109 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
4 people	f0a40e4395	[client, management] Harden the certificate posture client and keep challenge nonces fresh (#8052) ... * implement certificate posture check * log signal address * add keychain and cert store support * read the console user's keychain through a user session helper A root daemon cannot reach a login keychain: securityd is per session and a key ACL needs a session to prompt in, so dropping uid is not enough. The daemon now answers certificate challenges from the System keychain itself, where MDM installs device identities, and launches "netbird posture cert-proof" into the console user's desktop session with launchctl asuser for the login keychain. Only the signature and the chain cross back, never the private key. The console user comes from SCDynamicStoreCopyConsoleUser, bound with purego like the keychain calls. The login window reports no user, root, or "loginwindow", and all three are treated as no keychain to read, so a Mac at the lock screen sends device proofs alone. Adds info logging across the path: the keychain search list, per class query status and item counts, the chain built per candidate, and the verification error for every rejected candidate. A run that sends nothing now says why. README.md documents the trust model, the console user limitation and how to read the logs. * read the signed-in user's certificate store on Windows A service reads LocalMachine\MY, where AD and Intune enrol device certificates. CurrentUser\MY lives in the signed-in user's registry hive with keys protected against their profile, and a service that opens it does not fail: "current user" resolves to HKU\S-1-5-18, so it silently reads the service account's own empty store. The service therefore reads the machine store itself and launches "netbird posture cert-proof" with the session token for the rest, mirroring the macOS console user helper. Windows lets a privileged service assume a user identity, so the token goes straight into the child process and no external tooling is involved. CREATE_NO_WINDOW keeps a console window from flashing on the desktop every sync. In-process impersonation would also work but is per OS thread while goroutines migrate, so the child process avoids that class of bug. Session selection prefers the physical console and falls back to any active session, so remote desktop and VDI hosts are covered. WTSQueryUserToken needs SE_TCB_NAME, so a user-run client skips the helper and reads the machine store alone. SystemStore takes a store location, gaining NewUserStore alongside NewSystemStore and the per candidate logging macOS already had. The request building and proof merging move to helper_spawn.go, shared by both platforms, and helperStore picks what the helper reads per platform. * start TPM support * split goreleaser to support pkcs11 and exclude on docker * update goreleaser * go mod tidy * add tpm pin to netbird config * split cert and key location and allow key lookup on tpm * add unsupported flag for mobile devices * Isolate the cert proof helper from the service environment and cap its output * Read the PKCS#11 token PIN from NB_TPM_PIN instead of the profile config * Bound certificate proof collection so a stuck token or keychain cannot hold the sync loop * Stop retrying a PKCS#11 PIN the token rejected * Log certificate posture details at debug level * Sign only nonces and peer keys of the size management issues * Skip certificate files whose key belongs to another certificate * Bound PKCS#11 driver sizes, pin template values, and log out only a login the session owns * Never pass NULL to CFRelease and skip unreadable keychain identities * Keep the macOS keychain code out of iOS and the PKCS#11 driver out of Android * Find a chain to each challenge's CAs through every intermediate the store holds * Require a token label whenever a PKCS#11 PIN is set * Read user certificates only from the session of the active profile's owner * Collect certificate proofs again when the owner's session changes and report lost proofs * Test the PKCS#11 build against SoftHSM in CI and warn once where the build has no driver * Document where an inline PKCS#11 PIN is stored and how it is protected * Refuse PKCS#11 URIs that this client cannot honour instead of widening the match * Trust certificate and key files only when no other user can write or redirect them * Explain a Windows certificate whose key only a legacy CryptoAPI provider holds * Use platform absolute module paths in tests and add a real owner session test for Windows * Match the Windows profile owner by name instead of resolving it through the domain controller * Keep the certificate stores and TPM library out of the WebAssembly build * [client] Read TSS2 key files on go-tpm, checked against the library it replaces The TSS2 parser was the only reason this repository depended on a crypto suite whose own build tooling it inherits. The replacement sits on go-tpm, which was already a direct dependency and is in fact what that suite calls underneath, so this removes a wrapper rather than porting onto a different library: the load, the derived storage root key and the signing commands are the same calls. Swapping a parser on the one path a customer actually runs is not something to assert, so the two are held side by side for this commit. One test feeds the replacement bytes the old library wrote and requires the same key type, empty auth flag, parent handle, blobs and decoded public key; the other feeds both the fixtures the tests are built on, so those are the shape the format calls for and not merely the shape the new parser reads. The scaffolding goes away with the dependency in the commit that follows. The encoder behind the fixtures is written out separately from the parser under test, so an encoder bug and a decoder bug cannot cancel each other out. * [client] Drop go.step.sm/crypto and the repo-wide upgrades it imposed The TSS2 parser was the only thing in the repository that used this module, and it brought 302 modules into the graph to do it — 35 of them linters, along with Google Cloud KMS and IAM, the AWS SDK and a terminal styling library. Those are the module's own development dependencies, which minimal version selection turns into floors in ours, and they are the whole reason gRPC, protobuf, the AWS SDK, OpenTelemetry, logrus and five x/ packages had moved. Management, signal, relay and proxy inherited every one of them for a feature none of them runs. Removing the import is not enough, because tidy never downgrades: the raised floors stay written in go.mod. Each one is pinned back to the version main had, then tidy is left to raise again whatever something still genuinely needs. It raised nothing: all 43 are back where they were, and go-tpm was already in the graph at the same version, so the certificate feature now costs no new module at all. The differential tests go with it. They existed to check the swap against the library while both were present, and there is nothing left to compare against. * [client] Clear the lint findings only the macOS and Windows runners see golangci-lint analyses one build at a time, so running it on Linux says nothing about the two platforms CI also lints. Against those builds the feature's packages reported eight findings, and the structural one is Config.dir: it is dead on macOS and Windows because neither reads a directory at all, their collectors take the configuration and discard it. Moving the method beside its only callers makes that visible in the layout instead of in a linter, and leaves the gap itself — no file or token store on those platforms — where it belongs, as something to decide rather than something to silence. An absent key file beside a certificate was reported as a nil signer with a nil error, which the caller then had to recognise by its nilness. It is a sentinel now, so the meaning is in the error rather than in the absence of one. The rest follow the standard library: the elliptic coordinates and the private scalar come from the encoding helpers rather than the deprecated big.Int fields, and an error string loses its trailing colon. Lint is clean on linux, darwin and windows; the hardware TPM path was exercised separately against a real device and passes. * Accept the TSS2 emptyAuth boolean OpenSSL writes and persistent parents on 32-bit builds * Count the certificates field in the peer meta store test * Check the store directory before listing it, refuse group-writable files, and reject a URI with two PIN sources * Share a PKCS#11 login between sessions and send each PIN at most once at a time * Collect certificate proofs again when the meta sync carrying them failed * Use no Windows user store when a domainless owner matches accounts of several domains * Use no user certificate store when the active profile's owner cannot be read * Document the PIN sources on CertPKCS11URI and keep the README PIN example off the command line * Test that the PKCS#11 URI stays out of the debug bundle and run the wrong-PIN test only on a disposable token * Refuse a TPM PSS signature request for the maximum salt length * Add the certificate fields to the network map golden data * Retry posture checks whose meta sync timed out instead of dropping them * Start no system info gathering while a timed-out one is still running * Guard the applied posture checks across goroutines and keep refreshing proofs while a pending update times out * Log what a successful certificate proof helper wrote to stderr * Send recollected certificate proofs to management only when the proven chains changed * Explain a macOS keychain key whose access list does not allow netbird * Kill the whole macOS certificate helper process group when it times out * End sudo option parsing before the macOS certificate helper binary * Hold off system info gathering only while a timed-out one is still running * Collect certificate proofs on the posture watcher instead of under the sync lock * Read the certificate store directory and PKCS#11 URI from the daemon environment, not the profile config * Install the RPM sysconfig file readable by root only and show the certificate posture variables * Move the certificate posture README into the package doc and the docs site * Name NB_CERT_PKCS11_URI in the PIN-without-token error * Keep the file check results of the latest-started system info refresh * Give the full import command for a keychain key netbird may not use, and correct the package doc * Restrict the service environment file to root on every package install * Search only the System keychain in the macOS daemon and only the login keychain in the user helper * Let the certificate proof helper read the PKCS#11 token from the environment on Linux * Ask a macOS user's keychain again only after an hour when