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A custom domain row was created and bound to a live service whether or not its CNAME ownership check ever succeeded. Validated was computed once, stored, and read only by the dashboard listing, so an account that never proved DNS control still had its hostname routed and a certificate ordered for it. The domain string was also claimed globally, with no expiry, so an abandoned unvalidated row blocked that name for every other account permanently. Cluster derivation now matches a custom domain only when it is validated, and reports "domain is not validated" so the API tells the caller what to fix. Service updates no longer fall back to the previously derived cluster when derivation fails, which was a way around the same check. Claims carry a claimed_at date and are evicted after 24h without validation. Uniqueness is now per (account_id, domain); the global constraint is dropped and replaced by a manager-side rule that only one account may hold a validated row for a name. That matches what the check actually proves: control of the zone, not the identity of the requester, so the first account to validate owns the name and a later one is refused. Creation pre-checks both cases and returns AlreadyExists without naming the holding account. An hourly job re-checks validated domains and, after three consecutive failed lookups, marks them unvalidated and restarts their claim window, so a domain whose DNS moved away stops being served and eventually frees the name. Custom domains are capped per account because each one becomes an ACME order against issuance rate limits shared by every account on the cluster. ProxyMapping carries the verdict and the proxy refuses to set up routes, auth, or certificate management without it, so the domain cannot be served if the management-side gate is ever regressed. This makes management the required first upgrade: a proxy on this version drops mappings from an older management that does not set the field. The migration drops the old constraint before AutoMigrate (dropping it rebuilds the table on SQLite, discarding its indexes) and backfills claimed_at from the upgrade time, so pre-existing unvalidated rows get a full window to validate before they expire.
1422 lines
53 KiB
Go
1422 lines
53 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/tls"
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"encoding/base64"
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"net/netip"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"google.golang.org/grpc"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/sessionkey"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/auth"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/proxy"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/restrict"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/types"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
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)
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func generateTestKeyPair(t *testing.T) *sessionkey.KeyPair {
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t.Helper()
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kp, err := sessionkey.GenerateKeyPair()
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require.NoError(t, err)
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return kp
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}
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// stubScheme is a minimal Scheme implementation for testing.
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type stubScheme struct {
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method auth.Method
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token string
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promptID string
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authFn func(*http.Request) (string, string, error)
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}
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func (s *stubScheme) Type() auth.Method { return s.method }
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func (s *stubScheme) Authenticate(r *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
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if s.authFn != nil {
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return s.authFn(r)
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}
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return s.token, s.promptID, nil
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}
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func newPassthroughHandler() http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("backend"))
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})
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}
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func TestAddDomain_ValidKey(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
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kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
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scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
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err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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mw.domainsMux.RLock()
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config, exists := mw.domains["example.com"]
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mw.domainsMux.RUnlock()
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assert.True(t, exists, "domain should be registered")
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assert.Len(t, config.Schemes, 1)
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assert.Equal(t, ed25519.PublicKeySize, len(config.SessionPublicKey))
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assert.Equal(t, time.Hour, config.SessionExpiration)
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}
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func TestAddDomain_EmptyKey(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
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scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
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err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, "", time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true)
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require.Error(t, err)
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assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid session public key size")
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mw.domainsMux.RLock()
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_, exists := mw.domains["example.com"]
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mw.domainsMux.RUnlock()
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assert.False(t, exists, "domain must not be registered with an empty session key")
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}
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func TestAddDomain_InvalidBase64(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
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scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
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err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, "not-valid-base64!!!", time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true)
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require.Error(t, err)
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assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "decode session public key")
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mw.domainsMux.RLock()
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_, exists := mw.domains["example.com"]
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mw.domainsMux.RUnlock()
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assert.False(t, exists, "domain must not be registered with invalid base64 key")
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}
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func TestAddDomain_WrongKeySize(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
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shortKey := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("tooshort"))
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scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
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err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, shortKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true)
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require.Error(t, err)
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assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid session public key size")
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mw.domainsMux.RLock()
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_, exists := mw.domains["example.com"]
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mw.domainsMux.RUnlock()
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assert.False(t, exists, "domain must not be registered with a wrong-size key")
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}
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func TestAddDomain_NoSchemes_NoKeyRequired(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
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err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true)
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require.NoError(t, err, "domains with no auth schemes should not require a key")
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mw.domainsMux.RLock()
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_, exists := mw.domains["example.com"]
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mw.domainsMux.RUnlock()
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assert.True(t, exists)
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}
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// A domain management has not marked validated is never registered, so no
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// request for it can reach a backend even if the mapping was delivered.
