* implement certificate posture check
* log signal address
* add keychain and cert store support
* read the console user's keychain through a user session helper
A root daemon cannot reach a login keychain: securityd is per session and a
key ACL needs a session to prompt in, so dropping uid is not enough. The
daemon now answers certificate challenges from the System keychain itself,
where MDM installs device identities, and launches "netbird posture
cert-proof" into the console user's desktop session with launchctl asuser
for the login keychain. Only the signature and the chain cross back, never
the private key.
The console user comes from SCDynamicStoreCopyConsoleUser, bound with purego
like the keychain calls. The login window reports no user, root, or
"loginwindow", and all three are treated as no keychain to read, so a Mac at
the lock screen sends device proofs alone.
Adds info logging across the path: the keychain search list, per class query
status and item counts, the chain built per candidate, and the verification
error for every rejected candidate. A run that sends nothing now says why.
README.md documents the trust model, the console user limitation and how to
read the logs.
* read the signed-in user's certificate store on Windows
A service reads LocalMachine\MY, where AD and Intune enrol device
certificates. CurrentUser\MY lives in the signed-in user's registry hive
with keys protected against their profile, and a service that opens it does
not fail: "current user" resolves to HKU\S-1-5-18, so it silently reads the
service account's own empty store. The service therefore reads the machine
store itself and launches "netbird posture cert-proof" with the session
token for the rest, mirroring the macOS console user helper.
Windows lets a privileged service assume a user identity, so the token goes
straight into the child process and no external tooling is involved.
CREATE_NO_WINDOW keeps a console window from flashing on the desktop every
sync. In-process impersonation would also work but is per OS thread while
goroutines migrate, so the child process avoids that class of bug.
Session selection prefers the physical console and falls back to any active
session, so remote desktop and VDI hosts are covered. WTSQueryUserToken
needs SE_TCB_NAME, so a user-run client skips the helper and reads the
machine store alone.
SystemStore takes a store location, gaining NewUserStore alongside
NewSystemStore and the per candidate logging macOS already had. The request
building and proof merging move to helper_spawn.go, shared by both
platforms, and helperStore picks what the helper reads per platform.
* start TPM support
* split goreleaser to support pkcs11 and exclude on docker
* update goreleaser
* go mod tidy
* add tpm pin to netbird config
* split cert and key location and allow key lookup on tpm
* add unsupported flag for mobile devices
* Isolate the cert proof helper from the service environment and cap its output
* Read the PKCS#11 token PIN from NB_TPM_PIN instead of the profile config
* Bound certificate proof collection so a stuck token or keychain cannot hold the sync loop
* Stop retrying a PKCS#11 PIN the token rejected
* Log certificate posture details at debug level
* Sign only nonces and peer keys of the size management issues
* Skip certificate files whose key belongs to another certificate
* Bound PKCS#11 driver sizes, pin template values, and log out only a login the session owns
* Never pass NULL to CFRelease and skip unreadable keychain identities
* Keep the macOS keychain code out of iOS and the PKCS#11 driver out of Android
* Find a chain to each challenge's CAs through every intermediate the store holds
* Require a token label whenever a PKCS#11 PIN is set
* Read user certificates only from the session of the active profile's owner
* Collect certificate proofs again when the owner's session changes and report lost proofs
* Test the PKCS#11 build against SoftHSM in CI and warn once where the build has no driver
* Document where an inline PKCS#11 PIN is stored and how it is protected
* Refuse PKCS#11 URIs that this client cannot honour instead of widening the match
* Trust certificate and key files only when no other user can write or redirect them
* Explain a Windows certificate whose key only a legacy CryptoAPI provider holds
* Use platform absolute module paths in tests and add a real owner session test for Windows
* Match the Windows profile owner by name instead of resolving it through the domain controller
* Keep the certificate stores and TPM library out of the WebAssembly build
* [client] Read TSS2 key files on go-tpm, checked against the library it replaces
The TSS2 parser was the only reason this repository depended on a crypto suite
whose own build tooling it inherits. The replacement sits on go-tpm, which was
already a direct dependency and is in fact what that suite calls underneath, so
this removes a wrapper rather than porting onto a different library: the load,
the derived storage root key and the signing commands are the same calls.
