* [client] Force interactive login when extending the auth session
A session extend must be answered from the account the peer is registered
under. With a silent PKCE flow (DisablePromptLogin or max_age=0) the IdP
answers from whatever session it already holds, which need not be the
peer's account when several are signed in; the token then fails the
user match in ExtendAuthSession with no way to pick another account.
Mark the PKCE flow request as a session extend so the management server
can force prompt=login for it, overriding the configured silent flow.
* [client] Reduce cognitive complexity of Server.Login
Login sat at cognitive complexity 27, over the 25 the linter allows.
Extract the interactive SSO branch into startSSOLogin, and split the
nested in-flight-flow reuse check out of it into reuseOAuthFlow, which
flattens the original if/else into early returns: it returns the cached
auth info when the previous flow targets the same client and still has
more than 90s left, otherwise cancels the stale wait and returns nil so
the caller requests a fresh flow.
The helpers take the contextState through a small statusSetter
interface, since internal.contextState is unexported and re-deriving it
with CtxGetState inside the helper would resolve against callerCtx
rather than rootCtx.
No behavior change: same ordering of state transitions, same mutex scope
around the oauthAuthFlow write, same error paths. Login is now at 21.
* [client] Respect DisablePromptLogin when extending the auth session
Forcing prompt=login on a session extend overrode DisablePromptLogin, which
is set for IdPs that break on it: Authentik triggers a double authentication
and social logins fail outright. Overriding it there trades a recoverable
extend for a login that cannot complete at all.
Keep the LoginFlag override, which only replaces max_age=0 or none with
prompt=login so the IdP honours login_hint, and leave DisablePromptLogin as
configured. Those deployments keep the silent flow, and with several accounts
signed in an extend answered from the wrong one still fails the user match.
* [client] Guard the shared OAuth flow state with the server mutex
reuseOAuthFlow read flow, expiresAt, waitCancel and info without holding
s.mutex, while startSSOLogin and WaitSSOLogin write them under it. Reading the
fields one at a time could also answer with auth info from a flow that was
already replaced, or cancel a wait that no longer belongs to the flow just
judged stale. Take one snapshot under the lock and decide from it.
WaitSSOLogin read oauthAuthFlow.flow twice outside the lock; both now use a
value snapshotted in the critical section that already installs actCancel.
Its stale waitCancel was read and called in a separate section from the one
installing the new one, so two racing calls could read the same predecessor and
leave one wait uncancelled. Swap the two in a single critical section. Both
cancels run after unlocking: the displaced wait takes s.mutex as it unwinds.
* [client] Verify the SSO login came back for the hinted account
login_hint is a suggestion the IdP may ignore: with a silent flow configured
(DisablePromptLogin or max_age=0) and a live IdP session for another account,
the login completes with that account's token. On a registered peer the
management server rejects it as a user mismatch, but on a fresh profile the
peer silently registers under the wrong account and the profile is then bound
to it — every later login follows the stored hint straight back.
After the token exchange, compare the ID token's email against the hint the
flow was sent with. On a mismatch, do not log in to management with the token;
run one more round asking the IdP to re-decide the account (prompt=login, via
ForceAccountPrompt — DisablePromptLogin still wins there). If the prompted
round also comes back different, proceed with a warning: the address may
legitimately have changed, and refusing forever would lock the user out of the
profile while the management server still rejects a token that does not own
the peer. A token or profile with no email to compare is not judged.
The retry differs per platform because of who opens the browser:
- CLI (netbird login foreground) and Android run the whole flow in one
process, so the mismatch retries automatically: the browser reopens with
the account prompt within the same login attempt.
- On desktop the login is split between the daemon and the GUI: Login hands
the authorize URL to the GUI, WaitSSOLogin blocks for the token, and only
the GUI can open a browser. A new URL cannot be handed out from inside
WaitSSOLogin (its response has no field for one, kept that way to avoid a
proto change), so the daemon arms forceAccountPrompt, fails the round with
"connect again to choose the account", and builds the next Login's flow
with the prompt — the user's next connect is the retry.