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func TestAddDomain_RefusesUnvalidatedDomain(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
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err := mw.AddDomain("unproven.example.com", nil, "", time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, false)
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require.Error(t, err, "an unvalidated domain must be rejected")
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assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "not validated")
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mw.domainsMux.RLock()
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_, exists := mw.domains["unproven.example.com"]
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mw.domainsMux.RUnlock()
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assert.False(t, exists, "an unvalidated domain must not be registered")
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}
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func TestAddDomain_OverwritesPreviousConfig(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
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kp1 := generateTestKeyPair(t)
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kp2 := generateTestKeyPair(t)
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scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
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require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp1.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
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require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp2.PublicKey, 2*time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
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mw.domainsMux.RLock()
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config := mw.domains["example.com"]
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mw.domainsMux.RUnlock()
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pubKeyBytes, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(kp2.PublicKey)
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assert.Equal(t, ed25519.PublicKey(pubKeyBytes), config.SessionPublicKey, "should use the latest key")
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assert.Equal(t, 2*time.Hour, config.SessionExpiration)
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}
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func TestRemoveDomain(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
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kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
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scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
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require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
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mw.RemoveDomain("example.com")
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mw.domainsMux.RLock()
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_, exists := mw.domains["example.com"]
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mw.domainsMux.RUnlock()
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assert.False(t, exists)
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}
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func TestProtect_UnknownDomainPassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
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handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://unknown.com/", nil)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
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assert.Equal(t, "backend", rec.Body.String())
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}
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func TestProtect_DomainWithNoSchemesPassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
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require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
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handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
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assert.Equal(t, "backend", rec.Body.String())
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}
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func TestProtect_UnauthenticatedRequestIsBlocked(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
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kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
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scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
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require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
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var backendCalled bool
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backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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backendCalled = true
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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})
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handler := mw.Protect(backend)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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assert.False(t, backendCalled, "unauthenticated request should not reach backend")
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}
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func TestProtect_HostWithPortIsMatched(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
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kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
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scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
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require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
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var backendCalled bool
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backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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backendCalled = true
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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})
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handler := mw.Protect(backend)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com:8443/", nil)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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assert.False(t, backendCalled, "host with port should still match the protected domain")
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}
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func TestProtect_ValidSessionCookiePassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
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kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
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scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
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require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
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token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "test-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodPIN, nil, nil, time.Hour)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
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handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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cd := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context())
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require.NotNil(t, cd)
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assert.Equal(t, "test-user", cd.GetUserID())
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assert.Equal(t, "pin", cd.GetAuthMethod())
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("authenticated"))
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}))
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
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req = req.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), capturedData))
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req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: auth.SessionCookieName, Value: token})
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
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assert.Equal(t, "authenticated", rec.Body.String())
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}
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// TestProtect_SessionCookieGroupsPropagate verifies the cookie path lifts the
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// JWT's groups claim into CapturedData so policy-aware middlewares can
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// authorise without an extra management round-trip.
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func TestProtect_SessionCookieGroupsPropagate(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
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kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
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scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
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require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
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groups := []string{"engineering", "sre"}
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token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "test-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodPIN, groups, nil, time.Hour)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
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handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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cd := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context())
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require.NotNil(t, cd, "captured data must be present in request context")
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assert.Equal(t, "test-user", cd.GetUserID())
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assert.Equal(t, groups, cd.GetUserGroups(), "JWT groups claim must propagate to CapturedData")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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}))
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
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req = req.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), capturedData))
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req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: auth.SessionCookieName, Value: token})
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "request with valid groups-bearing cookie must succeed")
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assert.Equal(t, groups, capturedData.GetUserGroups(), "CapturedData groups must be retained after handler completes")
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}
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// stubTunnelValidator implements SessionValidator for the tunnel-peer
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// path. ValidateTunnelPeer returns a fixed response so tests can assert
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// how the proxy maps it onto CapturedData, and records whether the
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// fast-path actually reached management.
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type stubTunnelValidator struct {
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called bool
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resp *proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse
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}
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func (s *stubTunnelValidator) ValidateSession(context.Context, *proto.ValidateSessionRequest, ...grpc.CallOption) (*proto.ValidateSessionResponse, error) {
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return nil, errors.New("not used in this test")
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}
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func (s *stubTunnelValidator) ValidateTunnelPeer(context.Context, *proto.ValidateTunnelPeerRequest, ...grpc.CallOption) (*proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse, error) {
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s.called = true
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return s.resp, nil
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}
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// TestProtect_PrivateService_TunnelPeerGroupsPropagate locks the agent-network
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// auth path end-to-end at the proxy edge: a Private service must route through
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// ValidateTunnelPeer and lift the returned peer_group_ids onto CapturedData so
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// the llm_router group-authorisation pass can see them. Regression guard for
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// the failure that surfaces downstream as llm_policy.no_authorised_provider —
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// i.e. a synthesised service that reaches the proxy without private=true (so
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// this path is skipped) leaves UserGroups empty and every request is denied.
