Files
netbird/e2e/agentnetwork/guardrail_test.go
Maycon Santos 277d8e4c53 [proxy] enforce model allowlist for URL-routed providers (Bedrock/Vertex) (#6764)
## Describe your changes

The Agent Network policy Guardrail "Model Allowlist" was not enforced
for providers whose model travels in the URL/path rather than the JSON
body — most visibly AWS Bedrock (reported in netbirdio/netbird#6751),
and the same class applies to Google Vertex.

Root cause: the `llm_guardrail` allowlist check **failed open**.
`evaluateAllowlist` returned allow whenever the request model was absent
from the metadata bag (`middleware.go`, `if !modelPresent { return nil
}`). The model is stamped upstream by `llm_request_parser`; for
body-routed providers (OpenAI/Anthropic) it comes from the JSON body,
but for path-routed providers the model is recovered only when the
request matches a recognized path shape (Bedrock
`/model/{id}/{invoke|converse|...}`, Vertex
`/v1/projects/.../publishers/.../models/...`). Any shape the parser did
not recognize reached the guardrail with no model and was allowed
regardless of the allowlist.

Fix (provider-agnostic): **fail closed**. When an allowlist is
configured and the model cannot be determined (absent or empty), the
request is denied `403` with a distinct `llm_policy.model_unknown`
reason. This closes the bypass for Bedrock, Vertex, and any future
URL-routed provider in one place. When no allowlist is configured,
behavior is unchanged.

The model allowlist is enforced solely in the proxy `llm_guardrail`;
management's `CheckLLMPolicyLimits` handles only token/budget caps, so
no management change is required.

## Issue ticket number and link

<https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions/6751>

## Stack

- \#6726 <!-- branch-stack -->
  - \#6764 :point\_left:

### Checklist

- [x] Is it a bug fix
- [ ] Is a typo/documentation fix
- [ ] Is a feature enhancement
- [ ] It is a refactor
- [x] Created tests that fail without the change (if possible)
- [x] This change does **not** modify the public API, gRPC protocols,
functionality behavior, CLI / service flags, or introduce a new feature
— **OR** I have discussed it with the NetBird team beforehand (link the
issue / Slack thread in the description). See
[CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#discuss-changes-with-the-netbird-team-first).

> By submitting this pull request, you confirm that you have read and
agree to the terms of the [Contributor License
Agreement](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTOR_LICENSE_AGREEMENT.md).

## Documentation

Select exactly one:

- [ ] I added/updated documentation for this change
- [x] Documentation is **not needed** for this change (explain why)

Bug fix that restores the documented allowlist behavior; no user-facing
surface changes.

### Docs PR URL (required if "docs added" is checked)

Paste the PR link from <https://github.com/netbirdio/docs> here:

<https://github.com/netbirdio/docs/pull/>\_\_

## Tests

- `llm_guardrail`: absent/empty model under a configured allowlist now
denies (`model_unknown`); empty allowlist still allows a missing model
(fail-closed only applies when a list is set); existing
allow/deny/case-insensitive cases retained.
- `llm_request_parser`: new parser→guardrail integration test drives
real **Bedrock** (`/model/{id}/invoke`) and **Vertex**
(`/v1/projects/.../models/...`) URL shapes and asserts allowed→200,
disallowed→403 (`model_blocked`), and an unrecognized Bedrock action→403
(`model_unknown`, the #6751 regression guard).