The flag and the flow annotations live in daemon memory only; SwitchProfile
drops them so the previous profile's hint cannot judge the next profile's
token. The device code flow has no prompt parameter (RFC 8628), so a prompted
round there runs as-is and a repeated mismatch is let through with the
warning rather than looping.
* [client] Address review comments on PKCE session extend flow
Fail the PKCE authorization flow test on request error instead of
continuing into a nil dereference, and make the godoc comments on the
touched exported symbols identifier-leading full sentences.
* [client] Match accounts only on the email claim of the ID token
The name-claim fallback in the ID token parsing is kept for the login
hint and display, but account matching now only considers a value that
came from the email claim, so a token without one no longer produces a
false account mismatch.
* [client] Drop the pending session extend on a profile switch
The profile-switch cleanup dropped the pending login flow and the
account-prompt flag, but left extendAuthSessionFlow untouched. Its device
code was issued by the previous profile's IdP client, so a
WaitExtendAuthSession still parked on the browser leg would submit the
resulting token against the new profile's engine.
* [client] Judge the SSO account against the flow that produced the token
WaitSSOLogin snapshotted the flow on entry but re-read the info, hint and
accountPrompted from the live s.oauthAuthFlow afterwards, in separate
critical sections. WaitToken blocks for the whole browser leg, so a
concurrent Login or RequestJWTAuth could replace the flow meanwhile and
the mismatch check would compare this wait's token against another flow's
account: either arming the prompt spuriously or letting a wrong-account
token through against an unrelated profile's hint. Take all of it in the
entry snapshot.
* [client] Keep the forced account prompt from being lost to flow reuse
startSSOLogin consumed forceAccountPrompt and applied the prompt to the
freshly built flow, but reuseOAuthFlow could then answer from a cached
flow for the same client — one built without prompt=login, e.g. by
RequestJWTAuth. The user got the same silent authorization URL that
produced the mismatch, with the flag already spent, so no later round
asked either. Rule reuse out when the prompt is forced, while still
cancelling the predecessor's wait.
RequestJWTAuth also wrote the flow fields one by one, leaving the previous
login's hint and accountPrompted behind for WaitSSOLogin to judge a later
token against. Both sites now replace the whole record.
* [client] Consume the forced account prompt after the retry
forceAccountPrompt was never cleared, so a flow that outlived the retry it
was armed for kept sending prompt=login on every later authorization
request and re-authenticated the user each time. RequestAuthInfo now takes
the flag as it builds the request.
* [client] Cancel the caller context in the SSO login tests
WaitSSOLogin parks a goroutine on the caller's context for the whole
browser leg. The tests passed context.Background(), which never cancels,
so each left one goroutine behind for the lifetime of the test binary.
* [client] Cancel the wait displaced by an OAuth flow replacement
Replacing the shared record with a whole struct value dropped the previous
flow's waitCancel, so an SSO browser wait still parked on it lost its
cancel: nothing could preempt it, and it could go on to run attemptLogin
or mutate the record behind the new flow. Both replacement sites now take
the displaced cancel over in the same critical section, via a shared
replaceOAuthFlow, and invoke it after the unlock.
* [client] Guard OAuth flow mutations by the flow that owns the wait
* [client] Arm the account prompt only from the wait that owns the flow
* [client] Adopt the three-value parseEmailFromIDToken in the device flow
The main merge brought in the device flow's email extraction from #7193,
which still used the two-value signature this branch replaced when account
matching was narrowed to the email claim. Git merged the files without a
textual conflict, so the branch stopped compiling.
Take the fromEmailClaim result and fill EmailClaim from it, the same way the
PKCE path does, so device-flow clients get the same account matching.
* [client] Populate the pending extend flow in the test server helper
SwitchProfile cancels and clears the pending session extend flow
unconditionally, the same way it clears the SSH JWT cache. New always
populates the field, but the hand-assembled test server did not, so
TestSwitchProfile_ClearsJWTCache panicked on a nil PendingFlow.
