[proxy,management] Serve Bedrock model discovery from the control plane
A Bedrock provider could never answer a model-discovery request. The router
sent GET /inference-profiles to the record's upstream, which has to be
bedrock-runtime.<region> for InvokeModel to work, and that host does not
implement the operation. ListInferenceProfiles is a control-plane operation on
bedrock.<region>.amazonaws.com, and one provider record carries one upstream,
so the two hosts genuinely differ.
The route now carries a discovery host, taken from the catalog's declaration
with the region read back out of the configured upstream, and the listing — and
only the listing — goes there. Inference is untouched. A proxied or self-hosted
Bedrock endpoint gets no discovery host at all rather than a guessed one, since
inventing a host would send the operator's credential somewhere they never
configured.
Two things had to follow for the listing to be usable once it arrives. The
response filter only understood OpenAI's {"data":[{"id":…}]}, so a Bedrock
listing fell through it untouched, offering every profile in the account
whatever the policy said. And discoverableModels intersected by exact string,
so a record registering the raw profile id while a guardrail names the catalog
key intersected to nothing — bounding a working provider's listing down to
empty.
Normalisation is the third. The geography in front of a cross-region profile
was matched against a hardcoded list of four, so every profile issued under jp,
au, ca, sa or us-gov carried its prefix into the pricing key, matched no
catalog entry and metered at zero. It is now recognised by either the geography
or the vendor that follows it, so an id has to be new on both axes at once to
slip through — a live eu-central-1 listing returned "global.xai.grok-4.6" days
after the vendor list was first written.
[management] Offer a provider's live model list in the config form
Adds POST /api/agent-network/catalog/providers/models, which asks a vendor
which models an operator's own credential can actually reach, so the provider
form can offer a live list instead of only the compiled-in catalog. The catalog
goes stale, and it cannot see an account: which OpenAI models an org is
entitled to, which Bedrock inference profiles an account and region hold, which
Vertex models a project has enabled.
The endpoints, auth headers and response shapes come from probing the live APIs
(#7244); each vendor invented its own envelope and none can be guessed from the
request. Bedrock shaped the design: its listing lives on the control plane
while inference must go to the runtime host, so Discovery carries its own host
rather than reusing the record's upstream, and profile ids are taken verbatim
because the region prefix is what AWS requires at invoke time.
A caller supplies either the key they are typing or the id of a saved record
whose stored credential is reused — never both, since accepting both would run
an arbitrary credential under the identity of a record the caller may only be
permitted to read. Gated on Create rather than Read, because this spends the
operator's credential against a third party.
Management has not made outbound calls on an operator's behalf before and it
holds a credential for every provider, so every resolved address must be public
— covering loopback, RFC1918, the cloud metadata address and NetBird's own
100.64/10 range — and redirects are not followed, since a redirect moves the
request to a host the check never saw.
The vendor is authoritative for the id; the catalog stays authoritative for
pricing. A discovered model the shipped table cannot price returns
pricing_known: false so the operator must set rates rather than being
registered at a silent zero.
[proxy,management] Bound model discovery to the caller's own policies
GET /v1/models was bounded by the provider record's enumerated models, which is
the right bound only while a single policy reaches a provider. Where two teams
share one provider under different allowlists, every caller was offered the
union — each model outside their own policy being a request the guardrail
refuses a moment later. A gateway record enumerating nothing was worse: it
offered the upstream's entire catalogue however narrow the policy was.
Each route now carries one rule per authorising policy — its source groups and
the models it permits — instead of a single flattened list. At request time the
router keeps the rules whose groups intersect the caller's, unions their
models, and intersects that with what the provider serves.
nil and [] stay distinct end to end: a policy setting no allowlist reaches the
router as nil and lifts the restriction for the groups it binds, while an
enabled allowlist with no models arrives as [] and permits nothing. Collapsing
them would let a listing that should offer nothing fall open to everything.
The guardrail's own per-provider allowlist is untouched. It is a fail-closed
backstop that cannot tell who is asking, so discovery is now narrower than the
backstop rather than wider.
[proxy,management] Conform the Agent Network endpoint to the LLM gateway protocol
Reviewed the proxy against Claude Code's published gateway contract. The
transport layer already held up; fourteen gaps sat one layer up, in the model
catalog and in the non-inference endpoints clients call.
