Files
netbird/shared/management/client/rest/reverse_proxy_tokens_test.go
Maycon Santos fa1e241aea [management, client, proxy] Follow-up fixes for private reverse-proxy services (#6268)
* fix(proxy): gate tunnel-peer fast-path on inbound listener marker

forwardWithTunnelPeer previously accepted any RFC1918 / ULA / CGNAT
source IP, so a public client whose address happened to fall in those
ranges could bypass the configured operator auth scheme by colliding
with a known tunnel IP. The fast-path is now gated on
TunnelLookupFromContext(r.Context()) being present — that context value
is attached only by the per-account inbound (overlay) listener, so the
host-facing listener never enters this branch.

Tests updated to reflect the new requirement: requests that don't
carry the inbound marker now fall through to the regular auth flow.

* fix(proxy): harden inbound listener resource + startup-ctx handling

Three correctness fixes on the per-account inbound path, with tests:

- Close the logrus ErrorLog PipeWriter on tearDown. WriterLevel hands
  back an *io.PipeWriter backed by a pipe + scanner goroutine that the
  caller owns; the two writers per account (https + plain) were never
  closed, leaking the pipe and goroutine on every teardown.
- Run the post-Start hooks on context.Background(). runClientStartup
  is launched in a goroutine from AddPeer and was inheriting the
  caller's request-scoped ctx, so a cancelled request could abort the
  inbound bring-up or fail the management status notification. The
  tail is split into notifyClientReady so the contract is testable.

Tests cover the PipeWriter close behaviour and assert the readyHandler
+ NotifyStatus calls receive a non-cancelled background context.

* feat(proxy): short-circuit peer-own-target loops with 421

When a peer that hosts the target of a private service dials its own
service URL the request was being looped through the proxy and back
over WireGuard to the same peer — twice the WG round-trip for no
benefit, with no signal to the caller that something was wrong.

Add isSelfTargetLoop to ReverseProxy.ServeHTTP: when the request
arrived on the per-account overlay listener (IsOverlayOrigin) and the
source tunnel IP matches the target host, refuse the request with 421
Misdirected Request and a body pointing the operator at the backend
directly.

The gate is scoped to overlay origin so requests on the public
listener that happen to share a source IP with the target host are
forwarded normally.

* fix(management): private-service validation + tunnel-IP lookup semantics

- Require an explicit port for L4 cluster targets. validateL4Target
  exempted TargetTypeCluster from the port check, but buildPathMappings
  serializes every L4 target via net.JoinHostPort(host, port) — port=0
  shipped a ":0" upstream. Cluster targets use the same Host/Port
  fields, so the same requirement applies.
- GetPeerByIP returns NotFound on a tunnel-IP miss instead of mapping
  every error to Internal. The proxy's ValidateTunnelPeer probes IPs
  that legitimately aren't in the roster; the miss is expected and now
  distinguishable from a real store failure.
- Thread ctx into getClusterCapability's gorm query so a cancelled
  request doesn't keep the store busy.

Tests updated for the L4-cluster port requirement and the GetPeerByIP
NotFound path.

* fix(client): include offlinePeers in PeerStateByIP lookup

ReplaceOfflinePeers moves peers into d.offlinePeers but PeerStateByIP
only scanned d.peers. Callers (the local DNS filter via
localPeerConnectivity, embed.Client.IdentityForIP used by the
proxy's tunnel-peer validator) were treating known-but-offline peers
as unknown, which:

- causes the DNS filter to keep returning records pointing at peers
  that have no live tunnel, AND
- makes the proxy's local-roster check deny a request from such a
  peer rather than letting the cached management RPC carry the
  authorisation decision.

Search both slices in PeerStateByIP. Adds a unit test for the IPv4
and IPv6 offline-match paths.

* fix(rest): reject empty Delete path params in reverse-proxy clients

ReverseProxyClustersAPI.Delete and ReverseProxyTokensAPI.Delete passed
the path parameter into url.PathEscape without an empty check.
PathEscape("") returns "" which collapses the request onto the
collection endpoint ("/api/reverse-proxies/clusters/" /
"/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens/"), so a caller bug delete with no
id reached a routable URL with surprising semantics (typically 405).

Short-circuit with a typed error before the request is built. Tests
mount a handler on the collection path that fails the test if hit, so
the regression is impossible to reintroduce silently.

* chore(api,ci,docs,test): private-service schema, proto-check, fixups

Non-functional cleanups and contract/CI hardening around the
private-service work:

API schema (openapi.yml):
- Require a non-empty access_groups and mode=http when private=true,
  on both Service and ServiceRequest, mirroring
  validatePrivateRequirements. mode stays optional-but-constrained
  (empty defaults to http server-side), matching runtime.

CI (proto-version-check.yml):
- Cover renamed .pb.go files (read base via previous_filename).
- Match protoc-gen-go-grpc version headers (optional "- " prefix and
  -gen-go-grpc suffix) so grpc-generated files are in scope.

Docs / comments:
- Reword Config field docs to say defaults are applied at Server.Start
  (initDefaults), not New.
- Rename the obsolete --private-inbound flag to --private across
  comments and the proto doc.

Pre-existing test fixups surfaced by review:
- Repair the integration-tagged validate_session_test.go (SignToken
  signature growth + new Manager interface methods).
- Fix the CI-skip boolean precedence so Windows isn't skipped
  unconditionally.
- Guard the router.HTTPListener type assertion with comma-ok.

