Files
netbird/client/internal/auth/device_flow.go
T
Zoltan Papp 515a01dd11 [client] Force interactive login when extending the auth session (#7216)
* [client] Force interactive login when extending the auth session

A session extend must be answered from the account the peer is registered
under. With a silent PKCE flow (DisablePromptLogin or max_age=0) the IdP
answers from whatever session it already holds, which need not be the
peer's account when several are signed in; the token then fails the
user match in ExtendAuthSession with no way to pick another account.

Mark the PKCE flow request as a session extend so the management server
can force prompt=login for it, overriding the configured silent flow.

* [client] Reduce cognitive complexity of Server.Login

Login sat at cognitive complexity 27, over the 25 the linter allows.

Extract the interactive SSO branch into startSSOLogin, and split the
nested in-flight-flow reuse check out of it into reuseOAuthFlow, which
flattens the original if/else into early returns: it returns the cached
auth info when the previous flow targets the same client and still has
more than 90s left, otherwise cancels the stale wait and returns nil so
the caller requests a fresh flow.

The helpers take the contextState through a small statusSetter
interface, since internal.contextState is unexported and re-deriving it
with CtxGetState inside the helper would resolve against callerCtx
rather than rootCtx.

No behavior change: same ordering of state transitions, same mutex scope
around the oauthAuthFlow write, same error paths. Login is now at 21.

* [client] Respect DisablePromptLogin when extending the auth session

Forcing prompt=login on a session extend overrode DisablePromptLogin, which
is set for IdPs that break on it: Authentik triggers a double authentication
and social logins fail outright. Overriding it there trades a recoverable
extend for a login that cannot complete at all.

Keep the LoginFlag override, which only replaces max_age=0 or none with
prompt=login so the IdP honours login_hint, and leave DisablePromptLogin as
configured. Those deployments keep the silent flow, and with several accounts
signed in an extend answered from the wrong one still fails the user match.

* [client] Guard the shared OAuth flow state with the server mutex

reuseOAuthFlow read flow, expiresAt, waitCancel and info without holding
s.mutex, while startSSOLogin and WaitSSOLogin write them under it. Reading the
fields one at a time could also answer with auth info from a flow that was
already replaced, or cancel a wait that no longer belongs to the flow just
judged stale. Take one snapshot under the lock and decide from it.

WaitSSOLogin read oauthAuthFlow.flow twice outside the lock; both now use a
value snapshotted in the critical section that already installs actCancel.

Its stale waitCancel was read and called in a separate section from the one
installing the new one, so two racing calls could read the same predecessor and
leave one wait uncancelled. Swap the two in a single critical section. Both
cancels run after unlocking: the displaced wait takes s.mutex as it unwinds.

* [client] Verify the SSO login came back for the hinted account

login_hint is a suggestion the IdP may ignore: with a silent flow configured
(DisablePromptLogin or max_age=0) and a live IdP session for another account,
the login completes with that account's token. On a registered peer the
management server rejects it as a user mismatch, but on a fresh profile the
peer silently registers under the wrong account and the profile is then bound
to it — every later login follows the stored hint straight back.

After the token exchange, compare the ID token's email against the hint the
flow was sent with. On a mismatch, do not log in to management with the token;
run one more round asking the IdP to re-decide the account (prompt=login, via
ForceAccountPrompt — DisablePromptLogin still wins there). If the prompted
round also comes back different, proceed with a warning: the address may
legitimately have changed, and refusing forever would lock the user out of the
profile while the management server still rejects a token that does not own
the peer. A token or profile with no email to compare is not judged.

The retry differs per platform because of who opens the browser:

- CLI (netbird login foreground) and Android run the whole flow in one
  process, so the mismatch retries automatically: the browser reopens with
  the account prompt within the same login attempt.
- On desktop the login is split between the daemon and the GUI: Login hands
  the authorize URL to the GUI, WaitSSOLogin blocks for the token, and only
  the GUI can open a browser. A new URL cannot be handed out from inside
  WaitSSOLogin (its response has no field for one, kept that way to avoid a
  proto change), so the daemon arms forceAccountPrompt, fails the round with
  "connect again to choose the account", and builds the next Login's flow
  with the prompt — the user's next connect is the retry.

The flag and the flow annotations live in daemon memory only; SwitchProfile
drops them so the previous profile's hint cannot judge the next profile's
token. The device code flow has no prompt parameter (RFC 8628), so a prompted
round there runs as-is and a repeated mismatch is let through with the
warning rather than looping.