Swapping a parser on the one path a customer actually runs is not something to
assert, so the two are held side by side for this commit. One test feeds the
replacement bytes the old library wrote and requires the same key type, empty
auth flag, parent handle, blobs and decoded public key; the other feeds both the
fixtures the tests are built on, so those are the shape the format calls for and
not merely the shape the new parser reads. The scaffolding goes away with the
dependency in the commit that follows.
The encoder behind the fixtures is written out separately from the parser under
test, so an encoder bug and a decoder bug cannot cancel each other out.
* [client] Drop go.step.sm/crypto and the repo-wide upgrades it imposed
The TSS2 parser was the only thing in the repository that used this module, and
it brought 302 modules into the graph to do it — 35 of them linters, along with
Google Cloud KMS and IAM, the AWS SDK and a terminal styling library. Those are
the module's own development dependencies, which minimal version selection turns
into floors in ours, and they are the whole reason gRPC, protobuf, the AWS SDK,
OpenTelemetry, logrus and five x/ packages had moved. Management, signal, relay
and proxy inherited every one of them for a feature none of them runs.
Removing the import is not enough, because tidy never downgrades: the raised
floors stay written in go.mod. Each one is pinned back to the version main had,
then tidy is left to raise again whatever something still genuinely needs. It
raised nothing: all 43 are back where they were, and go-tpm was already in the
graph at the same version, so the certificate feature now costs no new module at
all.
The differential tests go with it. They existed to check the swap against the
library while both were present, and there is nothing left to compare against.
* [client] Clear the lint findings only the macOS and Windows runners see
golangci-lint analyses one build at a time, so running it on Linux says nothing
about the two platforms CI also lints. Against those builds the feature's
packages reported eight findings, and the structural one is Config.dir: it is
dead on macOS and Windows because neither reads a directory at all, their
collectors take the configuration and discard it. Moving the method beside its
only callers makes that visible in the layout instead of in a linter, and leaves
the gap itself — no file or token store on those platforms — where it belongs,
as something to decide rather than something to silence.
An absent key file beside a certificate was reported as a nil signer with a nil
error, which the caller then had to recognise by its nilness. It is a sentinel
now, so the meaning is in the error rather than in the absence of one.
The rest follow the standard library: the elliptic coordinates and the private
scalar come from the encoding helpers rather than the deprecated big.Int fields,
and an error string loses its trailing colon.
Lint is clean on linux, darwin and windows; the hardware TPM path was exercised
separately against a real device and passes.
* Accept the TSS2 emptyAuth boolean OpenSSL writes and persistent parents on 32-bit builds
* Count the certificates field in the peer meta store test
* Check the store directory before listing it, refuse group-writable files, and reject a URI with two PIN sources
* Share a PKCS#11 login between sessions and send each PIN at most once at a time
* Collect certificate proofs again when the meta sync carrying them failed
* Use no Windows user store when a domainless owner matches accounts of several domains
* Use no user certificate store when the active profile's owner cannot be read
* Document the PIN sources on CertPKCS11URI and keep the README PIN example off the command line
* Test that the PKCS#11 URI stays out of the debug bundle and run the wrong-PIN test only on a disposable token
* Refuse a TPM PSS signature request for the maximum salt length
* Add the certificate fields to the network map golden data
* Retry posture checks whose meta sync timed out instead of dropping them
* Start no system info gathering while a timed-out one is still running
* Guard the applied posture checks across goroutines and keep refreshing proofs while a pending update times out
* Log what a successful certificate proof helper wrote to stderr
* Send recollected certificate proofs to management only when the proven chains changed
* Explain a macOS keychain key whose access list does not allow netbird
* Kill the whole macOS certificate helper process group when it times out
* End sudo option parsing before the macOS certificate helper binary
* Hold off system info gathering only while a timed-out one is still running
* Collect certificate proofs on the posture watcher instead of under the sync lock
* Read the certificate store directory and PKCS#11 URI from the daemon environment, not the profile config
* Install the RPM sysconfig file readable by root only and show the certificate posture variables
