[client] Add port forwarding to ssh proxy (#5031)

* Implement port forwarding for the ssh proxy

* Allow user switching for port forwarding
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Liu
2026-01-07 12:18:04 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 7142d45ef3
commit f012fb8592
15 changed files with 1006 additions and 370 deletions

View File

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"io"
"net"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
@@ -40,6 +41,11 @@ const (
msgPrivilegedUserDisabled = "privileged user login is disabled"
cmdInteractiveShell = "<interactive shell>"
cmdPortForwarding = "<port forwarding>"
cmdSFTP = "<sftp>"
cmdNonInteractive = "<idle>"
// DefaultJWTMaxTokenAge is the default maximum age for JWT tokens accepted by the SSH server
DefaultJWTMaxTokenAge = 5 * 60
)
@@ -90,10 +96,10 @@ func logSessionExitError(logger *log.Entry, err error) {
}
}
// safeLogCommand returns a safe representation of the command for logging
// safeLogCommand returns a safe representation of the command for logging.
func safeLogCommand(cmd []string) string {
if len(cmd) == 0 {
return "<interactive shell>"
return cmdInteractiveShell
}
if len(cmd) == 1 {
return cmd[0]
@@ -101,26 +107,50 @@ func safeLogCommand(cmd []string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s [%d args]", cmd[0], len(cmd)-1)
}
type sshConnectionState struct {
hasActivePortForward bool
username string
remoteAddr string
// connState tracks the state of an SSH connection for port forwarding and status display.
type connState struct {
username string
remoteAddr net.Addr
portForwards []string
jwtUsername string
}
// authKey uniquely identifies an authentication attempt by username and remote address.
// Used to temporarily store JWT username between passwordHandler and sessionHandler.
type authKey string
// connKey uniquely identifies an SSH connection by its remote address.
// Used to track authenticated connections for status display and port forwarding.
type connKey string
func newAuthKey(username string, remoteAddr net.Addr) authKey {
return authKey(fmt.Sprintf("%s@%s", username, remoteAddr.String()))
}
// sessionState tracks an active SSH session (shell, command, or subsystem like SFTP).
type sessionState struct {
session ssh.Session
sessionType string
jwtUsername string
}
type Server struct {
sshServer *ssh.Server
mu sync.RWMutex
hostKeyPEM []byte
sessions map[SessionKey]ssh.Session
sessionCancels map[ConnectionKey]context.CancelFunc
sessionJWTUsers map[SessionKey]string
pendingAuthJWT map[authKey]string
sshServer *ssh.Server
mu sync.RWMutex
hostKeyPEM []byte
// sessions tracks active SSH sessions (shell, command, SFTP).
// These are created when a client opens a session channel and requests shell/exec/subsystem.
sessions map[sessionKey]*sessionState
// pendingAuthJWT temporarily stores JWT username during the auth→session handoff.
// Populated in passwordHandler, consumed in sessionHandler/sftpSubsystemHandler.
pendingAuthJWT map[authKey]string
// connections tracks all SSH connections by their remote address.
// Populated at authentication time, stores JWT username and port forwards for status display.
connections map[connKey]*connState
allowLocalPortForwarding bool
allowRemotePortForwarding bool
@@ -132,8 +162,7 @@ type Server struct {
wgAddress wgaddr.Address
remoteForwardListeners map[ForwardKey]net.Listener
sshConnections map[*cryptossh.ServerConn]*sshConnectionState
remoteForwardListeners map[forwardKey]net.Listener
jwtValidator *jwt.Validator
jwtExtractor *jwt.ClaimsExtractor
@@ -167,6 +196,7 @@ type SessionInfo struct {
RemoteAddress string
Command string
JWTUsername string
PortForwards []string
}
// New creates an SSH server instance with the provided host key and optional JWT configuration
@@ -175,11 +205,10 @@ func New(config *Config) *Server {
s := &Server{
mu: sync.RWMutex{},
hostKeyPEM: config.HostKeyPEM,
sessions: make(map[SessionKey]ssh.Session),
sessionJWTUsers: make(map[SessionKey]string),
sessions: make(map[sessionKey]*sessionState),
pendingAuthJWT: make(map[authKey]string),
remoteForwardListeners: make(map[ForwardKey]net.Listener),
sshConnections: make(map[*cryptossh.ServerConn]*sshConnectionState),
remoteForwardListeners: make(map[forwardKey]net.Listener),
connections: make(map[connKey]*connState),
jwtEnabled: config.JWT != nil,
jwtConfig: config.JWT,
authorizer: sshauth.NewAuthorizer(), // Initialize with empty config
@@ -265,14 +294,8 @@ func (s *Server) Stop() error {
s.sshServer = nil
maps.Clear(s.sessions)
maps.Clear(s.sessionJWTUsers)
maps.Clear(s.pendingAuthJWT)
maps.Clear(s.sshConnections)
for _, cancelFunc := range s.sessionCancels {
cancelFunc()
}
maps.Clear(s.sessionCancels)
maps.Clear(s.connections)
for _, listener := range s.remoteForwardListeners {
if err := listener.Close(); err != nil {
@@ -284,32 +307,70 @@ func (s *Server) Stop() error {
return nil
}
// GetStatus returns the current status of the SSH server and active sessions
// GetStatus returns the current status of the SSH server and active sessions.
