI route fall through to
// the fallback relay (if set) or are closed.
func NewPortRouter(logger *log.Logger, dialResolve DialResolver) *Router {
return &Router{
logger: logger,
routes: make(map[SNIHost][]Route),
dialResolve: dialResolve,
relaySem: make(chan struct{}, DefaultMaxRelayConns),
svcCtxs: make(map[types.ServiceID]context.Context),
svcCancels: make(map[types.ServiceID]context.CancelFunc),
}
}
// HTTPListener returns a net.Listener that yields connections routed
// to the HTTP handler. Use this with http.Server.ServeTLS.
func (r *Router) HTTPListener() net.Listener {
return r.httpListener
}
// HTTPListenerPlain returns a net.Listener yielding non-TLS connections
// for use with a parallel plain http.Server. Returns nil when the router
// was not constructed with WithPlainHTTP.
func (r *Router) HTTPListenerPlain() net.Listener {
if r.httpPlainListener == nil {
return nil
}
return r.httpPlainListener
}
// AddRoute registers an SNI route. Multiple routes for the same host are
// stored and resolved by priority at lookup time (HTTP > TCP).
// Empty host is ignored to prevent conflicts with ECH/ESNI fallback.
func (r *Router) AddRoute(host SNIHost, route Route) {
host = SNIHost(strings.ToLower(string(host)))
if host == "" {
return
}
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
routes := r.routes[host]
for i, existing := range routes {
if existing.ServiceID == route.ServiceID {
r.cancelServiceLocked(route.ServiceID)
routes[i] = route
return
}
}
r.routes[host] = append(routes, route)
}
// RemoveRoute removes the route for the given host and service ID.
// Active relay connections for the service are closed immediately.
// If other routes remain for the host, they are preserved.
func (r *Router) RemoveRoute(host SNIHost, svcID types.ServiceID) {
host = SNIHost(strings.ToLower(string(host)))
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
r.routes[host] = slices.DeleteFunc(r.routes[host], func(route Route) bool {
return route.ServiceID == svcID
})
if len(r.routes[host]) == 0 {
delete(r.routes, host)
}
r.cancelServiceLocked(svcID)
}
// SetFallback registers a catch-all route for connections that don't
// match any SNI route. On a port router this handles plain TCP relay;
// on the main router it takes priority over the HTTP channel.
func (r *Router) SetFallback(route Route) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
r.fallback = &route
}
// RemoveFallback clears the catch-all fallback route and closes any
// active relay connections for the given service.
func (r *Router) RemoveFallback(svcID types.ServiceID) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
r.fallback = nil
r.cancelServiceLocked(svcID)
}
// SetObserver sets the relay lifecycle observer. Must be called before Serve.
func (r *Router) SetObserver(obs RelayObserver) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
r.observer = obs
}
// SetAccessLogger sets the L4 access logger. Must be called before Serve.
func (r *Router) SetAccessLogger(l l4Logger) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
r.accessLog = l
}
// getObserver returns the current relay observer under the read lock.
func (r *Router) getObserver() RelayObserver {
r.mu.RLock()
defer r.mu.RUnlock()
return r.observer
}
// IsEmpty returns true when the router has no SNI routes and no fallback.
func (r *Router) IsEmpty() bool {
r.mu.RLock()
defer r.mu.RUnlock()
return len(r.routes) == 0 && r.fallback == nil
}
// Serve accepts connections from ln and routes them based on SNI.
// It blocks until ctx is canceled or ln is closed, then drains
// active relay connections up to DefaultDrainTimeout.
func (r *Router) Serve(ctx context.Context, ln net.Listener) error {
done := make(chan struct{})
defer close(done)
go func() {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
_ = ln.Close()
if r.httpListener != nil {
r.httpListener.Close()
}
if r.httpPlainListener != nil {
r.httpPlainListener.Close()
}
case <-done:
}
}()
for {
conn, err := ln.Accept()
if err != nil {
if ctx.Err() != nil || errors.Is(err, net.ErrClosed) {
if ok := r.Drain(DefaultDrainTimeout); !ok {
r.logger.Warn("timed out waiting for connections to drain")
}
return nil
}
r.logger.Debugf("SNI router accept: %v", err)
continue
}
r.logger.Debugf("SNI router accepted conn from %s on %s", conn.RemoteAddr(), conn.LocalAddr())
r.activeConns.Add(1)
go func() {
defer r.activeConns.Done()
r.handleConn(ctx, conn)
}()
}
}
// HandleConn lets external accept loops feed a connection through the
// router's peek-and-dispatch logic. Use this when the same router serves
// a secondary listener (for example, a per-account inbound :80 socket
// alongside its :443 socket).