* Move the certificate posture README into the package doc and the docs site
* Name NB_CERT_PKCS11_URI in the PIN-without-token error
* Keep the file check results of the latest-started system info refresh
* Give the full import command for a keychain key netbird may not use, and correct the package doc
* Restrict the service environment file to root on every package install
* Search only the System keychain in the macOS daemon and only the login keychain in the user helper
* Let the certificate proof helper read the PKCS#11 token from the environment on Linux
* Ask a macOS user's keychain again only after an hour when it proved nothing
* Clear the lint findings in certificate posture
* Hold off the keychain helper only after a completed or timed-out run, independent of CA order
* Keep free functions out of the method lists of PKCS11Store, URI and Challenger
* Name the post-install permission helper in snake case and shorten the sysconfig certificate block
* Drop the certificate store directory from certproof.Config, which only NB_CERT_STORE_DIR sets
* [management] Renew certificate challenge nonces on quiet accounts
A certificate challenge nonce is accepted for its own window and the one before
it, and it only reaches a peer attached to a network map. An account where
nothing changes sends no map, so after a day the peer re-sends the nonce it
still holds, verification rejects its whole proof set, and the certificates
stored for it are dropped. It fails the certificate check and loses every policy
gated on it until some unrelated change happens to push a map. The outage
repairs itself in seconds, which is what makes it expensive: it is intermittent,
it only hits stable networks, and it is not reproducible on demand.
Push the account's peers an update often enough that the nonce they hold is
never close to expiring. Only accounts whose posture checks actually ask for a
certificate are tracked, so a deployment without the feature does no extra work.
The refresh runs from one goroutine over a map of accounts rather than a timer
per account: the period is hours, so one pass every few minutes costs nothing
next to it, and there is no timer to re-arm when an account that falls due
sooner appears. Each account's first run is offset by a hash of its ID, because
the challenge window is global and an instance restart would otherwise arm every
account in the same moment.
The push carries no administrative change, so it is counted as a refresh rather
than an update and stays out of the figures that track what was edited.
(cherry picked from commit 7ad4a0df37)
* [management] Make the certificate challenge window one knob to turn
Renewal was timed against the window in two different ways: the period derived
from it, the sweep interval did not. Shortening the window to watch a renewal in
an end-to-end run would have left the refresher still looking for due accounts
every quarter of an hour, so nothing would have been renewed in time and the
test would have reported the feature broken.
Derive the sweep from the period, within bounds that keep a very short window
from spinning and a normal one from checking less often than is useful, and
allow the window itself to be set through the environment so a run can take
seconds instead of half a day. A value that cannot be parsed or falls outside
the bounds keeps the default, because a window nobody intended is a security
property nobody chose, and an override is logged at warning level since it sets
how long a device keeps passing the check after its key is gone.
Every instance has to be given the same value: the window is part of the nonce,
so instances that disagree reject each other's.
(cherry picked from commit 0e38fcf409)
* [management] Pin the property that makes per-peer nonce state unnecessary
A nonce carries the window it was minted in, not the instant, and is accepted
for that window and the one before it. So a peer re-stamped at least once per
window can never be left holding one outside the accepted pair, whenever it was
last served and however much life its own nonce had left. That is the whole
reason management tracks nothing per peer, and it was resting on an argument
rather than a test.
The phases are part of the property, not decoration: accounts are deliberately
given a refresh phase of their own, so the guarantee has to hold off the window
boundary too. The negative case shows why that matters — a cadence of exactly
two windows lands inside the grace window when it is aligned to the boundary and
leaves a gap when it is not.
(cherry picked from commit dee68facfd)
* [management] Renew challenges only for the peers that answer one
The refresh pushed an update to every connected peer of the account, while only
the peers a certificate check applies to carry a nonce. On an account where a
handful of peers sit behind the check and the rest do not, everyone was woken
several times a day to be handed a map that changed nothing for them.