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func TestProtect_PrivateService_TunnelPeerGroupsPropagate(t *testing.T) {
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groups := []string{"grp-admins", "grp-users"}
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names := []string{"Admins", "Users"}
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validator := &stubTunnelValidator{resp: &proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse{
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Valid: true,
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UserId: "user-1",
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UserEmail: "user@example.com",
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SessionToken: "tunnel-session-token",
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PeerGroupIds: groups,
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PeerGroupNames: names,
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}}
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), validator, nil)
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kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
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// Private service: no operator schemes — auth gates solely on the tunnel peer.
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require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("agent.example.com", nil, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acct-1", "svc-1", nil, true, true))
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cd := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
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cd.SetClientIP(netip.MustParseAddr("100.90.1.14")) // CGNAT tunnel source
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var seenGroups []string
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var seenUser string
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handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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c := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context())
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require.NotNil(t, c, "captured data must be present in request context")
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seenGroups = c.GetUserGroups()
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seenUser = c.GetUserID()
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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}))
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lookup := TunnelLookupFunc(func(_ netip.Addr) (PeerIdentity, bool) {
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return PeerIdentity{}, true
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})
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://agent.example.com/v1/chat/completions", nil)
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req.RemoteAddr = "100.90.1.14:5000"
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req = req.WithContext(WithTunnelLookup(proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), cd), lookup))
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "private service must authorise a tunnel peer the validator accepts")
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assert.Equal(t, groups, seenGroups, "ValidateTunnelPeer peer_group_ids must reach CapturedData.UserGroups for llm_router authorisation")
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assert.Equal(t, "user-1", seenUser, "tunnel-peer principal must reach CapturedData")
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assert.Equal(t, groups, cd.GetUserGroups(), "groups must persist on CapturedData after the handler returns")
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}
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// TestProtect_PrivateService_TunnelPeerDenied verifies the deny path: when
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// ValidateTunnelPeer rejects the peer, a Private service 403s and never reaches
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// the upstream handler (no fall-through to unauthenticated pass-through).
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func TestProtect_PrivateService_TunnelPeerDenied(t *testing.T) {
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validator := &stubTunnelValidator{resp: &proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse{
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Valid: false,
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DeniedReason: "not_in_group",
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}}
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), validator, nil)
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kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
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require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("agent.example.com", nil, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acct-1", "svc-1", nil, true, true))
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cd := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
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cd.SetClientIP(netip.MustParseAddr("100.90.1.14"))
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reached := false
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
reached = true
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
}))
|
|
lookup := TunnelLookupFunc(func(_ netip.Addr) (PeerIdentity, bool) {
|
|
return PeerIdentity{}, true
|
|
})
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://agent.example.com/v1/chat/completions", nil)
|
|
req.RemoteAddr = "100.90.1.14:5000"
|
|
req = req.WithContext(WithTunnelLookup(proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), cd), lookup))
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code, "private service must 403 when the tunnel peer is rejected")
|
|
assert.False(t, reached, "denied private request must not reach the upstream handler")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_ExpiredSessionCookieIsRejected(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
// Sign a token that expired 1 second ago.
|
|
token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "test-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodPIN, nil, nil, -time.Second)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
var backendCalled bool
|
|
backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
|
backendCalled = true
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
})
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(backend)
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: auth.SessionCookieName, Value: token})
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.False(t, backendCalled, "expired session should not reach the backend")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_WrongDomainCookieIsRejected(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
// Token signed for a different domain audience.
|
|
token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "test-user", "", "other.com", auth.MethodPIN, nil, nil, time.Hour)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
var backendCalled bool
|
|
backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
|
backendCalled = true
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
})
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(backend)
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: auth.SessionCookieName, Value: token})
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.False(t, backendCalled, "cookie for wrong domain should be rejected")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_WrongKeyCookieIsRejected(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp1 := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
kp2 := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp1.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
// Token signed with a different private key.
