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* fix(proxy): gate tunnel-peer fast-path on inbound listener marker
forwardWithTunnelPeer previously accepted any RFC1918 / ULA / CGNAT
source IP, so a public client whose address happened to fall in those
ranges could bypass the configured operator auth scheme by colliding
with a known tunnel IP. The fast-path is now gated on
TunnelLookupFromContext(r.Context()) being present — that context value
is attached only by the per-account inbound (overlay) listener, so the
host-facing listener never enters this branch.
Tests updated to reflect the new requirement: requests that don't
carry the inbound marker now fall through to the regular auth flow.
* fix(proxy): harden inbound listener resource + startup-ctx handling
Three correctness fixes on the per-account inbound path, with tests:
- Close the logrus ErrorLog PipeWriter on tearDown. WriterLevel hands
back an *io.PipeWriter backed by a pipe + scanner goroutine that the
caller owns; the two writers per account (https + plain) were never
closed, leaking the pipe and goroutine on every teardown.
- Run the post-Start hooks on context.Background(). runClientStartup
is launched in a goroutine from AddPeer and was inheriting the
caller's request-scoped ctx, so a cancelled request could abort the
inbound bring-up or fail the management status notification. The
tail is split into notifyClientReady so the contract is testable.
Tests cover the PipeWriter close behaviour and assert the readyHandler
+ NotifyStatus calls receive a non-cancelled background context.
* feat(proxy): short-circuit peer-own-target loops with 421
When a peer that hosts the target of a private service dials its own
service URL the request was being looped through the proxy and back
over WireGuard to the same peer — twice the WG round-trip for no
benefit, with no signal to the caller that something was wrong.
Add isSelfTargetLoop to ReverseProxy.ServeHTTP: when the request
arrived on the per-account overlay listener (IsOverlayOrigin) and the
source tunnel IP matches the target host, refuse the request with 421
Misdirected Request and a body pointing the operator at the backend
directly.
The gate is scoped to overlay origin so requests on the public
listener that happen to share a source IP with the target host are
forwarded normally.
* fix(management): private-service validation + tunnel-IP lookup semantics
- Require an explicit port for L4 cluster targets. validateL4Target
exempted TargetTypeCluster from the port check, but buildPathMappings
serializes every L4 target via net.JoinHostPort(host, port) — port=0
shipped a ":0" upstream. Cluster targets use the same Host/Port
fields, so the same requirement applies.
- GetPeerByIP returns NotFound on a tunnel-IP miss instead of mapping
every error to Internal. The proxy's ValidateTunnelPeer probes IPs
that legitimately aren't in the roster; the miss is expected and now
distinguishable from a real store failure.
- Thread ctx into getClusterCapability's gorm query so a cancelled
request doesn't keep the store busy.
Tests updated for the L4-cluster port requirement and the GetPeerByIP
NotFound path.
* fix(client): include offlinePeers in PeerStateByIP lookup
ReplaceOfflinePeers moves peers into d.offlinePeers but PeerStateByIP
only scanned d.peers. Callers (the local DNS filter via
localPeerConnectivity, embed.Client.IdentityForIP used by the
proxy's tunnel-peer validator) were treating known-but-offline peers
as unknown, which:
- causes the DNS filter to keep returning records pointing at peers
that have no live tunnel, AND
- makes the proxy's local-roster check deny a request from such a
peer rather than letting the cached management RPC carry the
authorisation decision.
Search both slices in PeerStateByIP. Adds a unit test for the IPv4
and IPv6 offline-match paths.
* fix(rest): reject empty Delete path params in reverse-proxy clients
ReverseProxyClustersAPI.Delete and ReverseProxyTokensAPI.Delete passed
the path parameter into url.PathEscape without an empty check.
PathEscape("") returns "" which collapses the request onto the
collection endpoint ("/api/reverse-proxies/clusters/" /
"/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens/"), so a caller bug delete with no
id reached a routable URL with surprising semantics (typically 405).
Short-circuit with a typed error before the request is built. Tests
mount a handler on the collection path that fails the test if hit, so
the regression is impossible to reintroduce silently.