Push to the sources of the enabled policies whose posture checks include a
certificate check, which is exactly the set that is sent a challenge.
Resolving the set the other way round than the gRPC layer does is the risk here:
a peer the refresh forgets stops being renewed and falls out of its policies
silently, which is the failure this whole mechanism exists to prevent. So the
selection is held against processPeerPostureChecks, the per-peer rule that
decides who receives a challenge in the first place, by a test that asks both
the same question and requires the same answer.
(cherry picked from commit dc4d0e0274)
* [management] Derive certificate challenge nonces from the stored encryption key
The nonce secret came from the server's WireGuard key, which is generated afresh
in every process and never persisted. A nonce carries no state, so the only
thing that lets one instance verify what another issued is deriving the same
secret — and that premise, written in the comment above the challenger, was not
met: every instance had its own key.
A peer reconnecting after a restart therefore presented a nonce minted under the
previous secret, verification failed with a mismatch, its whole proof set was
rejected and the certificates stored for it were dropped until it signed again.
Reproduced three times on the lab, each one logging "nonce was not issued to
this peer", which only a changed secret produces. On a single instance it costs
seconds of lost policy access per restart; across instances it is not transient
at all, because every reconnect that lands elsewhere is rejected the same way.
Derive from the data store encryption key instead: it is generated once, written
back to the configuration and read by every instance, so it survives restarts
and is shared. Where none is configured the secret falls back to the WireGuard
key with a warning — degraded but still unpredictable, which is the property
that matters most: a peer able to guess it could mint the nonces of future
windows, sign them while its key is present and keep passing after it is gone.
The challenger is now built once and passed to the two places that need it,
rather than re-derived per message.
(cherry picked from commit 278f2f3807)
* [management] Register an account for renewal where its nonce is issued
Renewal was armed when a peer connected or when a posture check was saved, both
of which ask the store whether the account has a certificate check. That misses
the case it most needs to catch: the check is created through one instance while
the peers are connected to another, so the instance serving them never learns it
has anything to renew and their nonce expires. It also charged a query to every
peer connect in every account, including the ones that will never use the
feature, which a fleet reconnecting after a restart pays all at once.
Register where the nonce is actually stamped instead. A nonce is verified from a
shared secret and so travels between instances, but the renewal that keeps it
fresh cannot: only the instance holding a peer's stream can push to it. Issuing
and renewing now line up by construction — an instance renews exactly the
accounts it has issued nonces for — and an instance that never issues one has
nothing to renew, so there is no case left to miss.
The registration is a map insert with no store access, which is what lets it sit
on a path taken by every login and every initial sync.
Reported by Viktor Liu, who also proposed registering at the point of issue.
(cherry picked from commit 2d16dd7d7cf54762f2e64c5630ea092f32ef63ab)
* [management] Register for renewal on pushed updates, not only on connect
Registering where the nonce is stamped only covered the login and the initial
sync, which both happen when a peer opens a stream. That left out the path the
mechanism exists for.
On the cloud the network map controller is wrapped so that an update publishes
to an event bus instead of pushing locally: an instance handling a REST change
broadcasts, and every instance holding a peer of that account pushes to its own.
Those pushes stamp a nonce through the update handler, and nothing there
registered, so an instance learned about an account only when one of its peers
happened to reconnect. For a quiet fleet that is the original bug: the check is
created, the peers are told about it, and nobody renews what they were told.
Registering on the pushed update closes it, and is the difference between
stamping and marking a peer connected — one happens on every push, the other
only when a stream opens. Reported by Viktor Liu; the broadcast that makes it
work was pointed out by Pascal Fischer.
(cherry picked from commit 59efe8d93e53bacdf57cb546f4ab2c19dc4eddab)
* [management] Let the challenge refresh loop stop with the manager that owns it
The loop was started on a context explicitly detached from the caller's, so
nothing could ever stop it. Production is unaffected either way, since
BuildManager is called with context.Background(), but a test that builds a
manager leaked a sweeping goroutine for the rest of the run, and a shutdown
path added later would have had no way to reach it.
