3 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
mlsmaycon	2d8b0310a4	[client, proxy] IPv6 in-place apply + accept-loop hardening on netstack listeners ... Two related fixes for the embedded netbird client and the per-account inbound listeners that ride on its gVisor netstack. client/internal/engine.go — replace hasIPv6Changed with reconcileIPv6: - First v6 assignment (current had no v6, conf carries one) is applied in place via WGIface.UpdateAddr instead of returning ErrResetConnection. Pre-fix, every embedded client whose account had IPv6 enabled would reset on its first NetworkMap sync — boot config has no v6, the sync introduces one, the engine tore itself down to "apply" it. That teardown destroys the gVisor netstack and orphans every listener bound on it, which is what made the proxy's per-account :80/:443 silently stop accepting traffic. - v6 removed clears in place. - v6 swapped to a different non-empty value still resets (gVisor netstack can't safely swap its address at runtime). - Mutates e.config.WgAddr to match the applied state so subsequent PeerConfig comparisons are stable. proxy/internal/tcp/accept.go (new) + proxy/inbound.go + proxy/internal/tcp/router.go — harden the two Accept() loops on netstack-backed listeners: - IsClosedListenerErr recognises net.ErrClosed AND gVisor's "endpoint is in invalid state" — the latter survives gonet's *net.OpError wrapping in a way errors.Is(.., net.ErrClosed) does not. Without this the loop spins CPU-hot after the underlying netstack is destroyed (peer rekey, embedded-client reset, account churn), emitting one log line per iteration. - AcceptBackoff implements the exponential backoff that net/http.Server.Serve uses on transient Accept errors: 5ms doubling up to 1s. Defence-in-depth so an unknown sticky error cannot burn a CPU core even if IsClosedListenerErr misses its signature. proxy/internal/roundtrip/netbird.go — emit a single structured INFO line summarising every embed.Options flag (account_id, service_id, public_key, management_url, wg_port, block_inbound, block_lan_access, disable_ipv6, no_userspace, presence of credentials) when each per-account embedded client is created. Secrets reduced to a "present" boolean — never logged verbatim. Diagnostic-only; no behavior change, but it makes the "why is this embedded peer misbehaving" loop a single log read instead of a code dive. Tests (real listeners, scripted errors, no mocks of production code): - engine_reconcileipv6_test.go: 8 cases for every transition (first assignment, no change, removed, prefix-length changed, value changed, invalid bytes, UpdateAddr error) plus a updateConfig integration check that the fix actually fires on a v6-added PeerConfig. - accept_test.go: IsClosedListenerErr matrix + AcceptBackoff progression / cap / reset / cancel-during-wait / cancel-before-call. - router_test.go, inbound_test.go: scriptedAcceptListener + TestRouter_Serve_ExitsOnGVisorInvalidEndpoint and TestFeedRouterFromListener_ExitsOnGVisorInvalidEndpoint — regression guards that fail in 2 s if the loop ever spins.	2026-06-18 10:37:51 +02:00
Maycon Santos	fa1e241aea	[management, client, proxy] Follow-up fixes for private reverse-proxy services (#6268) ... * fix(proxy): gate tunnel-peer fast-path on inbound listener marker forwardWithTunnelPeer previously accepted any RFC1918 / ULA / CGNAT source IP, so a public client whose address happened to fall in those ranges could bypass the configured operator auth scheme by colliding with a known tunnel IP. The fast-path is now gated on TunnelLookupFromContext(r.Context()) being present — that context value is attached only by the per-account inbound (overlay) listener, so the host-facing listener never enters this branch. Tests updated to reflect the new requirement: requests that don't carry the inbound marker now fall through to the regular auth flow. * fix(proxy): harden inbound listener resource + startup-ctx handling Three correctness fixes on the per-account inbound path, with tests: - Close the logrus ErrorLog PipeWriter on tearDown. WriterLevel hands back an *io.PipeWriter backed by a pipe + scanner goroutine that the caller owns; the two writers per account (https + plain) were never closed, leaking the pipe and goroutine on every teardown. - Run the post-Start hooks on context.Background(). runClientStartup