People who only ever reach private services through the reverse proxy were
invisible to activity accounting. Active users are counted from user.LastLogin
or from the LastSeen of a peer they own, and neither column was written on the
proxy paths — so a person signing in via SSO to a proxied service, or a peer
serving one over the mesh, never showed up in the 24 hour numbers.
Both writes now happen where the proxy already authenticates:
- GenerateSessionToken stamps LastLogin after the session token is signed,
the same column and the same way the dashboard and device login paths do.
- ValidateTunnelPeer stamps the calling peer's LastSeen, the column its owner
activates through.
The policy lives in a new reverseproxy/activity manager rather than in the gRPC
service, matching the module layout the other reverse proxy domains use. It
skips what can never count — service users, embedded proxy peers and WASM
clients — and throttles peer writes to once an hour, well inside the window
accounting asks about and far above the proxy's five minute tunnel cache.
The peer write is a single indexed UPDATE that touches only
peer_status_last_seen. Connected and SessionStartedAt are left alone so the
session-ownership fencing MarkPeerConnectedIfNewerSession relies on is never
disturbed, and the timestamp comes from the database clock rather than the
caller, for the same reason the other status writers take it from there. The
caller's cutoff travels into the statement's WHERE, so concurrent requests for
one peer collapse into a single write instead of each acting on its own stale
read, and a peer that was never seen — NULL last seen, since Status is an
embedded pointer — still records its first activity.
Nothing outside the reverse proxy changes behaviour: the only addition
elsewhere is the RefreshPeerLastSeen store method the manager calls.
Store the per-account gateway endpoint as {domain, proxy_address} with a
global unique index on the full hostname; dedicated = (domain ==
proxy_address). Bootstrap becomes an explicit POST carrying exactly one
of proxy_address (server allocates an adjective-noun label beneath it)
or endpoint (claimed verbatim, address-first); provider create loses its
bootstrap side effect. PUT is a full replace with every field required —
the immutable identity fields must be echoed unchanged and a mismatch is
rejected with 422. A guarded DELETE releases the endpoint: refused with
412 while providers exist or a proxy is actively serving the endpoint
hostname (matched case-insensitively); re-creating bootstraps fresh. A
self-addressed pin excludes its address from the account's cluster allow
list, and the live mapping update path now addresses the serving proxy
from the synthesized service. Existing rows are migrated on all three
store engines.
A user in the Pending Approval state could complete SSO and reach any
SSO-protected reverse proxy service distributed to a group they belong
to, including the All Users group. The reverse proxy authorization path
checked the session token signature, that the user exists, that the
user's account matches the service's account, and group membership —
never the user's account status. The REST API (`permissions/manager.go`)
and peer registration both gate on that state, but the proxy gRPC
service does not go through the permissions manager, so neither gate
applied. A pending user is persisted as blocked and pending approval, so
blocked users reached those services the same way.
`ValidateSession` now denies on account status, reporting
`pending_approval` or `user_blocked` so the proxy access log and the
denied page carry the cause rather than a generic refusal.
`GenerateSessionToken` refuses to mint a token for such a user at all,
so the browser never receives a session cookie and the OIDC callback can
tell the user why instead of showing "Service configuration error".
`ValidateUserGroupAccess` and `ValidateTunnelPeer` close the same gap;
for the tunnel path this covers a user blocked after their peer was
registered, since peer group membership alone kept mesh-origin access
open.
A single helper produces both the denied reason for the RPC responses
and the sentinel error for the error-returning callers, so the four
entry points cannot drift apart. A user the store cannot resolve is
denied rather than passed through.
One thing deliberately left out: session cookies are validated locally
by the proxy against the service public key with no management
round-trip, so a cookie issued before a user is blocked stays valid
until it expires (24h by default). That is a revocation-propagation
problem rather than this authorization gap, and every option for it
(per-request validation with a cache, short-lived tokens with refresh,
push-based revocation) changes the proxy hot path or the
proxy/management protocol. Worth its own ticket.
## Describe your changes
A group could be deleted while a reverse proxy service still referenced
it, silently breaking the service's access control: private services
list groups in `access_groups` as the peer allowlist, and SSO bearer
auth distributes tokens to `distribution_groups`.
Group deletion now runs through the same linkage validation as routes,
policies, and agent network policies: deleting a group that backs a
private service allowlist or an enabled bearer-auth distribution list
fails with a `GroupLinkError` naming the service domain. Disabled bearer
configs and stale `access_groups` on non-private services are inert and
do not block deletion.
Tests cover both linked cases in single and bulk deletion, and pin the
non-blocking cases. The test account seeds decoy services ahead of the
linked ones so the check is proven to scan the full service list.
Block deleting a group referenced as a source group by an agent network
policy, and drop unresolvable groups from synthesised private-service
ACLs. A deleted group survived in agent_network_policies.source_groups
and was carried into the injected in-memory policy, where network-map
assembly resolved it to a nil group and panicked on every proxy peer
sync.