* fix(proxy): background ctx for already-started AddPeer notification

The earlier ctx fix covered the async runClientStartup path but missed
the synchronous branch: when a service is added to an already-started
client, AddPeer called NotifyStatus with the caller's request-scoped
ctx. A cancelled request/stream could drop the connected notification
to management. Use context.Background() here too, matching
notifyClientReady.

Extends TestNetBird_AddPeer_ExistingStartedClient_NotifiesStatus to
pass a pre-cancelled caller ctx and assert the notification still ran
on a non-cancelled context.

* use the cmd context for roundtripper
2026-06-02 13:40:09 +02:00

145 lines
5.1 KiB
Go

//go:build integration
package rest_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net/http"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/client/rest"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/util"
)
func intPtr(v int) *int { return &v }
var testProxyToken = api.ProxyToken{
Id: "tok-1",
Name: "ci-runner",
CreatedAt: time.Date(2026, 5, 21, 9, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
Revoked: false,
}
var testProxyTokenCreated = api.ProxyTokenCreated{
Id: "tok-1",
Name: "ci-runner",
CreatedAt: time.Date(2026, 5, 21, 9, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
PlainToken: "nbproxy_abcdef0123456789",
Revoked: false,
}
func TestReverseProxyTokens_List_200(t *testing.T) {
withMockClient(func(c *rest.Client, mux *http.ServeMux) {
mux.HandleFunc("/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
assert.Equal(t, "GET", r.Method, "List must use GET")
retBytes, _ := json.Marshal([]api.ProxyToken{testProxyToken})
_, err := w.Write(retBytes)
require.NoError(t, err)
})
ret, err := c.ReverseProxyTokens.List(context.Background())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, ret, 1)
assert.Equal(t, testProxyToken.Id, ret[0].Id)
assert.Equal(t, testProxyToken.Name, ret[0].Name)
})
}
func TestReverseProxyTokens_List_Err(t *testing.T) {
withMockClient(func(c *rest.Client, mux *http.ServeMux) {
mux.HandleFunc("/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
retBytes, _ := json.Marshal(util.ErrorResponse{Message: "No", Code: 500})
w.WriteHeader(500)
_, err := w.Write(retBytes)
require.NoError(t, err)
})
ret, err := c.ReverseProxyTokens.List(context.Background())
assert.Error(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, ret)
})
}
func TestReverseProxyTokens_Create_200(t *testing.T) {
withMockClient(func(c *rest.Client, mux *http.ServeMux) {
mux.HandleFunc("/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
assert.Equal(t, "POST", r.Method, "Create must use POST")
body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
require.NoError(t, err)
var req api.ProxyTokenRequest
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(body, &req), "server must receive a valid ProxyTokenRequest body")
assert.Equal(t, "ci-runner", req.Name, "name must round-trip through the client")
require.NotNil(t, req.ExpiresIn, "expires_in must be sent when provided")
assert.Equal(t, 3600, *req.ExpiresIn, "expires_in value must round-trip unchanged")
retBytes, _ := json.Marshal(testProxyTokenCreated)
_, err = w.Write(retBytes)
require.NoError(t, err)
})
ret, err := c.ReverseProxyTokens.Create(context.Background(), api.ProxyTokenRequest{
Name: "ci-runner",
ExpiresIn: intPtr(3600),
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, testProxyTokenCreated.Id, ret.Id)
assert.Equal(t, testProxyTokenCreated.PlainToken, ret.PlainToken,
"PlainToken must be returned to the caller — it's the one-shot secret")
})
}
func TestReverseProxyTokens_Create_Err(t *testing.T) {
withMockClient(func(c *rest.Client, mux *http.ServeMux) {
mux.HandleFunc("/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
retBytes, _ := json.Marshal(util.ErrorResponse{Message: "Bad", Code: 400})
w.WriteHeader(400)
_, err := w.Write(retBytes)
require.NoError(t, err)
})
ret, err := c.ReverseProxyTokens.Create(context.Background(), api.ProxyTokenRequest{Name: ""})
assert.Error(t, err)
assert.Nil(t, ret)
})
}
func TestReverseProxyTokens_Delete_200(t *testing.T) {
withMockClient(func(c *rest.Client, mux *http.ServeMux) {
mux.HandleFunc("/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens/tok-1", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
assert.Equal(t, "DELETE", r.Method, "Delete must use DELETE")
w.WriteHeader(200)
})
err := c.ReverseProxyTokens.Delete(context.Background(), "tok-1")
require.NoError(t, err)
})
}
func TestReverseProxyTokens_Delete_Err(t *testing.T) {
withMockClient(func(c *rest.Client, mux *http.ServeMux) {
mux.HandleFunc("/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens/tok-1", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
retBytes, _ := json.Marshal(util.ErrorResponse{Message: "Not found", Code: 404})
w.WriteHeader(404)
_, err := w.Write(retBytes)
require.NoError(t, err)
})
err := c.ReverseProxyTokens.Delete(context.Background(), "tok-1")
assert.Error(t, err)
})
}
// TestReverseProxyTokens_Delete_EmptyID guards against an empty tokenID
// reaching the wire — url.PathEscape("") would collapse the URL onto
// the collection endpoint.
func TestReverseProxyTokens_Delete_EmptyID(t *testing.T) {
withMockClient(func(c *rest.Client, mux *http.ServeMux) {
mux.HandleFunc("/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens/", func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
t.Fatal("empty tokenID must be rejected client-side; no request should reach the server")
})
err := c.ReverseProxyTokens.Delete(context.Background(), "")
assert.Error(t, err, "empty tokenID must surface as an error")
})
}