|
|
token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp2.PrivateKey, "test-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodPIN, nil, nil, time.Hour)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
var backendCalled bool
|
|
backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
|
backendCalled = true
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
})
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(backend)
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: auth.SessionCookieName, Value: token})
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.False(t, backendCalled, "cookie signed by wrong key should be rejected")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_SchemeAuthRedirectsWithCookie(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "pin-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodPIN, nil, nil, time.Hour)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{
|
|
method: auth.MethodPIN,
|
|
authFn: func(r *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
|
|
if r.FormValue("pin") == "111111" {
|
|
return token, "", nil
|
|
}
|
|
return "", "pin", nil
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
var backendCalled bool
|
|
backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
|
backendCalled = true
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
})
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(backend)
|
|
|
|
// Submit the PIN via form POST.
|
|
form := url.Values{"pin": {"111111"}}
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://example.com/somepath", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
|
|
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.False(t, backendCalled, "backend should not be called during auth, only a redirect should be returned")
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, rec.Code)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "/somepath", rec.Header().Get("Location"), "redirect should point to the original request URI")
|
|
|
|
cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
|
|
var sessionCookie *http.Cookie
|
|
for _, c := range cookies {
|
|
if c.Name == auth.SessionCookieName {
|
|
sessionCookie = c
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
require.NotNil(t, sessionCookie, "session cookie should be set after successful auth")
|
|
assert.True(t, sessionCookie.HttpOnly)
|
|
assert.True(t, sessionCookie.Secure)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteLaxMode, sessionCookie.SameSite)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSetSessionCookieHasRootPath(t *testing.T) {
|
|
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
setSessionCookie(w, "test-token", time.Hour)
|
|
|
|
cookies := w.Result().Cookies()
|
|
require.Len(t, cookies, 1)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "/", cookies[0].Path, "session cookie must be scoped to root so it applies to all paths")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_FailedAuthDoesNotSetCookie(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{
|
|
method: auth.MethodPIN,
|
|
authFn: func(_ *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
|
|
return "", "pin", nil
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
|
|
assert.NotEqual(t, auth.SessionCookieName, c.Name, "no session cookie should be set on failed auth")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_MultipleSchemes(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "password-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodPassword, nil, nil, time.Hour)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
// First scheme (PIN) always fails, second scheme (password) succeeds.
|
|
pinScheme := &stubScheme{
|
|
method: auth.MethodPIN,
|
|
authFn: func(_ *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
|
|
return "", "pin", nil
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
passwordScheme := &stubScheme{
|
|
method: auth.MethodPassword,
|
|
authFn: func(r *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
|
|
if r.FormValue("password") == "secret" {
|
|
return token, "", nil
|
|
}
|
|
return "", "password", nil
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{pinScheme, passwordScheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
var backendCalled bool
|
|
backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
|
backendCalled = true
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
})
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(backend)
|
|
|
|
form := url.Values{"password": {"secret"}}
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://example.com/", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
|
|
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.False(t, backendCalled, "backend should not be called during auth")
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, rec.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_InvalidTokenFromSchemeReturns400(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
// Return a garbage token that won't validate.
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{
|
|
method: auth.MethodPIN,
|
|
authFn: func(_ *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
|
|
return "invalid-jwt-token", "", nil
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, rec.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestAddDomain_RandomBytes32NotEd25519(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
|
|
// 32 random bytes that happen to be valid base64 and correct size
|
|
// but are actually a valid ed25519 public key length-wise.
|
|
// This should succeed because ed25519 public keys are just 32 bytes.
|
|
randomBytes := make([]byte, ed25519.PublicKeySize)
|
|
_, err := rand.Read(randomBytes)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
key := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(randomBytes)
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
|
|
|
|
err = mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, key, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err, "any 32-byte key should be accepted at registration time")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestAddDomain_InvalidKeyDoesNotCorruptExistingConfig(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
// Attempt to overwrite with an invalid key.
|
|
err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, "bad", time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true)
|
|
require.Error(t, err)
|
|
|
|
// The original valid config should still be intact.
