Files
netbird/shared/management/proto/proxy_service.proto
Maycon Santos 92a66cdd20 [management,proxy,client] 0.74.0 version (#6563)
* [management,proxy] Agent network: per-account LLM gateway (policy, metering, multi-provider) (#6555)

* [agent-network] Shared proto, OpenAPI schema, and generated types

* [agent-network] Management: store, manager, synthesizer, policy engine, provider catalog, HTTP/gRPC API

Adds the account-scoped agent-network module: provider/policy/budget CRUD and
store, the reverse-proxy service synthesizer, policy selection + limit
enforcement, the provider catalog (incl. Vertex AI and AWS Bedrock entries),
and the management HTTP + proxy gRPC surfaces.

* [management] Fix agent-network proxy-peer fan-out on affected-peer recompute

The affected-peers resolver loaded only persisted reverse-proxy services, but
agent-network services are synthesized on demand and never persisted. As a
result the embedded proxy peer was never folded into the affected set when a
client's group changed, so the proxy received no network-map update for a newly
authorised client and rejected its handshake until a full resync (restart).

loadProxyServices now merges the synthesized agent-network services (injected
via a registration hook to avoid an import cycle), so proxy peers learn newly
authorised clients immediately.

* [proxy] Reverse-proxy middleware framework, chain, and request plumbing

The per-target middleware chain (slots, dispatcher, mutation gate, metadata
merger), body capture, access-log terminal sink, and the proxy wiring that
builds + runs chains for synthesized agent-network services.

* [proxy] LLM parsers, pricing, and builtin middlewares (OpenAI, Anthropic, Vertex AI, AWS Bedrock)

Request/response parsers and SSE/event-stream metering, the embedded pricing
table, and the builtin middleware set: request parser, router, policy
limit-check/record, cost meter, guardrail, identity inject, response parser.
Includes the path-routed providers — Google Vertex AI (keyfile:: service-account
OAuth minting) and AWS Bedrock (bearer auth, invoke/converse/streaming, optional
/bedrock prefix) — plus the Models allowlist and unmeterable-publisher deny.

* [proxy] IPv6 in-place apply and TCP accept-loop hardening on netstack listeners

* [agent-network] End-to-end test suite, module docs, and deployment preset

* [agent-network] Fix codespell typos and exclude false positives

- labelgen word pool: vermillion -> vermilion, racoon -> raccoon.
- codespell ignore list: add flate (Go compress/flate package), recordin
  (a test-local identifier), and unparseable (a valid alternative spelling used
  consistently across identifiers + a metadata-value constant).

* [management] Set LastSeen on injected proxy peer in realstack test (MySQL strict-mode)

The injected embedded proxy peer had a PeerStatus with a zero LastSeen, which
serializes to '0000-00-00' and is rejected by MySQL in strict mode (SQLite
tolerates it). Set LastSeen to a valid time so SaveAccount succeeds on both
engines.

* [agent-network] Remove e2e shell-script suite from this branch

The end-to-end shell scripts under scripts/e2e/ are maintained in a separate
testing suite and are not part of this change set.

* [agent-network] Polish module docs: remove internal review scaffolding, fix links, verify diagrams

Strip PR-review framing, commit references, absolute paths, and stale internal
references from the agent-network module docs; fix broken relative links; verify
all diagrams against the current architecture. Remove the internal AI-reviewer
prompt file.

* [management] Refine session expiration handling to support 3-state encoding for SSO deadlines

* [agent-network] Relocate agentnetwork package to internals/modules

Move management/server/agentnetwork (and its catalog/, labelgen/, types/
subpackages) to management/internals/modules/agentnetwork, alongside the
reverse-proxy module, and rewrite all importers. Pure relocation: package names,
the synthesizer + affectedpeers registration hook, and store access (shared
store.Store) are unchanged, so no import cycle is introduced (affectedpeers
still depends only on the agentnetwork/types leaf).

* [agent-network] Co-locate HTTP handlers in the module (RegisterEndpoints)

Move the agent-network HTTP handlers from server/http/handlers/agentnetwork into
the module at internals/modules/agentnetwork/handlers (package handlers) and
rename the entrypoint AddEndpoints -> RegisterEndpoints, matching the
reverse-proxy module convention. Wiring in http/handler.go updated accordingly.