* [client] Address review comments on PKCE session extend flow

Fail the PKCE authorization flow test on request error instead of
continuing into a nil dereference, and make the godoc comments on the
touched exported symbols identifier-leading full sentences.

* [client] Match accounts only on the email claim of the ID token

The name-claim fallback in the ID token parsing is kept for the login
hint and display, but account matching now only considers a value that
came from the email claim, so a token without one no longer produces a
false account mismatch.

* [client] Drop the pending session extend on a profile switch

The profile-switch cleanup dropped the pending login flow and the
account-prompt flag, but left extendAuthSessionFlow untouched. Its device
code was issued by the previous profile's IdP client, so a
WaitExtendAuthSession still parked on the browser leg would submit the
resulting token against the new profile's engine.

* [client] Judge the SSO account against the flow that produced the token

WaitSSOLogin snapshotted the flow on entry but re-read the info, hint and
accountPrompted from the live s.oauthAuthFlow afterwards, in separate
critical sections. WaitToken blocks for the whole browser leg, so a
concurrent Login or RequestJWTAuth could replace the flow meanwhile and
the mismatch check would compare this wait's token against another flow's
account: either arming the prompt spuriously or letting a wrong-account
token through against an unrelated profile's hint. Take all of it in the
entry snapshot.

* [client] Keep the forced account prompt from being lost to flow reuse

startSSOLogin consumed forceAccountPrompt and applied the prompt to the
freshly built flow, but reuseOAuthFlow could then answer from a cached
flow for the same client — one built without prompt=login, e.g. by
RequestJWTAuth. The user got the same silent authorization URL that
produced the mismatch, with the flag already spent, so no later round
asked either. Rule reuse out when the prompt is forced, while still
cancelling the predecessor's wait.

RequestJWTAuth also wrote the flow fields one by one, leaving the previous
login's hint and accountPrompted behind for WaitSSOLogin to judge a later
token against. Both sites now replace the whole record.

* [client] Consume the forced account prompt after the retry

forceAccountPrompt was never cleared, so a flow that outlived the retry it
was armed for kept sending prompt=login on every later authorization
request and re-authenticated the user each time. RequestAuthInfo now takes
the flag as it builds the request.

* [client] Cancel the caller context in the SSO login tests

WaitSSOLogin parks a goroutine on the caller's context for the whole
browser leg. The tests passed context.Background(), which never cancels,
so each left one goroutine behind for the lifetime of the test binary.

* [client] Cancel the wait displaced by an OAuth flow replacement

Replacing the shared record with a whole struct value dropped the previous
flow's waitCancel, so an SSO browser wait still parked on it lost its
cancel: nothing could preempt it, and it could go on to run attemptLogin
or mutate the record behind the new flow. Both replacement sites now take
the displaced cancel over in the same critical section, via a shared
replaceOAuthFlow, and invoke it after the unlock.

* [client] Guard OAuth flow mutations by the flow that owns the wait

* [client] Arm the account prompt only from the wait that owns the flow

* [client] Adopt the three-value parseEmailFromIDToken in the device flow

The main merge brought in the device flow's email extraction from #7193,
which still used the two-value signature this branch replaced when account
matching was narrowed to the email claim. Git merged the files without a
textual conflict, so the branch stopped compiling.

Take the fromEmailClaim result and fill EmailClaim from it, the same way the
PKCE path does, so device-flow clients get the same account matching.

* [client] Populate the pending extend flow in the test server helper

SwitchProfile cancels and clears the pending session extend flow
unconditionally, the same way it clears the SSH JWT cache. New always
populates the field, but the hand-assembled test server did not, so
TestSwitchProfile_ClearsJWTCache panicked on a nil PendingFlow.
2026-10-08 15:40:39 +02:00