is launched in a goroutine from AddPeer and was inheriting the caller's request-scoped ctx, so a cancelled request could abort the inbound bring-up or fail the management status notification. The tail is split into notifyClientReady so the contract is testable. Tests cover the PipeWriter close behaviour and assert the readyHandler + NotifyStatus calls receive a non-cancelled background context. * feat(proxy): short-circuit peer-own-target loops with 421 When a peer that hosts the target of a private service dials its own service URL the request was being looped through the proxy and back over WireGuard to the same peer — twice the WG round-trip for no benefit, with no signal to the caller that something was wrong. Add isSelfTargetLoop to ReverseProxy.ServeHTTP: when the request arrived on the per-account overlay listener (IsOverlayOrigin) and the source tunnel IP matches the target host, refuse the request with 421 Misdirected Request and a body pointing the operator at the backend directly. The gate is scoped to overlay origin so requests on the public listener that happen to share a source IP with the target host are forwarded normally. * fix(management): private-service validation + tunnel-IP lookup semantics - Require an explicit port for L4 cluster targets. validateL4Target exempted TargetTypeCluster from the port check, but buildPathMappings serializes every L4 target via net.JoinHostPort(host, port) — port=0 shipped a ":0" upstream. Cluster targets use the same Host/Port fields, so the same requirement applies. - GetPeerByIP returns NotFound on a tunnel-IP miss instead of mapping every error to Internal. The proxy's ValidateTunnelPeer probes IPs that legitimately aren't in the roster; the miss is expected and now distinguishable from a real store failure. - Thread ctx into getClusterCapability's gorm query so a cancelled request doesn't keep the store busy. Tests updated for the L4-cluster port requirement and the GetPeerByIP NotFound path. * fix(client): include offlinePeers in PeerStateByIP lookup ReplaceOfflinePeers moves peers into d.offlinePeers but PeerStateByIP only scanned d.peers. Callers (the local DNS filter via localPeerConnectivity, embed.Client.IdentityForIP used by the proxy's tunnel-peer validator) were treating known-but-offline peers as unknown, which: - causes the DNS filter to keep returning records pointing at peers that have no live tunnel, AND - makes the proxy's local-roster check deny a request from such a peer rather than letting the cached management RPC carry the authorisation decision. Search both slices in PeerStateByIP. Adds a unit test for the IPv4 and IPv6 offline-match paths. * fix(rest): reject empty Delete path params in reverse-proxy clients ReverseProxyClustersAPI.Delete and ReverseProxyTokensAPI.Delete passed the path parameter into url.PathEscape without an empty check. PathEscape("") returns "" which collapses the request onto the collection endpoint ("/api/reverse-proxies/clusters/" / "/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens/"), so a caller bug delete with no id reached a routable URL with surprising semantics (typically 405). Short-circuit with a typed error before the request is built. Tests mount a handler on the collection path that fails the test if hit, so the regression is impossible to reintroduce silently. * chore(api,ci,docs,test): private-service schema, proto-check, fixups Non-functional cleanups and contract/CI hardening around the private-service work: API schema (openapi.yml): - Require a non-empty access_groups and mode=http when private=true, on both Service and ServiceRequest, mirroring validatePrivateRequirements. mode stays optional-but-constrained (empty defaults to http server-side), matching runtime. CI (proto-version-check.yml): - Cover renamed .pb.go files (read base via previous_filename). - Match protoc-gen-go-grpc version headers (optional "- " prefix and -gen-go-grpc suffix) so grpc-generated files are in scope. Docs / comments: - Reword Config field docs to say defaults are applied at Server.Start (initDefaults), not New. - Rename the obsolete --private-inbound flag to --private across comments and the proto doc. Pre-existing test fixups surfaced by review: - Repair the integration-tagged validate_session_test.go (SignToken signature growth + new Manager interface