Note: a full through-tunnel e2e for the allowlist is intentionally
deferred — the agent-network e2e (`WaitProxyPeer`) is currently red on
`main`/`0.74.x` for an unrelated lazy-connection reason; it will be
added once that harness gate is fixed.
2026-07-14 19:03:01 +02:00

169 lines
6.2 KiB
Go

//go:build e2e
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
// catalogModel returns the normalized catalog id the proxy stamps for a
// path-routed provider's configured model — the form the guardrail allowlist is
// compared against (region prefix / @version stripped).
func catalogModel(pc providerCase) string {
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
return strings.TrimPrefix(pc.model, "us.")
case harness.WireVertex:
return strings.SplitN(pc.model, "@", 2)[0]
default:
return pc.model
}
}
// disallowedModel returns a valid-shaped model id for the provider that is NOT
// the configured/allowed one, so the guardrail must reject it before the
// request ever reaches the upstream.
func disallowedModel(pc providerCase) string {
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
return "us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8"
case harness.WireVertex:
return "claude-opus-4-8@20250101"
default:
return "unlisted-model"
}
}
// sendModel drives one request for the given model through the provider's native
// wire shape and returns the HTTP status.
func sendModel(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, cl *harness.Client, endpoint, proxyIP string, pc providerCase, model string) int {
t.Helper()
var code int
var err error
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
code, _, err = cl.Bedrock(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
case harness.WireVertex:
code, _, err = cl.Vertex(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
default:
code, _, err = cl.Chat(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
}
require.NoError(t, err, "request must reach the proxy for %s", pc.name)
return code
}
// TestModelAllowlistEnforced provisions a Model Allowlist guardrail limiting each
// path-routed provider (Bedrock, Vertex) to its configured model, then drives
// requests over the tunnel: the allowed model returns 200 while a model outside
// the allowlist is denied 403 by the guardrail before it reaches the upstream.
// This is the coverage missing for #6751 — the model for these providers travels
// in the URL path, and the allowlist must be enforced there.
func TestModelAllowlistEnforced(t *testing.T) {
var providers []providerCase
for _, pc := range availableProviders() {
if pc.kind == harness.WireBedrock || pc.kind == harness.WireVertex {
providers = append(providers, pc)
}
}
if len(providers) == 0 {
t.Skip("no path-routed provider keys set (AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK / GOOGLE_VERTEX_*); source ~/.llm-keys")
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
grp, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-allowlist"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grp.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-allowlist-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grp.Id},
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
// Providers with their configured (allowed) models; the first bootstraps the cluster.
ids := make([]string, 0, len(providers))
allowed := make([]string, 0, len(providers))
for i, pc := range providers {
req := providerRequest(pc)
if i == 0 {
req.BootstrapCluster = ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster)
}
prov, perr := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, req)
require.NoError(t, perr, "create provider %s", pc.name)
id := prov.Id
ids = append(ids, id)
allowed = append(allowed, catalogModel(pc))
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), id) })
}
// Guardrail allowlisting exactly the configured models.
var gr api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest
gr.Name = "e2e-allowlist"
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled = true
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models = allowed
guard, err := srv.CreateGuardrail(ctx, gr)
require.NoError(t, err, "create guardrail")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteGuardrail(context.Background(), guard.Id) })
enabled := true
pol, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-allowlist",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grp.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: ids,
GuardrailIds: &[]string{guard.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), pol.Id) })
settings, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err, "read settings for endpoint")
require.NotEmpty(t, settings.Endpoint, "agent-network endpoint must be assigned")
proxyToken, err := srv.CreateProxyTokenCLI(ctx, "e2e-proxy-allowlist")
require.NoError(t, err, "mint proxy token via CLI")
px, err := harness.StartProxy(ctx, srv, proxyToken)
require.NoError(t, err, "start proxy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = px.Terminate(context.Background()) })
cl, err := harness.StartClient(ctx, srv, sk.Key)
require.NoError(t, err, "start client")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve agent-network endpoint to proxy IP")
for _, pc := range providers {
pc := pc
t.Run(pc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// The admin's allowlisted model is served end to end.
assert.Equal(t, 200, sendModel(ctx, t, cl, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc, pc.model),
"allowlisted model must be permitted for %s", pc.name)
// A model outside the allowlist is rejected by the guardrail (before
// the upstream), regardless of whether it is a real catalog model.
assert.Equal(t, 403, sendModel(ctx, t, cl, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc, disallowedModel(pc)),
"model outside the allowlist must be denied for %s", pc.name)
})
}
}