Commit Graph
13 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
riccardom 97b9a18ef6 [client] Resolve the merge conflicts left in the tree
262ce8c3b landed with the conflict markers still in it, so client/server and
the iOS SDK did not compile. Four regions, resolved as follows.

client/server/mdm.go — main moved the MDM conflict-check machinery into the
mdm package (mdm.ResolveConflicts, mdm.ConflictBool, mdm.ConflictURL, ...).
This branch had edited the local copies, which are now dead: dropped, along
with the profilemanager import that only the local conflictURL needed.

client/server/server.go, Login gate — this branch's value-aware gate stays
(the point of the PR: refuse a real divergence, let a restatement through),
so main's presence-based `loginRequestHasConfigOverrides` block goes; that
helper no longer exists here anyway. Main's other change in the same lines
is real and kept: the MDM policy now comes from the daemon-owned
s.mdmLoader.Load() instead of the package-level loadMDMPolicy, which main
removed. The stale call right below the conflict was the reason the file
would not have compiled even with the markers gone.

client/server/server.go, getConfig — both sides add something and both are
needed. The identity is provisioned and persisted first, then the MDM
overlay is applied, so what reaches disk stays the profile's own config: the
overlay is runtime-only and re-derived on every load.

client/ios/NetBirdSDK/client.go — main reworked SetConfigFromJSON to store
the JSON and re-parse it on each load, which is the shape kept; the parse is
now only a validity check, and this branch's reason for it (a document with
no peer identity is refused, not just an unparseable one) moves into that
comment.

client/server/update_settings_gate_test.go — follows the sentinel constant
to its new home, mdm.PreSharedKeyRedactedSentinel.
2026-09-08 14:03:15 +02:00
riccardom 6790c34b08 [client] Let an unprivileged caller log out a profile with no identity
The empty-key check sat behind requirePrivilegeForDeregistration, so an
unprivileged logout of an identity-less profile was refused with
PermissionDenied instead of completing as the no-op it is. And it was refused
for most profiles, not a corner case: the gate arms whenever the SSH server is
enabled, and sshServerEnabled reads an absent ServerSSHAllowed as enabled, so
every legacy profile qualifies.

The check now runs first. What the gate protects against is handing this
machine's registered key to another management server; with no key there is
nothing to hand over and nothing to protect.

Reported by CodeRabbit and cubic-dev-ai on PR #7398, both on the same defect.
2026-09-02 16:24:00 +02:00
riccardom 682b2de549 [client] Fail netbird up when the daemon refuses the settings update
With the update-settings kill switch on, `netbird up --enable-rosenpass`
connected and said almost nothing: SetConfig refused the change, the CLI
downgraded that to a warning, and Login carries no rosenpass field to apply, so
the flag was silently dropped. The setting stayed disabled, which is the point
of the switch, but the caller was never told their request had been ignored.

The refusal now travels as codes.FailedPrecondition instead of
codes.Unavailable, and the CLI fails on it. Unavailable means "the daemon
cannot serve this call", which is why the CLI downgraded it and why
client/ui/services reads it as an unreachable daemon — both wrong for a daemon
that answered and refused. FailedPrecondition also matches what the MDM gate
already returns for a managed field, so both refusals are now one class of
error, and it is added to the login backoff's early-exit codes so a refused
login stops instead of retrying for 30s.

This does not put the container back in the deadlock: with the value-aware
gate, a client restating its own configuration is not refused at all, so
nothing reaches this path unless a real change was asked for.
2026-09-02 15:56:32 +02:00
riccardom 1d213dd4d4 [client] Treat a profile with no identity as already deregistered
Two findings on the same consequence of pure reads: a profile can legitimately
carry no keys, because logging out clears them in place.

- sendLogoutRequestWithConfig went straight to wgtypes.ParseKey and failed with
  "incorrect key size: 0" on the second logout of the same profile. There is
  nothing to deregister for a peer that was never registered, so it returns
  cleanly. Before pure reads this case was hidden: the read minted a key and
  the daemon dialed management with one it had never seen.
- The mobile logout read the config with the generating reader right after
  checking the file exists. The two are not atomic, so a profile removed in
  between was resolved from the defaults and recreated by the write that
  follows. It uses the existing-file reader now.