## Describe your changes
Work on the Terraform provider (terraform-provider-netbird #177–#183)
surfaced places where the agent-network API broke its own contracts or
deviated from the conventions the rest of the management API follows,
forcing client-side workarounds.
Settings reads now follow the settings-endpoint convention: GET always
answers with a JSON object. Before bootstrap it returns the defaults
with an empty cluster/subdomain/endpoint (previously 200 with a JSON
`null` body, while the spec said 404). The settings PUT can bootstrap
the account by carrying a `cluster` — previously the row could only come
into existence through the first provider create, and a settings-first
setup was impossible; a differing cluster on a bootstrapped account is
rejected instead of silently ignored. PUT remains full-state.
The provider PUT schema promised omit-preserves semantics for several
operator-editable fields that the handler never delivered (it builds the
row from the request, like every other update handler). The schema
wording now matches the shipped full-state behavior; only the api_key
(secret) and session keys stay preserved by the manager. Identity
headers are always present in provider responses so an explicitly
cleared value round-trips as an empty string.
The Go REST client gains the full agent-network surface (catalog,
providers, policies, guardrails, budget rules, settings), including a
shim translating the legacy 200+`null` settings body from older servers
into an `IsNotFound` error.
Note for reviewers: the dashboard special-cased the `null` settings
body; it needs a small follow-up for the new defaults response (in
progress).
## Describe your changes
Agent Network gates providers, policies, guardrails, budgets, usage,
access logs, and settings behind the single `agent_network` permission
module, so access is all-or-nothing: a future delegated role cannot be
scoped to a subset of the area (for example usage-only visibility).
This introduces dotted submodules (`agent_network.providers`,
`.policies`, `.guardrails`, `.budgets`, `.usage`, `.logs`, `.settings`)
and resolves grants with a cascade: exact module first, then its parent,
then the role's `AutoAllowNew` default. The agent network manager now
validates each operation against its matching submodule. `usage`
(aggregated counters, overview) is deliberately separate from `logs`
(request-level entries, which can contain captured prompts).
No role definitions change. No built-in role carries an explicit
`agent_network` entry, so every role resolves the submodules exactly as
it resolved the parent module before — pinned by a test that compares
each built-in role's answer on every submodule against its answer on
`agent_network`. Role additions that use these submodules come
separately.
## Summary
Adds a unified `admin` CLI for self-hosted instance administrators in
both the management and combined binaries.
## User Management
### `admin user change-password`
- Changes a local embedded IdP user's password.
- Selects the user with `--email` or `--user-id`.
- Reads the new password from `--password` or `--password-file`.
- Clears the user's local authentication session so the new password is
required on the next login.
- **Alias:** `admin user set-password`.
### `admin user reset-mfa`
- Resets a local embedded IdP user's MFA enrollment.
- Selects the user with `--email` or `--user-id`.
- Clears TOTP/WebAuthn enrollment data and removes the local
authentication session.
- The user will re-enroll MFA on the next login.
## MFA Management
### `admin mfa status`
- Shows whether local MFA is enabled in the account settings.
- Checks the embedded IdP client configuration and reports whether MFA
is enabled there.
### `admin mfa enable`
- Enables local MFA for embedded IdP users.
- Updates embedded IdP clients and saves the account MFA setting.
- Records an audit event on a best-effort basis.
### `admin mfa disable`
- Disables local MFA for embedded IdP users.
- Updates embedded IdP clients and saves the account MFA setting.
- Records an audit event on a best-effort basis.
## Reverse Proxy Tokens
### `admin token create --name <name> [--expires-in <duration>]`
- Creates a reverse proxy access token.
- Prints the plaintext token once, along with the token ID.
- `--expires-in` supports values such as `24h`, `30d`, or `365d`. If
omitted, the token never expires.
### `admin token list`
- Lists reverse proxy access tokens.
- Shows the token ID, name, creation date, expiration, last-used time,
and revocation status.
- **Alias:** `admin token ls`.
### `admin token revoke <token-id>`
- Revokes a reverse proxy access token.
- Revoked tokens can no longer authenticate reverse proxy instances.
## Reverse Proxy Management
### `admin proxy disconnect-all`
- Lists registered reverse proxy instances and force-marks all connected
instances as disconnected.
- Useful for repairing stale proxy state after an unclean management
server shutdown.
- Prompts for confirmation by default.
- `--dry-run` previews the changes without applying them.
- `--force` skips the confirmation prompt.
- Live proxies may appear again after their next heartbeat, reconnect,
or re-registration.
## Compatibility Commands
### `token ...`
- Deprecated top-level compatibility path.
- Behaves the same as `admin token ...`.
- Retained so existing scripts using `token create`, `token list`, or
`token revoke` continue to work.
## Changes
- Adds reusable `management/cmd/admin` command package.
- Wires `admin` into `netbird-mgmt` and `combined`.
- Adds local user password reset with existing password strength
validation.