it proved nothing * Clear the lint findings in certificate posture * Hold off the keychain helper only after a completed or timed-out run, independent of CA order * Keep free functions out of the method lists of PKCS11Store, URI and Challenger * Name the post-install permission helper in snake case and shorten the sysconfig certificate block * Drop the certificate store directory from certproof.Config, which only NB_CERT_STORE_DIR sets * [management] Renew certificate challenge nonces on quiet accounts A certificate challenge nonce is accepted for its own window and the one before it, and it only reaches a peer attached to a network map. An account where nothing changes sends no map, so after a day the peer re-sends the nonce it still holds, verification rejects its whole proof set, and the certificates stored for it are dropped. It fails the certificate check and loses every policy gated on it until some unrelated change happens to push a map. The outage repairs itself in seconds, which is what makes it expensive: it is intermittent, it only hits stable networks, and it is not reproducible on demand. Push the account's peers an update often enough that the nonce they hold is never close to expiring. Only accounts whose posture checks actually ask for a certificate are tracked, so a deployment without the feature does no extra work. The refresh runs from one goroutine over a map of accounts rather than a timer per account: the period is hours, so one pass every few minutes costs nothing next to it, and there is no timer to re-arm when an account that falls due sooner appears. Each account's first run is offset by a hash of its ID, because the challenge window is global and an instance restart would otherwise arm every account in the same moment. The push carries no administrative change, so it is counted as a refresh rather than an update and stays out of the figures that track what was edited. (cherry picked from commit 7ad4a0df37) * [management] Make the certificate challenge window one knob to turn Renewal was timed against the window in two different ways: the period derived from it, the sweep interval did not. Shortening the window to watch a renewal in an end-to-end run would have left the refresher still looking for due accounts every quarter of an hour, so nothing would have been renewed in time and the test would have reported the feature broken. Derive the sweep from the period, within bounds that keep a very short window from spinning and a normal one from checking less often than is useful, and allow the window itself to be set through the environment so a run can take seconds instead of half a day. A value that cannot be parsed or falls outside the bounds keeps the default, because a window nobody intended is a security property nobody chose, and an override is logged at warning level since it sets how long a device keeps passing the check after its key is gone. Every instance has to be given the same value: the window is part of the nonce, so instances that disagree reject each other's. (cherry picked from commit 0e38fcf409) * [management] Pin the property that makes per-peer nonce state unnecessary A nonce carries the window it was minted in, not the instant, and is accepted for that window and the one before it. So a peer re-stamped at least once per window can never be left holding one outside the accepted pair, whenever it was last served and however much life its own nonce had left. That is the whole reason management tracks nothing per peer, and it was resting on an argument rather than a test. The phases are part of the property, not decoration: accounts are deliberately given a refresh phase of their own, so the guarantee has to hold off the window boundary too. The negative case shows why that matters — a cadence of exactly two windows lands inside the grace window when it is aligned to the boundary and leaves a gap when it is not. (cherry picked from commit dee68facfd) * [management] Renew challenges only for the peers that answer one The refresh pushed an update to every connected peer of the account, while only the peers a certificate check applies to carry a nonce. On an account where a handful of peers sit behind the check and the rest do not, everyone was woken several times a day to be handed a map that changed nothing for them. Push to the sources of the enabled policies whose posture checks include a certificate check, which is exactly the set that is sent a challenge. Resolving the set the other way round than the gRPC layer does is the risk here: a peer the refresh forgets stops being renewed and falls out of its policies silently, which is the failure this whole mechanism exists to prevent. So the selection is held against processPeerPostureChecks, the per-peer rule that decides who receives a challenge in the first place, by a test that asks both the same question and requires the same answer. (cherry picked from commit dc4d0e0274) * [management] Derive certificate challenge nonces from the stored encryption key The nonce secret came from the server's WireGuard key, which is generated afresh in every process and never persisted. A nonce carries no state, so the only thing that lets one instance verify what another issued is deriving the same secret — and that premise, written in the comment above the challenger, was not met: every instance had its own key. A peer reconnecting after a restart therefore presented a nonce minted under the previous secret, verification failed with a mismatch, its whole proof set was rejected and the certificates stored for it were dropped until it signed again. Reproduced three times on the lab, each one logging "nonce was not issued to this peer", which only a changed secret produces. On a single instance it costs seconds of lost policy access per restart; across instances it is not transient at all, because every reconnect that lands elsewhere is rejected the same way. Derive from the data store encryption key instead: it is generated once, written back to the configuration and read by every instance, so it survives restarts and is shared. Where none is configured the secret falls back to the WireGuard key with a warning — degraded but still unpredictable, which is the property that matters most: a peer able to guess it could mint the nonces of future windows, sign them while its key is present and keep passing after it is gone. The challenger is now built once and passed to the two places that need it, rather than re-derived per message. (cherry picked from commit 278f2f3807) * [management] Register an account for renewal where its nonce is issued Renewal was armed when a peer connected or when a posture check was saved, both of which ask the store whether the account has a certificate check. That misses the case it most needs to catch: the check is created through one instance while the peers are connected to another, so the instance serving them never learns it has anything to renew and their nonce expires. It also charged a query to every peer connect in every account, including the ones that will never use the feature, which a fleet reconnecting after a restart pays all at once. Register where the nonce is actually stamped instead. A nonce is verified from a shared secret and so travels between instances, but the renewal that keeps it fresh cannot: only the instance holding a peer's stream can push to it. Issuing and renewing now line up by construction — an instance renews exactly the accounts it has issued nonces for — and an instance that never issues one has nothing to renew, so there is no case left to miss. The registration is a map insert with no store access, which is what lets it sit on a path taken by every login and every initial sync. Reported by Viktor Liu, who also proposed registering at the point of issue. (cherry picked from commit 2d16dd7d7cf54762f2e64c5630ea092f32ef63ab) * [management] Register for renewal on pushed updates, not only on connect Registering where the nonce is stamped only covered the login and the initial sync, which both happen when a peer opens a stream. That left out the path the mechanism exists for. On the cloud the network map controller is wrapped so that an update publishes to an event bus instead of pushing locally: an instance handling a REST change broadcasts, and every instance holding a peer of that account pushes to its own. Those pushes stamp a nonce through the update handler, and nothing there registered, so an instance learned about an account only when one of its peers happened to reconnect. For a quiet fleet that is the original bug: the check is created, the peers are told about it, and nobody renews what they were told. Registering on the pushed update closes it, and is the difference between stamping and marking a peer connected — one happens on every push, the other only when a stream opens. Reported by Viktor Liu; the broadcast that makes it work was pointed out by Pascal Fischer. (cherry picked from commit 59efe8d93e53bacdf57cb546f4ab2c19dc4eddab) * [management] Let the challenge refresh loop stop with the manager that owns it The loop was started on a context explicitly detached from the caller's, so nothing could ever stop it. Production is unaffected either way, since BuildManager is called with context.Background(), but a test that builds a manager leaked a sweeping goroutine for the rest of the run, and a shutdown path added later would have had no way to reach it. Take the manager's context as the request buffer built on the line above already does. The test pins the contract the loop offers, so a detached context cannot come back inside Start either. * [management] Bound one account's challenge refresh so it cannot starve the rest Resolving which peers answer a challenge reads the store three times, and the refresher sweeps accounts one after another on a single goroutine. A read that never returns held the sweep for the life of the process, so every other account on the instance stopped being renewed and its peers fell out of the policies gated on the check: one account's bad luck became an outage for all of them. Give each refresh the sweep interval it is allowed to occupy, capped at 30s so a 12-hour window does not grant minutes to a query that should take milliseconds. A refresh that runs out of time keeps its account tracked, since a deadline says nothing about whether that account still has a certificate check. * [management] Send challenge refreshes down the path the rest of management uses The refresh dispatched through UpdateAffectedPeers, the one variant that takes no reason, so it was missing from the update counters and coalesced with nothing. An administrator editing a policy while the sweep ran made the account's network map twice over, and UpdateOperationRefresh, added for exactly this caller, was