* Update getting started to point to rc when agent network enabled

* Add a reference to a commercial license

* Fix docs localhost link

* Fix docs localhost link

* Add private services domain note

* [management] Add agent-network telemetry metrics (#6561)

Surface agent-network adoption and usage in the self-hosted metrics
worker: distinct accounts, providers, policies, budget rules, accounts
with log collection enabled, and aggregated input/output tokens plus
cost.

Tokens and cost are summed from agent_network_request_usage (the
always-written per-request ledger) so the figures are accurate
regardless of the log-collection toggle and carry no double-counting.
All values come from a handful of indexed aggregate queries run only on
the worker's periodic tick.

Adds store.AgentNetworkMetrics with GetAgentNetworkMetrics on the Store
interface, the SqlStore implementation, and a zero-valued FileStore stub.

* Update NetBird server and proxy image versions to 0.74.0-rc.2

* [management,proxy] Reduce agent-network cognitive complexity (#6566)

Address the SonarCloud quality-gate findings in new agent-network code
by extracting focused helpers. No behavior change.

- synthesizer.go: split buildIdentityInjectConfigJSON into per-shape
  rule builders; extract mergeGuardrail from mergeGuardrails to cut
  nesting depth.
- llm_identity_inject: extract injectionEmitsAnything validation
  predicate from New.
- llm_response_parser/streaming.go: extract applyOpenAIStreamUsage and
  applyAnthropicStreamUsage (via a named anthropicStreamUsage type) and
  simplify the OpenAI scanner loop.
- reverseproxy.go: decompose ServeHTTP into serveRouteError,
  buildTargetContext, serveDirect, serveWithChain, captureRequestForChain,
  serveDeny, newResponseWriter, observeResponse, and forwardUpstream,
  preserving the defer ordering so response observation still reads the
  captured writer before it is released.

* [management] Move agent-network access-log ingest into the agentnetwork module (#6568)

The agent-network access-log ingest path (metaKey wire contract, flatten,
usage derivation, and the dual-write of the usage ledger + settings-gated
full row) lived in the reverseproxy accesslogs manager, even though the
agentnetwork module already owns the rest of that domain — types, read
(ListAccessLogs / GetUsageOverview), the budget-counter writes, and
retention cleanup.

Move it next to the rest: a stateless agentnetwork.IngestAccessLog(ctx,
store, entry) that the reverseproxy SaveAccessLog delegates to when the
entry is agent-network. Removes the agentNetworkTypes import from the
reverseproxy manager. No behavior change; the write/read table separation
is unchanged.

Adds real-store coverage for the disable->enable log-collection toggle
(usage ledger always written, full row gated) plus the metadata parse and
group-dedup helpers, which previously had no dedicated tests.

* Add session view support in the access log

* [management,proxy] Container-based agent-network e2e harness (#6577)

* [e2e] Add container-based agent-network e2e harness (Pillar 1)

Introduce a self-contained, OIDC-free e2e harness that stands up NetBird
in containers, so suites no longer depend on the hand-maintained Tilt
stack or a real IdP.

- harness brings up the combined server (management + signal + relay +
  STUN + embedded IdP) in a single container built from
  combined/Dockerfile.multistage, and mints an admin PAT through the
  unauthenticated /api/setup bootstrap (NB_SETUP_PAT_ENABLED). API access
  goes through the existing shared/management/client/rest typed client.
- the image is built via the docker CLI (BuildKit) so the Dockerfile's
  cache mounts are honored; testcontainers then runs the tagged image.
- everything is behind the `e2e` build tag so normal builds and unit
  tests never pull in testcontainers.

Adds BuildKit cache mounts to combined/Dockerfile.multistage so source
changes recompile incrementally rather than from scratch.

Pillar 1 proven by TestCombinedBootstrap: server builds, boots, mints a
PAT, and the PAT authenticates a real management API call.

* [e2e] Add management-side agent-network scenarios (Pillar 2)

Port the API-driven agent-network scenarios from the bash suites to Go,
sharing one combined server per package run (TestMain) with each test
owning its resource cleanup. Drives the /api/agent-network/* endpoints
through the shared REST client's NewRequest primitive with the generated
api types.