func (r *Router) HandleConn(ctx context.Context, conn net.Conn) {
r.activeConns.Add(1)
defer r.activeConns.Done()
r.handleConn(ctx, conn)
}
// handleConn peeks at the TLS ClientHello and routes the connection.
func (r *Router) handleConn(ctx context.Context, conn net.Conn) {
// Fast path: when no SNI routes and no HTTP channel exist (pure TCP
// fallback port), skip the TLS peek entirely to avoid read errors on
// non-TLS connections and reduce latency.
if r.isFallbackOnly() {
r.logger.Debugf("SNI router fallback-only mode for conn from %s; skipping ClientHello peek", conn.RemoteAddr())
r.handleUnmatched(ctx, conn, false)
return
}
if err := conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(sniPeekTimeout)); err != nil {
r.logger.Debugf("set SNI peek deadline: %v", err)
_ = conn.Close()
return
}
sni, wrapped, isTLS, err := PeekClientHello(conn)
if err != nil {
r.logger.Debugf("SNI peek failed for conn from %s: %v", conn.RemoteAddr(), err)
if wrapped != nil {
r.handleUnmatched(ctx, wrapped, isTLS)
} else {
_ = conn.Close()
}
return
}
if err := wrapped.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}); err != nil {
r.logger.Debugf("clear SNI peek deadline: %v", err)
_ = wrapped.Close()
return
}
host := SNIHost(strings.ToLower(sni))
route, ok := r.lookupRoute(host)
r.logger.WithFields(log.Fields{
"remote": wrapped.RemoteAddr().String(),
"sni": string(host),
"match": ok,
"tls": isTLS,
}).Debug("SNI route lookup")
if !ok {
r.handleUnmatched(ctx, wrapped, isTLS)
return
}
if route.Type == RouteHTTP {
r.logger.Debugf("SNI %q routed to HTTP handler (service_id=%s)", host, route.ServiceID)
r.sendToHTTP(wrapped, isTLS)
return
}
if err := r.relayTCP(ctx, wrapped, host, route); err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, errAccessRestricted) {
r.logger.WithFields(log.Fields{
"sni": host,
"service_id": route.ServiceID,
"target": route.Target,
}).Warnf("TCP relay: %v", err)
}
_ = wrapped.Close()
}
}
// isFallbackOnly returns true when the router has no SNI routes and no HTTP
// channel, meaning all connections should go directly to the fallback relay.
func (r *Router) isFallbackOnly() bool {
r.mu.RLock()
defer r.mu.RUnlock()
return len(r.routes) == 0 && r.httpCh == nil
}
// handleUnmatched routes a connection that didn't match any SNI route.
// This includes ECH/ESNI connections where the cleartext SNI is empty,
// and plain (non-TLS) HTTP connections when isTLS is false.
// It tries the fallback relay first, then the HTTP channel, and closes
// the connection if neither is available.
func (r *Router) handleUnmatched(ctx context.Context, conn net.Conn, isTLS bool) {
r.mu.RLock()
fb := r.fallback
r.mu.RUnlock()
if fb != nil {
r.logger.Debugf("unmatched conn from %s relayed to TCP fallback (service_id=%s, target=%s)", conn.RemoteAddr(), fb.ServiceID, fb.Target)
if err := r.relayTCP(ctx, conn, SNIHost("fallback"), *fb); err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, errAccessRestricted) {
r.logger.WithFields(log.Fields{
"service_id": fb.ServiceID,
"target": fb.Target,
}).Warnf("TCP relay (fallback): %v", err)
}
_ = conn.Close()
}
return
}
r.logger.Debugf("unmatched conn from %s sent to HTTP channel (no TCP fallback configured)", conn.RemoteAddr())
r.sendToHTTP(conn, isTLS)
}
// lookupRoute returns the highest-priority route for the given SNI host.
// HTTP routes take precedence over TCP routes.
func (r *Router) lookupRoute(host SNIHost) (Route, bool) {
r.mu.RLock()
defer r.mu.RUnlock()
routes, ok := r.routes[host]
if !ok || len(routes) == 0 {
return Route{}, false
}
best := routes[0]
for _, route := range routes[1:] {
if route.Type < best.Type {
best = route
}
}
return best, true
}
// sendToHTTP feeds the connection to the HTTP handler via the channel.
