An unrestricted policy on a provider without an operator declaration left
the caller-scoped model list empty while the setup answer advertises the
catalog models. The scoped list now always carries the effective set, so
the dashboard's model filter matches the setup page in every shape.
Re-saving the fixture's policy id passed on SQLite but MySQL rejects the
upsert, failing the suite there. The guardrail tests now seed from a
users-only fixture and declare their own provider and policy ids, so no
test overwrites another's rows. Verified against the MySQL and Postgres
test containers.
The caller-scoped provider list now reduces each provider's models
through the same effective computation the setup answer and the proxy
use: allowlist guardrails intersected with the operator's declared
models, with bare entries synthesized when the operator declared none.
The dashboard's model filter therefore never offers a self-scoped caller
a model their own requests could not use. Grant holders keep the full
declared lists — their usage view spans everyone's requests, and their
own setup page already answers with the caller-scoped effective set.
The providers endpoints now fall back to the caller's own authorized
providers instead of denying, mirroring the usage and log endpoints: a
plain user gets the providers their policies reference — the same
selection the self-service setup answer derives from, now shared through
authorizedProvidersForGroups — reduced to the display surface. A single
provider outside that scope answers not-found, indistinguishable from a
nonexistent one. This feeds the dashboard's provider and model filters on
the self-scoped Usage & Logs view.
The provider read grant now serves usage_viewer the display surface only:
the manager blanks upstream URL, operator-typed header values, identity
header names, and the TLS override for callers holding read without
update. The me/setup model intersection compares declared ids through the
same normalization the proxy's parser applies, so a Bedrock declaration
in region/version form still advertises when its canonical id is
allowlisted. Docs and comments now say account-wide for the logs
exclusion and describe the real group source shared with enforcement.
* Support per-peer lazy connection state and default proxy peers to lazy
* Classify forward targets from incoming config in lazy exclusion
* Set IsUserspaceBind mock so lazy manager starts in engine test
* Skip lazy exclude reconciliation when the set is unchanged
* Keep cached lazy flag when a sync carries no peer config
* fix a nil-ptr error occuring in sendInitialSync when the peer being synced is deleted
Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io>
* handle a nil ptr in GetPeerNetworkMapComponents
Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io>
---------
Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io>
[proxy,management] Serve Bedrock model discovery from the control plane
A Bedrock provider could never answer a model-discovery request. The router
sent GET /inference-profiles to the record's upstream, which has to be
bedrock-runtime.<region> for InvokeModel to work, and that host does not
implement the operation. ListInferenceProfiles is a control-plane operation on
bedrock.<region>.amazonaws.com, and one provider record carries one upstream,
so the two hosts genuinely differ.
The route now carries a discovery host, taken from the catalog's declaration
with the region read back out of the configured upstream, and the listing — and
only the listing — goes there. Inference is untouched. A proxied or self-hosted
Bedrock endpoint gets no discovery host at all rather than a guessed one, since
inventing a host would send the operator's credential somewhere they never
configured.
Two things had to follow for the listing to be usable once it arrives. The
response filter only understood OpenAI's {"data":[{"id":…}]}, so a Bedrock
listing fell through it untouched, offering every profile in the account
whatever the policy said. And discoverableModels intersected by exact string,
so a record registering the raw profile id while a guardrail names the catalog
key intersected to nothing — bounding a working provider's listing down to
empty.
Normalisation is the third. The geography in front of a cross-region profile
was matched against a hardcoded list of four, so every profile issued under jp,
au, ca, sa or us-gov carried its prefix into the pricing key, matched no
catalog entry and metered at zero. It is now recognised by either the geography
or the vendor that follows it, so an id has to be new on both axes at once to
slip through — a live eu-central-1 listing returned "global.xai.grok-4.6" days
after the vendor list was first written.
[management] Offer a provider's live model list in the config form
Adds POST /api/agent-network/catalog/providers/models, which asks a vendor
which models an operator's own credential can actually reach, so the provider
form can offer a live list instead of only the compiled-in catalog. The catalog
goes stale, and it cannot see an account: which OpenAI models an org is
entitled to, which Bedrock inference profiles an account and region hold, which
Vertex models a project has enabled.