never referenced. Buffer it with a posture_check/refresh reason instead. The periodic push is now visible in the metrics as what it is, distinct from an edit, and the send detaches from the sweep deadline on its own, so that deadline bounds the store reads it was meant for. * [management] Keep the certificate challenge comments to what the history does not say Four of these ran to three and four times the comment budget, the longest at 992 characters. Most of the excess argued against designs that were never written or explained a bug that no longer exists in the code, which is what the commit that fixed it is for. What is left is the part a reader cannot recover from the code: that the nonce secret has to be persisted and unpredictable, that stamping and renewing are decided together because only the serving instance can push, and that the target rule is the inverse of processPeerPostureChecks. * Keep the newest posture checks pending whatever made their meta sync fail * Report no lost certificate when the engine stops during a proof collection * Share the proof collection single-flight across engine restarts * Close a PKCS#11 module that loads but cannot be used * Fix the pending checks comments * Renew certificate challenges only for the peers streamed to this instance * Ignore a challenge stamp from an older sync stream of the same peer * Kill the Windows certificate proof helper with its whole process tree * Expect the challenge untrack in the session ownership test * Drop an invalid certificate proof without discarding the valid ones * Start a system info gathering beside one that has been stuck for ten timeouts --------- Co-authored-by: pascal <pascal@netbird.io> Co-authored-by: mlsmaycon <mlsmaycon@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: riccardom <riccardomanfrin@gmail.com>	2026-10-09 15:42:18 +02:00
Pascal Fischerandmlsmaycon	53a14551c8	[client, management] implement certificate posture check (#7535) ... Co-authored-by: mlsmaycon <mlsmaycon@gmail.com>	2026-10-09 14:57:00 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	01d828d732	[management] Fall back to the IdP for the proxy session email (#8112)	2026-10-08 16:28:56 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	06c4c20010	[management] Tear down only the peer session that owns the stream (#8057)	2026-10-08 16:17:23 +02:00
Zoltan Papp	515a01dd11	[client] Force interactive login when extending the auth session (#7216) ... * [client] Force interactive login when extending the auth session A session extend must be answered from the account the peer is registered under. With a silent PKCE flow (DisablePromptLogin or max_age=0) the IdP answers from whatever session it already holds, which need not be the peer's account when several are signed in; the token then fails the user match in ExtendAuthSession with no way to pick another account. Mark the PKCE flow request as a session extend so the management server can force prompt=login for it, overriding the configured silent flow. * [client] Reduce cognitive complexity of Server.Login Login sat at cognitive complexity 27, over the 25 the linter allows. Extract the interactive SSO branch into startSSOLogin, and split the nested in-flight-flow reuse check out of it into reuseOAuthFlow, which flattens the original if/else into early returns: it returns the cached auth info when the previous flow targets the same client and still has more than 90s left, otherwise cancels the stale wait and returns nil so the caller requests a fresh flow. The helpers take the contextState through a small statusSetter interface, since internal.contextState is unexported and re-deriving it with CtxGetState inside the helper would resolve against callerCtx rather than rootCtx. No behavior change: same ordering of state transitions, same mutex scope around the oauthAuthFlow write, same error paths. Login is now at 21. * [client] Respect DisablePromptLogin when extending the auth session Forcing prompt=login on a session extend overrode DisablePromptLogin, which is set for IdPs that break on it: Authentik triggers a double authentication and social logins fail outright. Overriding it there trades a recoverable extend for a login that cannot complete at all. Keep the LoginFlag override, which only replaces max_age=0 or none with prompt=login so the IdP honours login_hint, and leave DisablePromptLogin as configured. Those deployments keep the silent flow, and with several accounts signed in an extend answered from the wrong one still fails the user match. * [client] Guard the shared OAuth flow state with the server mutex reuseOAuthFlow read flow, expiresAt, waitCancel and info without holding s.mutex, while startSSOLogin and WaitSSOLogin write them under it. Reading the fields one at a time could also answer with auth info from a flow that was already replaced, or cancel a wait that no longer belongs to the flow just judged stale. Take one snapshot under the lock and decide from it. WaitSSOLogin read oauthAuthFlow.flow twice outside the lock; both now use a value snapshotted in the critical section that already installs actCancel. Its stale waitCancel was read and called in a separate section from the one installing the new one, so two racing calls could read the same predecessor and leave one wait uncancelled. Swap the two in a single critical section. Both cancels run after unlocking: the displaced wait takes s.mutex as it unwinds. * [client] Verify the SSO login came back for the hinted account login_hint is a suggestion the IdP may ignore: with a silent flow configured (DisablePromptLogin or max_age=0) and a live IdP session for another account, the login completes with that account's token. On a registered peer the management server rejects it as a user mismatch, but on a fresh profile the peer silently registers under the wrong account and the profile is then bound to it — every later login follows the stored hint straight back. After the token exchange, compare the ID token's email against the hint the flow was sent with. On a mismatch, do not log in to management with the token; run one more round asking the IdP to re-decide the account (prompt=login, via ForceAccountPrompt — DisablePromptLogin still wins there). If the prompted round also comes back different, proceed with a warning: the address may legitimately have changed, and refusing forever would lock the user out of the profile while the management server still rejects a token that does not own the peer. A token or profile with no email to compare is not judged. The retry differs per platform because of who opens the browser: - CLI (netbird login foreground) and Android run the whole flow in one process, so the mismatch retries automatically: the browser reopens with the account prompt within the same login attempt. - On desktop the login is split between the daemon and the GUI: Login hands the authorize URL to the GUI, WaitSSOLogin blocks for the token, and only the GUI can open a browser. A new URL cannot be handed out from inside WaitSSOLogin (its response has no field for one, kept that way to avoid a proto change), so the daemon arms forceAccountPrompt, fails the round with "connect again to choose the account", and builds the next Login's flow with the prompt — the user's next connect is the retry. The flag and the flow annotations live in daemon memory only; SwitchProfile drops them so the previous profile's hint cannot judge the next profile's token. The device code flow has no prompt parameter (RFC 8628), so a prompted round there runs as-is and a repeated mismatch is let through with the warning rather than looping. * [client] Address review comments on PKCE session extend flow Fail the PKCE authorization flow test on request error instead of continuing into a nil dereference, and make the godoc comments on the touched exported symbols identifier-leading full sentences. * [client] Match accounts only on the email claim of the ID token The name-claim fallback in the ID token parsing is kept for the login hint and display, but account matching now only considers a value that came from the email claim, so a token without one no longer produces a false account mismatch. * [client] Drop the pending session extend on a profile switch The profile-switch cleanup dropped the pending login flow and the account-prompt flag, but left extendAuthSessionFlow untouched. Its device code was issued by the previous profile's IdP client, so a WaitExtendAuthSession still parked on the browser leg would submit the resulting token against the new profile's engine. * [client] Judge the SSO account against the flow that produced the token WaitSSOLogin snapshotted the flow on entry but re-read the info, hint and accountPrompted from the live s.oauthAuthFlow afterwards, in separate critical sections. WaitToken blocks for the whole browser leg, so a concurrent Login or RequestJWTAuth could replace the flow meanwhile and the mismatch check would compare this wait's token against another flow's account: either arming the prompt spuriously or letting a wrong-account token through against an unrelated profile's hint. Take all of it in the entry snapshot. * [client] Keep the forced account prompt from being lost to flow reuse startSSOLogin consumed forceAccountPrompt and applied the prompt to the freshly built flow, but reuseOAuthFlow could then answer from a cached flow for the same client — one built without prompt=login, e.g. by RequestJWTAuth. The user got the same silent authorization URL that produced the mismatch, with the flag already spent, so no later round asked either. Rule reuse out when the prompt is forced, while still cancelling the predecessor's wait. RequestJWTAuth also wrote the flow fields one by one, leaving the previous login's hint and accountPrompted behind for WaitSSOLogin to judge a later token against. Both sites now replace the whole record. * [client] Consume the forced account prompt after the retry forceAccountPrompt was never cleared, so a flow that outlived the retry it was armed for kept sending prompt=login on every later authorization request and re-authenticated the user each time. RequestAuthInfo now takes the flag as it builds the request. * [client] Cancel the caller context in the SSO login tests WaitSSOLogin parks a goroutine on the caller's context for the whole browser leg. The tests passed context.Background(), which never cancels, so each left one goroutine behind for the lifetime of the test binary. * [client] Cancel the wait displaced by an OAuth flow replacement Replacing the shared record with a whole struct value dropped the previous flow's waitCancel, so an SSO browser wait still parked on it lost its cancel: nothing could preempt it, and it could go on to run attemptLogin or mutate the record behind the new flow. Both replacement sites now take the displaced cancel over in the same critical section, via a shared replaceOAuthFlow, and invoke it after the unlock. * [client] Guard OAuth flow mutations by the flow that owns the wait * [client] Arm the account prompt only from the wait that owns the flow * [client] Adopt the three-value parseEmailFromIDToken in the device flow The main merge brought in the device flow's email extraction from #7193, which still used the two-value signature this branch replaced when account matching was narrowed to the email claim. Git merged the files without a textual conflict, so the branch stopped compiling. Take the fromEmailClaim result and fill EmailClaim from it, the same way the PKCE path does, so device-flow clients get the same account matching. * [client] Populate the pending extend flow in the test server helper SwitchProfile cancels and clears the pending session extend flow unconditionally, the same way it clears the SSH JWT cache. New always populates the field, but the hand-assembled test server did not, so TestSwitchProfile_ClearsJWTCache panicked on a nil PendingFlow.	2026-10-08 15:40:39 +02:00