Scenarios:
- provider lifecycle (create/get/list/delete + 404 after delete)
- provider validation (missing api_key, unknown catalog id → 4xx)
- settings collection-toggle round-trip with cluster/subdomain immutability
- policy window floor (reject <60s enabled limit, accept at 60s)
- consumption read endpoint returns an array

All deterministic and dependency-free (dummy provider keys; no upstream
calls), so they run headless in CI.

* [e2e] Add live chat-through-proxy scenario (Pillar 3)

Stand up the full agent-network data path in containers and drive a real
chat-completion through the gateway:

- harness: a shared docker network (combined server reachable by alias),
  a proxy container built from the published reverse-proxy image
  (NB_PROXY_PRIVATE, NB_PROXY_ALLOW_INSECURE, NB_RELAY_TRANSPORT=ws to match
  the combined server's WS-multiplexed relay) with a generated self-signed
  wildcard cert, and a netbird client container that joins via a setup key.
- the combined image, proxy image, and client image default to the
  published rc.2 releases (overridable via NB_E2E_*_IMAGE; a bare local tag
  is built from source instead). Geolocation download is disabled so the
  server starts without external fetches.
- one shared domain is used for the management exposed address, the proxy
  domain, and the agent-network cluster; the proxy token is minted via the
  server CLI (global) to match the manual install.

TestChatCompletionThroughProxy provisions provider+policy+group+setup key,
runs proxy+client, drives an OpenAI chat-completion through the tunnel, and
asserts a 200 plus the ingested access-log row. Requires OPENAI_TOKEN
(skips otherwise). The provider must be created with enabled=true explicitly
— the create default is false despite the API doc.

* [e2e] Run the live chat scenario across a provider matrix

Replace the single-provider chat test with a data-driven matrix that runs
the same scenario through every provider whose credentials are present in
the environment (keys/URLs sourced from ~/.llm-keys locally, Actions
secrets in CI):

- OpenAI (chat), Anthropic (messages), Vercel, OpenRouter, Cloudflare
  (OpenAI-compatible gateways), and Bedrock (path-routed, bearer, via the
  messages shape) — covering both wire shapes and the gateway routing.
- all providers are created enabled with a unique model string so the
  proxy's connect-time snapshot carries them all and model->provider
  routing is unambiguous (provider toggles after connect don't reconcile
  to a connected proxy).
- the client supports both wire shapes (/v1/chat/completions and
  /v1/messages); Cloudflare gets the openai provider segment appended to
  its gateway URL.

Each provider must return 200 through the tunnel and produce an ingested
access-log row. Vertex is intentionally excluded from the uniform matrix:
it needs a bespoke rawPredict request shape rather than the shared
chat/messages path, so it warrants a dedicated scenario.

* [ci] Add manual workflow for the agent-network e2e suite

The e2e suite (build tag `e2e`) stands up the combined server + proxy +
client in Docker and drives live chat-completions, so it is slow and needs
provider credentials. Gate it out of normal CI (it already is, via the
build tag) and run it on demand via workflow_dispatch. Provider scenarios
skip when their secret is unset, so it degrades gracefully.

* [e2e] Add Vertex to the provider matrix; run e2e on ubuntu-latest

Vertex (Anthropic-on-Vertex) doesn't share the chat/messages wire shapes:
the model travels in a rawPredict path and the proxy mints the service
account's OAuth token. Add a Vertex client method that posts
/v1/projects/<project>/locations/<region>/publishers/anthropic/models/<model>:rawPredict
with the Vertex anthropic_version body, and wire it into the matrix as a
path-routed provider (created without a models array). It is keyed off
GOOGLE_VERTEX_SA_BASE64 + GOOGLE_VERTEX_PROJECT (region defaults to
"global", model to a pinned claude snapshot, both overridable).

Also bump the e2e workflow runner to ubuntu-latest and add the Vertex
secrets.

* Add docker/docker and docker/go-connections as direct dependencies in go.mod

* [ci] Trigger agent-network e2e workflow on push to main and pull requests

* [e2e] Fix proxy cert permission denied on Linux CI runners

The proxy bind-mounts a temp dir of self-signed certs. MkdirTemp creates
it 0700 and the key was 0600, which Docker Desktop on macOS ignores but a
non-root proxy container on Linux runners cannot traverse/read, so the
cert watcher failed with "open /certs/tls.crt: permission denied" and the
container exited. Widen the cert dir to 0755 and write the throwaway key
0644 so the proxy uid can read the bind-mounted material.