- Adds local MFA enrollment reset by clearing Dex TOTP/WebAuthn
credentials and local auth sessions.
- Adds local MFA enable/disable/status helpers for embedded IdP
deployments.
- Moves proxy access token commands under `admin token` for a single
admin-focused CLI entry point.
- Exports `server.ValidatePassword` for reuse by CLI helpers.
## Tests
```bash
go test ./management/cmd/...
go test ./management/cmd/admin ./management/cmd ./combined/cmd
go test ./management/server -run TestValidatePassword
```
Pre-push lint also passed.
### Checklist
- [ ] Is it a bug fix
- [ ] Is a typo/documentation fix
- [x] Is a feature enhancement
- [ ] It is a refactor
- [ ] Created tests that fail without the change (if possible)
- [ ] This change does **not** modify the public API, gRPC protocols,
functionality behavior, CLI / service flags, or introduce a new feature
— **OR** I have discussed it with the NetBird team beforehand (link the
issue / Slack thread in the description). See
[CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#discuss-changes-with-the-netbird-team-first).
> By submitting this pull request, you confirm that you have read and
agree to the terms of the [Contributor License
Agreement](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTOR_LICENSE_AGREEMENT.md).
## Documentation
Select exactly one:
- [x] I added/updated documentation for this change
- [ ] Documentation is **not needed** for this change (explain why)
### Docs PR URL (required if "docs added" is checked)
Paste the PR link from https://github.com/netbirdio/docs here:
https://github.com/netbirdio/docs/pull/832
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
## Release Notes
* **New Features**
* Added self-hosted admin CLI commands for changing passwords, resetting
MFA (including WebAuthn), and managing embedded IdP client MFA
(enable/disable/status).
* Introduced a unified admin command entry point and improved
data-directory handling for embedded IdP storage.
* **Refactor**
* Centralized password strength validation into a shared exported
validator.
* **Tests**
* Added a comprehensive admin command test suite covering password
input, selectors, MFA reset, and client MFA state handling.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
## Describe your changes
* [proxy] enforce model allowlist for URL-routed providers
(Bedrock/Vertex) by @mlsmaycon in
https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/pull/6764
* [management] Remove proxy peer stale deduplication logic by @mlsmaycon
in https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/pull/6768
## Issue ticket number and link
## Stack
<!-- branch-stack -->
### Checklist
- [ ] Is it a bug fix
- [ ] Is a typo/documentation fix
- [ ] Is a feature enhancement
- [ ] It is a refactor
- [ ] Created tests that fail without the change (if possible)
- [ ] This change does **not** modify the public API, gRPC protocols,
functionality behavior, CLI / service flags, or introduce a new feature
— **OR** I have discussed it with the NetBird team beforehand (link the
issue / Slack thread in the description). See
[CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#discuss-changes-with-the-netbird-team-first).
> By submitting this pull request, you confirm that you have read and
agree to the terms of the [Contributor License
Agreement](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTOR_LICENSE_AGREEMENT.md).
## Documentation
Select exactly one:
- [ ] I added/updated documentation for this change
- [x] Documentation is **not needed** for this change (explain why)
### Docs PR URL (required if "docs added" is checked)
Paste the PR link from https://github.com/netbirdio/docs here:
https://github.com/netbirdio/docs/pull/__
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
- **New Features**
- Added model-allowlist guardrails for path-routed providers, including
Bedrock and Vertex.
- Added Bedrock request support for chat interactions.
- Added guardrail management capabilities.
- **Bug Fixes**
- Requests with missing or blank model identifiers are now denied when a
model allowlist is configured, improving fail-closed protection.
- Corrected provider-specific request handling and session tracking for
Bedrock interactions.
- **Tests**
- Expanded coverage for allowlist enforcement and provider routing
scenarios.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
---------
Co-authored-by: Theodor Midtlien <theodor@midtlien.com>
Co-authored-by: blaugrau90 <61945343+blaugrau90@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Viktor Liu <17948409+lixmal@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds a settings constraint: enabling `agent_network_only` requires `dashboard_features.agent_network` to be `true` in the same account update. Without the Agent Network menu flag, a focused account that later turns the focused view off would lose access to the Agent Network menu entirely, so the two must be set together.
The check runs in `updateAccountRequestSettings` against the parsed request state: if the resulting settings have `agent_network_only == true` but `dashboard_features.agent_network` is not `true`, the update is rejected with `status.InvalidArgument` (HTTP 422) before anything is persisted.
The OpenAPI field descriptions for `agent_network_only` and `dashboard_features.agent_network` document the requirement. Only the descriptions changed — `required` and the schema `$ref` are untouched — and `types.gen.go` was regenerated from the spec (diff is the two comment lines).
Introduce a nullable dashboard_features object on account settings, serialized
to a single JSON column so new dashboard sections can be added without schema
changes. Starts with agent_network (show the Agent Network menu for an account
without the deployment flag). Wires the API handler mapping, the pgx GetAccount
loader, and adds store round-trip and handler tests.