dmitri-netbird	24cb7b75c2	[management] switch to libopenapi for managing of openapi-based api (#8056) ... * use libopenapi OpenAPI generator Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * added a handler for v1alpha1/peers Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * wire up request validator Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * wired up spec-based validation Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * use sync validation; set base url to v1alpha1 Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * moved stuff around, extracted runtime libopenapu deps into runtime_tooling Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * testing /peers path params Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * fixed tests Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * added user schemas and paths Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * use api validation in tests Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * post-merge fixes Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * deleted tmp command used to test validator integration Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * require request body in post/put requests in order to force validation Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * making linter happy Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * switch to api/v1alpha1 Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * go mod tidy Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * keep the original order of middleware: metrics, cors, then auth Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * return 422 on validation errors Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * cleanups Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * more cleanups Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * v1alpha1 spec cleanups Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * no need for a double-pointer Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * more linter fixes Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * removed more double pointers Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * use di to inject api_v0 and api_v1 http routers Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * do not re-add middleware on repeated call to ApiHandler Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * calling ApiRouter() now also calls ApiV1Router() Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io>	2026-10-07 19:07:31 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	2623feeb5b	[management] remove ingress ports (#8062)	2026-10-06 16:35:31 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	39de33ceca	[management] handle db conn close on errpr (#7740)	2026-09-30 11:35:18 +02:00
Bethuel Mmbaga	30dd076b36	[management,proxy] Use single-use codes for OIDC session handoff (#7635) ... * Generalize PKCE verifier store into SingleUseStore * Generalize PKCE verifier store into SingleUseStore * Extend single-use store to generate one-time retrieval codes * Hand off proxy OIDC session via one-time code instead of URL token * Use the single-use store in integration tests * Read active proxy versions by cluster * Detect proxy clusters that support session codes * Bind OIDC session handoff mode to signed state * Deprecate legacy OIDC session token handoff * Remove unrelated session code test stub * fix tests * fix merge * Fix session code compatibility detection * Isolate proxy session codes in shared cache * bump min session version	2026-09-29 18:29:55 +03:00
Pascal Fischer	93cb226a5e	[management] fix login filter (#7739)	2026-09-29 13:29:24 +02:00
Bethuel Mmbaga	082aca1556	[management] Refactor PKCE verifier store into a reusable single-use store (#7634) ... * Generalize PKCE verifier store into SingleUseStore * Use the single-use store in integration tests * Remove unrelated session code test stub	2026-09-29 13:25:56 +03:00
Pascal Fischer	782c943410	[management] extract shared db conn + data repository (#7649) ... * extract shared db conn + data repository * extract repository interface * protect against nested transactions * fix mysql and db conn creation * fix context management * remove query warpper * remove withContext and withLock wrapper * remove context from function call * remove in memory mode * fix nested transaction handling * use db directly * remove leftover test * remove pool close on error during conn creation	2026-09-29 00:45:55 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	40dffc69ae	[management] record proxy version on connect (#7630)	2026-09-23 17:59:58 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	771d81b72a	[management] Add proxy credentials limiter on management (#7569)	2026-09-21 15:55:56 +02:00
dmitri-netbird	f422c41654	[management] extract peer update logic and wrap it in tests (#7338) ... * extract peer update loop into a dedicated struct and wrap it in tests Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * make linter happy Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io>	2026-09-11 17:07:26 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	0bdfa4277e	[management] blocking sync requests for user peers sharing the same wireguard key (#7427)	2026-09-04 13:10:51 +02:00
Bethuel Mmbaga	13ab50b901	[management] Add SetNX and GetDel cache store operations (#7084)	2026-09-04 11:03:28 +03:00
Viktor Liu	c2b5d211d9	[management] Enforce reverse proxy group access before minting and when honouring a session cookie (#7240)	2026-09-04 07:15:20 +02:00
Maycon Santos	ebc259e30b	[management,client] Gate remote jobs behind an admin opt-in with MDM support (#7153) ... This introduces a disabled-by-default allow-remote-jobs setting that controls whether the management server may run jobs (such as debug bundles) on a peer. The flag propagates end to end: through client configuration, the daemon SetConfig and Login requests, authentication, and system info, up to management, where it is stored on the peer and exposed on the peers API as remote_jobs_allowed. The client refuses any management-requested job unless the peer has opted in. Because enabling remote jobs crosses the user-to-root boundary, turning it on requires privilege, mirroring the SSH-server gate. Administrators can enforce the setting through MDM policy on both macOS and Windows, and MDM can also override the debug-bundle upload URL. The change ships policy documentation and generated profile templates, and adds configuration, conflict, and enforcement tests covering the opt-in, privilege, and MDM paths.	2026-09-01 17:53:41 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	611a9291cd	[management] fix posture check flip evaluation for affected peers calc (#7347)	2026-08-28 15:39:48 +02:00
Pascal FischerandDmitri Dolguikh	e06c17cf59	[management] network map from nmap data type (#6919) ... Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> Co-authored-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io>	2026-08-27 11:28:05 +02:00
Viktor Liu	51095cb986	[client, management] Support per-peer lazy connection state and default proxy peers to lazy (#6762) ... * Support per-peer lazy connection state and default proxy peers to lazy * Classify forward targets from incoming config in lazy exclusion * Set IsUserspaceBind mock so lazy manager starts in engine test * Skip lazy exclude reconciliation when the set is unchanged * Keep cached lazy flag when a sync carries no peer config	2026-08-26 09:33:51 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	7d83a3902d	[proxy] validate header auth on proxy (#7263)	2026-08-25 13:46:26 +02:00
Bethuel Mmbaga	e206f8827d	[management] Suppress staticcheck warnings for deprecated proto fields (#7261)	2026-08-20 16:20:18 +02:00
dmitri-netbird	a144e8c144	[client, management] switch to go.uber.org/mock (#7253) ... * switch to go.uber.org/mock/gomock Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * updated go:generate commands + regenerated mocks Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * update go:generate mockgen commands Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * removed duplicate import Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> * fix go:generate Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> --------- Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io>	2026-08-20 11:53:19 +02:00
Maycon Santos	f805c149d9	[management] Record reverse proxy usage for activity accounting (#7116) ... People who only ever reach private services through the reverse proxy were invisible to activity accounting. Active users are counted from user.LastLogin or from the LastSeen of a peer they own, and neither column was written on the proxy paths — so a person signing in via SSO to a proxied service, or a peer serving one over the mesh, never showed up in the 24 hour numbers. Both writes now happen where the proxy already authenticates: - GenerateSessionToken stamps LastLogin after the session token is signed, the same column and the same way the dashboard and device login paths do. - ValidateTunnelPeer stamps the calling peer's LastSeen, the column its owner activates through. The policy lives in a new reverseproxy/activity manager rather than in the gRPC service, matching the module layout the other reverse proxy domains use. It skips what can never count — service users, embedded proxy peers and WASM clients — and throttles peer writes to once an hour, well inside the window accounting asks about and far above the proxy's five minute tunnel cache. The peer write is a single indexed UPDATE that touches only peer_status_last_seen. Connected and SessionStartedAt are left alone so the session-ownership fencing MarkPeerConnectedIfNewerSession relies on is never disturbed, and the timestamp comes from the database clock rather than the caller, for the same reason the other status writers take it from there. The caller's cutoff travels into the statement's WHERE, so concurrent requests for one peer collapse into a single write instead of each acting on its own stale read, and a peer that was never seen — NULL last seen, since Status is an embedded pointer — still records its first activity. Nothing outside the reverse proxy changes behaviour: the only addition elsewhere is the RefreshPeerLastSeen store method the manager calls.	2026-08-11 15:54:39 +02:00