|
|
mw.domainsMux.RLock()
|
|
config, exists := mw.domains["example.com"]
|
|
mw.domainsMux.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
assert.True(t, exists, "original config should still exist")
|
|
assert.Len(t, config.Schemes, 1)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, time.Hour, config.SessionExpiration)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_FailedPinAuthCapturesAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
// Scheme that always fails authentication (returns empty token)
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{
|
|
method: auth.MethodPIN,
|
|
authFn: func(_ *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
|
|
return "", "pin", nil
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
|
|
|
|
// Submit wrong PIN - should capture auth method
|
|
form := url.Values{"pin": {"wrong-pin"}}
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://example.com/", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
|
|
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
|
|
req = req.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), capturedData))
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "pin", capturedData.GetAuthMethod(), "Auth method should be captured for failed PIN auth")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_FailedPasswordAuthCapturesAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{
|
|
method: auth.MethodPassword,
|
|
authFn: func(_ *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
|
|
return "", "password", nil
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
|
|
|
|
// Submit wrong password - should capture auth method
|
|
form := url.Values{"password": {"wrong-password"}}
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://example.com/", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
|
|
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
|
|
req = req.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), capturedData))
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "password", capturedData.GetAuthMethod(), "Auth method should be captured for failed password auth")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_NoCredentialsDoesNotCaptureAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{
|
|
method: auth.MethodPIN,
|
|
authFn: func(_ *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
|
|
return "", "pin", nil
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
|
|
|
|
// No credentials submitted - should not capture auth method
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req = req.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), capturedData))
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code)
|
|
assert.Empty(t, capturedData.GetAuthMethod(), "Auth method should not be captured when no credentials submitted")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestWasCredentialSubmitted(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
method auth.Method
|
|
formData url.Values
|
|
query url.Values
|
|
expected bool
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "PIN submitted",
|
|
method: auth.MethodPIN,
|
|
formData: url.Values{"pin": {"123456"}},
|
|
expected: true,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "PIN not submitted",
|
|
method: auth.MethodPIN,
|
|
formData: url.Values{},
|
|
expected: false,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "Password submitted",
|
|
method: auth.MethodPassword,
|
|
formData: url.Values{"password": {"secret"}},
|
|
expected: true,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "Password not submitted",
|
|
method: auth.MethodPassword,
|
|
formData: url.Values{},
|
|
expected: false,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "OIDC token in query",
|
|
method: auth.MethodOIDC,
|
|
query: url.Values{"session_token": {"abc123"}},
|
|
expected: true,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "OIDC token not in query",
|
|
method: auth.MethodOIDC,
|
|
query: url.Values{},
|
|
expected: false,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
reqURL := "http://example.com/"
|
|
if len(tt.query) > 0 {
|
|
reqURL += "?" + tt.query.Encode()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var body *strings.Reader
|
|
if len(tt.formData) > 0 {
|
|
body = strings.NewReader(tt.formData.Encode())
|
|
} else {
|
|
body = strings.NewReader("")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, reqURL, body)
|
|
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
|
|
|
|
result := wasCredentialSubmitted(req, tt.method)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, result)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestCheckIPRestrictions_UnparseableAddress(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
|
|
err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", 0, "acc1", "svc1",
|
|
restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"10.0.0.0/8"}}), false, true)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
}))
|
|
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
remoteAddr string
|
|
wantCode int
|
|
}{
|
|
{"unparsable address denies", "not-an-ip:1234", http.StatusForbidden},
|
|
{"empty address denies", "", http.StatusForbidden},
|
|
{"allowed address passes", "10.1.2.3:5678", http.StatusOK},
|
|
{"denied address blocked", "192.168.1.1:5678", http.StatusForbidden},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.RemoteAddr = tt.remoteAddr
|
|
req.Host = "example.com"
|
|
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, tt.wantCode, rr.Code)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestCheckIPRestrictions_UsesCapturedDataClientIP(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// When CapturedData is set (by the access log middleware, which resolves
|
|
// trusted proxies), checkIPRestrictions should use that IP, not RemoteAddr.
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
|
|
err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", 0, "acc1", "svc1",
|
|
restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"203.0.113.0/24"}}), false, true)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
}))
|
|
|
|
// RemoteAddr is a trusted proxy, but CapturedData has the real client IP.
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:5000"
|
|
req.Host = "example.com"
|
|
|
|
cd := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
|
|
cd.SetClientIP(netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"))
|
|
ctx := proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), cd)
|
|
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
|
|
|
|
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "should use CapturedData IP (203.0.113.50), not RemoteAddr (10.0.0.1)")
|
|
|
|
// Same request but CapturedData has a blocked IP.
|
|
req2 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req2.RemoteAddr = "203.0.113.50:5000"
|
|
req2.Host = "example.com"
|
|
|
|
cd2 := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
|
|
cd2.SetClientIP(netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1"))
|
|
ctx2 := proxy.WithCapturedData(req2.Context(), cd2)
|
|
req2 = req2.WithContext(ctx2)
|
|
|
|
rr2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rr2, req2)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rr2.Code, "should use CapturedData IP (10.0.0.1), not RemoteAddr (203.0.113.50)")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestCheckIPRestrictions_NilGeoWithCountryRules(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Geo is nil, country restrictions are configured: must deny (fail-close).