This introduces a disabled-by-default allow-remote-jobs setting that
controls whether the management server may run jobs (such as debug
bundles) on a peer. The flag propagates end to end: through client
configuration, the daemon SetConfig and Login requests, authentication,
and system info, up to management, where it is stored on the peer and
exposed on the peers API as remote_jobs_allowed. The client refuses any
management-requested job unless the peer has opted in. Because enabling
remote jobs crosses the user-to-root boundary, turning it on requires
privilege, mirroring the SSH-server gate. Administrators can enforce the
setting through MDM policy on both macOS and Windows, and MDM can also
override the debug-bundle upload URL. The change ships policy
documentation and generated profile templates, and adds configuration,
conflict, and enforcement tests covering the opt-in, privilege, and MDM
paths.
Adds an SSHClient gomobile binding so the Android app can run an SSH session over the tunnel with a PTY, exposed through a listener interface for the in-app terminal.
Server type is auto-detected from the SSH banner, which selects the auth path: JWT device-code flow, NetBird key, or a regular server (NetBird key first, then password). Host keys are verified against the peer registry for NetBird servers and trust-on-first-use for regular ones.
- **Wails v3 application** (`client/ui`) with a React + TypeScript + Tailwind frontend replacing the Fyne UI: main connection view, exit-node switcher, networks/peers browser with detail panels, profile management, settings (general, network, SSH, security, troubleshooting, appearance), debug-bundle creation, and a first-run welcome flow.
- **Internationalization**: go-i18n bundle with 9 locales (en, de, es, fr, hu, it, pt, ru, zh-CN) shared between the tray and the frontend.
- **New system tray** implementation with per-platform theme-aware icons, including a native XEmbed host for Linux (`xembed_tray_linux.c`) and a Linux theme watcher.
- **Session handling**: auth session watcher (`client/internal/auth/sessionwatch`), pending login flow, session-expiration dialog and tray notifications, and `netbird login` improvements.
- **Daemon API extensions** (`daemon.proto`): status stream subscription, event stream, networks/exit-node selection endpoints, and richer full status — with probe throttling on the daemon side to protect against UI-driven request storms.
- **UI preferences store** persisted per profile, autostart management via the daemon (single source of truth in HKCU on Windows).
- **Build system**: Taskfile-based builds per platform (macOS, Linux, Windows), Docker cross-compilation images, MSIX/NSIS/nfpm/AppImage packaging, and a new `frontend-ui` CI workflow.
Co-authored-by: Zoltan Papp <zoltan.pmail@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Eduard Gert <kontakt@eduardgert.de>
Co-authored-by: braginini <bangvalo@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Pascal Fischer <32096965+pascal-fischer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: riccardom <riccardomanfrin@gmail.com>
* Unexport GetServerPublicKey, add HealthCheck method
Internalize server key fetching into Login, Register,
GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow, and GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow methods,
removing the need for callers to fetch and pass the key separately.
Replace the exported GetServerPublicKey with a HealthCheck() error
method for connection validation, keeping IsHealthy() bool for
non-blocking background monitoring.
Fix test encryption to use correct key pairs (client public key as
remotePubKey instead of server private key).
* Refactor `doMgmLogin` to return only error, removing unused response
Remove client secret from gRPC auth flow. The secret was originally included to support providers like Google Workspace that don't offer a proper PKCE flow, but this is no longer necessary with the embedded IdP. Deployments using such providers should migrate to the embedded IdP instead.
* Consolidate authentication logic
- Moving auth functions from client/internal to client/internal/auth package
- Creating unified auth.Auth client with NewAuth() constructor
- Replacing direct auth function calls with auth client methods
- Refactoring device flow and PKCE flow implementations
- Updating iOS/Android/server code to use new auth client API
* Refactor PKCE auth and login methods
- Remove unnecessary internal package reference in PKCE flow test
- Adjust context assignment placement in iOS and Android login methods
Zoltan Papp