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[proxy,management] Bound model discovery to the caller's own policies
The listing was narrowed by the provider record's enumerated models, which is the right bound only while one policy reaches a provider. Where two teams share a provider under different allowlists, every caller was offered the union: each model outside their own policy is a request the guardrail refuses a moment later, which is the empty-or-wrong picker this endpoint exists to avoid, moved one level up. A gateway record enumerating nothing was worse still — it offered the upstream's entire catalogue however narrow the policy. The synthesiser already knows which policies authorise a provider and which groups each binds, so the router can answer this at request time where it knows the caller's groups. Each route now carries one rule per authorising policy — its source groups and the models it permits — and the listing is bounded to the union across the rules matching the caller, intersected with what the provider serves. This is deliberately finer than the guardrail's own per-provider allowlist, which stays as it is: that list is a fail-closed backstop and cannot tell who is asking, so discovery is now narrower than the backstop rather than wider. A policy setting no allowlist lifts the restriction for the groups it binds, so nil and empty model lists stay distinct end to end — collapsing them would let a listing that should offer nothing fall open to everything.
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@@ -44,6 +44,12 @@ type ProviderRoute struct {
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AuthHeaderName string `json:"auth_header_name"`
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AuthHeaderValue string `json:"auth_header_value"`
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AllowedGroupIDs []string `json:"allowed_group_ids"`
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// ModelPolicies carries, per authorising policy, the source groups it
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// binds and the models it permits. The router uses it to bound a model
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// listing to what THIS caller may use: a provider reachable by two groups
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// under different allowlists must not offer either group the other's
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// models. Empty means no policy restricts models on this route.
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ModelPolicies []ModelPolicyRule `json:"model_policies,omitempty"`
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// Vertex marks a Google Vertex AI provider. Vertex requests carry the
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// model in the URL path, so the router selects this route by path
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// (isVertexPath) and bypasses the model/vendor table entirely.
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@@ -65,6 +71,18 @@ type ProviderRoute struct {
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SkipTLSVerify bool `json:"skip_tls_verify,omitempty"`
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}
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// ModelPolicyRule is one authorising policy's contribution to what a caller
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// may use on a route: the source groups it binds, and the models it permits.
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//
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// Models is nil when the policy sets no model allowlist — an unrestricted
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// policy, which lifts the restriction for the groups it binds. That is why
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// nil and empty must stay distinct: an empty list is a guardrail that permits
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// nothing, and collapsing the two would let a listing fail open.
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type ModelPolicyRule struct {
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GroupIDs []string `json:"group_ids"`
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Models []string `json:"models"`
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}
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// Config is the on-wire configuration accepted by the factory. An
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// empty Providers slice yields a router that denies every request as
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// not-routable; the synthesiser is responsible for stamping the
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@@ -242,12 +242,13 @@ func (m *Middleware) routeModelless(reqPath, surface, method string, userGroups
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if _, hadPrefix := splitBedrockNamespace(reqPath); hadPrefix {
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stripBedrockNamespace(out)
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}
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// A route that enumerates its models bounds what the caller may use,
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// so the picker must not offer the rest: every entry outside the list
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// is a request the chain will deny.
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if reqPath == modelListingPath && len(route.Models) > 0 &&
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out.Mutations != nil && out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream != nil {
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out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.DiscoveryModels = append([]string(nil), route.Models...)
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// What the caller may actually use bounds what the picker may offer:
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// every entry outside it is a request the chain will deny a moment
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// later.
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if reqPath == modelListingPath && out.Mutations != nil && out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream != nil {
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if models, bounded := discoverableModels(route, userGroups); bounded {
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out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.DiscoveryModels = models
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}
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}
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return out
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case matchOutcomeUnauthorised:
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@@ -271,6 +272,96 @@ func isNonInferenceMethod(method string) bool {
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return method == http.MethodGet || method == http.MethodHead
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}
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// discoverableModels returns the model ids a caller in userGroups may actually
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// use on this route, and whether the listing should be bounded to them at all.
