Files
netbird/proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_guardrail/middleware_test.go
Maycon Santos bab5572a74 [management, proxy] scope agent-network model allowlist per policy/group and provider (#6905)
## Describe your changes

The model-allowlist guardrail was merged into one account-wide union and
enforced flat on every request, ignoring which policy/group/provider
authorised it. With multiple policies — especially a mix of guardrailed
and un-guardrailed ones — this caused:

- **false-allow**: a model allowlisted for one group/provider leaked to
any caller; and
- **false-deny**: an un-guardrailed policy (intended unrestricted) was
blocked by another policy's allowlist.

Enforcement is now policy/group-aware, mirroring `llm_limit_check`:

- **Management (`SelectPolicyForRequest`) is authoritative.** It uses
the request model (already carried in
`CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest.model`, previously ignored) to keep only
applicable policies whose guardrails permit the model; no
allowlist-enabled guardrail = unrestricted. Denies
`llm_policy.model_blocked` when policies govern the (provider, groups)
but none permits the model.
- **Proxy `llm_guardrail` becomes a per-provider fail-closed backstop.**
The synthesiser emits an allowlist only for providers every authorising
policy restricts; the middleware keys off the resolved provider id and
keeps unknown-model fail-closed.
2026-07-27 20:43:59 +02:00