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
|
|
err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", 0, "acc1", "svc1",
|
|
restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCountries: []string{"US"}}), false, true)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
}))
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.RemoteAddr = "1.2.3.4:5678"
|
|
req.Host = "example.com"
|
|
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rr.Code, "country restrictions with nil geo must deny")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestCheckIPRestrictions_OverlayOriginSkipsCountryRules covers the
|
|
// inbound (WG) listener path: requests stamped with WithOverlayOrigin
|
|
// must skip country lookups, even when no geo database is configured.
|
|
// Without this short-circuit the inbound flow would fail-closed for
|
|
// every overlay request whenever country rules are configured.
|
|
func TestCheckIPRestrictions_OverlayOriginSkipsCountryRules(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
|
|
err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", 0, "acc1", "svc1",
|
|
restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{
|
|
AllowedCIDRs: []string{"100.64.0.0/10"},
|
|
AllowedCountries: []string{"US"},
|
|
}), false, true)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
}))
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.RemoteAddr = "100.64.5.6:5000"
|
|
req.Host = "example.com"
|
|
req = req.WithContext(types.WithOverlayOrigin(req.Context()))
|
|
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code,
|
|
"overlay-origin requests must not be denied by country rules they would fail without geo data")
|
|
|
|
// Sanity check: the same filter without the overlay flag denies (no geo,
|
|
// country allowlist active → DenyGeoUnavailable).
|
|
req2 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req2.RemoteAddr = "100.64.5.6:5000"
|
|
req2.Host = "example.com"
|
|
rr2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rr2, req2)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rr2.Code,
|
|
"WAN-origin requests must still hit the full Check path and be denied without geo data")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestCheckIPRestrictions_OverlayOriginRespectsCIDR confirms CIDR
|
|
// rules still apply on the overlay path so operators retain a way to
|
|
// scope private services to specific peer subnets.
|
|
func TestCheckIPRestrictions_OverlayOriginRespectsCIDR(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
|
|
err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", 0, "acc1", "svc1",
|
|
restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"100.64.0.0/16"}}), false, true)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
}))
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.RemoteAddr = "100.65.5.6:5000" // outside 100.64.0.0/16
|
|
req.Host = "example.com"
|
|
req = req.WithContext(types.WithOverlayOrigin(req.Context()))
|
|
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rr.Code,
|
|
"CIDR rules must still apply on the overlay path")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_OIDCOnlyRedirectsDirectly(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
oidcURL := "https://idp.example.com/authorize?client_id=abc"
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{
|
|
method: auth.MethodOIDC,
|
|
authFn: func(_ *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
|
|
return "", oidcURL, nil
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{}
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusFound, rec.Code, "should redirect directly to IdP")
|
|
assert.Equal(t, oidcURL, rec.Header().Get("Location"))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_OIDCWithOtherMethodShowsLoginPage(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
oidcScheme := &stubScheme{
|
|
method: auth.MethodOIDC,
|
|
authFn: func(_ *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
|
|
return "", "https://idp.example.com/authorize", nil
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
pinScheme := &stubScheme{
|
|
method: auth.MethodPIN,
|
|
authFn: func(_ *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
|
|
return "", "pin", nil
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{oidcScheme, pinScheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{}
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code, "should show login page when multiple methods exist")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// mockAuthenticator is a minimal mock for the authenticator gRPC interface
|
|
// used by the Header scheme.
|
|
type mockAuthenticator struct {
|
|
fn func(ctx context.Context, req *proto.AuthenticateRequest) (*proto.AuthenticateResponse, error)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (m *mockAuthenticator) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, in *proto.AuthenticateRequest, _ ...grpc.CallOption) (*proto.AuthenticateResponse, error) {
|
|
return m.fn(ctx, in)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// newHeaderSchemeWithToken creates a Header scheme backed by a mock that
|
|
// returns a signed session token when the expected header value is provided.
|
|
func newHeaderSchemeWithToken(t *testing.T, kp *sessionkey.KeyPair, headerName, expectedValue string) Header {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "header-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodHeader, nil, nil, time.Hour)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
mock := &mockAuthenticator{fn: func(_ context.Context, req *proto.AuthenticateRequest) (*proto.AuthenticateResponse, error) {
|
|
ha := req.GetHeaderAuth()
|
|
if ha != nil && ha.GetHeaderValue() == expectedValue {
|
|
return &proto.AuthenticateResponse{Success: true, SessionToken: token}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return &proto.AuthenticateResponse{Success: false}, nil
|
|
}}
|
|
return NewHeader(mock, "svc1", "acc1", headerName)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_ForwardsOnSuccess(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
hdr := newHeaderSchemeWithToken(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
var backendCalled bool
|
|
capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
|
backendCalled = true
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok"))
|
|
}))
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/path", nil)
|
|
req.Header.Set("X-API-Key", "secret-key")
|
|
req = req.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), capturedData))
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.True(t, backendCalled, "backend should be called directly for header auth (no redirect)")
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "ok", rec.Body.String())
|
|
|
|
// Session cookie should be set.