methods). - Fix the CI-skip boolean precedence so Windows isn't skipped unconditionally. - Guard the router.HTTPListener type assertion with comma-ok. * fix(proxy): background ctx for already-started AddPeer notification The earlier ctx fix covered the async runClientStartup path but missed the synchronous branch: when a service is added to an already-started client, AddPeer called NotifyStatus with the caller's request-scoped ctx. A cancelled request/stream could drop the connected notification to management. Use context.Background() here too, matching notifyClientReady. Extends TestNetBird_AddPeer_ExistingStartedClient_NotifiesStatus to pass a pre-cancelled caller ctx and assert the notification still ran on a non-cancelled context. * use the cmd context for roundtripper	2026-06-02 13:40:09 +02:00
Maycon Santos	7aebdd69dd	[management, client, proxy] add expose NetBird-only services over tunnel peers (#6226) ... Adds a new "private" service mode for the reverse proxy: services reachable exclusively over the embedded WireGuard tunnel, gated by per-peer group membership instead of operator auth schemes. Wire contract - ProxyMapping.private (field 13): the proxy MUST call ValidateTunnelPeer and fail closed; operator schemes are bypassed. - ProxyCapabilities.private (4) + supports_private_service (5): capability gate. Management never streams private mappings to proxies that don't claim the capability; the broadcast path applies the same filter via filterMappingsForProxy. - ValidateTunnelPeer RPC: resolves an inbound tunnel IP to a peer, checks the peer's groups against service.AccessGroups, and mints a session JWT on success. checkPeerGroupAccess fails closed when a private service has empty AccessGroups. - ValidateSession/ValidateTunnelPeer responses now carry peer_group_ids + peer_group_names so the proxy can authorise policy-aware middlewares without an extra management round-trip. - ProxyInboundListener + SendStatusUpdate.inbound_listener: per-account inbound listener state surfaced to dashboards. - PathTargetOptions.direct_upstream (11): bypass the embedded NetBird client and dial the target via the proxy host's network stack for upstreams reachable without WireGuard. Data model - Service.Private (bool) + Service.AccessGroups ([]string, JSON- serialised). Validate() rejects bearer auth on private services. Copy() deep-copies AccessGroups. pgx getServices loads the columns. - DomainConfig.Private threaded into the proxy auth middleware. Request handler routes private services through forwardWithTunnelPeer and returns 403 on validation failure. - Account-level SynthesizePrivateServiceZones (synthetic DNS) and injectPrivateServicePolicies (synthetic ACL) gate on len(svc.AccessGroups) > 0. Proxy - /netbird proxy --private (embedded mode) flag; Config.Private in proxy/lifecycle.go. - Per-account inbound listener (proxy/inbound.go) binding HTTP/HTTPS on the embedded NetBird client's WireGuard tunnel netstack. - proxy/internal/auth/tunnel_cache: ValidateTunnelPeer response cache with single-flight de-duplication and per-account eviction. - Local peerstore short-circuit: when the inbound IP isn't in the account roster, deny fast without an RPC. - proxy/server.go reports SupportsPrivateService=true and redacts the full ProxyMapping JSON from info logs (auth_token + header-auth hashed values now only at debug level). Identity forwarding - ValidateSessionJWT returns user_id, email, method, groups, group_names. sessionkey.Claims carries Email + Groups + GroupNames so the proxy can stamp identity onto upstream requests without an extra management round-trip on every cookie-bearing request. - CapturedData carries userEmail / userGroups / userGroupNames; the proxy stamps X-NetBird-User and X-NetBird-Groups on r.Out from the authenticated identity (strips client-supplied values first to prevent spoofing). - AccessLog.UserGroups: access-log enrichment captures the user's group memberships at write time so the dashboard can render group context without reverse-resolving stale memberships. OpenAPI/dashboard surface - ReverseProxyService gains private + access_groups; ReverseProxyCluster gains private + supports_private. ReverseProxyTarget target_type enum gains "cluster". ServiceTargetOptions gains direct_upstream. ProxyAccessLog gains user_groups.	2026-05-25 17:41:50 +02:00