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//
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// Two things narrow a listing, and both must apply or the picker offers models
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// the very next request refuses:
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//
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// - the provider's own enumerated models, when it lists any (a gateway record
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// enumerates nothing and claims everything);
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// - the model allowlists of the policies that authorise THIS caller. A
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// provider reachable by two groups under different allowlists must not
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// offer either group the other's models, which is why the rules carry their
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// source groups rather than arriving pre-flattened.
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//
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// A policy that sets no allowlist lifts the restriction for the groups it
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// binds, so a caller holding one unrestricted policy sees the provider's full
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// list. bounded is false when nothing narrows the listing — an unrestricted
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// caller on a route that enumerates nothing — in which case the upstream's own
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// answer passes through untouched.
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func discoverableModels(route ProviderRoute, userGroups []string) ([]string, bool) {
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permitted, restricted := policyPermittedModels(route, userGroups)
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switch {
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case !restricted && len(route.Models) == 0:
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return nil, false
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case !restricted:
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return append([]string(nil), route.Models...), true
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case len(route.Models) == 0:
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// A gateway record enumerates nothing, so the allowlist is the whole
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// bound — previously such a record offered the upstream's entire
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// catalogue however narrow the policy was.
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return sortedModels(permitted), true
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}
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// Both bound: only what the provider serves and the policy permits.
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intersection := make(map[string]struct{}, len(route.Models))
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for _, m := range route.Models {
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if _, ok := permitted[m]; ok {
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intersection[m] = struct{}{}
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}
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}
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return sortedModels(intersection), true
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}
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// policyPermittedModels folds the rules whose groups intersect the caller's
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// into the set of models they permit. restricted is false when the caller
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// holds at least one authorising policy that sets no allowlist, or when no
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// rule binds them at all.
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func policyPermittedModels(route ProviderRoute, userGroups []string) (map[string]struct{}, bool) {
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permitted := make(map[string]struct{})
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restricted := false
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for _, rule := range route.ModelPolicies {
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if !groupsIntersect(rule.GroupIDs, userGroups) {
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continue
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}
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if rule.Models == nil {
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// An unrestricted policy the caller holds lifts the restriction
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// entirely, whatever the others say.
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return nil, false
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}
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restricted = true
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for _, m := range rule.Models {
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permitted[m] = struct{}{}
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}
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}
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return permitted, restricted
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}
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// groupsIntersect reports whether the two group-id sets share a member.
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func groupsIntersect(a, b []string) bool {
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for _, x := range a {
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for _, y := range b {
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if x == y {
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return true
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}
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// sortedModels flattens a model set into a stable slice so the bound the proxy
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// applies — and any test asserting on it — does not depend on map order.
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func sortedModels(set map[string]struct{}) []string {
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out := make([]string, 0, len(set))
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for m := range set {
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out = append(out, m)
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}
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sort.Strings(out)
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return out
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}
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// markNonInference tags an allow as a request that spends no tokens, so the
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// limit check skips the management pre-flight it would charge nothing against.
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func markNonInference(out *middleware.Output) {
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@@ -1145,3 +1145,144 @@ func TestRouter_PinnedDatedModelStaysDistinct(t *testing.T) {
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"declaration order must not decide between two deliberately pinned builds")
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})
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}
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// TestRouter_DiscoveryBoundToCallersPolicies pins that a model listing is
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// bounded by the policies that authorise the caller, not by the union across
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// everyone who can reach the provider. Two teams sharing one provider record
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// under different allowlists is the case that makes the difference visible: a
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// flattened per-provider list would offer each team the other's models, and
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// every one of those entries is a request the guardrail then refuses.