Two of them cost money. The catalog carried no claude-opus-5 or
claude-sonnet-5, so an operator could not authorise the models coding agents
default to — those requests denied as not-routable, or priced at zero where a
catch-all carried them. And gateway records pin ParserID "openai" while the
same record serves /v1/messages, so Anthropic responses were read with the
OpenAI parser, which never looks at message_start where input tokens live:
input metered as roughly zero on every stream and cost was skipped entirely.
The rest fix requests refused for structural rather than policy reasons: model
discovery denied for every account with a model allowlist, token counting
denied on Bedrock and mis-parsed on Vertex, startup probes refused and written
into the access log at every session start, and denials rendered in a shape no
LLM client parses. Two changes are additive by design — the deny body keeps
every field it had and adds the vendor's error object alongside, and body-level
identity injection is now gated on the request's dialect so it stops sending
OpenAI-shape fields into Anthropic bodies that reject them.
The end-to-end work turned up one more: the discovery filter treated any slash
in a model id as a gateway prefix, which would have dropped every self-hosted
"Qwen/..." model from the picker.
People who only ever reach private services through the reverse proxy were
invisible to activity accounting. Active users are counted from user.LastLogin
or from the LastSeen of a peer they own, and neither column was written on the
proxy paths — so a person signing in via SSO to a proxied service, or a peer
serving one over the mesh, never showed up in the 24 hour numbers.
Both writes now happen where the proxy already authenticates:
- GenerateSessionToken stamps LastLogin after the session token is signed,
the same column and the same way the dashboard and device login paths do.
- ValidateTunnelPeer stamps the calling peer's LastSeen, the column its owner
activates through.
The policy lives in a new reverseproxy/activity manager rather than in the gRPC
service, matching the module layout the other reverse proxy domains use. It
skips what can never count — service users, embedded proxy peers and WASM
clients — and throttles peer writes to once an hour, well inside the window
accounting asks about and far above the proxy's five minute tunnel cache.
The peer write is a single indexed UPDATE that touches only
peer_status_last_seen. Connected and SessionStartedAt are left alone so the
session-ownership fencing MarkPeerConnectedIfNewerSession relies on is never
disturbed, and the timestamp comes from the database clock rather than the
caller, for the same reason the other status writers take it from there. The
caller's cutoff travels into the statement's WHERE, so concurrent requests for
one peer collapse into a single write instead of each acting on its own stale
read, and a peer that was never seen — NULL last seen, since Status is an
embedded pointer — still records its first activity.
Nothing outside the reverse proxy changes behaviour: the only addition
elsewhere is the RefreshPeerLastSeen store method the manager calls.
At proxy connect time, the declared cluster address is validated for
shape and checked for availability (`IsClusterAddressAvailable`), and
from then on the declaration is what routes the cluster's mappings to
the connection. Deployments that embed management through the
integrations seam may need a policy on that claim — deciding which
credential is allowed to declare which address.
This adds an optional `ProxyConnectAuthorizer` hook on
`ProxyServiceServer`, following the pattern of the existing `Set*` seams
(`SetServiceManager`, `SetAgentNetworkSynthesizer`,
`SetAgentNetworkLimitsService`, `SetProxyController`):
- A nil-able interface field plus `SetProxyConnectAuthorizer`, guarded
by the existing mutex.
- One call at the end of `validateProxyConnect`, so both
`GetMappingUpdate` and `SyncMappings` are covered by a single site.
- **Nothing installs it by default** — with the hook unset (always, in
this repo), behavior is byte-for-byte unchanged, which the tests pin.
Design details:
- The authorizer runs **last** — after input validation and the
availability check — and **outside** the account-scoped branch, so
management-wide tokens and token-less connects are also presented to it
rather than bypassing policy.
- The authorizer receives the presented `*types.ProxyAccessToken` (nil
when none), the proxy ID, and the declared address. Everything it needs
is already in the request/context; no proto or schema change.
- A plain error from the authorizer surfaces as `PermissionDenied`,
keeping an authorization rejection distinguishable from the
`AlreadyExists` used for address conflicts in proxy logs. A status error
passes through unchanged so implementations can pick their own code.