Take the manager's context as the request buffer built on the line above
already does. The test pins the contract the loop offers, so a detached
context cannot come back inside Start either.
* [management] Bound one account's challenge refresh so it cannot starve the rest
Resolving which peers answer a challenge reads the store three times, and the
refresher sweeps accounts one after another on a single goroutine. A read that
never returns held the sweep for the life of the process, so every other
account on the instance stopped being renewed and its peers fell out of the
policies gated on the check: one account's bad luck became an outage for all
of them.
Give each refresh the sweep interval it is allowed to occupy, capped at 30s so
a 12-hour window does not grant minutes to a query that should take
milliseconds. A refresh that runs out of time keeps its account tracked, since
a deadline says nothing about whether that account still has a certificate
check.
* [management] Send challenge refreshes down the path the rest of management uses
The refresh dispatched through UpdateAffectedPeers, the one variant that takes
no reason, so it was missing from the update counters and coalesced with
nothing. An administrator editing a policy while the sweep ran made the
account's network map twice over, and UpdateOperationRefresh, added for
exactly this caller, was never referenced.
Buffer it with a posture_check/refresh reason instead. The periodic push is
now visible in the metrics as what it is, distinct from an edit, and the send
detaches from the sweep deadline on its own, so that deadline bounds the store
reads it was meant for.
* [management] Keep the certificate challenge comments to what the history does not say
Four of these ran to three and four times the comment budget, the longest at
992 characters. Most of the excess argued against designs that were never
written or explained a bug that no longer exists in the code, which is what
the commit that fixed it is for.
What is left is the part a reader cannot recover from the code: that the
nonce secret has to be persisted and unpredictable, that stamping and
renewing are decided together because only the serving instance can push, and
that the target rule is the inverse of processPeerPostureChecks.
* Keep the newest posture checks pending whatever made their meta sync fail
* Report no lost certificate when the engine stops during a proof collection
* Share the proof collection single-flight across engine restarts
* Close a PKCS#11 module that loads but cannot be used
* Fix the pending checks comments
* Renew certificate challenges only for the peers streamed to this instance
* Ignore a challenge stamp from an older sync stream of the same peer
* Kill the Windows certificate proof helper with its whole process tree
* Expect the challenge untrack in the session ownership test
* Drop an invalid certificate proof without discarding the valid ones
* Start a system info gathering beside one that has been stuck for ten timeouts
---------
Co-authored-by: pascal <pascal@netbird.io>
Co-authored-by: mlsmaycon <mlsmaycon@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: riccardom <riccardomanfrin@gmail.com>
* [self-hosted] Add a UBI image variant for the combined server
OpenShift and other Red Hat environments expect UBI-based images that run
as an arbitrary non-root UID. The proxy and rootless client already ship
-ubi variants; this adds the same for netbird-server, published as
<version>-ubi and ubi-latest for amd64 and arm64.
* [self-hosted] Check the license output path before creating temp files
The existing-output exit ran before the cleanup trap was registered, so it
left the two mktemp files behind.
* [self-hosted] Certify the netbird-server UBI image
Adds netbird-server to the Red Hat certification components. Its Partner
Connect component ID goes in the REDHAT_CERT_ID_NETBIRD_SERVER repository
variable.
* [misc] Share one license collection script across the UBI images
The client, proxy and combined images each carried a near-identical copy of
collect-licenses.sh, and the signal and relay variants would add two more.
The copies differed only in the Go package, build tags, component license
and the proxy's web licenses, which are now options of one script in
release_files/. The client gains the staged write the others already had.
Goreleaser's RPM build is split into one nfpm entry per architecture, each pinned to a single-arch build, with the version substituted from the release job. The deb package, archives, and container images are unaffected.
Also fixes rpmlint: incoherent-version-in-changelog, found while investigating: nfpm writes the changelog title straight from semver and never appends the release, so entries read 0.79.0 against a 0.79.0-1 package.