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func TestRouter_DiscoveryBoundToCallersPolicies(t *testing.T) {
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const (
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eng = "grp-eng"
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sales = "grp-sales"
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)
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route := ProviderRoute{
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ID: "shared-gateway",
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Models: []string{"claude-sonnet-5", "claude-haiku-4-5", "gpt-4o"},
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AllowedGroupIDs: []string{eng, sales},
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UpstreamScheme: "https",
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UpstreamHost: "gateway.example.com",
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ModelPolicies: []ModelPolicyRule{
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{GroupIDs: []string{eng}, Models: []string{"claude-sonnet-5"}},
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{GroupIDs: []string{sales}, Models: []string{"gpt-4o"}},
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},
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}
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listingFor := func(t *testing.T, group string) []string {
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t.Helper()
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mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{route}})
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in := newModellessInput(modelListingPath)
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in.UserGroups = []string{group}
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), in)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision)
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require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations)
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require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream)
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return out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.DiscoveryModels
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}
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t.Run("each group sees only its own policy's models", func(t *testing.T) {
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assert.Equal(t, []string{"claude-sonnet-5"}, listingFor(t, eng),
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"engineering must not be offered the model only sales may use")
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assert.Equal(t, []string{"gpt-4o"}, listingFor(t, sales),
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"sales must not be offered the model only engineering may use")
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})
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t.Run("a model no policy allows is offered to nobody", func(t *testing.T) {
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for _, group := range []string{eng, sales} {
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assert.NotContains(t, listingFor(t, group), "claude-haiku-4-5",
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"the provider serves it, but no policy permits it")
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}
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})
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}
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// TestRouter_DiscoveryUnrestrictedPolicy covers the lifting rule: a caller
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// holding one policy without a model allowlist sees everything the provider
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// enumerates, whatever the other policies say.
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func TestRouter_DiscoveryUnrestrictedPolicy(t *testing.T) {
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const (
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eng = "grp-eng"
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admin = "grp-admin"
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)
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route := ProviderRoute{
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ID: "shared-gateway",
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Models: []string{"claude-sonnet-5", "gpt-4o"},
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AllowedGroupIDs: []string{eng, admin},
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UpstreamScheme: "https",
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UpstreamHost: "gateway.example.com",
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ModelPolicies: []ModelPolicyRule{
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{GroupIDs: []string{eng}, Models: []string{"claude-sonnet-5"}},
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// nil Models: a policy that sets no allowlist at all.
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{GroupIDs: []string{admin}},
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},
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}
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mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{route}})
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in := newModellessInput(modelListingPath)
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in.UserGroups = []string{eng, admin}
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), in)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream)
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assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"claude-sonnet-5", "gpt-4o"},
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out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.DiscoveryModels,
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"an unrestricted policy the caller holds lifts the restriction")
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}
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// TestRouter_DiscoveryOnGatewayRecord covers a record that enumerates no
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// models. It previously offered the upstream's whole catalogue however narrow
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// the policy was, because there was nothing to intersect against; the policy
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// allowlist is now the bound on its own.
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func TestRouter_DiscoveryOnGatewayRecord(t *testing.T) {
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const eng = "grp-eng"
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base := ProviderRoute{
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ID: "litellm",
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AllowedGroupIDs: []string{eng},
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UpstreamScheme: "https",
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UpstreamHost: "litellm.internal",
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}
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t.Run("a policy allowlist bounds it", func(t *testing.T) {
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route := base
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route.ModelPolicies = []ModelPolicyRule{{GroupIDs: []string{eng}, Models: []string{"gpt-4o"}}}
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mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{route}})
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in := newModellessInput(modelListingPath)
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in.UserGroups = []string{eng}
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), in)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, []string{"gpt-4o"}, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.DiscoveryModels,
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"a catch-all record must still be bounded by what policy permits")
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})
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t.Run("an allowlist permitting nothing offers nothing", func(t *testing.T) {
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route := base
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route.ModelPolicies = []ModelPolicyRule{{GroupIDs: []string{eng}, Models: []string{}}}
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mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{route}})
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in := newModellessInput(modelListingPath)
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in.UserGroups = []string{eng}
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), in)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream)
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assert.Empty(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.DiscoveryModels,
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"an empty allowlist permits nothing, and must not be read as unrestricted")
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})
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t.Run("no policy restriction leaves the listing alone", func(t *testing.T) {
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mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{base}})
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in := newModellessInput(modelListingPath)
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in.UserGroups = []string{eng}
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out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), in)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream)
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assert.Nil(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.DiscoveryModels,
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"nothing narrows the listing, so the upstream's own answer passes through")
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})
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}
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