Brad Ison	27b2d3f351	[management] Add a proxy-connect authorizer seam (#7136) ... At proxy connect time, the declared cluster address is validated for shape and checked for availability (`IsClusterAddressAvailable`), and from then on the declaration is what routes the cluster's mappings to the connection. Deployments that embed management through the integrations seam may need a policy on that claim — deciding which credential is allowed to declare which address. This adds an optional `ProxyConnectAuthorizer` hook on `ProxyServiceServer`, following the pattern of the existing `Set*` seams (`SetServiceManager`, `SetAgentNetworkSynthesizer`, `SetAgentNetworkLimitsService`, `SetProxyController`): - A nil-able interface field plus `SetProxyConnectAuthorizer`, guarded by the existing mutex. - One call at the end of `validateProxyConnect`, so both `GetMappingUpdate` and `SyncMappings` are covered by a single site. - **Nothing installs it by default** — with the hook unset (always, in this repo), behavior is byte-for-byte unchanged, which the tests pin. Design details: - The authorizer runs **last** — after input validation and the availability check — and **outside** the account-scoped branch, so management-wide tokens and token-less connects are also presented to it rather than bypassing policy. - The authorizer receives the presented `*types.ProxyAccessToken` (nil when none), the proxy ID, and the declared address. Everything it needs is already in the request/context; no proto or schema change. - A plain error from the authorizer surfaces as `PermissionDenied`, keeping an authorization rejection distinguishable from the `AlreadyExists` used for address conflicts in proxy logs. A status error passes through unchanged so implementations can pick their own code.	2026-08-10 19:50:00 +02:00
Maycon Santos	f65f7b347e	[management] Deny reverse proxy access to pending and blocked users (#7105) ... A user in the Pending Approval state could complete SSO and reach any SSO-protected reverse proxy service distributed to a group they belong to, including the All Users group. The reverse proxy authorization path checked the session token signature, that the user exists, that the user's account matches the service's account, and group membership — never the user's account status. The REST API (`permissions/manager.go`) and peer registration both gate on that state, but the proxy gRPC service does not go through the permissions manager, so neither gate applied. A pending user is persisted as blocked and pending approval, so blocked users reached those services the same way. `ValidateSession` now denies on account status, reporting `pending_approval` or `user_blocked` so the proxy access log and the denied page carry the cause rather than a generic refusal. `GenerateSessionToken` refuses to mint a token for such a user at all, so the browser never receives a session cookie and the OIDC callback can tell the user why instead of showing "Service configuration error". `ValidateUserGroupAccess` and `ValidateTunnelPeer` close the same gap; for the tunnel path this covers a user blocked after their peer was registered, since peer group membership alone kept mesh-origin access open. A single helper produces both the denied reason for the RPC responses and the sentinel error for the error-returning callers, so the four entry points cannot drift apart. A user the store cannot resolve is denied rather than passed through. One thing deliberately left out: session cookies are validated locally by the proxy against the service public key with no management round-trip, so a cookie issued before a user is blocked stays valid until it expires (24h by default). That is a revocation-propagation problem rather than this authorization gap, and every option for it (per-request validation with a cache, short-lived tokens with refresh, push-based revocation) changes the proxy hot path or the proxy/management protocol. Worth its own ticket.	2026-08-08 20:48:34 +09:00
Pascal Fischer	f9b412228e	[management] fix handling of empty network map during decode and encode (#6987)	2026-08-03 13:20:53 +02:00
Viktor Liu	b3f9b82442	[management] Force routing-peer DNS resolution for reverse-proxy domain targets (#6872)	2026-07-28 14:45:57 +02:00
Maycon Santos	bab5572a74	[management, proxy] scope agent-network model allowlist per policy/group and provider (#6905) ... ## Describe your changes The model-allowlist guardrail was merged into one account-wide union and enforced flat on every request, ignoring which policy/group/provider authorised it. With multiple policies — especially a mix of guardrailed and un-guardrailed ones — this caused: - **false-allow**: a model allowlisted for one group/provider leaked to any caller; and - **false-deny**: an un-guardrailed policy (intended unrestricted) was blocked by another policy's allowlist. Enforcement is now policy/group-aware, mirroring `llm_limit_check`: - **Management (`SelectPolicyForRequest`) is authoritative.** It uses the request model (already carried in `CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest.model`, previously ignored) to keep only applicable policies whose guardrails permit the model; no allowlist-enabled guardrail = unrestricted. Denies `llm_policy.model_blocked` when policies govern the (provider, groups) but none permits the model. - **Proxy `llm_guardrail` becomes a per-provider fail-closed backstop.** The synthesiser emits an allowlist only for providers every authorising policy restricts; the middleware keys off the resolved provider id and keeps unknown-model fail-closed.	2026-07-27 20:43:59 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	31ed241a1a	[management] component types (#6866)	2026-07-23 11:37:09 +02:00
Nicolas Frati	b0c1ed31b8	[infrastructure] Add unified admin CLI for self-hosted helpers (#6507) ... ## Summary Adds a unified `admin` CLI for self-hosted instance administrators in both the management and combined binaries. ## User Management ### `admin user change-password` - Changes a local embedded IdP user's password. - Selects the user with `--email` or `--user-id`. - Reads the new password from `--password` or `--password-file`. - Clears the user's local authentication session so the new password is required on the next login. - **Alias:** `admin user set-password`. ### `admin user reset-mfa` - Resets a local embedded IdP user's MFA enrollment. - Selects the user with `--email` or `--user-id`. - Clears TOTP/WebAuthn enrollment data and removes the local authentication session. - The user will re-enroll MFA on the next login. ## MFA Management ### `admin mfa status` - Shows whether local MFA is enabled in the account settings. - Checks the embedded IdP client configuration and reports whether MFA is enabled there. ### `admin mfa enable` - Enables local MFA for embedded IdP users. - Updates embedded IdP clients and saves the account MFA setting. - Records an audit event on a best-effort basis. ### `admin mfa disable` - Disables local MFA for embedded IdP users. - Updates embedded IdP clients and saves the account MFA setting. - Records an audit event on a best-effort basis. ## Reverse Proxy Tokens ### `admin token create --name <name> [--expires-in <duration>]` - Creates a reverse proxy access token. - Prints the plaintext token once, along with the token ID. - `--expires-in` supports values such as `24h`, `30d`, or `365d`. If omitted, the token never expires. ### `admin token list` - Lists reverse proxy access tokens. - Shows the token ID, name, creation date, expiration, last-used time, and revocation status. - **Alias:** `admin token ls`. ### `admin token revoke <token-id>` - Revokes a reverse proxy access token. - Revoked tokens can no longer authenticate reverse proxy instances. ## Reverse Proxy Management ### `admin proxy disconnect-all` - Lists registered reverse proxy instances and force-marks all connected instances as disconnected. - Useful for repairing stale proxy state after an unclean management server shutdown. - Prompts for confirmation by default. - `--dry-run` previews the changes without applying them. - `--force` skips the confirmation prompt. - Live proxies may appear again after their next heartbeat, reconnect, or re-registration. ## Compatibility Commands ### `token ...` - Deprecated top-level compatibility path. - Behaves the same as `admin token ...`. - Retained so existing scripts using `token create`, `token list`, or `token revoke` continue to work. ## Changes - Adds reusable `management/cmd/admin` command package. - Wires `admin` into `netbird-mgmt` and `combined`. - Adds local user password reset with existing password strength validation. - Adds local MFA enrollment reset by clearing Dex TOTP/WebAuthn credentials and local auth sessions. - Adds local MFA enable/disable/status helpers for embedded IdP deployments. - Moves proxy access token commands under `admin token` for a single admin-focused CLI entry point. - Exports `server.ValidatePassword` for reuse by CLI helpers. ## Tests ```bash go test ./management/cmd/... go test ./management/cmd/admin ./management/cmd ./combined/cmd go test ./management/server -run TestValidatePassword ``` Pre-push lint also passed. ### Checklist - [ ] Is it a bug fix - [ ] Is a typo/documentation fix - [x] Is a feature enhancement - [ ] It is a refactor - [ ] Created tests that fail without the change (if possible) - [ ] This change does **not** modify the public API, gRPC protocols, functionality behavior, CLI / service flags, or introduce a new feature — **OR** I have discussed it with the NetBird team beforehand (link the issue / Slack thread in the description). See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#discuss-changes-with-the-netbird-team-first). > By submitting this pull request, you confirm that you have read and agree to the terms of the [Contributor License Agreement](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTOR_LICENSE_AGREEMENT.md). ## Documentation Select exactly one: - [x] I added/updated documentation for this change - [ ] Documentation is **not needed** for this change (explain why) ### Docs PR URL (required if "docs added" is checked) Paste the PR link from https://github.com/netbirdio/docs here: https://github.com/netbirdio/docs/pull/832 <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit ## Release Notes * **New Features** * Added self-hosted admin CLI commands for changing passwords, resetting MFA (including WebAuthn), and managing embedded IdP client MFA (enable/disable/status). * Introduced a unified admin command entry point and improved data-directory handling for embedded IdP storage. * **Refactor** * Centralized password strength validation into a shared exported validator. * **Tests** * Added a comprehensive admin command test suite covering password input, selectors, MFA reset, and client MFA state handling. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->	2026-07-22 18:47:19 +02:00