325 lines
10 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util/embeddedroots"
)
// HostedGrantType grant type for device flow on Hosted
const (
HostedGrantType = "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code"
)
var _ OAuthFlow = &DeviceAuthorizationFlow{}
// DeviceAuthProviderConfig has all attributes needed to initiate a device authorization flow
type DeviceAuthProviderConfig struct {
// ClientID An IDP application client id
ClientID string
// ClientSecret An IDP application client secret
ClientSecret string
// Domain An IDP API domain
// Deprecated. Use OIDCConfigEndpoint instead
Domain string
// Audience An Audience for to authorization validation
Audience string
// TokenEndpoint is the endpoint of an IDP manager where clients can obtain access token
TokenEndpoint string
// DeviceAuthEndpoint is the endpoint of an IDP manager where clients can obtain device authorization code
DeviceAuthEndpoint string
// Scopes provides the scopes to be included in the token request
Scope string
// UseIDToken indicates if the id token should be used for authentication
UseIDToken bool
// LoginHint is used to pre-fill the email/username field during authentication
LoginHint string
}
// validateDeviceAuthConfig validates device authorization provider configuration
func validateDeviceAuthConfig(config *DeviceAuthProviderConfig) error {
errorMsgFormat := "invalid provider configuration received from management: %s value is empty. Contact your NetBird administrator"
if config.Audience == "" {
return fmt.Errorf(errorMsgFormat, "Audience")
}
if config.ClientID == "" {
return fmt.Errorf(errorMsgFormat, "Client ID")
}
if config.TokenEndpoint == "" {
return fmt.Errorf(errorMsgFormat, "Token Endpoint")
}
if config.DeviceAuthEndpoint == "" {
return fmt.Errorf(errorMsgFormat, "Device Auth Endpoint")
}
if config.Scope == "" {
return fmt.Errorf(errorMsgFormat, "Device Auth Scopes")
}
return nil
}
// DeviceAuthorizationFlow implements the OAuthFlow interface,
// for the Device Authorization Flow.
type DeviceAuthorizationFlow struct {
providerConfig DeviceAuthProviderConfig
HTTPClient HTTPClient
}
// RequestDeviceCodePayload used for request device code payload for auth0
type RequestDeviceCodePayload struct {
Audience string `json:"audience"`
ClientID string `json:"client_id"`
Scope string `json:"scope"`
}
// TokenRequestPayload used for requesting the auth0 token
type TokenRequestPayload struct {
GrantType string `json:"grant_type"`
DeviceCode string `json:"device_code,omitempty"`
ClientID string `json:"client_id"`
RefreshToken string `json:"refresh_token,omitempty"`
}
// TokenRequestResponse used for parsing Hosted token's response
type TokenRequestResponse struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
ErrorDescription string `json:"error_description"`
TokenInfo
}
// NewDeviceAuthorizationFlow returns device authorization flow client
func NewDeviceAuthorizationFlow(config DeviceAuthProviderConfig) (*DeviceAuthorizationFlow, error) {
httpTransport := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()
httpTransport.MaxIdleConns = 5
certPool, err := x509.SystemCertPool()
if err != nil || certPool == nil {
log.Debugf("System cert pool not available; falling back to embedded cert, error: %v", err)
certPool = embeddedroots.Get()
} else {
log.Debug("Using system certificate pool.")
}
httpTransport.TLSClientConfig = &tls.Config{
RootCAs: certPool,
}
httpClient := &http.Client{
Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
Transport: httpTransport,
}
return &DeviceAuthorizationFlow{
providerConfig: config,
HTTPClient: httpClient,
}, nil
}
// GetClientID returns the provider client id
func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) GetClientID(ctx context.Context) string {
return d.providerConfig.ClientID
}
// SetLoginHint sets the login hint for the device authorization flow
func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) SetLoginHint(hint string) {
d.providerConfig.LoginHint = hint
}
// RequestAuthInfo requests a device code login flow information from Hosted
func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) RequestAuthInfo(ctx context.Context) (AuthFlowInfo, error) {
form := url.Values{}
form.Add("client_id", d.providerConfig.ClientID)
form.Add("audience", d.providerConfig.Audience)
form.Add("scope", d.providerConfig.Scope)
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", d.providerConfig.DeviceAuthEndpoint,
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
if err != nil {
return AuthFlowInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("creating request failed with error: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Add("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
res, err := d.HTTPClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return AuthFlowInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("doing request failed with error: %v", err)
}
defer res.Body.Close()
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
if err != nil {
return AuthFlowInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("reading body failed with error: %v", err)
}
if res.StatusCode != 200 {
return AuthFlowInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("request device code returned status %d error: %s", res.StatusCode, string(body))
