mirror of
https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird.git
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## Describe your changes The model-allowlist guardrail was merged into one account-wide union and enforced flat on every request, ignoring which policy/group/provider authorised it. With multiple policies — especially a mix of guardrailed and un-guardrailed ones — this caused: - **false-allow**: a model allowlisted for one group/provider leaked to any caller; and - **false-deny**: an un-guardrailed policy (intended unrestricted) was blocked by another policy's allowlist. Enforcement is now policy/group-aware, mirroring `llm_limit_check`: - **Management (`SelectPolicyForRequest`) is authoritative.** It uses the request model (already carried in `CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest.model`, previously ignored) to keep only applicable policies whose guardrails permit the model; no allowlist-enabled guardrail = unrestricted. Denies `llm_policy.model_blocked` when policies govern the (provider, groups) but none permits the model. - **Proxy `llm_guardrail` becomes a per-provider fail-closed backstop.** The synthesiser emits an allowlist only for providers every authorising policy restricts; the middleware keys off the resolved provider id and keeps unknown-model fail-closed.
346 lines
15 KiB
Go
346 lines
15 KiB
Go
package llm_guardrail
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware"
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)
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func metaValue(t *testing.T, kvs []middleware.KV, key string) (string, bool) {
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t.Helper()
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for _, kv := range kvs {
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if kv.Key == key {
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return kv.Value, true
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}
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}
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return "", false
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}
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func newInput(meta ...middleware.KV) *middleware.Input {
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return &middleware.Input{Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest, Metadata: meta}
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}
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const (
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testProvider = "prov-1"
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otherProvider = "prov-2"
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)
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// providerCfg builds a Config restricting testProvider to the given models.
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func providerCfg(models ...string) Config {
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return Config{ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{testProvider: models}}
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}
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// newInputProvider builds an input that carries a resolved provider id (as
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// llm_router would stamp) plus any extra metadata.
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func newInputProvider(provider string, meta ...middleware.KV) *middleware.Input {
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all := make([]middleware.KV, 0, len(meta)+1)
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all = append(all, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID, Value: provider})
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all = append(all, meta...)
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return &middleware.Input{Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest, Metadata: all}
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}
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func TestMiddlewareIdentity(t *testing.T) {
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mw := New(Config{})
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assert.Equal(t, ID, mw.ID(), "middleware ID must be llm_guardrail")
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assert.Equal(t, "1.0.0", mw.Version(), "version must be 1.0.0")
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.SlotOnRequest, mw.Slot(), "guardrail must run in SlotOnRequest")
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assert.False(t, mw.MutationsSupported(), "guardrail must not mutate requests")
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assert.Equal(t, []string{"application/json"}, mw.AcceptedContentTypes(), "guardrail accepts application/json bodies")
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assert.Equal(t,
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[]string{
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middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision,
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middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason,
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middleware.KeyLLMRequestPrompt,
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},
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mw.MetadataKeys(),
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"metadata key allowlist must match the spec",
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)
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require.NoError(t, mw.Close())
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}
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func TestAllowlistEmptyAllowsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
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mw := New(Config{})
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotNil(t, out)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "no provider allowlists must allow any model")
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v, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision)
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require.True(t, ok, "decision metadata must be emitted")
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assert.Equal(t, "allow", v, "decision must be allow")
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r, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason)
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require.True(t, ok, "reason metadata must be emitted")
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assert.Equal(t, "", r, "reason must be empty on allow")
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}
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func TestAllowlistMatchAllows(t *testing.T) {
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mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o", "claude-opus-4"))
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "model in allowlist must be allowed")
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}
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func TestAllowlistMissDenies(t *testing.T) {
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mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotNil(t, out)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "non-allowlisted model must be denied")
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assert.Equal(t, 403, out.DenyStatus, "deny status must be 403")
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require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
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assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must match spec")
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assert.Equal(t, "model is not in the policy allowlist", out.DenyReason.Message, "deny message must match spec")
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assert.Equal(t, "claude-opus-4", out.DenyReason.Details["model"], "deny details must include the offending model")
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dec, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision)
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assert.Equal(t, "deny", dec, "decision metadata must be deny")
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reason, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason)
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assert.Equal(t, "model_blocked", reason, "reason metadata must be model_blocked")
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}
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func TestAllowlistCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
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mw := New(providerCfg(" GPT-4o ", "Claude-OPUS-4"))
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cases := []string{"gpt-4o", "GPT-4O", " claude-opus-4 "}
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for _, model := range cases {
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: model},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "case/whitespace variants must match: %q", model)
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}
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}
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func TestAllowlistMissingModelKeyDenies(t *testing.T) {
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// Fail closed: with an allowlist in effect for the resolved provider, a
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// request whose model the parser could not extract (URL/path-routed
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// providers such as Bedrock or Vertex whose shape wasn't recognised) must be
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// denied, not allowed.
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mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotNil(t, out)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "absent model must be denied when the provider is restricted")
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assert.Equal(t, 403, out.DenyStatus, "deny status must be 403")
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require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
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assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
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dec, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision)
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assert.Equal(t, "deny", dec, "decision must be deny when model key is absent")
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reason, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason)
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assert.Equal(t, "model_unknown", reason, "reason metadata must be model_unknown")
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}
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func TestAllowlistEmptyModelValueDenies(t *testing.T) {
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// A present-but-empty model is as undeterminable as an absent one.
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mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: " "},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotNil(t, out)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "empty model must be denied when the provider is restricted")
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require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
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assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
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}
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func TestAllowlistEmptyListAllowsMissingModel(t *testing.T) {
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// Without any provider allowlists there is nothing to enforce, so a missing
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// model is still allowed — the fail-closed rule only applies when a
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// restriction is in effect.