* [e2e] Build images from source by default instead of pulling rc.2

The agent-network code under test lives in this branch, so the e2e should
exercise it rather than a frozen published release. Flip the harness
default: combined/proxy/client are now built from their in-repo
Dockerfiles (combined/Dockerfile.multistage, proxy/Dockerfile.multistage,
e2e/harness/Dockerfile.client) under local tags. Pulling a published image
stays available by setting NB_E2E_*_IMAGE to a registry reference.

Builds now go through buildx --load so the Dockerfile cache mounts are
honored and the result is loaded for testcontainers. The CI workflow adds
a container-driver builder and a local layer cache (NB_E2E_BUILDX_CACHE)
persisted via actions/cache, which caches the base/apt/dep-download layers
across runs. The Go compile still re-runs each time, as BuildKit mount
caches cannot be exported to the GitHub cache.

* [e2e] Cover real providers in lifecycle + assert real consumption metering

- TestProviderLifecycle now runs per available real provider (create → get →
  list → delete → 404) instead of a single dummy provider, exercising each
  catalog's create and field round-trip. Create is offline, so it stays fast
  and burns no provider quota; falls back to a synthetic OpenAI provider when
  no keys are set.
- TestProvidersMatrix attaches a token limit (high caps, 60s window) to its
  policy, which switches on usage metering, and asserts consumption rows are
  recorded with positive token counts after the live traffic. Consumption is
  account-scoped (keyed by source group / user and window, not per provider),
  so the assertion is aggregate.
- TestProviderValidation gains invalid-upstream and blank-name cases. Create
  validation is uniform across catalogs (no per-provider required-field rules),
  so per-provider rejection cases would be redundant.

* [e2e] Assert session id propagates per provider

Each matrix request now sends a unique session id as the universal
x-session-id header and asserts it round-trips into that provider's
access-log row. This guards the session-grouping contract end to end for
every provider (header extraction runs in llm_request_parser ahead of the
parser-specific body extraction, so it is provider-agnostic).

* [e2e] Drop accidentally committed sync-phases dashboard

netbird-sync-phases.json was swept into the Pillar 1 commit by a broad
git add; it belongs to the unrelated sync-phases metrics work, not this
e2e harness. Remove it from the branch so the PR diff is scoped to the
e2e changes.

* [e2e] Revert accidentally committed sync-phase ingest spec

The netbird_sync_phase measurement spec in metrics ingest was swept into
the Pillar 1 commit; it belongs to the unrelated sync-phases metrics work,
not this e2e harness. Its emission side never landed here, so the spec was
orphaned anyway. Restore ingest/main.go to its origin/main state.

* Fix golint issues

* Fix sonar

* Add access log session test

* Fix access log tests

---------

Co-authored-by: braginini <bangvalo@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zoltan Papp <zoltan.pmail@gmail.com>
2026-07-01 12:45:14 +02:00

