The community and enterprise bootstrap scripts now generate a dedicated
`server.auth.sessionCookieEncryptionKey` from 32 random bytes for fresh
installations.
The key is Base64-encoded, persisted independently from the datastore
encryption key, and reused from the generated configuration after
restarts.
The community script now also creates `config.yaml` with mode `0600`
before writing it, matching the existing enterprise behavior.
The server already supports the session cookie encryption key, but the
bootstrap scripts left it unset.
This adds defense-in-depth for newly generated deployments while
preserving the existing server-side nonce validation.
Because this only changes newly generated configuration, existing
installations and sessions are unchanged.
A focused regression test checks key presence, decoded length,
separation from the datastore key, YAML placement, and file mode for
both scripts.
It is included in the infrastructure workflow.
## Describe your changes
The relay client's reconnect backoff was constructed without a
`RandomizationFactor`
([guard.go:156-165](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/shared/relay/client/guard.go#L156-L165)),
so it kept the zero value: every client that lost the same relay server
retried on the identical 2/4/8/16/32/60, potentially in waves.
It was the only exponential backoff in the codebase without a
randomization factor.
Use `backoff.DefaultRandomizationFactor`, as random factor.
## Issue ticket number and link
No public issue. Found while reviewing the relay reconnect path for the
client-metrics review:
22k relay reconnection events in 24h, and the shared transport's own
retry schedule was
identical across all clients.
## Stack
<!-- branch-stack -->
### Checklist
- [x] Is it a bug fix
- [ ] Is a typo/documentation fix
- [ ] Is a feature enhancement
- [ ] It is a refactor
- [x] Created tests that fail without the change (if possible)
> By submitting this pull request, you confirm that you have read and
agree to the terms of the [Contributor License
Agreement](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTOR_LICENSE_AGREEMENT.md).
## Documentation
Select exactly one:
- [ ] I added/updated documentation for this change
- [x] Documentation is **not needed** for this change (explain why)
Internal retry-timing change with no user-visible surface: no CLI flag,
configuration option
or API field is added or altered, and the mean reconnect delay is
unchanged.
### Docs PR URL (required if "docs added" is checked)
Paste the PR link from https://github.com/netbirdio/docs here:
N/A
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
* **Bug Fixes**
* Improved reconnect timing to distribute repeated connection attempts
more evenly and reduce synchronized retry spikes.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
## Describe your changes
A group could be deleted while a reverse proxy service still referenced
it, silently breaking the service's access control: private services
list groups in `access_groups` as the peer allowlist, and SSO bearer
auth distributes tokens to `distribution_groups`.
Group deletion now runs through the same linkage validation as routes,
policies, and agent network policies: deleting a group that backs a
private service allowlist or an enabled bearer-auth distribution list
fails with a `GroupLinkError` naming the service domain. Disabled bearer
configs and stale `access_groups` on non-private services are inert and
do not block deletion.
Tests cover both linked cases in single and bulk deletion, and pin the
non-blocking cases. The test account seeds decoy services ahead of the
linked ones so the check is proven to scan the full service list.
pascal