The endpoints, auth headers and response shapes come from probing the live APIs
(#7244); each vendor invented its own envelope and none can be guessed from the
request. Bedrock shaped the design: its listing lives on the control plane
while inference must go to the runtime host, so Discovery carries its own host
rather than reusing the record's upstream, and profile ids are taken verbatim
because the region prefix is what AWS requires at invoke time.
A caller supplies either the key they are typing or the id of a saved record
whose stored credential is reused — never both, since accepting both would run
an arbitrary credential under the identity of a record the caller may only be
permitted to read. Gated on Create rather than Read, because this spends the
operator's credential against a third party.
Management has not made outbound calls on an operator's behalf before and it
holds a credential for every provider, so every resolved address must be public
— covering loopback, RFC1918, the cloud metadata address and NetBird's own
100.64/10 range — and redirects are not followed, since a redirect moves the
request to a host the check never saw.
The vendor is authoritative for the id; the catalog stays authoritative for
pricing. A discovered model the shipped table cannot price returns
pricing_known: false so the operator must set rates rather than being
registered at a silent zero.
[proxy,management] Bound model discovery to the caller's own policies
GET /v1/models was bounded by the provider record's enumerated models, which is
the right bound only while a single policy reaches a provider. Where two teams
share one provider under different allowlists, every caller was offered the
union — each model outside their own policy being a request the guardrail
refuses a moment later. A gateway record enumerating nothing was worse: it
offered the upstream's entire catalogue however narrow the policy was.
Each route now carries one rule per authorising policy — its source groups and
the models it permits — instead of a single flattened list. At request time the
router keeps the rules whose groups intersect the caller's, unions their
models, and intersects that with what the provider serves.
nil and [] stay distinct end to end: a policy setting no allowlist reaches the
router as nil and lifts the restriction for the groups it binds, while an
enabled allowlist with no models arrives as [] and permits nothing. Collapsing
them would let a listing that should offer nothing fall open to everything.
The guardrail's own per-provider allowlist is untouched. It is a fail-closed
backstop that cannot tell who is asking, so discovery is now narrower than the
backstop rather than wider.
[proxy,management] Conform the Agent Network endpoint to the LLM gateway protocol
Reviewed the proxy against Claude Code's published gateway contract. The
transport layer already held up; fourteen gaps sat one layer up, in the model
catalog and in the non-inference endpoints clients call.
Two of them cost money. The catalog carried no claude-opus-5 or
claude-sonnet-5, so an operator could not authorise the models coding agents
default to — those requests denied as not-routable, or priced at zero where a
catch-all carried them. And gateway records pin ParserID "openai" while the
same record serves /v1/messages, so Anthropic responses were read with the
OpenAI parser, which never looks at message_start where input tokens live:
input metered as roughly zero on every stream and cost was skipped entirely.
The rest fix requests refused for structural rather than policy reasons: model
discovery denied for every account with a model allowlist, token counting
denied on Bedrock and mis-parsed on Vertex, startup probes refused and written
into the access log at every session start, and denials rendered in a shape no
LLM client parses. Two changes are additive by design — the deny body keeps
every field it had and adds the vendor's error object alongside, and body-level
identity injection is now gated on the request's dialect so it stops sending
OpenAI-shape fields into Anthropic bodies that reject them.
The end-to-end work turned up one more: the discovery filter treated any slash
in a model id as a gateway prefix, which would have dropped every self-hosted
"Qwen/..." model from the picker.
The usage overview and access-log listings no longer deny callers without
the account-wide grant: the filter is pinned to the caller (their own
user id, group filters dropped), so every authenticated user reads their
own usage and requests through the same endpoints the admin dashboard
uses. The dedicated /agent-network/me/usage/overview endpoint is removed
in favor of that fallback.
usage_viewer gains read-only access to the resources the usage view's
filters and columns resolve against: users, groups, peers, and the
provider list (provider and model filter options).