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mw := New(Config{})
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "no allowlist must allow even without a model")
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}
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func TestUnrestrictedProviderAllowsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
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// The request resolved to otherProvider, which has no allowlist, so its
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// traffic must not be caught by testProvider's restriction — the
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// cross-provider-leak / false-deny guard.
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mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(otherProvider,
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "an unrestricted provider must not inherit another provider's allowlist")
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}
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func TestPerProviderAllowlistsAreIsolated(t *testing.T) {
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// gpt-4o is allowed only on testProvider; claude-opus-4 only on
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// otherProvider. A model allowlisted for one provider must not be usable on
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// the other — the fail-closed layer never unions allowlists across providers.
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mw := New(Config{ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{
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testProvider: {"gpt-4o"},
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otherProvider: {"claude-opus-4"},
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}})
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "claude-opus-4 is allowed only on otherProvider, not testProvider")
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require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
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assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "cross-provider model must be blocked, not model_unknown")
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}
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func TestRestrictionsButNoResolvedProviderFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
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// Restrictions exist for the account but the resolved provider id is absent,
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// so the request cannot be scoped to a provider. Fail closed rather than
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// wave it through.
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mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotNil(t, out)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "missing resolved provider must fail closed when restrictions exist")
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require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
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assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
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}
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func TestEnabledButEmptyAllowlistDeniesEveryModel(t *testing.T) {
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// An allowlist-enabled provider with zero models is distinct from an
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// unrestricted (absent) provider: it must deny every model.
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mw := New(providerCfg())
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotNil(t, out)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "an enabled-but-empty allowlist must deny every model")
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require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
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assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_blocked, not model_unknown")
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}
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func TestFactoryAllEmptyEntriesDenyEveryModel(t *testing.T) {
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// All the provider's entries are blank; they collapse to a non-nil empty
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// list (deny everything for that provider), not "no restriction".
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raw := []byte(`{"provider_allowlists":{"prov-1":[""," "]}}`)
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mw, err := Factory{}.New(raw)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotNil(t, out)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "all-blank allowlist entries must still restrict the provider")
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require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
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assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_blocked")
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}
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func TestPromptCaptureDisabledEmitsNoPrompt(t *testing.T) {
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mw := New(Config{})
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMRequestPromptRaw, Value: "hello world"},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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_, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMRequestPrompt)
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assert.False(t, ok, "prompt must not be emitted when capture is disabled")
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}
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func TestPromptCaptureNoRedactionEmitsRaw(t *testing.T) {
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mw := New(Config{PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true}})
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raw := "hello world from user@example.com"
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMRequestPromptRaw, Value: raw},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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prompt, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMRequestPrompt)
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require.True(t, ok, "prompt must be emitted when capture is enabled")
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assert.Equal(t, raw, prompt, "prompt must pass through unchanged when redaction is off")
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}
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func TestPromptCaptureWithRedactionRedacts(t *testing.T) {
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mw := New(Config{PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true, RedactPii: true}})
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raw := "contact me at user@example.com or +14155551234"
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMRequestPromptRaw, Value: raw},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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prompt, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMRequestPrompt)
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require.True(t, ok, "prompt must be emitted when capture is enabled")
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assert.Contains(t, prompt, "[REDACTED:email]", "email must be redacted")
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assert.Contains(t, prompt, "[REDACTED:phone]", "phone must be redacted")
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assert.NotContains(t, prompt, "user@example.com", "raw email must not leak")
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}
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func TestPromptCaptureRedactionTruncatesIfGrows(t *testing.T) {
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mw := New(Config{PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true, RedactPii: true}})
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body := strings.Repeat("a", maxPromptBytes-10) + " user@example.com"
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMRequestPromptRaw, Value: body},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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prompt, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMRequestPrompt)
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require.True(t, ok, "prompt must be emitted when capture is enabled")
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assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(prompt), maxPromptBytes, "prompt must be truncated to maxPromptBytes")
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}
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func TestPromptCaptureMissingRawNoEmit(t *testing.T) {
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mw := New(Config{PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true, RedactPii: true}})
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
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require.NoError(t, err)
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_, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMRequestPrompt)
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assert.False(t, ok, "prompt must not be emitted when raw key is missing")
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}
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func TestFactoryAcceptsZeroConfigs(t *testing.T) {
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cases := map[string][]byte{
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"nil": nil,
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"empty": []byte(""),
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"whitespace": []byte(" \n "),
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"null": []byte("null"),
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"emptyObject": []byte("{}"),
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}
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f := Factory{}
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for name, raw := range cases {
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mw, err := f.New(raw)
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require.NoError(t, err, "case %s must yield a zero-value config", name)
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require.NotNil(t, mw)
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assert.Equal(t, ID, mw.ID(), "case %s must build a guardrail middleware", name)
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}
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}
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func TestFactoryDecodesValidConfig(t *testing.T) {
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cfg := Config{
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ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{testProvider: {"gpt-4o"}},
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PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true, RedactPii: true},
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}
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raw, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
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require.NoError(t, err, "marshalling test config must succeed")
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mw, err := Factory{}.New(raw)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotNil(t, mw)
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}
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func TestFactoryRejectsMalformedJSON(t *testing.T) {
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mw, err := Factory{}.New([]byte("{not-json"))
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assert.Error(t, err, "malformed JSON must surface as a factory error")
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assert.Nil(t, mw, "no middleware must be returned on malformed config")
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}
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func TestFactoryNormalisesAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
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raw := []byte(`{"provider_allowlists":{"prov-1":[" GPT-4o ","",""," Claude-3 "]}}`)
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mw, err := Factory{}.New(raw)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "factory must lowercase + trim allowlist entries")
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out2, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
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middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-3"},
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))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out2.Decision, "trimmed entry must still match")
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}
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