func (s *Server) GetStatus() (enabled bool, sessions []SessionInfo) {
s.mu.RLock()
defer s.mu.RUnlock()
enabled = s.sshServer != nil
reportedAddrs := make(map[string]bool)
for sessionKey, session := range s.sessions {
cmd := "<interactive shell>"
if len(session.Command()) > 0 {
cmd = safeLogCommand(session.Command())
for _, state := range s.sessions {
info := s.buildSessionInfo(state)
reportedAddrs[info.RemoteAddress] = true
sessions = append(sessions, info)
}
// Add authenticated connections without sessions (e.g., -N/-T or port-forwarding only)
for key, connState := range s.connections {
remoteAddr := string(key)
if reportedAddrs[remoteAddr] {
continue
}
cmd := cmdNonInteractive
if len(connState.portForwards) > 0 {
cmd = cmdPortForwarding
}
jwtUsername := s.sessionJWTUsers[sessionKey]
sessions = append(sessions, SessionInfo{
Username: session.User(),
RemoteAddress: session.RemoteAddr().String(),
Username: connState.username,
RemoteAddress: remoteAddr,
Command: cmd,
JWTUsername: jwtUsername,
JWTUsername: connState.jwtUsername,
PortForwards: connState.portForwards,
})
}
return enabled, sessions
}
func (s *Server) buildSessionInfo(state *sessionState) SessionInfo {
session := state.session
cmd := state.sessionType
if cmd == "" {
cmd = safeLogCommand(session.Command())
}
remoteAddr := session.RemoteAddr().String()
info := SessionInfo{
Username: session.User(),
RemoteAddress: remoteAddr,
Command: cmd,
JWTUsername: state.jwtUsername,
}
connState, exists := s.connections[connKey(remoteAddr)]
if !exists {
return info
}
info.PortForwards = connState.portForwards
if len(connState.portForwards) > 0 && (cmd == cmdInteractiveShell || cmd == cmdNonInteractive) {
info.Command = cmdPortForwarding
}
return info
}
// SetNetstackNet sets the netstack network for userspace networking
func (s *Server) SetNetstackNet(net *netstack.Net) {
s.mu.Lock()
@@ -520,69 +581,129 @@ func (s *Server) parseTokenWithoutValidation(tokenString string) (map[string]int
func (s *Server) passwordHandler(ctx ssh.Context, password string) bool {
osUsername := ctx.User()
remoteAddr := ctx.RemoteAddr()
logger := s.getRequestLogger(ctx)
if err := s.ensureJWTValidator(); err != nil {
log.Errorf("JWT validator initialization failed for user %s from %s: %v", osUsername, remoteAddr, err)
logger.Errorf("JWT validator initialization failed: %v", err)
return false
}
token, err := s.validateJWTToken(password)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("JWT authentication failed for user %s from %s: %v", osUsername, remoteAddr, err)
logger.Warnf("JWT authentication failed: %v", err)
return false
}
userAuth, err := s.extractAndValidateUser(token)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("User validation failed for user %s from %s: %v", osUsername, remoteAddr, err)
logger.Warnf("user validation failed: %v", err)
return false
}
logger = logger.WithField("jwt_user", userAuth.UserId)
s.mu.RLock()
authorizer := s.authorizer
s.mu.RUnlock()
if err := authorizer.Authorize(userAuth.UserId, osUsername); err != nil {
log.Warnf("SSH authorization denied for user %s (JWT user ID: %s) from %s: %v", osUsername, userAuth.UserId, remoteAddr, err)
msg, err := authorizer.Authorize(userAuth.UserId, osUsername)
if err != nil {
logger.Warnf("SSH auth denied: %v", err)
return false
}
logger.Infof("SSH auth %s", msg)
key := newAuthKey(osUsername, remoteAddr)
remoteAddrStr := ctx.RemoteAddr().String()
s.mu.Lock()
s.pendingAuthJWT[key] = userAuth.UserId