Field testing the role surfaced two gaps. GET /api/accounts validates
Settings read (the settings manager gates account settings), so an
agent_network_admin got permission denied on the endpoint the dashboard
needs to boot; grant Settings read-only, the same as network_admin.
The me/consumption endpoint returned raw per-window counter rows, which
reads nothing like the usage overview admins see. Replace it with
GET /api/agent-network/me/usage/overview: the same filter parsing,
bounds, granularity, and bucket aggregation as the admin overview, with
the user filter forced to the caller and group filters dropped, so the
dashboard renders My Usage with the exact component of the admin view
while never exposing another user's rows.
users.account_id is a foreign key into accounts on MySQL/Postgres, so
saving users for an account that has no row fails with a constraint
violation there while passing on sqlite.
Delegating Agent Network today means handing out full account admin, and
regular users cannot see their own usage or how to connect a local tool.
Add two roles on top of the existing agent_network permission
submodules. agent_network_admin owns the whole area (providers,
policies, guardrails, budgets, usage, logs, settings) with read-only
users, groups, peers, and account info needed to build policies, and
nothing else in the account. usage_viewer is the regular User baseline
plus read on the aggregated usage and cost overview: no provider
configuration, no policies, no request-level logs, which can contain
captured prompts. billing_admin gets a proper permission-map entry with
the User baseline so role resolution stops failing with role-not-found;
its plan and invoice permissions stay enforced cloud-side.
Add the self-service endpoints behind the "My Agent Network" view,
available to every authenticated user because both answers are scoped
strictly to the caller. GET /api/agent-network/me/setup returns the
account endpoint plus the providers and models the caller's own groups
authorize, computed with the same rules the proxy enforces: policy
filtering as in policy selection, model allowlist union intersected
with declared models, orphan and disabled providers omitted. Not set up
and no access are deliberately indistinguishable, and the response
carries display metadata only. GET /api/agent-network/me/consumption
returns the caller's own user-dimension counters.
Linear: NET-1399
People who only ever reach private services through the reverse proxy were
invisible to activity accounting. Active users are counted from user.LastLogin
or from the LastSeen of a peer they own, and neither column was written on the
proxy paths — so a person signing in via SSO to a proxied service, or a peer
serving one over the mesh, never showed up in the 24 hour numbers.
Both writes now happen where the proxy already authenticates:
- GenerateSessionToken stamps LastLogin after the session token is signed,
the same column and the same way the dashboard and device login paths do.
- ValidateTunnelPeer stamps the calling peer's LastSeen, the column its owner
activates through.
The policy lives in a new reverseproxy/activity manager rather than in the gRPC
service, matching the module layout the other reverse proxy domains use. It
skips what can never count — service users, embedded proxy peers and WASM
clients — and throttles peer writes to once an hour, well inside the window
accounting asks about and far above the proxy's five minute tunnel cache.
The peer write is a single indexed UPDATE that touches only
peer_status_last_seen. Connected and SessionStartedAt are left alone so the
session-ownership fencing MarkPeerConnectedIfNewerSession relies on is never
disturbed, and the timestamp comes from the database clock rather than the
caller, for the same reason the other status writers take it from there. The
caller's cutoff travels into the statement's WHERE, so concurrent requests for
one peer collapse into a single write instead of each acting on its own stale
read, and a peer that was never seen — NULL last seen, since Status is an
embedded pointer — still records its first activity.
Nothing outside the reverse proxy changes behaviour: the only addition
elsewhere is the RefreshPeerLastSeen store method the manager calls.
At proxy connect time, the declared cluster address is validated for
shape and checked for availability (`IsClusterAddressAvailable`), and
from then on the declaration is what routes the cluster's mappings to
the connection. Deployments that embed management through the
integrations seam may need a policy on that claim — deciding which
credential is allowed to declare which address.
This adds an optional `ProxyConnectAuthorizer` hook on
`ProxyServiceServer`, following the pattern of the existing `Set*` seams
(`SetServiceManager`, `SetAgentNetworkSynthesizer`,
`SetAgentNetworkLimitsService`, `SetProxyController`):
- A nil-able interface field plus `SetProxyConnectAuthorizer`, guarded
by the existing mutex.