3 people	8435682ac8	[client, management] offload client config generation to the client (#6711) ... Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io> Co-authored-by: crn4 <vladimir@netbird.io> Co-authored-by: pascal <pascal@netbird.io>	2026-07-22 18:20:27 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	62703ca23e	[management] add logs to ephemeral delete (#6747)	2026-07-13 19:06:22 +02:00
Maycon Santos	859fe19fff	[management] return nil when config is not set (#6642) ... * [management] return nil when config is not set * [management] add relay invariant test and enforce config behavior	2026-07-02 14:55:55 +02:00
Zoltan Papp	980598ed4a	[management, client] Add management-controlled client metrics push (#5886) ... * [management, client] Add management-controlled client metrics push Allow enabling/disabling client metrics push from the dashboard via account settings instead of requiring env vars on every client. - Add MetricsConfig proto message to NetbirdConfig - Add MetricsPushEnabled to account Settings (DB-persisted) - Expose metrics_push_enabled in OpenAPI and dashboard API handler - Populate MetricsConfig in sync and login responses - Client dynamically starts/stops push based on management config - NB_METRICS_PUSH_ENABLED env var overrides management when explicitly set - Add activity events for metrics push enable/disable * Remove log line * [management] Fix peer update test for MetricsConfig in NetbirdConfig Update TestUpdateAccountPeers assertions: NetbirdConfig is no longer nil in peer update responses since it now carries MetricsConfig even when STUN/TURN config is absent. * Regenerate proto files with protoc v7.34.1 * [management] Read metrics push setting in Postgres account query getAccountPgx omitted settings_metrics_push_enabled from its hand-written SELECT and Scan, so the toggle was always read back as false on Postgres and never reached clients. * [client] Fix metrics push getting stuck off after engine restart Engine restarts (backoff retries within the same login session) cancel e.ctx, which the push goroutine's lifetime was tied to. The goroutine died silently but ClientMetrics.push stayed non-nil since only an explicit stop clears it, so the next UpdatePushFromMgm call saw a "push already running" state and never restarted it. Give the Engine its own metricsCtx sourced from ConnectClient.ctx, which outlives engine restarts, so handleMetricsUpdate stops tying the push to the wrong-scoped context. Additionally make ClientMetrics.push an atomic.Pointer that the push goroutine clears via CompareAndSwap on exit, so the tracked state can never drift from the goroutine's actual lifetime regardless of which context a future caller passes in. * [management] Regenerate OpenAPI types with oapi-codegen v2.7.1 types.gen.go was regenerated with a stale local v2.6.0 binary, causing the CI git-diff check against generate.sh's pinned v2.7.1 to fail.	2026-07-01 14:50:25 +02:00
3 people	92a66cdd20	[management,proxy,client] 0.74.0 version (#6563) ... * [management,proxy] Agent network: per-account LLM gateway (policy, metering, multi-provider) (#6555) * [agent-network] Shared proto, OpenAPI schema, and generated types * [agent-network] Management: store, manager, synthesizer, policy engine, provider catalog, HTTP/gRPC API Adds the account-scoped agent-network module: provider/policy/budget CRUD and store, the reverse-proxy service synthesizer, policy selection + limit enforcement, the provider catalog (incl. Vertex AI and AWS Bedrock entries), and the management HTTP + proxy gRPC surfaces. * [management] Fix agent-network proxy-peer fan-out on affected-peer recompute The affected-peers resolver loaded only persisted reverse-proxy services, but agent-network services are synthesized on demand and never persisted. As a result the embedded proxy peer was never folded into the affected set when a client's group changed, so the proxy received no network-map update for a newly authorised client and rejected its handshake until a full resync (restart). loadProxyServices now merges the synthesized agent-network services (injected via a registration hook to avoid an import cycle), so proxy peers learn newly authorised clients immediately. * [proxy] Reverse-proxy middleware framework, chain, and request plumbing The per-target middleware chain (slots, dispatcher, mutation gate, metadata merger), body capture, access-log terminal sink, and the proxy wiring that builds + runs chains for synthesized agent-network services. * [proxy] LLM parsers, pricing, and builtin middlewares (OpenAI, Anthropic, Vertex AI, AWS Bedrock) Request/response parsers and SSE/event-stream metering, the embedded pricing table, and the builtin middleware set: request parser, router, policy limit-check/record, cost meter, guardrail, identity inject, response parser. Includes the path-routed providers — Google Vertex AI (keyfile:: service-account OAuth minting) and AWS Bedrock (bearer auth, invoke/converse/streaming, optional /bedrock prefix) — plus the Models allowlist and unmeterable-publisher deny. * [proxy] IPv6 in-place apply and TCP accept-loop hardening on netstack listeners * [agent-network] End-to-end test suite, module docs, and deployment preset * [agent-network] Fix codespell typos and exclude false positives - labelgen word pool: vermillion -> vermilion, racoon -> raccoon. - codespell ignore list: add flate (Go compress/flate package), recordin (a test-local identifier), and unparseable (a valid alternative spelling used consistently across identifiers + a metadata-value constant). * [management] Set LastSeen on injected proxy peer in realstack test (MySQL strict-mode) The injected embedded proxy peer had a PeerStatus with a zero LastSeen, which serializes to '0000-00-00' and is rejected by MySQL in strict mode (SQLite tolerates it). Set LastSeen to a valid time so SaveAccount succeeds on both engines. * [agent-network] Remove e2e shell-script suite from this branch The end-to-end shell scripts under scripts/e2e/ are maintained in a separate testing suite and are not part of this change set. * [agent-network] Polish module docs: remove internal review scaffolding, fix links, verify diagrams Strip PR-review framing, commit references, absolute paths, and stale internal references from the agent-network module docs; fix broken relative links; verify all diagrams against the current architecture. Remove the internal AI-reviewer prompt file. * [management] Refine session expiration handling to support 3-state encoding for SSO deadlines * [agent-network] Relocate agentnetwork package to internals/modules Move management/server/agentnetwork (and its catalog/, labelgen/, types/ subpackages) to management/internals/modules/agentnetwork, alongside the reverse-proxy module, and rewrite all importers. Pure relocation: package names, the synthesizer + affectedpeers registration hook, and store access (shared store.Store) are unchanged, so no import cycle is introduced (affectedpeers still depends only on the agentnetwork/types leaf). * [agent-network] Co-locate HTTP handlers in the module (RegisterEndpoints) Move the agent-network HTTP handlers from server/http/handlers/agentnetwork into the module at internals/modules/agentnetwork/handlers (package handlers) and rename the entrypoint AddEndpoints -> RegisterEndpoints, matching the reverse-proxy module convention. Wiring in http/handler.go updated accordingly. * Update getting started to point to rc when agent network enabled * Add a reference to a commercial license * Fix docs localhost link * Fix docs localhost link * Add private services domain note * [management] Add agent-network telemetry metrics (#6561) Surface agent-network adoption and usage in the self-hosted metrics worker: distinct accounts, providers, policies, budget rules, accounts with log collection enabled, and aggregated input/output tokens plus cost. Tokens and cost are summed from agent_network_request_usage (the always-written per-request ledger) so the figures are accurate regardless of the log-collection toggle and carry no double-counting. All values come from a handful of indexed aggregate queries run only on the worker's periodic tick. Adds store.AgentNetworkMetrics with GetAgentNetworkMetrics on the Store interface, the SqlStore implementation, and a zero-valued FileStore stub. * Update NetBird server and proxy image versions to 0.74.0-rc.2 * [management,proxy] Reduce agent-network cognitive complexity (#6566) Address the SonarCloud quality-gate findings in new agent-network code by extracting focused helpers. No behavior change. - synthesizer.go: split buildIdentityInjectConfigJSON into per-shape rule builders; extract mergeGuardrail from mergeGuardrails to cut nesting depth. - llm_identity_inject: extract injectionEmitsAnything validation predicate from New. - llm_response_parser/streaming.go: extract applyOpenAIStreamUsage and applyAnthropicStreamUsage (via a named anthropicStreamUsage type) and simplify the OpenAI scanner loop. - reverseproxy.go: decompose ServeHTTP into serveRouteError, buildTargetContext, serveDirect, serveWithChain, captureRequestForChain, serveDeny, newResponseWriter, observeResponse, and forwardUpstream, preserving the defer ordering so response observation still reads the captured writer before it is released. * [management] Move agent-network access-log ingest into the agentnetwork module (#6568) The agent-network access-log ingest path (metaKey wire contract, flatten, usage derivation, and the dual-write of the usage ledger + settings-gated full row) lived in the reverseproxy accesslogs manager, even though the agentnetwork module already owns the rest of that domain — types, read (ListAccessLogs / GetUsageOverview), the budget-counter writes, and retention cleanup. Move it next to the rest: a stateless agentnetwork.IngestAccessLog(ctx, store, entry) that the reverseproxy SaveAccessLog delegates to when the entry is agent-network. Removes the agentNetworkTypes import from the reverseproxy manager. No behavior change; the write/read table separation is unchanged. Adds real-store coverage for the disable->enable log-collection toggle (usage ledger always written, full