* chore(api,ci,docs,test): private-service schema, proto-check, fixups
Non-functional cleanups and contract/CI hardening around the
private-service work:
API schema (openapi.yml):
- Require a non-empty access_groups and mode=http when private=true,
on both Service and ServiceRequest, mirroring
validatePrivateRequirements. mode stays optional-but-constrained
(empty defaults to http server-side), matching runtime.
CI (proto-version-check.yml):
- Cover renamed .pb.go files (read base via previous_filename).
- Match protoc-gen-go-grpc version headers (optional "- " prefix and
-gen-go-grpc suffix) so grpc-generated files are in scope.
Docs / comments:
- Reword Config field docs to say defaults are applied at Server.Start
(initDefaults), not New.
- Rename the obsolete --private-inbound flag to --private across
comments and the proto doc.
Pre-existing test fixups surfaced by review:
- Repair the integration-tagged validate_session_test.go (SignToken
signature growth + new Manager interface methods).
- Fix the CI-skip boolean precedence so Windows isn't skipped
unconditionally.
- Guard the router.HTTPListener type assertion with comma-ok.
* fix(proxy): background ctx for already-started AddPeer notification
The earlier ctx fix covered the async runClientStartup path but missed
the synchronous branch: when a service is added to an already-started
client, AddPeer called NotifyStatus with the caller's request-scoped
ctx. A cancelled request/stream could drop the connected notification
to management. Use context.Background() here too, matching
notifyClientReady.
Extends TestNetBird_AddPeer_ExistingStartedClient_NotifiesStatus to
pass a pre-cancelled caller ctx and assert the notification still ran
on a non-cancelled context.
* use the cmd context for roundtripper
80 lines
2.6 KiB
Go
80 lines
2.6 KiB
Go
package rest
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"net/url"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
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)
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// ReverseProxyTokensAPI exposes the account-scoped proxy access tokens that
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// self-hosted (bring-your-own-proxy) deployments use to register a
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// `netbird proxy` instance with management. Tokens are bound to the
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// calling account; revoking a token disconnects every proxy that
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// authenticated with it.
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type ReverseProxyTokensAPI struct {
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c *Client
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}
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// List returns every proxy token the calling account has minted, including
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// already-revoked entries. The plain token is never returned — only the
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// metadata (id, name, created_at, last_used, revoked).
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func (a *ReverseProxyTokensAPI) List(ctx context.Context) ([]api.ProxyToken, error) {
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resp, err := a.c.NewRequest(ctx, "GET", "/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens", nil, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if resp.Body != nil {
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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}
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ret, err := parseResponse[[]api.ProxyToken](resp)
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return ret, err
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}
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// Create mints a fresh account-scoped proxy token. The returned
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// ProxyTokenCreated.PlainToken is shown only once — callers must persist
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// it immediately. Subsequent reads will only expose the token metadata,
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// not the secret material.
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func (a *ReverseProxyTokensAPI) Create(ctx context.Context, request api.ProxyTokenRequest) (*api.ProxyTokenCreated, error) {
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requestBytes, err := json.Marshal(request)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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resp, err := a.c.NewRequest(ctx, "POST", "/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens", bytes.NewReader(requestBytes), nil)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if resp.Body != nil {
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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}
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ret, err := parseResponse[api.ProxyTokenCreated](resp)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return &ret, nil
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}
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// Delete revokes a previously-issued proxy token by ID. Revoked tokens
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// remain in List output (with revoked=true) so operators can audit which
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// credentials existed; the plain secret can no longer authenticate any
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// new proxy registration.
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func (a *ReverseProxyTokensAPI) Delete(ctx context.Context, tokenID string) error {
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// Guard against the empty input: url.PathEscape("") returns "" which
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// would collapse the request URL onto the collection endpoint and
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// silently delete nothing (or 405 depending on routing).
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if tokenID == "" {
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return errors.New("tokenID is required")
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}
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resp, err := a.c.NewRequest(ctx, "DELETE", "/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens/"+url.PathEscape(tokenID), nil, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if resp.Body != nil {
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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}
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return nil
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}
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