|
|
var sessionCookie *http.Cookie
|
|
for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
|
|
if c.Name == auth.SessionCookieName {
|
|
sessionCookie = c
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
require.NotNil(t, sessionCookie, "session cookie should be set after successful header auth")
|
|
assert.True(t, sessionCookie.HttpOnly)
|
|
assert.True(t, sessionCookie.Secure)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "header-user", capturedData.GetUserID())
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "header", capturedData.GetAuthMethod())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_MissingHeaderFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
hdr := newHeaderSchemeWithToken(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
|
|
// Also add a PIN scheme so we can verify fallthrough behavior.
|
|
pinScheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr, pinScheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
|
|
|
|
// No X-API-Key header: should fall through to PIN login page (401).
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code, "missing header should fall through to login page")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_WrongValueReturns401(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
mock := &mockAuthenticator{fn: func(_ context.Context, _ *proto.AuthenticateRequest) (*proto.AuthenticateResponse, error) {
|
|
return &proto.AuthenticateResponse{Success: false}, nil
|
|
}}
|
|
hdr := NewHeader(mock, "svc1", "acc1", "X-API-Key")
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.Header.Set("X-API-Key", "wrong-key")
|
|
req = req.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), capturedData))
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "header", capturedData.GetAuthMethod())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_InfraErrorReturns502(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
mock := &mockAuthenticator{fn: func(_ context.Context, _ *proto.AuthenticateRequest) (*proto.AuthenticateResponse, error) {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("gRPC unavailable")
|
|
}}
|
|
hdr := NewHeader(mock, "svc1", "acc1", "X-API-Key")
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.Header.Set("X-API-Key", "some-key")
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadGateway, rec.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_SubsequentRequestUsesSessionCookie(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
hdr := newHeaderSchemeWithToken(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
}))
|
|
|
|
// First request with header auth.
|
|
req1 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req1.Header.Set("X-API-Key", "secret-key")
|
|
req1 = req1.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(req1.Context(), proxy.NewCapturedData("")))
|
|
rec1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec1, req1)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec1.Code)
|
|
|
|
// Extract session cookie.
|
|
var sessionCookie *http.Cookie
|
|
for _, c := range rec1.Result().Cookies() {
|
|
if c.Name == auth.SessionCookieName {
|
|
sessionCookie = c
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
require.NotNil(t, sessionCookie)
|
|
|
|
// Second request with only the session cookie (no header).
|
|
capturedData2 := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
|
|
req2 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/other", nil)
|
|
req2.AddCookie(sessionCookie)
|
|
req2 = req2.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(req2.Context(), capturedData2))
|
|
rec2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec2, req2)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec2.Code)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "header-user", capturedData2.GetUserID())
|
|
assert.Equal(t, "header", capturedData2.GetAuthMethod())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestProtect_HeaderAuth_MultipleValuesSameHeader verifies that the proxy
|
|
// correctly handles multiple valid credentials for the same header name.
|
|
// In production, the mgmt gRPC authenticateHeader iterates all configured
|
|
// header auths and accepts if any hash matches (OR semantics). The proxy
|
|
// creates one Header scheme per entry, but a single gRPC call checks all.
|
|
func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_MultipleValuesSameHeader(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
// Mock simulates mgmt behavior: accepts either token-a or token-b.
|
|
accepted := map[string]bool{"Bearer token-a": true, "Bearer token-b": true}
|
|
mock := &mockAuthenticator{fn: func(_ context.Context, req *proto.AuthenticateRequest) (*proto.AuthenticateResponse, error) {
|
|
ha := req.GetHeaderAuth()
|
|
if ha != nil && accepted[ha.GetHeaderValue()] {
|
|
token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "header-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodHeader, nil, nil, time.Hour)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
return &proto.AuthenticateResponse{Success: true, SessionToken: token}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return &proto.AuthenticateResponse{Success: false}, nil
|
|
}}
|
|
|
|
// Single Header scheme (as if one entry existed), but the mock checks both values.