346 lines
15 KiB
Go

package llm_guardrail
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware"
)
func metaValue(t *testing.T, kvs []middleware.KV, key string) (string, bool) {
t.Helper()
for _, kv := range kvs {
if kv.Key == key {
return kv.Value, true
}
}
return "", false
}
func newInput(meta ...middleware.KV) *middleware.Input {
return &middleware.Input{Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest, Metadata: meta}
}
const (
testProvider = "prov-1"
otherProvider = "prov-2"
)
// providerCfg builds a Config restricting testProvider to the given models.
func providerCfg(models ...string) Config {
return Config{ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{testProvider: models}}
}
// newInputProvider builds an input that carries a resolved provider id (as
// llm_router would stamp) plus any extra metadata.
func newInputProvider(provider string, meta ...middleware.KV) *middleware.Input {
all := make([]middleware.KV, 0, len(meta)+1)
all = append(all, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID, Value: provider})
all = append(all, meta...)
return &middleware.Input{Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest, Metadata: all}
}
func TestMiddlewareIdentity(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{})
assert.Equal(t, ID, mw.ID(), "middleware ID must be llm_guardrail")
assert.Equal(t, "1.0.0", mw.Version(), "version must be 1.0.0")
assert.Equal(t, middleware.SlotOnRequest, mw.Slot(), "guardrail must run in SlotOnRequest")
assert.False(t, mw.MutationsSupported(), "guardrail must not mutate requests")
assert.Equal(t, []string{"application/json"}, mw.AcceptedContentTypes(), "guardrail accepts application/json bodies")
assert.Equal(t,
[]string{
middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision,
middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason,
middleware.KeyLLMRequestPrompt,
},
mw.MetadataKeys(),
"metadata key allowlist must match the spec",
)
require.NoError(t, mw.Close())
}
func TestAllowlistEmptyAllowsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "no provider allowlists must allow any model")
v, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision)
require.True(t, ok, "decision metadata must be emitted")
assert.Equal(t, "allow", v, "decision must be allow")
r, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason)
require.True(t, ok, "reason metadata must be emitted")
assert.Equal(t, "", r, "reason must be empty on allow")
}
func TestAllowlistMatchAllows(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o", "claude-opus-4"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "model in allowlist must be allowed")
}
func TestAllowlistMissDenies(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "non-allowlisted model must be denied")
assert.Equal(t, 403, out.DenyStatus, "deny status must be 403")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must match spec")
assert.Equal(t, "model is not in the policy allowlist", out.DenyReason.Message, "deny message must match spec")
assert.Equal(t, "claude-opus-4", out.DenyReason.Details["model"], "deny details must include the offending model")
dec, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision)
assert.Equal(t, "deny", dec, "decision metadata must be deny")
reason, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "model_blocked", reason, "reason metadata must be model_blocked")
}
func TestAllowlistCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(providerCfg(" GPT-4o ", "Claude-OPUS-4"))
cases := []string{"gpt-4o", "GPT-4O", " claude-opus-4 "}
for _, model := range cases {
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: model},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "case/whitespace variants must match: %q", model)
}
}
func TestAllowlistMissingModelKeyDenies(t *testing.T) {
// Fail closed: with an allowlist in effect for the resolved provider, a
// request whose model the parser could not extract (URL/path-routed
// providers such as Bedrock or Vertex whose shape wasn't recognised) must be
// denied, not allowed.
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "absent model must be denied when the provider is restricted")
assert.Equal(t, 403, out.DenyStatus, "deny status must be 403")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
dec, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision)
assert.Equal(t, "deny", dec, "decision must be deny when model key is absent")
reason, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "model_unknown", reason, "reason metadata must be model_unknown")
}
func TestAllowlistEmptyModelValueDenies(t *testing.T) {
// A present-but-empty model is as undeterminable as an absent one.
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: " "},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "empty model must be denied when the provider is restricted")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
}
func TestAllowlistEmptyListAllowsMissingModel(t *testing.T) {
// Without any provider allowlists there is nothing to enforce, so a missing
// model is still allowed — the fail-closed rule only applies when a
// restriction is in effect.
mw := New(Config{})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "no allowlist must allow even without a model")
}
func TestUnrestrictedProviderAllowsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
// The request resolved to otherProvider, which has no allowlist, so its
// traffic must not be caught by testProvider's restriction — the
// cross-provider-leak / false-deny guard.
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(otherProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "an unrestricted provider must not inherit another provider's allowlist")
}
func TestPerProviderAllowlistsAreIsolated(t *testing.T) {
// gpt-4o is allowed only on testProvider; claude-opus-4 only on
// otherProvider. A model allowlisted for one provider must not be usable on
// the other — the fail-closed layer never unions allowlists across providers.
mw := New(Config{ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{
testProvider: {"gpt-4o"},
otherProvider: {"claude-opus-4"},
}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "claude-opus-4 is allowed only on otherProvider, not testProvider")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "cross-provider model must be blocked, not model_unknown")
}
func TestRestrictionsButNoResolvedProviderFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
// Restrictions exist for the account but the resolved provider id is absent,
// so the request cannot be scoped to a provider. Fail closed rather than
// wave it through.
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "missing resolved provider must fail closed when restrictions exist")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
}
func TestEnabledButEmptyAllowlistDeniesEveryModel(t *testing.T) {
// An allowlist-enabled provider with zero models is distinct from an
// unrestricted (absent) provider: it must deny every model.
mw := New(providerCfg())
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "an enabled-but-empty allowlist must deny every model")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_blocked, not model_unknown")
}
func TestFactoryAllEmptyEntriesDenyEveryModel(t *testing.T) {
// All the provider's entries are blank; they collapse to a non-nil empty
// list (deny everything for that provider), not "no restriction".
raw := []byte(`{"provider_allowlists":{"prov-1":[""," "]}}`)
mw, err := Factory{}.New(raw)
require.NoError(t, err)
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "all-blank allowlist entries must still restrict the provider")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_blocked")
}
func TestPromptCaptureDisabledEmitsNoPrompt(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMRequestPromptRaw, Value: "hello world"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
_, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMRequestPrompt)
assert.False(t, ok, "prompt must not be emitted when capture is disabled")
}
func TestPromptCaptureNoRedactionEmitsRaw(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true}})
raw := "hello world from user@example.com"
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMRequestPromptRaw, Value: raw},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
prompt, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMRequestPrompt)
require.True(t, ok, "prompt must be emitted when capture is enabled")
assert.Equal(t, raw, prompt, "prompt must pass through unchanged when redaction is off")
}
func TestPromptCaptureWithRedactionRedacts(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true, RedactPii: true}})
raw := "contact me at user@example.com or +14155551234"
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMRequestPromptRaw, Value: raw},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
prompt, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMRequestPrompt)
require.True(t, ok, "prompt must be emitted when capture is enabled")
assert.Contains(t, prompt, "[REDACTED:email]", "email must be redacted")
assert.Contains(t, prompt, "[REDACTED:phone]", "phone must be redacted")
assert.NotContains(t, prompt, "user@example.com", "raw email must not leak")
}
func TestPromptCaptureRedactionTruncatesIfGrows(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true, RedactPii: true}})
body := strings.Repeat("a", maxPromptBytes-10) + " user@example.com"
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMRequestPromptRaw, Value: body},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
prompt, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMRequestPrompt)
require.True(t, ok, "prompt must be emitted when capture is enabled")
assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(prompt), maxPromptBytes, "prompt must be truncated to maxPromptBytes")
}
func TestPromptCaptureMissingRawNoEmit(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true, RedactPii: true}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
require.NoError(t, err)
_, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMRequestPrompt)
assert.False(t, ok, "prompt must not be emitted when raw key is missing")
}
func TestFactoryAcceptsZeroConfigs(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string][]byte{
"nil": nil,
"empty": []byte(""),
"whitespace": []byte(" \n "),
"null": []byte("null"),
"emptyObject": []byte("{}"),
}
f := Factory{}
for name, raw := range cases {
mw, err := f.New(raw)
require.NoError(t, err, "case %s must yield a zero-value config", name)
require.NotNil(t, mw)
assert.Equal(t, ID, mw.ID(), "case %s must build a guardrail middleware", name)
}
}
func TestFactoryDecodesValidConfig(t *testing.T) {
cfg := Config{
ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{testProvider: {"gpt-4o"}},
PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true, RedactPii: true},
}
raw, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err, "marshalling test config must succeed")
mw, err := Factory{}.New(raw)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, mw)
}
func TestFactoryRejectsMalformedJSON(t *testing.T) {
mw, err := Factory{}.New([]byte("{not-json"))
assert.Error(t, err, "malformed JSON must surface as a factory error")
assert.Nil(t, mw, "no middleware must be returned on malformed config")
}
func TestFactoryNormalisesAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
raw := []byte(`{"provider_allowlists":{"prov-1":[" GPT-4o ","",""," Claude-3 "]}}`)
mw, err := Factory{}.New(raw)
require.NoError(t, err)
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "factory must lowercase + trim allowlist entries")
out2, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-3"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out2.Decision, "trimmed entry must still match")
}