- One call at the end of `validateProxyConnect`, so both
`GetMappingUpdate` and `SyncMappings` are covered by a single site.
- **Nothing installs it by default** — with the hook unset (always, in
this repo), behavior is byte-for-byte unchanged, which the tests pin.
Design details:
- The authorizer runs **last** — after input validation and the
availability check — and **outside** the account-scoped branch, so
management-wide tokens and token-less connects are also presented to it
rather than bypassing policy.
- The authorizer receives the presented `*types.ProxyAccessToken` (nil
when none), the proxy ID, and the declared address. Everything it needs
is already in the request/context; no proto or schema change.
- A plain error from the authorizer surfaces as `PermissionDenied`,
keeping an authorization rejection distinguishable from the
`AlreadyExists` used for address conflicts in proxy logs. A status error
passes through unchanged so implementations can pick their own code.
Store the per-account gateway endpoint as {domain, proxy_address} with a
global unique index on the full hostname; dedicated = (domain ==
proxy_address). Bootstrap becomes an explicit POST carrying exactly one
of proxy_address (server allocates an adjective-noun label beneath it)
or endpoint (claimed verbatim, address-first); provider create loses its
bootstrap side effect. PUT is a full replace with every field required —
the immutable identity fields must be echoed unchanged and a mismatch is
rejected with 422. A guarded DELETE releases the endpoint: refused with
412 while providers exist or a proxy is actively serving the endpoint
hostname (matched case-insensitively); re-creating bootstraps fresh. A
self-addressed pin excludes its address from the account's cluster allow
list, and the live mapping update path now addresses the serving proxy
from the synthesized service. Existing rows are migrated on all three
store engines.
A user in the Pending Approval state could complete SSO and reach any
SSO-protected reverse proxy service distributed to a group they belong
to, including the All Users group. The reverse proxy authorization path
checked the session token signature, that the user exists, that the
user's account matches the service's account, and group membership —
never the user's account status. The REST API (`permissions/manager.go`)
and peer registration both gate on that state, but the proxy gRPC
service does not go through the permissions manager, so neither gate
applied. A pending user is persisted as blocked and pending approval, so
blocked users reached those services the same way.
`ValidateSession` now denies on account status, reporting
`pending_approval` or `user_blocked` so the proxy access log and the
denied page carry the cause rather than a generic refusal.
`GenerateSessionToken` refuses to mint a token for such a user at all,
so the browser never receives a session cookie and the OIDC callback can
tell the user why instead of showing "Service configuration error".
`ValidateUserGroupAccess` and `ValidateTunnelPeer` close the same gap;
for the tunnel path this covers a user blocked after their peer was
registered, since peer group membership alone kept mesh-origin access
open.
A single helper produces both the denied reason for the RPC responses
and the sentinel error for the error-returning callers, so the four
entry points cannot drift apart. A user the store cannot resolve is
denied rather than passed through.
One thing deliberately left out: session cookies are validated locally
by the proxy against the service public key with no management
round-trip, so a cookie issued before a user is blocked stays valid
until it expires (24h by default). That is a revocation-propagation
problem rather than this authorization gap, and every option for it
(per-request validation with a cache, short-lived tokens with refresh,
push-based revocation) changes the proxy hot path or the
proxy/management protocol. Worth its own ticket.
## Describe your changes
A group could be deleted while a reverse proxy service still referenced
it, silently breaking the service's access control: private services
list groups in `access_groups` as the peer allowlist, and SSO bearer
auth distributes tokens to `distribution_groups`.
Group deletion now runs through the same linkage validation as routes,
policies, and agent network policies: deleting a group that backs a
private service allowlist or an enabled bearer-auth distribution list
fails with a `GroupLinkError` naming the service domain. Disabled bearer
configs and stale `access_groups` on non-private services are inert and
do not block deletion.
Tests cover both linked cases in single and bulk deletion, and pin the
non-blocking cases. The test account seeds decoy services ahead of the
linked ones so the check is proven to scan the full service list.