504 lines
19 KiB
Protocol Buffer

syntax = "proto3";
package management;
option go_package = "/proto";
import "google/protobuf/duration.proto";
import "google/protobuf/timestamp.proto";
// ProxyService - Management is the SERVER, Proxy is the CLIENT
// Proxy initiates connection to management
service ProxyService {
rpc GetMappingUpdate(GetMappingUpdateRequest) returns (stream GetMappingUpdateResponse);
// SyncMappings is a bidirectional stream that replaces GetMappingUpdate for
// new proxies. The proxy sends an initial SyncMappingsRequest to start the
// stream and then sends an ack after each batch is fully processed.
// Management waits for the ack before sending the next batch, providing
// application-level back-pressure during large initial syncs.
// Old proxies continue using GetMappingUpdate; old management servers
// return Unimplemented for this RPC and proxies fall back.
rpc SyncMappings(stream SyncMappingsRequest) returns (stream SyncMappingsResponse);
rpc SendAccessLog(SendAccessLogRequest) returns (SendAccessLogResponse);
rpc Authenticate(AuthenticateRequest) returns (AuthenticateResponse);
rpc SendStatusUpdate(SendStatusUpdateRequest) returns (SendStatusUpdateResponse);
rpc CreateProxyPeer(CreateProxyPeerRequest) returns (CreateProxyPeerResponse);
rpc GetOIDCURL(GetOIDCURLRequest) returns (GetOIDCURLResponse);
// ValidateSession validates a session token and checks user access permissions.
// Called by the proxy after receiving a session token from OIDC callback.
rpc ValidateSession(ValidateSessionRequest) returns (ValidateSessionResponse);
// ValidateTunnelPeer resolves an inbound peer by its WireGuard tunnel IP and
// checks the resolved user's access against the service's access_groups.
// Acts as a fast-path equivalent of OIDC for requests originating on the
// netbird mesh: when the source IP maps to a known peer in the calling
// account and that peer is in the service's access_groups, the proxy can
// issue a session cookie without redirecting through the OIDC flow.
// Mirrors ValidateSession's response shape.
rpc ValidateTunnelPeer(ValidateTunnelPeerRequest) returns (ValidateTunnelPeerResponse);
// CheckLLMPolicyLimits is the pre-flight RPC the proxy calls before each
// LLM request. Management runs the per-policy headroom selection across
// every policy authorising the caller's user / groups for the resolved
// provider and returns the chosen attribution policy + group, or a deny
// when no applicable policy has headroom > 0.
rpc CheckLLMPolicyLimits(CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest) returns (CheckLLMPolicyLimitsResponse);
// RecordLLMUsage is the post-flight RPC the proxy calls after the upstream
// returns. Increments the per-(dimension, window) counters for the
// attribution policy chosen by CheckLLMPolicyLimits.
rpc RecordLLMUsage(RecordLLMUsageRequest) returns (RecordLLMUsageResponse);
}
// ProxyCapabilities describes what a proxy can handle.
message ProxyCapabilities {
// Whether the proxy can bind arbitrary ports for TCP/UDP/TLS services.
optional bool supports_custom_ports = 1;
// Whether the proxy requires a subdomain label in front of its cluster domain.
// When true, accounts cannot use the cluster domain bare.
optional bool require_subdomain = 2;
// Whether the proxy has CrowdSec configured and can enforce IP reputation checks.
optional bool supports_crowdsec = 3;
// Whether the proxy is running embedded in the netbird client and serving
// exclusively over the WireGuard tunnel (i.e. `netbird proxy` rather than
// the standalone netbird-proxy binary). Surfaces upstream so dashboards can
// distinguish per-peer / private clusters from centralised ones.
optional bool private = 4;
// Whether the proxy enforces ProxyMapping.private (fails closed on ValidateTunnelPeer failure). Management MUST NOT stream private mappings to proxies that don't claim this.
optional bool supports_private_service = 5;
}
// GetMappingUpdateRequest is sent to initialise a mapping stream.
message GetMappingUpdateRequest {
string proxy_id = 1;
string version = 2;
google.protobuf.Timestamp started_at = 3;
string address = 4;
ProxyCapabilities capabilities = 5;
}
// GetMappingUpdateResponse contains zero or more ProxyMappings.
// No mappings may be sent to test the liveness of the Proxy.
// Mappings that are sent should be interpreted by the Proxy appropriately.
message GetMappingUpdateResponse {
repeated ProxyMapping mapping = 1;
// initial_sync_complete is set on the last message of the initial snapshot.
// The proxy uses this to signal that startup is complete.
bool initial_sync_complete = 2;
}