row gated) plus the metadata parse and group-dedup helpers, which previously had no dedicated tests. * Add session view support in the access log * [management,proxy] Container-based agent-network e2e harness (#6577) * [e2e] Add container-based agent-network e2e harness (Pillar 1) Introduce a self-contained, OIDC-free e2e harness that stands up NetBird in containers, so suites no longer depend on the hand-maintained Tilt stack or a real IdP. - harness brings up the combined server (management + signal + relay + STUN + embedded IdP) in a single container built from combined/Dockerfile.multistage, and mints an admin PAT through the unauthenticated /api/setup bootstrap (NB_SETUP_PAT_ENABLED). API access goes through the existing shared/management/client/rest typed client. - the image is built via the docker CLI (BuildKit) so the Dockerfile's cache mounts are honored; testcontainers then runs the tagged image. - everything is behind the `e2e` build tag so normal builds and unit tests never pull in testcontainers. Adds BuildKit cache mounts to combined/Dockerfile.multistage so source changes recompile incrementally rather than from scratch. Pillar 1 proven by TestCombinedBootstrap: server builds, boots, mints a PAT, and the PAT authenticates a real management API call. * [e2e] Add management-side agent-network scenarios (Pillar 2) Port the API-driven agent-network scenarios from the bash suites to Go, sharing one combined server per package run (TestMain) with each test owning its resource cleanup. Drives the /api/agent-network/* endpoints through the shared REST client's NewRequest primitive with the generated api types. Scenarios: - provider lifecycle (create/get/list/delete + 404 after delete) - provider validation (missing api_key, unknown catalog id → 4xx) - settings collection-toggle round-trip with cluster/subdomain immutability - policy window floor (reject <60s enabled limit, accept at 60s) - consumption read endpoint returns an array All deterministic and dependency-free (dummy provider keys; no upstream calls), so they run headless in CI. * [e2e] Add live chat-through-proxy scenario (Pillar 3) Stand up the full agent-network data path in containers and drive a real chat-completion through the gateway: - harness: a shared docker network (combined server reachable by alias), a proxy container built from the published reverse-proxy image (NB_PROXY_PRIVATE, NB_PROXY_ALLOW_INSECURE, NB_RELAY_TRANSPORT=ws to match the combined server's WS-multiplexed relay) with a generated self-signed wildcard cert, and a netbird client container that joins via a setup key. - the combined image, proxy image, and client image default to the published rc.2 releases (overridable via NB_E2E_*_IMAGE; a bare local tag is built from source instead). Geolocation download is disabled so the server starts without external fetches. - one shared domain is used for the management exposed address, the proxy domain, and the agent-network cluster; the proxy token is minted via the server CLI (global) to match the manual install. TestChatCompletionThroughProxy provisions provider+policy+group+setup key, runs proxy+client, drives an OpenAI chat-completion through the tunnel, and asserts a 200 plus the ingested access-log row. Requires OPENAI_TOKEN (skips otherwise). The provider must be created with enabled=true explicitly — the create default is false despite the API doc. * [e2e] Run the live chat scenario across a provider matrix Replace the single-provider chat test with a data-driven matrix that runs the same scenario through every provider whose credentials are present in the environment (keys/URLs sourced from ~/.llm-keys locally, Actions secrets in CI): - OpenAI (chat), Anthropic (messages), Vercel, OpenRouter, Cloudflare (OpenAI-compatible gateways), and Bedrock (path-routed, bearer, via the messages shape) — covering both wire shapes and the gateway routing. - all providers are created enabled with a unique model string so the proxy's connect-time snapshot carries them all and model->provider routing is unambiguous (provider toggles after connect don't reconcile to a connected proxy). - the client supports both wire shapes (/v1/chat/completions and /v1/messages); Cloudflare gets the openai provider segment appended to its gateway URL. Each provider must return 200 through the tunnel and produce an ingested access-log row. Vertex is intentionally excluded from the uniform matrix: it needs a bespoke rawPredict request shape rather than the shared chat/messages path, so it warrants a dedicated scenario. * [ci] Add manual workflow for the agent-network e2e suite The e2e suite (build tag `e2e`) stands up the combined server + proxy + client in Docker and drives live chat-completions, so it is slow and needs provider credentials. Gate it out of normal CI (it already is, via the build tag) and run it on demand via workflow_dispatch. Provider scenarios skip when their secret is unset, so it degrades gracefully. * [e2e] Add Vertex to the provider matrix; run e2e on ubuntu-latest Vertex (Anthropic-on-Vertex) doesn't share the chat/messages wire shapes: the model travels in a rawPredict path and the proxy mints the service account's OAuth token. Add a Vertex client method that posts /v1/projects/<project>/locations/<region>/publishers/anthropic/models/<model>:rawPredict with the Vertex anthropic_version body, and wire it into the matrix as a path-routed provider (created without a models array). It is keyed off GOOGLE_VERTEX_SA_BASE64 + GOOGLE_VERTEX_PROJECT (region defaults to "global", model to a pinned claude snapshot, both overridable). Also bump the e2e workflow runner to ubuntu-latest and add the Vertex secrets. * Add docker/docker and docker/go-connections as direct dependencies in go.mod * [ci] Trigger agent-network e2e workflow on push to main and pull requests * [e2e] Fix proxy cert permission denied on Linux CI runners The proxy bind-mounts a temp dir of self-signed certs. MkdirTemp creates it 0700 and the key was 0600, which Docker Desktop on macOS ignores but a non-root proxy container on Linux runners cannot traverse/read, so the cert watcher failed with "open /certs/tls.crt: permission denied" and the container exited. Widen the cert dir to 0755 and write the throwaway key 0644 so the proxy uid can read the bind-mounted material. * [e2e] Build images from source by default instead of pulling rc.2 The agent-network code under test lives in this branch, so the e2e should exercise it rather than a frozen published release. Flip the harness default: combined/proxy/client are now built from their in-repo Dockerfiles (combined/Dockerfile.multistage, proxy/Dockerfile.multistage, e2e/harness/Dockerfile.client) under local tags. Pulling a published image stays available by setting NB_E2E_*_IMAGE to a registry reference. Builds now go through buildx --load so the Dockerfile cache mounts are honored and the result is loaded for testcontainers. The CI workflow adds a container-driver builder and a local layer cache (NB_E2E_BUILDX_CACHE) persisted via actions/cache, which caches the base/apt/dep-download layers across runs. The Go compile still re-runs each time, as BuildKit mount caches cannot be exported to the GitHub cache. * [e2e] Cover real providers in lifecycle + assert real consumption metering - TestProviderLifecycle now runs per available real provider (create → get → list → delete → 404) instead of a single dummy provider, exercising each catalog's create and field round-trip. Create is offline, so it stays fast and burns no provider quota; falls back to a synthetic OpenAI provider when no keys are set. - TestProvidersMatrix attaches a token limit (high caps, 60s window) to its policy, which switches on usage metering, and asserts consumption rows are recorded with positive token counts after the live traffic. Consumption is account-scoped (keyed by source group / user and window, not per provider), so the assertion is aggregate. - TestProviderValidation gains invalid-upstream and blank-name cases. Create validation is uniform across catalogs (no per-provider required-field rules), so per-provider rejection cases would be redundant. * [e2e] Assert session id propagates per provider Each matrix request now sends a unique session id as the universal x-session-id header and asserts it round-trips into that provider's access-log row. This guards the session-grouping contract end to end for every provider (header extraction runs in llm_request_parser ahead of the parser-specific body extraction, so it is provider-agnostic). * [e2e] Drop accidentally committed sync-phases dashboard netbird-sync-phases.json was swept into the Pillar 1 commit by a broad git add; it belongs to the unrelated sync-phases metrics work, not this e2e harness. Remove it from the branch so the PR diff is scoped to the e2e changes. * [e2e] Revert accidentally committed sync-phase ingest spec The netbird_sync_phase measurement spec in metrics ingest was swept into the Pillar 1 commit; it belongs to the unrelated sync-phases metrics work, not this e2e harness. Its emission side never landed here, so the spec was orphaned anyway. Restore ingest/main.go to its origin/main state. * Fix golint issues * Fix sonar * Add access log session test * Fix access log tests --------- Co-authored-by: braginini <bangvalo@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Zoltan Papp <zoltan.pmail@gmail.com>	2026-07-01 12:45:14 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	f4daf59bcd	[management] bring back client version check on login filter hash (#6552)	2026-06-26 16:36:50 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	a400828b89	[management] move some logs to trace (#6541)	2026-06-25 15:16:54 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	e2bb328a34	[management] less strict metaHash when blocking peers (#6531)	2026-06-25 15:02:43 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	2ebf26006a	[management] empty file check in nmap on other posturechecks (#6511)	2026-06-22 19:54:38 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	211a26019a	[management] validate meta change against posture checks (#6510)	2026-06-22 19:42:04 +02:00
Brad Ison	fb87f751a5	[management] Fetch complete user data in ValidateTunnelPeer (#6457) ... * [management] Fetch complete user data in ValidateTunnelPeer Previously the `ValidateTunnelPeer` method used by the ProxyService would fetch user information from the database if the connected peer was associated with a user ID, but it would not consult the IdP data for cached info from JWT claims like email. This caused the value of the injected `X-Netbird-User` header to always display the peer ID and never the user email associated with the peer as expected. This change adds an optional IdP manager to the ProxyService and fetches the complete user data from it if present. * [management] Refactor ValidateTunnelPeer principal info gathering This refactors the gathering of info on proxy tunnel peer principals into its own method to keep the complexity down and make Sonar happy.	2026-06-19 11:39:21 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	e4397d4d46	[management] remove nmap calc from login (#6449)	2026-06-17 16:37:24 +02:00