Store the per-account gateway endpoint as {domain, proxy_address} with a
global unique index on the full hostname; dedicated = (domain ==
proxy_address). Bootstrap becomes an explicit POST carrying exactly one
of proxy_address (server allocates an adjective-noun label beneath it)
or endpoint (claimed verbatim, address-first); provider create loses its
bootstrap side effect. PUT is a full replace with every field required —
the immutable identity fields must be echoed unchanged and a mismatch is
rejected with 422. A guarded DELETE releases the endpoint: refused with
412 while providers exist or a proxy is actively serving the endpoint
hostname (matched case-insensitively); re-creating bootstraps fresh. A
self-addressed pin excludes its address from the account's cluster allow
list, and the live mapping update path now addresses the serving proxy
from the synthesized service. Existing rows are migrated on all three
store engines.
A user in the Pending Approval state could complete SSO and reach any
SSO-protected reverse proxy service distributed to a group they belong
to, including the All Users group. The reverse proxy authorization path
checked the session token signature, that the user exists, that the
user's account matches the service's account, and group membership —
never the user's account status. The REST API (`permissions/manager.go`)
and peer registration both gate on that state, but the proxy gRPC
service does not go through the permissions manager, so neither gate
applied. A pending user is persisted as blocked and pending approval, so
blocked users reached those services the same way.
`ValidateSession` now denies on account status, reporting
`pending_approval` or `user_blocked` so the proxy access log and the
denied page carry the cause rather than a generic refusal.
`GenerateSessionToken` refuses to mint a token for such a user at all,
so the browser never receives a session cookie and the OIDC callback can
tell the user why instead of showing "Service configuration error".
`ValidateUserGroupAccess` and `ValidateTunnelPeer` close the same gap;
for the tunnel path this covers a user blocked after their peer was
registered, since peer group membership alone kept mesh-origin access
open.
A single helper produces both the denied reason for the RPC responses
and the sentinel error for the error-returning callers, so the four
entry points cannot drift apart. A user the store cannot resolve is
denied rather than passed through.
One thing deliberately left out: session cookies are validated locally
by the proxy against the service public key with no management
round-trip, so a cookie issued before a user is blocked stays valid
until it expires (24h by default). That is a revocation-propagation
problem rather than this authorization gap, and every option for it
(per-request validation with a cache, short-lived tokens with refresh,
push-based revocation) changes the proxy hot path or the
proxy/management protocol. Worth its own ticket.
## Describe your changes
A group could be deleted while a reverse proxy service still referenced
it, silently breaking the service's access control: private services
list groups in `access_groups` as the peer allowlist, and SSO bearer
auth distributes tokens to `distribution_groups`.
Group deletion now runs through the same linkage validation as routes,
policies, and agent network policies: deleting a group that backs a
private service allowlist or an enabled bearer-auth distribution list
fails with a `GroupLinkError` naming the service domain. Disabled bearer
configs and stale `access_groups` on non-private services are inert and
do not block deletion.
Tests cover both linked cases in single and bulk deletion, and pin the
non-blocking cases. The test account seeds decoy services ahead of the
linked ones so the check is proven to scan the full service list.
Block deleting a group referenced as a source group by an agent network
policy, and drop unresolvable groups from synthesised private-service
ACLs. A deleted group survived in agent_network_policies.source_groups
and was carried into the injected in-memory policy, where network-map
assembly resolved it to a nil group and panicked on every proxy peer
sync.
## Describe your changes
Work on the Terraform provider (terraform-provider-netbird #177–#183)
surfaced places where the agent-network API broke its own contracts or
deviated from the conventions the rest of the management API follows,
forcing client-side workarounds.
Settings reads now follow the settings-endpoint convention: GET always
answers with a JSON object. Before bootstrap it returns the defaults
with an empty cluster/subdomain/endpoint (previously 200 with a JSON
`null` body, while the spec said 404). The settings PUT can bootstrap
the account by carrying a `cluster` — previously the row could only come
into existence through the first provider create, and a settings-first
setup was impossible; a differing cluster on a bootstrapped account is
rejected instead of silently ignored. PUT remains full-state.
The provider PUT schema promised omit-preserves semantics for several
operator-editable fields that the handler never delivered (it builds the
row from the request, like every other update handler). The schema
wording now matches the shipped full-state behavior; only the api_key
(secret) and session keys stay preserved by the manager. Identity
headers are always present in provider responses so an explicitly
cleared value round-trips as an empty string.