Block deleting a group referenced as a source group by an agent network
policy, and drop unresolvable groups from synthesised private-service
ACLs. A deleted group survived in agent_network_policies.source_groups
and was carried into the injected in-memory policy, where network-map
assembly resolved it to a nil group and panicked on every proxy peer
sync.
## Describe your changes
Work on the Terraform provider (terraform-provider-netbird #177–#183)
surfaced places where the agent-network API broke its own contracts or
deviated from the conventions the rest of the management API follows,
forcing client-side workarounds.
Settings reads now follow the settings-endpoint convention: GET always
answers with a JSON object. Before bootstrap it returns the defaults
with an empty cluster/subdomain/endpoint (previously 200 with a JSON
`null` body, while the spec said 404). The settings PUT can bootstrap
the account by carrying a `cluster` — previously the row could only come
into existence through the first provider create, and a settings-first
setup was impossible; a differing cluster on a bootstrapped account is
rejected instead of silently ignored. PUT remains full-state.
The provider PUT schema promised omit-preserves semantics for several
operator-editable fields that the handler never delivered (it builds the
row from the request, like every other update handler). The schema
wording now matches the shipped full-state behavior; only the api_key
(secret) and session keys stay preserved by the manager. Identity
headers are always present in provider responses so an explicitly
cleared value round-trips as an empty string.
The Go REST client gains the full agent-network surface (catalog,
providers, policies, guardrails, budget rules, settings), including a
shim translating the legacy 200+`null` settings body from older servers
into an `IsNotFound` error.
Note for reviewers: the dashboard special-cased the `null` settings
body; it needs a small follow-up for the new defaults response (in
progress).
## Describe your changes
Agent Network gates providers, policies, guardrails, budgets, usage,
access logs, and settings behind the single `agent_network` permission
module, so access is all-or-nothing: a future delegated role cannot be
scoped to a subset of the area (for example usage-only visibility).
This introduces dotted submodules (`agent_network.providers`,
`.policies`, `.guardrails`, `.budgets`, `.usage`, `.logs`, `.settings`)
and resolves grants with a cascade: exact module first, then its parent,
then the role's `AutoAllowNew` default. The agent network manager now
validates each operation against its matching submodule. `usage`
(aggregated counters, overview) is deliberately separate from `logs`
(request-level entries, which can contain captured prompts).
No role definitions change. No built-in role carries an explicit
`agent_network` entry, so every role resolves the submodules exactly as
it resolved the parent module before — pinned by a test that compares
each built-in role's answer on every submodule against its answer on
`agent_network`. Role additions that use these submodules come
separately.
## Describe your changes
The model-allowlist guardrail was merged into one account-wide union and
enforced flat on every request, ignoring which policy/group/provider
authorised it. With multiple policies — especially a mix of guardrailed
and un-guardrailed ones — this caused:
- **false-allow**: a model allowlisted for one group/provider leaked to
any caller; and
- **false-deny**: an un-guardrailed policy (intended unrestricted) was
blocked by another policy's allowlist.
Enforcement is now policy/group-aware, mirroring `llm_limit_check`:
- **Management (`SelectPolicyForRequest`) is authoritative.** It uses
the request model (already carried in
`CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest.model`, previously ignored) to keep only
applicable policies whose guardrails permit the model; no
allowlist-enabled guardrail = unrestricted. Denies
`llm_policy.model_blocked` when policies govern the (provider, groups)
but none permits the model.
- **Proxy `llm_guardrail` becomes a per-provider fail-closed backstop.**
The synthesiser emits an allowlist only for providers every authorising
policy restricts; the middleware keys off the resolved provider id and
keeps unknown-model fail-closed.
## Summary
Adds a unified `admin` CLI for self-hosted instance administrators in
both the management and combined binaries.
## User Management
### `admin user change-password`
- Changes a local embedded IdP user's password.
- Selects the user with `--email` or `--user-id`.
- Reads the new password from `--password` or `--password-file`.
- Clears the user's local authentication session so the new password is
required on the next login.
- **Alias:** `admin user set-password`.
### `admin user reset-mfa`
- Resets a local embedded IdP user's MFA enrollment.
- Selects the user with `--email` or `--user-id`.
