A custom domain row was created and bound to a live service whether or not
its CNAME ownership check ever succeeded. Validated was computed once, stored,
and read only by the dashboard listing, so an account that never proved DNS
control still had its hostname routed and a certificate ordered for it. The
domain string was also claimed globally, with no expiry, so an abandoned
unvalidated row blocked that name for every other account permanently.
Cluster derivation now matches a custom domain only when it is validated, and
reports "domain is not validated" so the API tells the caller what to fix.
Service updates no longer fall back to the previously derived cluster when
derivation fails, which was a way around the same check.
Claims carry a claimed_at date and are evicted after 24h without validation.
Uniqueness is now per (account_id, domain); the global constraint is dropped
and replaced by a manager-side rule that only one account may hold a validated
row for a name. That matches what the check actually proves: control of the
zone, not the identity of the requester, so the first account to validate owns
the name and a later one is refused. Creation pre-checks both cases and returns
AlreadyExists without naming the holding account.
An hourly job re-checks validated domains and, after three consecutive failed
lookups, marks them unvalidated and restarts their claim window, so a domain
whose DNS moved away stops being served and eventually frees the name. Custom
domains are capped per account because each one becomes an ACME order against
issuance rate limits shared by every account on the cluster.
ProxyMapping carries the verdict and the proxy refuses to set up routes, auth,
or certificate management without it, so the domain cannot be served if the
management-side gate is ever regressed. This makes management the required
first upgrade: a proxy on this version drops mappings from an older management
that does not set the field.
The migration drops the old constraint before AutoMigrate (dropping it rebuilds
the table on SQLite, discarding its indexes) and backfills claimed_at from the
upgrade time, so pre-existing unvalidated rows get a full window to validate
before they expire.
Adds a new "private" service mode for the reverse proxy: services reachable exclusively over the embedded WireGuard tunnel, gated by per-peer group membership instead of operator auth schemes.
Wire contract
- ProxyMapping.private (field 13): the proxy MUST call ValidateTunnelPeer and fail closed; operator schemes are bypassed.
- ProxyCapabilities.private (4) + supports_private_service (5): capability gate. Management never streams private mappings to proxies that don't claim the capability; the broadcast path applies the same filter via filterMappingsForProxy.
- ValidateTunnelPeer RPC: resolves an inbound tunnel IP to a peer, checks the peer's groups against service.AccessGroups, and mints a session JWT on success. checkPeerGroupAccess fails closed when a private service has empty AccessGroups.
- ValidateSession/ValidateTunnelPeer responses now carry peer_group_ids + peer_group_names so the proxy can authorise policy-aware middlewares without an extra management round-trip.
- ProxyInboundListener + SendStatusUpdate.inbound_listener: per-account inbound listener state surfaced to dashboards.
- PathTargetOptions.direct_upstream (11): bypass the embedded NetBird client and dial the target via the proxy host's network stack for upstreams reachable without WireGuard.
Data model
- Service.Private (bool) + Service.AccessGroups ([]string, JSON- serialised). Validate() rejects bearer auth on private services. Copy() deep-copies AccessGroups. pgx getServices loads the columns.
- DomainConfig.Private threaded into the proxy auth middleware. Request handler routes private services through forwardWithTunnelPeer and returns 403 on validation failure.
- Account-level SynthesizePrivateServiceZones (synthetic DNS) and injectPrivateServicePolicies (synthetic ACL) gate on len(svc.AccessGroups) > 0.
Proxy
- /netbird proxy --private (embedded mode) flag; Config.Private in proxy/lifecycle.go.
- Per-account inbound listener (proxy/inbound.go) binding HTTP/HTTPS on the embedded NetBird client's WireGuard tunnel netstack.
- proxy/internal/auth/tunnel_cache: ValidateTunnelPeer response cache with single-flight de-duplication and per-account eviction.
- Local peerstore short-circuit: when the inbound IP isn't in the account roster, deny fast without an RPC.
- proxy/server.go reports SupportsPrivateService=true and redacts the full ProxyMapping JSON from info logs (auth_token + header-auth hashed values now only at debug level).
Identity forwarding
- ValidateSessionJWT returns user_id, email, method, groups, group_names. sessionkey.Claims carries Email + Groups + GroupNames so the proxy can stamp identity onto upstream requests without an extra management round-trip on every cookie-bearing request.
- CapturedData carries userEmail / userGroups / userGroupNames; the proxy stamps X-NetBird-User and X-NetBird-Groups on r.Out from the authenticated identity (strips client-supplied values first to prevent spoofing).
- AccessLog.UserGroups: access-log enrichment captures the user's group memberships at write time so the dashboard can render group context without reverse-resolving stale memberships.
OpenAPI/dashboard surface
- ReverseProxyService gains private + access_groups; ReverseProxyCluster gains private + supports_private. ReverseProxyTarget target_type enum gains "cluster". ServiceTargetOptions gains direct_upstream. ProxyAccessLog gains user_groups.
CLI: new expose command to publish a local port with flags for PIN, password, user groups, custom domain, name prefix and protocol (HTTP default).
Management/API: create/renew/stop expose sessions (streamed status), automatic naming/domain, TTL renewals, background expiration, new management RPCs and client methods.
UI/API: account settings now include peer_expose_enabled and peer_expose_groups; new activity codes for peer expose events.
mlsmaycon