s.connections[connKey(remoteAddrStr)] = &connState{
username: ctx.User(),
remoteAddr: ctx.RemoteAddr(),
jwtUsername: userAuth.UserId,
}
s.mu.Unlock()
log.Infof("JWT authentication successful for user %s (JWT user ID: %s) from %s", osUsername, userAuth.UserId, remoteAddr)
return true
}
func (s *Server) markConnectionActivePortForward(sshConn *cryptossh.ServerConn, username, remoteAddr string) {
func (s *Server) addConnectionPortForward(username string, remoteAddr net.Addr, forwardAddr string) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
if state, exists := s.sshConnections[sshConn]; exists {
state.hasActivePortForward = true
} else {
s.sshConnections[sshConn] = &sshConnectionState{
hasActivePortForward: true,
username: username,
remoteAddr: remoteAddr,
key := connKey(remoteAddr.String())
if state, exists := s.connections[key]; exists {
if !slices.Contains(state.portForwards, forwardAddr) {
state.portForwards = append(state.portForwards, forwardAddr)
}
return
}
// Connection not in connections (non-JWT auth path)
s.connections[key] = &connState{
username: username,
remoteAddr: remoteAddr,
portForwards: []string{forwardAddr},
jwtUsername: s.pendingAuthJWT[newAuthKey(username, remoteAddr)],
}
}
func (s *Server) connectionCloseHandler(conn net.Conn, err error) {
// We can't extract the SSH connection from net.Conn directly
// Connection cleanup will happen during session cleanup or via timeout
log.Debugf("SSH connection failed for %s: %v", conn.RemoteAddr(), err)
func (s *Server) removeConnectionPortForward(remoteAddr net.Addr, forwardAddr string) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
state, exists := s.connections[connKey(remoteAddr.String())]
if !exists {
return
}
state.portForwards = slices.DeleteFunc(state.portForwards, func(addr string) bool {
return addr == forwardAddr
})
}
func (s *Server) findSessionKeyByContext(ctx ssh.Context) SessionKey {
// trackedConn wraps a net.Conn to detect when it closes
type trackedConn struct {
net.Conn
server *Server
remoteAddr string
onceClose sync.Once
}
func (c *trackedConn) Close() error {
err := c.Conn.Close()
c.onceClose.Do(func() {
c.server.handleConnectionClose(c.remoteAddr)
})
return err
}
func (s *Server) handleConnectionClose(remoteAddr string) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
key := connKey(remoteAddr)
state, exists := s.connections[key]
if exists && len(state.portForwards) > 0 {
s.connLogger(state).Info("port forwarding connection closed")
}
delete(s.connections, key)
}
func (s *Server) connLogger(state *connState) *log.Entry {
logger := log.WithField("session", fmt.Sprintf("%s@%s", state.username, state.remoteAddr))
if state.jwtUsername != "" {
logger = logger.WithField("jwt_user", state.jwtUsername)
}
return logger
}
func (s *Server) findSessionKeyByContext(ctx ssh.Context) sessionKey {
if ctx == nil {
return "unknown"
}
// Try to match by SSH connection
sshConn := ctx.Value(ssh.ContextKeyConn)
if sshConn == nil {
return "unknown"
@@ -591,19 +712,14 @@ func (s *Server) findSessionKeyByContext(ctx ssh.Context) SessionKey {
s.mu.RLock()
defer s.mu.RUnlock()
// Look through sessions to find one with matching connection
for sessionKey, session := range s.sessions {
if session.Context().Value(ssh.ContextKeyConn) == sshConn {
for sessionKey, state := range s.sessions {
if state.session.Context().Value(ssh.ContextKeyConn) == sshConn {
return sessionKey
}
}
// If no session found, this might be during early connection setup