// When isTLS is false and a plain channel is configured the connection
// is forwarded to the plain channel; otherwise it lands on the TLS
// channel. If no usable channel exists, the router is draining, or the
// channel is full, the connection is closed.
func (r *Router) sendToHTTP(conn net.Conn, isTLS bool) {
ch := r.httpCh
chanName := "HTTP"
if !isTLS && r.httpPlainCh != nil {
ch = r.httpPlainCh
chanName = "HTTP-plain"
}
if ch == nil {
r.logger.Debugf("%s channel nil; dropping conn from %s", chanName, conn.RemoteAddr())
_ = conn.Close()
return
}
r.mu.RLock()
draining := r.draining
r.mu.RUnlock()
if draining {
r.logger.Debugf("router draining; dropping conn from %s", conn.RemoteAddr())
_ = conn.Close()
return
}
select {
case ch <- conn:
default:
r.logger.Warnf("%s channel full, dropping connection from %s", chanName, conn.RemoteAddr())
_ = conn.Close()
}
}
// Drain prevents new relay connections from starting and waits for all
// in-flight connection handlers and active relays to finish, up to the
// given timeout. Returns true if all completed, false on timeout.
func (r *Router) Drain(timeout time.Duration) bool {
r.mu.Lock()
r.draining = true
if r.drainDone == nil {
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
r.activeConns.Wait()
r.activeRelays.Wait()
close(done)
}()
r.drainDone = done
}
done := r.drainDone
r.mu.Unlock()
select {
case <-done:
return true
case <-time.After(timeout):
return false
}
}
// cancelServiceLocked cancels and removes the context for the given service,
// closing all its active relay connections. Must be called with mu held.
func (r *Router) cancelServiceLocked(svcID types.ServiceID) {
if cancel, ok := r.svcCancels[svcID]; ok {
cancel()
delete(r.svcCtxs, svcID)
delete(r.svcCancels, svcID)
}
}
// SetGeo sets the geolocation lookup used for country-based restrictions.
func (r *Router) SetGeo(geo restrict.GeoResolver) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
r.geo = geo
}
// checkRestrictions evaluates the route's access filter against the
// connection's remote address. Returns Allow if the connection is
// permitted, or a deny verdict indicating the reason.
func (r *Router) checkRestrictions(conn net.Conn, route Route) restrict.Verdict {
if route.Filter == nil {
return restrict.Allow
}
addr, err := addrFromConn(conn)
if err != nil {
r.logger.Debugf("cannot parse client address %s for restriction check, denying", conn.RemoteAddr())
return restrict.DenyCIDR
}
r.mu.RLock()
geo := r.geo
r.mu.RUnlock()
return route.Filter.Check(addr, geo)
}
// relayTCP sets up and runs a bidirectional TCP relay.
// The caller owns conn and must close it if this method returns an error.
// On success (nil error), both conn and backend are closed by the relay.
func (r *Router) relayTCP(ctx context.Context, conn net.Conn, sni SNIHost, route Route) error {
if verdict := r.checkRestrictions(conn, route); verdict != restrict.Allow {
if route.Filter != nil && route.Filter.IsObserveOnly(verdict) {
r.logger.Debugf("CrowdSec observe: would block %s for %s (%s)", conn.RemoteAddr(), sni, verdict)
r.logL4Deny(route, conn, verdict, true)
} else {
r.logger.Debugf("connection from %s rejected by access restrictions: %s", conn.RemoteAddr(), verdict)
r.logL4Deny(route, conn, verdict, false)
return errAccessRestricted
}
}
svcCtx, err := r.acquireRelay(ctx, route)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer func() {
<-r.relaySem
r.activeRelays.Done()
}()
backend, err := r.dialBackend(svcCtx, route)
if err != nil {
obs := r.getObserver()
if obs != nil {
obs.TCPRelayDialError(route.AccountID)
}
return err
}
if route.ProxyProtocol {
if err := writeProxyProtoV2(conn, backend); err != nil {
_ = backend.Close()
return fmt.Errorf("write PROXY protocol header: %w", err)
}
}
obs := r.getObserver()
if obs != nil {
obs.TCPRelayStarted(route.AccountID)
}
entry := r.logger.WithFields(log.Fields{
"sni": sni,
"service_id": route.ServiceID,
"target": route.Target,
})
entry.Debug("TCP relay started")
idleTimeout := route.SessionIdleTimeout
if idleTimeout <= 0 {
idleTimeout = netrelay.DefaultIdleTimeout
}
start := time.Now()
s2d, d2s := netrelay.Relay(svcCtx, conn, backend, netrelay.Options{
IdleTimeout: idleTimeout,
Logger: entry,
})
elapsed := time.Since(start)
if obs != nil {
obs.TCPRelayEnded(route.AccountID, elapsed, s2d, d2s)
}
entry.Debugf("TCP relay ended (client→backend: %d bytes, backend→client: %d bytes)", s2d, d2s)
r.logL4Entry(route, conn, elapsed, s2d, d2s)
return nil
}
// acquireRelay checks draining state, increments activeRelays, and acquires
// a semaphore slot. Returns the per-service context on success.