enum ProxyMappingUpdateType {
UPDATE_TYPE_CREATED = 0;
UPDATE_TYPE_MODIFIED = 1;
UPDATE_TYPE_REMOVED = 2;
}
enum PathRewriteMode {
PATH_REWRITE_DEFAULT = 0;
PATH_REWRITE_PRESERVE = 1;
}
message PathTargetOptions {
bool skip_tls_verify = 1;
google.protobuf.Duration request_timeout = 2;
PathRewriteMode path_rewrite = 3;
map<string, string> custom_headers = 4;
// Send PROXY protocol v2 header to this backend.
bool proxy_protocol = 5;
// Idle timeout before a UDP session is reaped.
google.protobuf.Duration session_idle_timeout = 6;
// When true, the proxy dials this target via the host's network stack
// instead of through the embedded NetBird client. Useful for upstreams
// reachable without WireGuard (public APIs, LAN services, localhost
// sidecars). Defaults to false — embedded client is the standard path.
bool direct_upstream = 7;
// Proxy clamps to [0, proxy-wide max (1 MiB)] at apply time. Agent-network
// synthesized targets only; private services leave these zero.
int64 capture_max_request_bytes = 8;
// Proxy clamps to [0, proxy-wide max (1 MiB)] at apply time.
int64 capture_max_response_bytes = 9;
// Content types eligible for body capture (e.g. "application/json").
repeated string capture_content_types = 10;
// Per-target middleware configurations populated by the agent-network
// synthesizer. Validated and clamped by the proxy at apply time.
repeated MiddlewareConfig middlewares = 11;
// When true, the proxy stamps agent_network=true on access-log entries
// for this target so management routes them to the agent-network log
// surface.
bool agent_network = 12;
// When true, the proxy suppresses the per-request access-log emission for
// this target. Defaults false to preserve existing access-log behavior for
// every non-agent-network target. The agent-network synth target sets this
// true only when the account's EnableLogCollection toggle is off.
bool disable_access_log = 13;
}
// MiddlewareSlot identifies where in the request lifecycle a middleware
// runs. Mirrors proxy/internal/middleware.Slot.
enum MiddlewareSlot {
MIDDLEWARE_SLOT_UNSPECIFIED = 0;
MIDDLEWARE_SLOT_ON_REQUEST = 1;
MIDDLEWARE_SLOT_ON_RESPONSE = 2;
MIDDLEWARE_SLOT_TERMINAL = 3;
}
// MiddlewareConfig is the per-target configuration for a single middleware.
// The proxy validates every incoming MiddlewareConfig at apply time:
// unknown ids are rejected, timeout is clamped to [10ms, 5s], and the
// declared slot must match the registered middleware's slot.
message MiddlewareConfig {
// Middleware id; must match the proxy-local compiled-in registry.
string id = 1;
bool enabled = 2;
MiddlewareSlot slot = 3;
// Free-form JSON unmarshalled by the middleware factory into its own typed
// config struct. Empty / null / {} are valid (zero-value config).
bytes config_json = 4;
enum FailMode {
FAIL_OPEN = 0;
FAIL_CLOSED = 1;
}
FailMode fail_mode = 5;
// Clamped to [10ms, 5s] at apply time; zero → 500ms default.
google.protobuf.Duration timeout = 6;
// When true, the middleware may mutate request headers or body (subject to
// policy). Honoured only when the implementation also declares
// MutationsSupported.
bool can_mutate = 7;
}
message PathMapping {
string path = 1;
string target = 2;
PathTargetOptions options = 3;
}
message HeaderAuth {
// Header name to check, e.g. "Authorization", "X-API-Key".
string header = 1;
// argon2id hash of the expected full header value.
string hashed_value = 2;
}
message Authentication {
string session_key = 1;
int64 max_session_age_seconds = 2;
bool password = 3;
bool pin = 4;
bool oidc = 5;
repeated HeaderAuth header_auths = 6;
}
message AccessRestrictions {
repeated string allowed_cidrs = 1;
repeated string blocked_cidrs = 2;
repeated string allowed_countries = 3;
repeated string blocked_countries = 4;
// CrowdSec IP reputation mode: "", "off", "enforce", or "observe".
string crowdsec_mode = 5;
}
message ProxyMapping {
ProxyMappingUpdateType type = 1;
string id = 2;
string account_id = 3;
string domain = 4;
repeated PathMapping path = 5;
string auth_token = 6;
Authentication auth = 7;
// When true, the original Host header from the client request is passed
// through to the backend instead of being rewritten to the backend's address.
bool pass_host_header = 8;
// When true, Location headers in backend responses are rewritten to replace
// the backend address with the public-facing domain.
bool rewrite_redirects = 9;
// Service mode: "http", "tcp", "udp", or "tls".
string mode = 10;
// For L4/TLS: the port the proxy listens on.
int32 listen_port = 11;
AccessRestrictions access_restrictions = 12;