|
|
hdr := NewHeader(mock, "svc1", "acc1", "Authorization")
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
var backendCalled bool
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
|
|
backendCalled = true
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
}))
|
|
|
|
t.Run("first value accepted", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
backendCalled = false
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer token-a")
|
|
req = req.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), proxy.NewCapturedData("")))
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
|
|
assert.True(t, backendCalled, "first token should be accepted")
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("second value accepted", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
backendCalled = false
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer token-b")
|
|
req = req.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), proxy.NewCapturedData("")))
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
|
|
assert.True(t, backendCalled, "second token should be accepted")
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("unknown value rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
backendCalled = false
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer token-c")
|
|
req = req.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), proxy.NewCapturedData("")))
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code)
|
|
assert.False(t, backendCalled, "unknown token should be rejected")
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestProtect_OIDCOnPlainHTTP_BlockedWith400 verifies that when an OIDC
|
|
// scheme is configured and the request arrived without TLS, the middleware
|
|
// short-circuits with a 400 instead of dispatching to the IdP redirect.
|
|
func TestProtect_OIDCOnPlainHTTP_BlockedWith400(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{
|
|
method: auth.MethodOIDC,
|
|
authFn: func(_ *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
|
|
return "", "https://idp.example.com/authorize", nil
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, rec.Code, "OIDC over plain HTTP should be rejected")
|
|
assert.Contains(t, rec.Body.String(), "OIDC requires TLS", "response body should explain the rejection")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestProtect_OIDCOverTLS_NotBlocked confirms the same configuration works
|
|
// over TLS — the block only fires on plain HTTP.
|
|
func TestProtect_OIDCOverTLS_NotBlocked(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{
|
|
method: auth.MethodOIDC,
|
|
authFn: func(_ *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
|
|
return "", "https://idp.example.com/authorize", nil
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{}
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusFound, rec.Code, "OIDC over TLS should redirect to IdP")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestProtect_NonOIDCSchemes_PlainHTTP_NotBlocked confirms that the OIDC
|
|
// block only fires when an OIDC scheme is configured. PIN-only domains
|
|
// pass through normally on plain HTTP.
|
|
func TestProtect_NonOIDCSchemes_PlainHTTP_NotBlocked(t *testing.T) {
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code, "PIN-only domain should serve the login page on plain HTTP")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestProtect_TunnelPeerFastPath_RequiresInboundMarker guards the
|
|
// anti-spoof gate: a request with an RFC1918 source IP arriving on the
|
|
// public listener (no TunnelLookupFromContext attached) must not be
|
|
// allowed to take the tunnel-peer fast-path. Without this gate a public
|
|
// client whose source IP happens to fall inside an RFC1918 range could
|
|
// bypass the configured auth scheme by colliding with a known tunnel
|
|
// IP.
|
|
func TestProtect_TunnelPeerFastPath_RequiresInboundMarker(t *testing.T) {
|
|
validator := &stubTunnelValidator{
|
|
resp: &proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse{
|
|
Valid: true,
|
|
SessionToken: "should-not-be-used",
|
|
UserId: "user-1",
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), validator, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
|
|
|
|
// Request from an RFC1918 source IP on the public listener — no
|
|
// TunnelLookupFromContext attached. The fast-path must reject this
|
|
// and fall through to the PIN scheme (which renders 401 on plain
|
|
// HTTP for a non-authenticated request).
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.RemoteAddr = "100.64.0.5:5000"
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.False(t, validator.called,
|
|
"ValidateTunnelPeer must not be invoked when the request lacks the inbound TunnelLookup marker")
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code,
|
|
"without the inbound marker the request must fall through to the operator auth scheme")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestProtect_TunnelPeerFastPath_TakesPathWithInboundMarker verifies
|
|
// the positive side: a request marked as overlay-origin (carrying the
|
|
// TunnelLookup context value) and matching a tunnel-IP range does take
|
|
// the fast-path and reach management.
|
|
func TestProtect_TunnelPeerFastPath_TakesPathWithInboundMarker(t *testing.T) {
|
|
validator := &stubTunnelValidator{
|
|
resp: &proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse{
|
|
Valid: true,
|
|
SessionToken: "tunnel-session-token",
|
|
UserId: "user-1",
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), validator, nil)
|
|
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
|
|
|
|
scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
|
|
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false, true))
|
|
|
|
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
|
|
|
|
lookup := TunnelLookupFunc(func(_ netip.Addr) (PeerIdentity, bool) {
|
|
return PeerIdentity{}, true
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
|
|
req.RemoteAddr = "100.64.0.5:5000"
|
|
req = req.WithContext(WithTunnelLookup(req.Context(), lookup))
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
assert.True(t, validator.called,
|
|
"ValidateTunnelPeer must run when the request carries the inbound TunnelLookup marker")
|
|
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code,
|
|
"a successful tunnel-peer validation must forward to the next handler")
|
|
}
|