}
deviceCode := AuthFlowInfo{}
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &deviceCode)
if err != nil {
return AuthFlowInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("unmarshaling response failed with error: %v", err)
}
// Fallback to the verification_uri if the IdP doesn't support verification_uri_complete
if deviceCode.VerificationURIComplete == "" {
deviceCode.VerificationURIComplete = deviceCode.VerificationURI
}
if d.providerConfig.LoginHint != "" {
deviceCode.VerificationURIComplete = appendLoginHint(deviceCode.VerificationURIComplete, d.providerConfig.LoginHint)
if deviceCode.VerificationURI != "" {
deviceCode.VerificationURI = appendLoginHint(deviceCode.VerificationURI, d.providerConfig.LoginHint)
}
}
return deviceCode, err
}
func appendLoginHint(uri, loginHint string) string {
if uri == "" || loginHint == "" {
return uri
}
parsedURL, err := url.Parse(uri)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to parse verification URI for login_hint: %v", err)
return uri
}
query := parsedURL.Query()
query.Set("login_hint", loginHint)
parsedURL.RawQuery = query.Encode()
return parsedURL.String()
}
func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) requestToken(info AuthFlowInfo) (TokenRequestResponse, error) {
form := url.Values{}
form.Add("client_id", d.providerConfig.ClientID)
form.Add("grant_type", HostedGrantType)
form.Add("device_code", info.DeviceCode)
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", d.providerConfig.TokenEndpoint, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
if err != nil {
return TokenRequestResponse{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to create request access token: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Add("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
res, err := d.HTTPClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return TokenRequestResponse{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to request access token with error: %v", err)
}
defer func() {
err := res.Body.Close()
if err != nil {
return
}
}()
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
if err != nil {
return TokenRequestResponse{}, fmt.Errorf("failed reading access token response body with error: %v", err)
}
if res.StatusCode > 499 {
return TokenRequestResponse{}, fmt.Errorf("access token response returned code: %s", string(body))
}
tokenResponse := TokenRequestResponse{}
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &tokenResponse)
if err != nil {
return TokenRequestResponse{}, fmt.Errorf("parsing token response failed with error: %v", err)
}
return tokenResponse, nil
}
// WaitToken waits user's login and authorize the app. Once the user's authorize
// it retrieves the access token from Hosted's endpoint and validates it before returning.
// The method creates a timeout context internally based on info.ExpiresIn.
func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowInfo) (TokenInfo, error) {
// Create timeout context based on flow expiration
timeout := time.Duration(info.ExpiresIn) * time.Second
waitCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, timeout)
defer cancel()
interval := time.Duration(info.Interval) * time.Second
ticker := time.NewTicker(interval)
defer ticker.Stop()
log.Infof("device flow: waiting for user authorization, polling token endpoint every %s, code expires in %s", interval, timeout)
start := time.Now()
polls := 0
for {
select {
case <-waitCtx.Done():
return TokenInfo{}, waitCtx.Err()
case <-ticker.C:
polls++
tokenResponse, err := d.requestToken(info)
if err != nil {
return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("parsing token response failed with error: %v", err)
}
if tokenResponse.Error != "" {
if tokenResponse.Error == "authorization_pending" {
log.Tracef("device flow: authorization still pending after poll %d", polls)
continue
} else if tokenResponse.Error == "slow_down" {
interval += (3 * time.Second)
ticker.Reset(interval)
log.Infof("device flow: IdP requested slow_down, polling interval increased to %s", interval)
continue
}
return TokenInfo{}, errors.New(tokenResponse.ErrorDescription)
}
tokenInfo := TokenInfo{
AccessToken: tokenResponse.AccessToken,
TokenType: tokenResponse.TokenType,
RefreshToken: tokenResponse.RefreshToken,
IDToken: tokenResponse.IDToken,
ExpiresIn: tokenResponse.ExpiresIn,
UseIDToken: d.providerConfig.UseIDToken,
}
err = validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
if err != nil {
return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("validate access token failed with error: %v", err)
}
// Same as the PKCE flow: the account the token belongs to is what
// callers store to send back as the login_hint. Without it a client
// driven through the device flow — Android TV and tvOS — never binds
// an account to its profile and every later login goes out blind.
if email, fromEmailClaim, err := parseEmailFromIDToken(tokenInfo.IDToken); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to parse email from ID token: %v", err)
} else {
tokenInfo.Email = email
if fromEmailClaim {
tokenInfo.EmailClaim = email
}
}
log.Infof("device flow: user authorization confirmed after %d polls in %s", polls, time.Since(start).Round(time.Second))
return tokenInfo, err
}
}
}