// Return a temporary key that we'll fix up later
if ctx.User() != "" && ctx.RemoteAddr() != nil {
tempKey := SessionKey(fmt.Sprintf("%s@%s", ctx.User(), ctx.RemoteAddr().String()))
log.Debugf("Using temporary session key for early port forward tracking: %s (will be updated when session established)", tempKey)
return tempKey
return sessionKey(fmt.Sprintf("%s@%s", ctx.User(), ctx.RemoteAddr().String()))
}
return "unknown"
@@ -644,7 +760,11 @@ func (s *Server) connectionValidator(_ ssh.Context, conn net.Conn) net.Conn {
}
log.Infof("SSH connection from NetBird peer %s allowed", tcpAddr)
return conn
return &trackedConn{
Conn: conn,
server: s,
remoteAddr: conn.RemoteAddr().String(),
}
}
func (s *Server) createSSHServer(addr net.Addr) (*ssh.Server, error) {
@@ -672,9 +792,8 @@ func (s *Server) createSSHServer(addr net.Addr) (*ssh.Server, error) {
"tcpip-forward": s.tcpipForwardHandler,
"cancel-tcpip-forward": s.cancelTcpipForwardHandler,
},
ConnCallback: s.connectionValidator,
ConnectionFailedCallback: s.connectionCloseHandler,
Version: serverVersion,
ConnCallback: s.connectionValidator,
Version: serverVersion,
}
if s.jwtEnabled {
@@ -690,13 +809,13 @@ func (s *Server) createSSHServer(addr net.Addr) (*ssh.Server, error) {
return server, nil
}
func (s *Server) storeRemoteForwardListener(key ForwardKey, ln net.Listener) {
func (s *Server) storeRemoteForwardListener(key forwardKey, ln net.Listener) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.remoteForwardListeners[key] = ln
}
func (s *Server) removeRemoteForwardListener(key ForwardKey) bool {
func (s *Server) removeRemoteForwardListener(key forwardKey) bool {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
@@ -714,6 +833,8 @@ func (s *Server) removeRemoteForwardListener(key ForwardKey) bool {
}
func (s *Server) directTCPIPHandler(srv *ssh.Server, conn *cryptossh.ServerConn, newChan cryptossh.NewChannel, ctx ssh.Context) {
logger := s.getRequestLogger(ctx)
var payload struct {
Host string
Port uint32
@@ -723,7 +844,7 @@ func (s *Server) directTCPIPHandler(srv *ssh.Server, conn *cryptossh.ServerConn,
if err := cryptossh.Unmarshal(newChan.ExtraData(), &payload); err != nil {
if err := newChan.Reject(cryptossh.ConnectionFailed, "parse payload"); err != nil {
log.Debugf("channel reject error: %v", err)
logger.Debugf("channel reject error: %v", err)
}
return
}
@@ -733,19 +854,20 @@ func (s *Server) directTCPIPHandler(srv *ssh.Server, conn *cryptossh.ServerConn,
s.mu.RUnlock()
if !allowLocal {
log.Warnf("local port forwarding denied for %s:%d: disabled by configuration", payload.Host, payload.Port)
logger.Warnf("local port forwarding denied for %s:%d: disabled", payload.Host, payload.Port)
_ = newChan.Reject(cryptossh.Prohibited, "local port forwarding disabled")
return
}
// Check privilege requirements for the destination port
if err := s.checkPortForwardingPrivileges(ctx, "local", payload.Port); err != nil {
log.Warnf("local port forwarding denied for %s:%d: %v", payload.Host, payload.Port, err)
logger.Warnf("local port forwarding denied for %s:%d: %v", payload.Host, payload.Port, err)
_ = newChan.Reject(cryptossh.Prohibited, "insufficient privileges")
return
}
log.Infof("local port forwarding: %s:%d", payload.Host, payload.Port)
forwardAddr := fmt.Sprintf("-L %s:%d", payload.Host, payload.Port)
s.addConnectionPortForward(ctx.User(), ctx.RemoteAddr(), forwardAddr)
logger.Infof("local port forwarding: %s:%d", payload.Host, payload.Port)
ssh.DirectTCPIPHandler(srv, conn, newChan, ctx)
}