The Go REST client gains the full agent-network surface (catalog,
providers, policies, guardrails, budget rules, settings), including a
shim translating the legacy 200+`null` settings body from older servers
into an `IsNotFound` error.
Note for reviewers: the dashboard special-cased the `null` settings
body; it needs a small follow-up for the new defaults response (in
progress).
## Describe your changes
Agent Network gates providers, policies, guardrails, budgets, usage,
access logs, and settings behind the single `agent_network` permission
module, so access is all-or-nothing: a future delegated role cannot be
scoped to a subset of the area (for example usage-only visibility).
This introduces dotted submodules (`agent_network.providers`,
`.policies`, `.guardrails`, `.budgets`, `.usage`, `.logs`, `.settings`)
and resolves grants with a cascade: exact module first, then its parent,
then the role's `AutoAllowNew` default. The agent network manager now
validates each operation against its matching submodule. `usage`
(aggregated counters, overview) is deliberately separate from `logs`
(request-level entries, which can contain captured prompts).
No role definitions change. No built-in role carries an explicit
`agent_network` entry, so every role resolves the submodules exactly as
it resolved the parent module before — pinned by a test that compares
each built-in role's answer on every submodule against its answer on
`agent_network`. Role additions that use these submodules come
separately.
## Describe your changes
The model-allowlist guardrail was merged into one account-wide union and
enforced flat on every request, ignoring which policy/group/provider
authorised it. With multiple policies — especially a mix of guardrailed
and un-guardrailed ones — this caused:
- **false-allow**: a model allowlisted for one group/provider leaked to
any caller; and
- **false-deny**: an un-guardrailed policy (intended unrestricted) was
blocked by another policy's allowlist.
Enforcement is now policy/group-aware, mirroring `llm_limit_check`:
- **Management (`SelectPolicyForRequest`) is authoritative.** It uses
the request model (already carried in
`CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest.model`, previously ignored) to keep only
applicable policies whose guardrails permit the model; no
allowlist-enabled guardrail = unrestricted. Denies
`llm_policy.model_blocked` when policies govern the (provider, groups)
but none permits the model.
- **Proxy `llm_guardrail` becomes a per-provider fail-closed backstop.**
The synthesiser emits an allowlist only for providers every authorising
policy restricts; the middleware keys off the resolved provider id and
keeps unknown-model fail-closed.
## Summary
Adds a unified `admin` CLI for self-hosted instance administrators in
both the management and combined binaries.
## User Management
### `admin user change-password`
- Changes a local embedded IdP user's password.
- Selects the user with `--email` or `--user-id`.
- Reads the new password from `--password` or `--password-file`.
- Clears the user's local authentication session so the new password is
required on the next login.
- **Alias:** `admin user set-password`.
### `admin user reset-mfa`
- Resets a local embedded IdP user's MFA enrollment.
- Selects the user with `--email` or `--user-id`.
- Clears TOTP/WebAuthn enrollment data and removes the local
authentication session.
- The user will re-enroll MFA on the next login.
## MFA Management
### `admin mfa status`
- Shows whether local MFA is enabled in the account settings.
- Checks the embedded IdP client configuration and reports whether MFA
is enabled there.
### `admin mfa enable`
- Enables local MFA for embedded IdP users.
- Updates embedded IdP clients and saves the account MFA setting.
- Records an audit event on a best-effort basis.
### `admin mfa disable`
- Disables local MFA for embedded IdP users.
- Updates embedded IdP clients and saves the account MFA setting.
- Records an audit event on a best-effort basis.
## Reverse Proxy Tokens
### `admin token create --name <name> [--expires-in <duration>]`
- Creates a reverse proxy access token.
- Prints the plaintext token once, along with the token ID.
- `--expires-in` supports values such as `24h`, `30d`, or `365d`. If
omitted, the token never expires.
### `admin token list`
- Lists reverse proxy access tokens.
- Shows the token ID, name, creation date, expiration, last-used time,
and revocation status.
- **Alias:** `admin token ls`.
### `admin token revoke <token-id>`
- Revokes a reverse proxy access token.
- Revoked tokens can no longer authenticate reverse proxy instances.