// The caller must release the semaphore and call activeRelays.Done() when done.
func (r *Router) acquireRelay(ctx context.Context, route Route) (context.Context, error) {
r.mu.Lock()
if r.draining {
r.mu.Unlock()
return nil, errors.New("router is draining")
}
r.activeRelays.Add(1)
svcCtx := r.getOrCreateServiceCtxLocked(ctx, route.ServiceID)
r.mu.Unlock()
select {
case r.relaySem <- struct{}{}:
return svcCtx, nil
default:
r.activeRelays.Done()
obs := r.getObserver()
if obs != nil {
obs.TCPRelayRejected(route.AccountID)
}
return nil, errors.New("TCP relay connection limit reached")
}
}
// dialBackend resolves the dialer for the route's account and dials the backend.
func (r *Router) dialBackend(svcCtx context.Context, route Route) (net.Conn, error) {
dialFn, err := r.dialResolve(route.AccountID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolve dialer: %w", err)
}
dialTimeout := route.DialTimeout
if dialTimeout <= 0 {
dialTimeout = defaultDialTimeout
}
dialCtx, dialCancel := context.WithTimeout(svcCtx, dialTimeout)
backend, err := dialFn(dialCtx, "tcp", route.Target)
dialCancel()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dial backend %s: %w", route.Target, err)
}
return backend, nil
}
// logL4Entry sends a TCP relay access log entry if an access logger is configured.
func (r *Router) logL4Entry(route Route, conn net.Conn, duration time.Duration, bytesUp, bytesDown int64) {
r.mu.RLock()
al := r.accessLog
r.mu.RUnlock()
if al == nil {
return
}
sourceIP, _ := addrFromConn(conn)
al.LogL4(accesslog.L4Entry{
AccountID: route.AccountID,
ServiceID: route.ServiceID,
Protocol: route.Protocol,
Host: route.Domain,
SourceIP: sourceIP,
DurationMs: duration.Milliseconds(),
BytesUpload: bytesUp,
BytesDownload: bytesDown,
})
}
// logL4Deny sends an access log entry for a denied connection.
func (r *Router) logL4Deny(route Route, conn net.Conn, verdict restrict.Verdict, observeOnly bool) {
r.mu.RLock()
al := r.accessLog
r.mu.RUnlock()
if al == nil {
return
}
sourceIP, _ := addrFromConn(conn)
entry := accesslog.L4Entry{
AccountID: route.AccountID,
ServiceID: route.ServiceID,
Protocol: route.Protocol,
Host: route.Domain,
SourceIP: sourceIP,
DenyReason: verdict.String(),
}
if verdict.IsCrowdSec() {
entry.Metadata = map[string]string{"crowdsec_verdict": verdict.String()}
if observeOnly {
entry.Metadata["crowdsec_mode"] = "observe"
entry.DenyReason = ""
}
}
al.LogL4(entry)
}
// getOrCreateServiceCtxLocked returns the context for a service, creating one
// if it doesn't exist yet. The context is a child of the server context.
// Must be called with mu held.
func (r *Router) getOrCreateServiceCtxLocked(parent context.Context, svcID types.ServiceID) context.Context {
if ctx, ok := r.svcCtxs[svcID]; ok {
return ctx
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(parent)
r.svcCtxs[svcID] = ctx
r.svcCancels[svcID] = cancel
return ctx
}
// addrFromConn extracts a netip.Addr from a connection's remote address.
func addrFromConn(conn net.Conn) (netip.Addr, error) {
remote := conn.RemoteAddr()
if remote == nil {
return netip.Addr{}, errors.New("no remote address")
}
ap, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(remote.String())
if err != nil {
return netip.Addr{}, err
}
return ap.Addr().Unmap(), nil
}