Reported by cubic-dev-ai and CodeRabbit on PR #7398.
2026-09-02 15:50:19 +02:00
riccardom bc49b7249c [client] Stop the gate test from dialing the real management server
TestLogin_RestatingTheStoredConfigPassesTheGate asserts that the gate lets a
no-op login through, and the handler then went on to do the login for real:
isLoginRequired builds an auth client when isLoginRequiredFn is unset, so the
test dialed the profile's management URL — api.netbird.io:443. It took 1.05s
locally and would hang on a runner with no egress, for a fact about the gate
that needs no network at all.

Stubbed like the login_outcome tests do. The test now runs in 0.00s.

Reported by cubic-dev-ai on PR #7398.
2026-09-02 15:47:57 +02:00
riccardom 294fa0bcfd [client] Address the remaining bot findings on PR #7398
- Login logged the active-profile-state error and returned the same cause; the
  repo's guidelines call for one or the other, and the wrapped error is the one
  that carries context. (CodeRabbit)
- `netbird up` reported a codes.Unavailable SetConfig failure as "the daemon
  refused the settings update", but that code also covers a daemon that became
  unreachable. It now reports what the daemon said without asserting why.
  (cubic-dev-ai)
- TestLogin_ChangingTheManagementURLIsRefused asserted the error and nothing
  else, while "refused before it can touch daemon state" is the contract. It now
  checks the stored management URL, the in-progress login and the active profile,
  matching its SetConfig counterpart. (cubic-dev-ai)
2026-09-02 15:31:52 +02:00
riccardom 844bf24a6f [client] Name the two config readers for what they do
ReadConfig and GetConfig differed in one thing — what happens when the file is
absent — and neither name said which was which:

- ReadConfig      -> ReadOrGenerateConfig  (reads it, or generates one in memory)
- GetConfig       -> GetExistingConfig     (reads it, or fails)

Three comments went with them:

- GetConfig's said "return with Config and if it was created. Errors out if it
  does not exist", which described a bool it does not return and a creation it
  never performs.
- ReadConfig's explained that it does not write, which is what a reader is
  supposed to do anyway.
- Server.getConfig's said it "errors out if it does not exist", which it does
  not — it resolves a default config, and now provisions the identity too.
2026-09-02 15:21:35 +02:00
riccardom 7a1f095eb5 [client] Make config reads pure and provision the identity explicitly
Reading a config wrote it back. profilemanager.readConfig persisted whatever
apply() had filled in, and ReadConfig created and wrote the file outright when
it was absent, so every reader was quietly a writer: a gate deciding whether to
refuse a request, a UI listing profiles, a mobile getter reading one preference.
The previous commit worked around that with a PeekConfig variant, which left
two read functions with opposite side effects and the antipattern still there
for everyone else.

Only one thing in a read genuinely had to be persisted: apply() generated the
WireGuard and SSH keys when it found them empty, and a generated key cannot be
recomputed — losing it means the peer comes back with a different identity and
registers again. Everything else apply() fills in is a deterministic default
that the next read recomputes anyway.

So identity provisioning is now its own step, Config.EnsureIdentity, and the
callers that provision write the result out themselves, in the open:

- Server.getConfig, the daemon's provisioning point;
- the CLI's foreground login, which is about to dial management;
- update() / directUpdate(), the config write paths — a stored profile can
  legitimately carry no identity, since a mobile logout clears the keys in
  place, and the next write is what has to mint a new one.

ReadConfig and GetConfig no longer write anything, PeekConfig is gone, and the
dry-run baseline no longer needs placeholder keys to keep apply() from minting
real ones.

One deliberate leftover: readConfig still calls util.EnforcePermission, which
chmods a config file whose permissions are too broad. It changes no content and
is idempotent, and dropping it would leave a legacy file world-readable until
its first write.
2026-09-02 15:04:46 +02:00
riccardom ee9a5c2e20 [client] Re-take the update-settings decision under the config lock
Login checks twice on purpose: the first check refuses the ordinary case
early, and authorizeAndPrepareLogin re-takes the authoritative one under
guardedConfigMu because the first is unsynchronized against a concurrent
privileged request. The update-settings decision is now equally
value-dependent — it compares the request against the stored config — but it
was taken only in the first, unlocked check.

So a login that was a no-op when it was checked could be written after a
concurrent writer had repointed the profile, which is exactly the window the
lock exists to close. The decision is now re-taken alongside the privilege one,
which also makes it the last read before persistLoginOverrides writes.