## Reverse Proxy Management
### `admin proxy disconnect-all`
- Lists registered reverse proxy instances and force-marks all connected
instances as disconnected.
- Useful for repairing stale proxy state after an unclean management
server shutdown.
- Prompts for confirmation by default.
- `--dry-run` previews the changes without applying them.
- `--force` skips the confirmation prompt.
- Live proxies may appear again after their next heartbeat, reconnect,
or re-registration.
## Compatibility Commands
### `token ...`
- Deprecated top-level compatibility path.
- Behaves the same as `admin token ...`.
- Retained so existing scripts using `token create`, `token list`, or
`token revoke` continue to work.
## Changes
- Adds reusable `management/cmd/admin` command package.
- Wires `admin` into `netbird-mgmt` and `combined`.
- Adds local user password reset with existing password strength
validation.
- Adds local MFA enrollment reset by clearing Dex TOTP/WebAuthn
credentials and local auth sessions.
- Adds local MFA enable/disable/status helpers for embedded IdP
deployments.
- Moves proxy access token commands under `admin token` for a single
admin-focused CLI entry point.
- Exports `server.ValidatePassword` for reuse by CLI helpers.
## Tests
```bash
go test ./management/cmd/...
go test ./management/cmd/admin ./management/cmd ./combined/cmd
go test ./management/server -run TestValidatePassword
```
Pre-push lint also passed.
### Checklist
- [ ] Is it a bug fix
- [ ] Is a typo/documentation fix
- [x] Is a feature enhancement
- [ ] It is a refactor
- [ ] Created tests that fail without the change (if possible)
- [ ] This change does **not** modify the public API, gRPC protocols,
functionality behavior, CLI / service flags, or introduce a new feature
— **OR** I have discussed it with the NetBird team beforehand (link the
issue / Slack thread in the description). See
[CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#discuss-changes-with-the-netbird-team-first).
> By submitting this pull request, you confirm that you have read and
agree to the terms of the [Contributor License
Agreement](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTOR_LICENSE_AGREEMENT.md).
## Documentation
Select exactly one:
- [x] I added/updated documentation for this change
- [ ] Documentation is **not needed** for this change (explain why)
### Docs PR URL (required if "docs added" is checked)
Paste the PR link from https://github.com/netbirdio/docs here:
https://github.com/netbirdio/docs/pull/832
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
## Release Notes
* **New Features**
* Added self-hosted admin CLI commands for changing passwords, resetting
MFA (including WebAuthn), and managing embedded IdP client MFA
(enable/disable/status).
* Introduced a unified admin command entry point and improved
data-directory handling for embedded IdP storage.
* **Refactor**
* Centralized password strength validation into a shared exported
validator.
* **Tests**
* Added a comprehensive admin command test suite covering password
input, selectors, MFA reset, and client MFA state handling.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
## Describe your changes
* [proxy] enforce model allowlist for URL-routed providers
(Bedrock/Vertex) by @mlsmaycon in
https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/pull/6764
* [management] Remove proxy peer stale deduplication logic by @mlsmaycon
in https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/pull/6768
## Issue ticket number and link
## Stack
<!-- branch-stack -->
### Checklist
- [ ] Is it a bug fix
- [ ] Is a typo/documentation fix
- [ ] Is a feature enhancement
- [ ] It is a refactor
- [ ] Created tests that fail without the change (if possible)
- [ ] This change does **not** modify the public API, gRPC protocols,
functionality behavior, CLI / service flags, or introduce a new feature
— **OR** I have discussed it with the NetBird team beforehand (link the
issue / Slack thread in the description). See
[CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#discuss-changes-with-the-netbird-team-first).
> By submitting this pull request, you confirm that you have read and
agree to the terms of the [Contributor License
Agreement](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTOR_LICENSE_AGREEMENT.md).
## Documentation
Select exactly one:
- [ ] I added/updated documentation for this change
- [x] Documentation is **not needed** for this change (explain why)
### Docs PR URL (required if "docs added" is checked)
Paste the PR link from https://github.com/netbirdio/docs here:
https://github.com/netbirdio/docs/pull/__
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
- **New Features**
- Added model-allowlist guardrails for path-routed providers, including
Bedrock and Vertex.
- Added Bedrock request support for chat interactions.
- Added guardrail management capabilities.