// NetBird-only: the proxy MUST call ValidateTunnelPeer and fail closed; operator auth schemes are bypassed.
bool private = 13;
}
// SendAccessLogRequest consists of one or more AccessLogs from a Proxy.
message SendAccessLogRequest {
AccessLog log = 1;
}
// SendAccessLogResponse is intentionally empty to allow for future expansion.
message SendAccessLogResponse {}
message AccessLog {
google.protobuf.Timestamp timestamp = 1;
string log_id = 2;
string account_id = 3;
string service_id = 4;
string host = 5;
string path = 6;
int64 duration_ms = 7;
string method = 8;
int32 response_code = 9;
string source_ip = 10;
string auth_mechanism = 11;
string user_id = 12;
bool auth_success = 13;
int64 bytes_upload = 14;
int64 bytes_download = 15;
string protocol = 16;
// Extra key-value metadata for the access log entry (e.g. crowdsec_verdict, scenario).
map<string, string> metadata = 17;
// When true, the entry was emitted by an agent-network synth service.
// Management routes these to the agent-network access-log surface instead
// of the standard service log.
bool agent_network = 18;
}
message AuthenticateRequest {
string id = 1;
string account_id = 2;
oneof request {
PasswordRequest password = 3;
PinRequest pin = 4;
HeaderAuthRequest header_auth = 5;
}
}
message HeaderAuthRequest {
string header_value = 1;
string header_name = 2;
}
message PasswordRequest {
string password = 1;
}
message PinRequest {
string pin = 1;
}
message AuthenticateResponse {
bool success = 1;
string session_token = 2;
}
enum ProxyStatus {
PROXY_STATUS_PENDING = 0;
PROXY_STATUS_ACTIVE = 1;
PROXY_STATUS_TUNNEL_NOT_CREATED = 2;
PROXY_STATUS_CERTIFICATE_PENDING = 3;
PROXY_STATUS_CERTIFICATE_FAILED = 4;
PROXY_STATUS_ERROR = 5;
}
// SendStatusUpdateRequest is sent by the proxy to update its status
message SendStatusUpdateRequest {
string service_id = 1;
string account_id = 2;
ProxyStatus status = 3;
bool certificate_issued = 4;
optional string error_message = 5;
// Per-account inbound listener state for the account that owns
// service_id. Populated only when --private is enabled and the
// embedded client for the account is up. Field numbers >=50 reserved
// for observability extensions.
optional ProxyInboundListener inbound_listener = 50;
}
// ProxyInboundListener describes a per-account inbound listener that the
// proxy has bound on the embedded netstack of the account's WireGuard
// client. Surfaced so dashboards can render "this account is reachable
// at <tunnel_ip>:<https_port> on this proxy".
message ProxyInboundListener {
// Tunnel IP the embedded netstack listens on. Same address other peers
// in the account see for the proxy peer.
string tunnel_ip = 1;
// TLS port served on tunnel_ip (auto-detected, default 443).
uint32 https_port = 2;
// Plain-HTTP port served on tunnel_ip (auto-detected, default 80).
uint32 http_port = 3;
}
// SendStatusUpdateResponse is intentionally empty to allow for future expansion
message SendStatusUpdateResponse {}
// CreateProxyPeerRequest is sent by the proxy to create a peer connection
// The token is a one-time authentication token sent via ProxyMapping
message CreateProxyPeerRequest {
string service_id = 1;
string account_id = 2;
string token = 3;
string wireguard_public_key = 4;
string cluster = 5;
}
// CreateProxyPeerResponse contains the result of peer creation
message CreateProxyPeerResponse {
bool success = 1;
optional string error_message = 2;
}
message GetOIDCURLRequest {
string id = 1;
string account_id = 2;
string redirect_url = 3;
}
message GetOIDCURLResponse {
string url = 1;
}
message ValidateSessionRequest {
string domain = 1;
string session_token = 2;
}
message ValidateSessionResponse {
bool valid = 1;
string user_id = 2;
string user_email = 3;
string denied_reason = 4;
// peer_group_ids carries the calling user's group memberships so the
// proxy can authorise policy-aware middlewares without an additional
// management round-trip.
repeated string peer_group_ids = 5;
// peer_group_names carries the human-readable display names for the
// ids in peer_group_ids, ordered identically (positional pairing).
// Stamped onto upstream requests as X-NetBird-Groups so downstream
// services can read names rather than opaque ids.
repeated string peer_group_names = 6;
}
// ValidateTunnelPeerRequest carries the inbound peer's tunnel IP and the
// service domain whose group requirements should gate access. The calling
// account is inferred from the proxy's gRPC metadata (ProxyToken).
message ValidateTunnelPeerRequest {
string tunnel_ip = 1;
string domain = 2;
}
// ValidateTunnelPeerResponse mirrors ValidateSessionResponse plus a freshly