Maycon Santos	62da482133	[management] Add version gate to stop sending deprecated RemotePeers field (#6371) ... * [management] Add version gate to stop sending deprecated RemotePeers field don't send top-level remote peers on peers in the v0.29.3 or newer * precompute deprecated remote peers version constraint * [management] update tests to validate network map-based remote peers * [management] move deprecatedRemotePeersVersion constant closer to its usage * fix misplaced precomputed constraint definition * ensure top-level RemotePeers is empty for v0.29.3+ clients	2026-06-10 16:59:09 +02:00
Pascal Fischer	13200265d8	[proxy] Add no-blocking mapping updates (#6369)	2026-06-09 13:57:17 +02:00
Maycon Santos	b377d99933	[management] Copy private field on shallowCloneMapping (#6347) ... * [management] Copy private field on shallowCloneMapping added test to ensure clone handles new fields * Remove unnecessary debug logs from proxy service * Increase Wasm binary size limit to 60MB in build validation	2026-06-05 22:45:49 +02:00
Maycon Santos	fa1e241aea	[management, client, proxy] Follow-up fixes for private reverse-proxy services (#6268) ... * fix(proxy): gate tunnel-peer fast-path on inbound listener marker forwardWithTunnelPeer previously accepted any RFC1918 / ULA / CGNAT source IP, so a public client whose address happened to fall in those ranges could bypass the configured operator auth scheme by colliding with a known tunnel IP. The fast-path is now gated on TunnelLookupFromContext(r.Context()) being present — that context value is attached only by the per-account inbound (overlay) listener, so the host-facing listener never enters this branch. Tests updated to reflect the new requirement: requests that don't carry the inbound marker now fall through to the regular auth flow. * fix(proxy): harden inbound listener resource + startup-ctx handling Three correctness fixes on the per-account inbound path, with tests: - Close the logrus ErrorLog PipeWriter on tearDown. WriterLevel hands back an *io.PipeWriter backed by a pipe + scanner goroutine that the caller owns; the two writers per account (https + plain) were never closed, leaking the pipe and goroutine on every teardown. - Run the post-Start hooks on context.Background(). runClientStartup is launched in a goroutine from AddPeer and was inheriting the caller's request-scoped ctx, so a cancelled request could abort the inbound bring-up or fail the management status notification. The tail is split into notifyClientReady so the contract is testable. Tests cover the PipeWriter close behaviour and assert the readyHandler + NotifyStatus calls receive a non-cancelled background context. * feat(proxy): short-circuit peer-own-target loops with 421 When a peer that hosts the target of a private service dials its own service URL the request was being looped through the proxy and back over WireGuard to the same peer — twice the WG round-trip for no benefit, with no signal to the caller that something was wrong. Add isSelfTargetLoop to ReverseProxy.ServeHTTP: when the request arrived on the per-account overlay listener (IsOverlayOrigin) and the source tunnel IP matches the target host, refuse the request with 421 Misdirected Request and a body pointing the operator at the backend directly. The gate is scoped to overlay origin so requests on the public listener that happen to share a source IP with the target host are forwarded normally. * fix(management): private-service validation + tunnel-IP lookup semantics - Require an explicit port for L4 cluster targets. validateL4Target exempted TargetTypeCluster from the port check, but buildPathMappings serializes every L4 target via net.JoinHostPort(host, port) — port=0 shipped a ":0" upstream. Cluster targets use the same Host/Port fields, so the same requirement applies. - GetPeerByIP returns NotFound on a tunnel-IP miss instead of mapping every error to Internal. The proxy's ValidateTunnelPeer probes IPs that legitimately aren't in the roster; the miss is expected and now distinguishable from a real store failure. - Thread ctx into getClusterCapability's gorm query so a cancelled request doesn't keep the store busy. Tests updated for the L4-cluster port requirement and the GetPeerByIP NotFound path. * fix(client): include offlinePeers in PeerStateByIP lookup ReplaceOfflinePeers moves peers into d.offlinePeers but PeerStateByIP only scanned d.peers. Callers (the local DNS filter via localPeerConnectivity, embed.Client.IdentityForIP used by the proxy's tunnel-peer validator) were treating known-but-offline peers as unknown, which: - causes the DNS filter to keep returning records pointing at peers that have no live tunnel, AND - makes the proxy's local-roster check deny a request from such a peer rather than letting the cached management RPC carry the authorisation decision. Search both slices in PeerStateByIP. Adds a unit test for the IPv4 and IPv6 offline-match paths. * fix(rest): reject empty Delete path params in reverse-proxy clients ReverseProxyClustersAPI.Delete and ReverseProxyTokensAPI.Delete passed the path parameter into url.PathEscape without an empty check. PathEscape("") returns "" which collapses the request onto the collection endpoint ("/api/reverse-proxies/clusters/" / "/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens/"), so a caller bug delete with no id reached a routable URL with surprising semantics (typically 405). Short-circuit with a typed error before the request is built. Tests mount a handler on the collection path that fails the test if hit, so the regression is impossible to reintroduce silently. * chore(api,ci,docs,test): private-service schema, proto-check, fixups Non-functional cleanups and contract/CI hardening around the private-service work: API schema (openapi.yml): - Require a non-empty access_groups and mode=http when private=true, on both Service and ServiceRequest, mirroring validatePrivateRequirements. mode stays optional-but-constrained (empty defaults to http server-side), matching runtime. CI (proto-version-check.yml): - Cover renamed .pb.go files (read base via previous_filename). - Match protoc-gen-go-grpc version headers (optional "- " prefix and -gen-go-grpc suffix) so grpc-generated files are in scope. Docs / comments: - Reword Config field docs to say defaults are applied at Server.Start (initDefaults), not New. - Rename the obsolete --private-inbound flag to --private across comments and the proto doc. Pre-existing test fixups surfaced by review: - Repair the integration-tagged validate_session_test.go (SignToken signature growth + new Manager interface methods). - Fix the CI-skip boolean precedence so Windows isn't skipped unconditionally. - Guard the router.HTTPListener type assertion with comma-ok. * fix(proxy): background ctx for already-started AddPeer notification The earlier ctx fix covered the async runClientStartup path but missed the synchronous branch: when a service is added to an already-started client, AddPeer called NotifyStatus with the caller's request-scoped ctx. A cancelled request/stream could drop the connected notification to management. Use context.Background() here too, matching notifyClientReady. Extends TestNetBird_AddPeer_ExistingStartedClient_NotifiesStatus to pass a pre-cancelled caller ctx and assert the notification still ran on a non-cancelled context. * use the cmd context for roundtripper	2026-06-02 13:40:09 +02:00
Zoltan Papp	174dc24867	[management] Add SSO session extend flow (management) (#6197) ... * add SSO session extend flow (management) Adds the management-server half of the SSO session-extension feature: - New ExtendAuthSession gRPC RPC that refreshes a peer's session expiry using a fresh JWT, validated through the same pipeline as Login but without tearing down the tunnel or redoing the NetworkMap sync. - Per-peer SessionExpiresAt timestamp on every LoginResponse and SyncResponse so connected clients learn the deadline on the existing long-lived stream, and admin-side changes (toggling expiration, changing the expiration window) reach every peer within seconds. - SessionExpiresAt(...) helper on Peer that derives the absolute UTC deadline from LastLogin + the account-level PeerLoginExpiration setting, returning zero when the peer is not SSO-tracked or expiration is disabled. The matching client-side consumer of these fields lands separately. * encode SessionExpiresAt as 3-state on the wire Previously the `sessionExpiresAt` field on LoginResponse, SyncResponse and ExtendAuthSessionResponse was 2-state: a valid timestamp meant "new deadline", and nil meant "clear". That conflated two distinct meanings — "no info in this snapshot" vs "expiry is explicitly off / peer is not SSO-tracked" — so a Sync push that legitimately couldn't compute the deadline (settings lookup failed) would silently clear the client's anchor and lose the warning window. Three states now, encoded on the same field number (no .proto schema churn — only comments and the server-side encoder change): - nil pointer (field absent) → "no info"; client preserves anchor - &Timestamp{} (seconds=0, nanos=0) → explicit "disabled / not SSO" sentinel; client clears - valid timestamp → new absolute UTC deadline A new encodeSessionExpiresAt helper centralises the zero/non-zero encoding and is shared by the Sync, Login and ExtendAuthSession builders. The Sync builder still emits nil when settings are missing. Login and ExtendAuthSession always carry an authoritative value. The matching client-side decoder lands on feature/session-extend. * add UserExtendedPeerSession activity event ExtendAuthSession previously reused UserLoggedInPeer for its audit record, which conflated two distinct user actions: a full interactive SSO login (tunnel re-established, network map resync) versus an in-place deadline refresh (tunnel untouched). Auditors reading the log couldn't tell which one happened, and downstream dashboards/alerts on "login" volume were polluted by routine extends. Adds a dedicated UserExtendedPeerSession Activity (code 125, "user.peer.session.extend") and switches ExtendPeerSession over to it. The peer-extend audit trail is now distinguishable from interactive logins. * make ExtendAuthSession JWT-retry backoff cancellable Skip the retry log and 200ms wait on the final attempt, and replace the uncancellable time.Sleep with a select on time.After/ctx.Done so an upstream cancellation aborts the wait instead of running it to completion.	2026-05-28 19:14:14 +02:00