Declare the runtime dependencies, generate the changelog from git tags with
chglog at release time, and ship LICENSE, README.md and an example
/etc/sysconfig/netbird as %license, %doc and %config(noreplace). The unit
generated by "netbird service install" already reads that path via
EnvironmentFile, so post_install.sh is unchanged.
Every curl invocation in the install script that follows redirects now passes
`--proto` and `--proto-redir` set to https only, so neither the initial request
nor any hop in the redirect chain can drop to plaintext. This matters most for
the macOS .pkg download, whose URL is itself the result of a redirect
resolution, and for the release tarballs that get moved into the install dir as
root.
The protocol set lives in a single `PROTO_HTTPS` variable rather than being
repeated at each call site, and every expansion is quoted — the variable holds
one option value, not a list of flags.
The two call sites without `-L` (the release metadata lookups) are left alone:
they do not follow redirects and their URLs are https literals.
Verified against every URL the script fetches on curl 7.29.0 (CentOS 7),
7.68.0, 7.76.1, 7.88.1 and 8.14.1; both options have existed since curl 7.20.0.
Plaintext http:// is refused on all of them.
The install script downloaded both the macOS .pkg and the release tarballs
into /tmp under fixed, predictable names, then passed those same paths to the
privileged install steps (`installer -pkg`, `mv` into the install dir).
/tmp is shared, so those fixed names can collide with entries created there
beforehand, and the privileged steps consume whatever the path resolves to.
Stage every download in a directory from `mktemp -d` instead: unpredictable
name, mode 0700, owned by the caller, created atomically. Extraction now
targets that directory (`tar -C`, `unzip -d`) rather than relying on `cd /tmp`,
and an EXIT trap removes it, so a failed run no longer leaves the archive and
the unpacked LICENSE/README behind in /tmp either.
* Made the docker check first for getting-started.sh, better atomic support for install.sh
* Check for docker socket perms
* Added fallback for systems without rpm-ostree or bootc.
* macOS fix for docker socket check
* Change error message for docker group.
No longer using a blanket recommendation for the docker group.
Fixes#4808 by extracting the full username by:
- Get PID using pgrep
- Get UID from PID using /proc/${PID}/loginuid
- Get user name from UID using id
Also replaces "complex" pipe from ps to sed with a (hopefully) "simpler" (as in requiring less knowledge about the arguments of ps and regexps) invocation of cat and id.
* Remove aur support and start service on ostree
The aur installation was adding many packages and installing more than just the client. For now is best to remove it and rely on binary install
Some users complained about ostree installation not starting the client, we add two explicit commands to it
* use ${SUDO}
* fix if closure
* Made changes to the peer install script that makes it work on alpine linux without changes
* fix small oversight with doas fix
* use try catch approach when curling binaries
Periodically fetch the latest available version, and the UI will shows a new menu for the download link. It checks both the daemon version and the UI version.
For installations using the binary release method (using the official installer script), it would be nice to be able to define a specific version to install.
A user/developer can choose to define the NETBIRD_RELEASE variable during installation, to pin a specific version during installation.
If NETBIRD_RELEASE is not defined, we default to the current behavior of latest
Resolve the problem with the update script that prevents netbird-ui from updating during binary installation.
Introduce the variable UPDATE_NETBIRD. Now we can upgrade the binary installation with
A function stop_running_netbird_ui has been added which checks if NetBird UI is currently running. If so, it stops the UI to allow the application update process to proceed smoothly. This was necessary to prevent conflicts or errors during updates if the UI was running.
---------
Co-authored-by: Maycon Santos <mlsmaycon@gmail.com>
This commit modifies the install.sh script to improve compatibility with systems lacking the sudo command. A conditional check is added at the beginning of the script to see if the sudo command exists. If it does, operations in the script that previously required sudo would proceed as normal, using the sudo command. If the system does not have sudo, the shell would execute these operations without it. This change enhances the usability of this script in restricted environments where sudo is not installed or available to users.
This pull request addresses the need to enhance the installer script by introducing a new parameter --update to trigger updates. The goal is to streamline the update process for binary installations and provide a better experience for users.