The test drives that interleaving through the existing afterLoginPreCheck seam
and fails without the re-check.
2026-09-02 14:35:05 +02:00
riccardom ec30004241 [client] Cover the login the update-settings gate used to refuse
The gate's decision procedure was tested directly, but no test drove the Login
RPC that the refusal actually broke: the CLI retries Login in a backoff loop,
so a refused no-op login is what kept a client configured by environment from
ever coming up. The handler-level coverage stopped at the refusal case, which
passes on the pre-fix code too.

This test fails on the pre-fix daemon with "update settings are disabled" and
passes now. Past the gate the handler does real work the test does not stand
up, so it asserts only that the refusal did not happen.
2026-09-02 14:33:33 +02:00
riccardom 2a17bf0d55 [client] Compare service URLs as endpoints, not as strings
Three places in one request path each had their own notion of "same
management URL": the config layer compared the parsed URLs as strings, the
privileged-change gate compared scheme + host + effective port, and the MDM
conflict check compared strings after filling in the default port. Only the
middle one was right.

A string comparison answers the wrong question. "https://api.netbird.io",
"https://api.netbird.io/" and "https://API.netbird.io:443" are one endpoint
written three ways, so a client restating its own management URL with a
trailing slash — a normal way to write it — was still read as a client asking
to be repointed, and the update-settings gate refused it. The MDM check had
the same flaw against the enforced value.

profilemanager.SameServiceURL is now the single comparison: same scheme, same
host case-insensitively as DNS names are, same effective port. The config
layer, the privileged-change gate and the MDM conflict check all defer to it,
so there is one answer to "did this URL change?" instead of three.
2026-09-02 14:31:38 +02:00
riccardom 0b969e2124 [client] Do not write the profile config while only reading it to decide
The update-settings gate needs the stored config to decide whether a request
changes anything, so the previous commit moved that read ahead of the refusal.
The read is not side-effect free: profilemanager.GetConfig writes the config
back whenever apply() has to fill in a default the file was missing. A request
that the gate then refuses had therefore already rewritten the profile file.

PeekConfig is GetConfig without that write-back. The returned config is still
normalized in memory, which is what the decision needs; the file is left
exactly as it was found. Every caller of storedConfigAtPath feeds a gate that
can refuse, so they all peek.

Note for reviewers: the daemon still normalizes the file on startup and on
every real update, so nothing depends on a read performing that write.
2026-09-02 14:28:19 +02:00
riccardom ef88c4de5f [client] Gate settings updates on value, not on field presence
The update-settings kill switch (--disable-update-settings /
NB_DISABLE_UPDATE_SETTINGS / the MDM DisableUpdateSettings key) forbids
changing settings, but it decided what a "change" was by looking at
whether a field was present in the request. The CLI fills the whole
config surface of SetConfigRequest and LoginRequest from its flags and
environment on every `netbird up` (setupSetConfigReq in cmd/up.go), so a
client configured by environment restates its own configuration on every
start and tripped the gate every time.

SetConfig only warned about that, but Login carries the same fields and
was gated the same way, and Login runs inside the CLI's backoff loop: the
daemon answered every attempt with codes.Unavailable, `netbird up` never
completed, and a container with NB_DISABLE_UPDATE_SETTINGS plus any
config env var (NB_MANAGEMENT_URL, for one) could not come up at all.

Both gates now compare values. Config.WouldChange is the dry-run half of
UpdateConfig: it runs the very same diff logic (Config.apply) against a
copy of the stored config, so the gate cannot drift from what an actual
update would do, nor go stale when a field is added. A request that
restates what the profile already holds changes nothing and is allowed; a
request that diverges is refused exactly as before, and a dry run that
cannot be evaluated fails closed. A profile with no config on disk yet is
judged against the config the daemon would create for it.

For Login, the compared input comes from loginOverridesInput, which
persistLoginOverrides also uses to perform the write, so the gate judges
precisely the two fields a login can persist (management URL, pre-shared
key) and no field it ignores.

Two adjacent defects surfaced while making the comparison exact:

- Config.apply compared URLs as raw strings, so the same endpoint spelled
  without its default port ("https://api.netbird.io" vs
  "https://api.netbird.io:443") counted as a new value and rewrote the
  config. It now compares the parsed forms.
- UpdateConfig did not collapse the redacted pre-shared key, unlike
  UpdateOrCreateConfig and DirectUpdateConfig, so a UI round-trip of the
  mask replaced the stored key with asterisks.

The CLI warning for a refused SetConfig said the method was not available
in the daemon, which sent people looking for a version mismatch that was
not there; it now reports the refusal.
2026-09-02 12:57:14 +02:00