- **Bug Fixes**
- Requests with missing or blank model identifiers are now denied when a
model allowlist is configured, improving fail-closed protection.
- Corrected provider-specific request handling and session tracking for
Bedrock interactions.
- **Tests**
- Expanded coverage for allowlist enforcement and provider routing
scenarios.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
---------
Co-authored-by: Theodor Midtlien <theodor@midtlien.com>
Co-authored-by: blaugrau90 <61945343+blaugrau90@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Viktor Liu <17948409+lixmal@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds a settings constraint: enabling `agent_network_only` requires `dashboard_features.agent_network` to be `true` in the same account update. Without the Agent Network menu flag, a focused account that later turns the focused view off would lose access to the Agent Network menu entirely, so the two must be set together.
The check runs in `updateAccountRequestSettings` against the parsed request state: if the resulting settings have `agent_network_only == true` but `dashboard_features.agent_network` is not `true`, the update is rejected with `status.InvalidArgument` (HTTP 422) before anything is persisted.
The OpenAPI field descriptions for `agent_network_only` and `dashboard_features.agent_network` document the requirement. Only the descriptions changed — `required` and the schema `$ref` are untouched — and `types.gen.go` was regenerated from the spec (diff is the two comment lines).
Introduce a nullable dashboard_features object on account settings, serialized
to a single JSON column so new dashboard sections can be added without schema
changes. Starts with agent_network (show the Agent Network menu for an account
without the deployment flag). Wires the API handler mapping, the pgx GetAccount
loader, and adds store round-trip and handler tests.
With improvements in userspace lazy connection handling, we should be able to enable it for new accounts with less impact on users.
These connections are cheaper and only target traffic that should go through the tunnels, leaving all other tunnels in an idle state.
* [management,proxy] Add per-provider skip_tls_verification for agent-network
Let agent-network providers opt into skipping upstream TLS verification for
self-hosted / internal gateways behind a private or self-signed cert.
- provider: add SkipTLSVerification (persisted via AutoMigrate) with
request/response mapping (nil on update preserves, explicit false clears).
- openapi: skip_tls_verification on the provider request + response; types
regenerated.
- synthesizer: carry the flag into the llm_router route config so it reaches
the proxy.
- proxy: llm_router sets it on the UpstreamRewrite mutation, and the reverse
proxy applies roundtrip.WithSkipTLSVerify per selected route when forwarding
upstream (the router dials per provider, so a per-target flag alone wouldn't
cover it).
- tests: synthesizer route config carries the flag, router rewrite propagates
it, and the request/response round-trip incl. update semantics.
* [e2e] Validate per-provider skip_tls_verification end to end
Add a self-signed HTTPS upstream (nginx) to the harness and a test that
provisions two providers on that same upstream — one with
skip_tls_verification=true, one false — behind one proxy + client. The
skip=true provider's chat reaches the upstream (200); the skip=false
provider's fails the TLS handshake (5xx). Same upstream, opposite outcome,
which proves the flag is honoured per provider (a single target-level flag
could not, since all of an account's providers share one synthesised
target).
* [e2e] WaitProxyPeer: require >=1 connected peer, not exact 1/1
Each proxy container registers a fresh WireGuard key and its peer is not
removed on teardown, so proxy peers from earlier tests linger in the
account as disconnected. WaitProxyPeer matched the exact string
"1/1 Connected", which failed once a second proxy-using test ran in the
same package (status "1/2"). Parse the "Peers count: X/Y Connected" line
and wait for X>=1 instead: only the live proxy can be connected, and the
caller's subsequent chat is the real end-to-end assertion. Fixes the CI
failure of TestProviderSkipTLSVerification (runs after TestProvidersMatrix).
The HTTP auth middleware runs syncUserJWTGroups in the request context.
The dashboard SPA routinely aborts in-flight requests on re-render or
navigation, which cancels the request context mid-write and rolls back
the group-sync DB transaction. The error is logged but swallowed, so the
synced groups silently never persist (users.auto_groups stays empty)
while the failing log line repeats on every request.
Detach the sync from the request's cancellation with
context.WithoutCancel so the write can commit regardless of the client
connection; the store already bounds the transaction with its own
timeout. Add a regression test asserting the sync receives a
non-cancelled context even when the originating request is cancelled.