- Clears TOTP/WebAuthn enrollment data and removes the local
authentication session.
- The user will re-enroll MFA on the next login.
## MFA Management
### `admin mfa status`
- Shows whether local MFA is enabled in the account settings.
- Checks the embedded IdP client configuration and reports whether MFA
is enabled there.
### `admin mfa enable`
- Enables local MFA for embedded IdP users.
- Updates embedded IdP clients and saves the account MFA setting.
- Records an audit event on a best-effort basis.
### `admin mfa disable`
- Disables local MFA for embedded IdP users.
- Updates embedded IdP clients and saves the account MFA setting.
- Records an audit event on a best-effort basis.
## Reverse Proxy Tokens
### `admin token create --name <name> [--expires-in <duration>]`
- Creates a reverse proxy access token.
- Prints the plaintext token once, along with the token ID.
- `--expires-in` supports values such as `24h`, `30d`, or `365d`. If
omitted, the token never expires.
### `admin token list`
- Lists reverse proxy access tokens.
- Shows the token ID, name, creation date, expiration, last-used time,
and revocation status.
- **Alias:** `admin token ls`.
### `admin token revoke <token-id>`
- Revokes a reverse proxy access token.
- Revoked tokens can no longer authenticate reverse proxy instances.
## Reverse Proxy Management
### `admin proxy disconnect-all`
- Lists registered reverse proxy instances and force-marks all connected
instances as disconnected.
- Useful for repairing stale proxy state after an unclean management
server shutdown.
- Prompts for confirmation by default.
- `--dry-run` previews the changes without applying them.
- `--force` skips the confirmation prompt.
- Live proxies may appear again after their next heartbeat, reconnect,
or re-registration.
## Compatibility Commands
### `token ...`
- Deprecated top-level compatibility path.
- Behaves the same as `admin token ...`.
- Retained so existing scripts using `token create`, `token list`, or
`token revoke` continue to work.
## Changes
- Adds reusable `management/cmd/admin` command package.
- Wires `admin` into `netbird-mgmt` and `combined`.
- Adds local user password reset with existing password strength
validation.
- Adds local MFA enrollment reset by clearing Dex TOTP/WebAuthn
credentials and local auth sessions.
- Adds local MFA enable/disable/status helpers for embedded IdP
deployments.
- Moves proxy access token commands under `admin token` for a single
admin-focused CLI entry point.
- Exports `server.ValidatePassword` for reuse by CLI helpers.
## Tests
```bash
go test ./management/cmd/...
go test ./management/cmd/admin ./management/cmd ./combined/cmd
go test ./management/server -run TestValidatePassword
```
Pre-push lint also passed.
### Checklist
- [ ] Is it a bug fix
- [ ] Is a typo/documentation fix
- [x] Is a feature enhancement
- [ ] It is a refactor
- [ ] Created tests that fail without the change (if possible)
- [ ] This change does **not** modify the public API, gRPC protocols,
functionality behavior, CLI / service flags, or introduce a new feature
— **OR** I have discussed it with the NetBird team beforehand (link the
issue / Slack thread in the description). See
[CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#discuss-changes-with-the-netbird-team-first).
> By submitting this pull request, you confirm that you have read and
agree to the terms of the [Contributor License
Agreement](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTOR_LICENSE_AGREEMENT.md).
## Documentation
Select exactly one:
- [x] I added/updated documentation for this change
- [ ] Documentation is **not needed** for this change (explain why)
### Docs PR URL (required if "docs added" is checked)
Paste the PR link from https://github.com/netbirdio/docs here:
https://github.com/netbirdio/docs/pull/832
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
## Release Notes
* **New Features**
* Added self-hosted admin CLI commands for changing passwords, resetting
MFA (including WebAuthn), and managing embedded IdP client MFA
(enable/disable/status).
* Introduced a unified admin command entry point and improved
data-directory handling for embedded IdP storage.
* **Refactor**
* Centralized password strength validation into a shared exported
validator.
* **Tests**
* Added a comprehensive admin command test suite covering password
input, selectors, MFA reset, and client MFA state handling.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