// minted session_token: when valid is true, the proxy installs the token as
// a session cookie so subsequent requests skip the management round-trip,
// matching the OIDC flow's UX. denied_reason values:
// "peer_not_found" — no peer with that tunnel IP in the calling account
// "no_user" — peer exists but is not bound to a user
// "service_not_found"
// "account_mismatch"
// "not_in_group" — peer resolved but not in service.access_groups
message ValidateTunnelPeerResponse {
bool valid = 1;
string user_id = 2;
string user_email = 3;
string denied_reason = 4;
// session_token is set only when valid is true. Same shape as the JWT
// the OIDC flow produces — proxy installs it via setSessionCookie so the
// tunnel fast-path is indistinguishable from OIDC for subsequent requests.
string session_token = 5;
// peer_group_ids carries the resolved peer's user group memberships so
// the proxy can authorise policy-aware middlewares without an additional
// management round-trip.
repeated string peer_group_ids = 6;
// peer_group_names carries the human-readable display names for the
// ids in peer_group_ids, ordered identically (positional pairing).
// Stamped onto upstream requests as X-NetBird-Groups so downstream
// services can read names rather than opaque ids.
repeated string peer_group_names = 7;
}
// SyncMappingsRequest is sent by the proxy on the bidirectional SyncMappings
// stream. The first message MUST be an init; all subsequent messages MUST be
// acks.
message SyncMappingsRequest {
oneof msg {
SyncMappingsInit init = 1;
SyncMappingsAck ack = 2;
}
}
// SyncMappingsInit is the first message on the stream, carrying the same
// identification fields as GetMappingUpdateRequest.
message SyncMappingsInit {
string proxy_id = 1;
string version = 2;
google.protobuf.Timestamp started_at = 3;
string address = 4;
ProxyCapabilities capabilities = 5;
}
// SyncMappingsAck is sent by the proxy after it has fully processed a batch.
// Management waits for this before sending the next batch.
message SyncMappingsAck {}
// SyncMappingsResponse is a batch of mappings sent by management.
// Identical semantics to GetMappingUpdateResponse.
message SyncMappingsResponse {
repeated ProxyMapping mapping = 1;
// initial_sync_complete is set on the last message of the initial snapshot.
bool initial_sync_complete = 2;
}
// CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest carries the resolved caller identity and the
// upstream provider already chosen by llm_router. Management computes which
// policies authorise the request, picks the one with the most remaining
// headroom, and returns the attribution decision.
message CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest {
// account_id is the netbird account the request belongs to.
string account_id = 1;
// user_id is the netbird user id of the caller. May be empty when the
// principal is a tunnel-peer that isn't bound to a user; group membership
// still gates the request in that case.
string user_id = 2;
// group_ids is the caller's full group membership at request time.
repeated string group_ids = 3;
// provider_id is the agent-network provider record id chosen by llm_router.
string provider_id = 4;
// model is the upstream model identifier extracted from the request body.
string model = 5;
}
// CheckLLMPolicyLimitsResponse is management's allow-or-deny decision for a
// pre-flight check.
message CheckLLMPolicyLimitsResponse {
// decision is "allow" or "deny".
string decision = 1;
// selected_policy_id names the policy that paid for this request.
string selected_policy_id = 2;
// attribution_group_id is the source group the request booked against.
string attribution_group_id = 3;
// window_seconds is the cap window length the selected policy uses.
int64 window_seconds = 4;
// deny_code is set on decision="deny" with a stable label.
string deny_code = 5;
// deny_reason is a short human-readable explanation paired with deny_code.
string deny_reason = 6;
}
// RecordLLMUsageRequest is the post-flight increment the proxy posts after
// the upstream call. Counters are keyed on (account, dimension, window).
message RecordLLMUsageRequest {
string account_id = 1;
string user_id = 2;
// group_id is the selected policy's attribution group, recorded against the
// policy window (window_seconds).
string group_id = 3;
int64 window_seconds = 4;
int64 tokens_input = 5;
int64 tokens_output = 6;
double cost_usd = 7;
// group_ids is the caller's full group membership, used to fan the same
// usage out to every applicable account-level budget rule's own window.
repeated string group_ids = 8;
}
message RecordLLMUsageResponse {
}