Merge branch 'main' into fix/remove-math-rand

This commit is contained in:
pascal
2026-07-29 12:06:01 +02:00
292 changed files with 20363 additions and 4042 deletions

View File

@@ -18,21 +18,26 @@ import (
// contract between the proxy and management; management flattens them into
// queryable columns. Keep in sync with the proxy side.
const (
metaKeyProvider = "llm.provider"
metaKeyModel = "llm.model"
metaKeyResolvedProviderID = "llm.resolved_provider_id"
metaKeySelectedPolicyID = "llm.selected_policy_id"
metaKeyPolicyDecision = "llm_policy.decision"
metaKeyPolicyReason = "llm_policy.reason"
metaKeyInputTokens = "llm.input_tokens" //nolint:gosec // metadata key name, not a credential
metaKeyOutputTokens = "llm.output_tokens" //nolint:gosec // metadata key name, not a credential
metaKeyTotalTokens = "llm.total_tokens" //nolint:gosec // metadata key name, not a credential
metaKeyCostUSDTotal = "cost.usd_total"
metaKeyStream = "llm.stream"
metaKeySessionID = "llm.session_id"
metaKeyAuthorisingGroups = "llm.authorising_groups"
metaKeyRequestPrompt = "llm.request_prompt"
metaKeyResponseCompletion = "llm.response_completion"
metaKeyProvider = "llm.provider"
metaKeyModel = "llm.model"
metaKeyResolvedProviderID = "llm.resolved_provider_id"
metaKeySelectedPolicyID = "llm.selected_policy_id"
metaKeyPolicyDecision = "llm_policy.decision"
metaKeyPolicyReason = "llm_policy.reason"
metaKeyInputTokens = "llm.input_tokens" //nolint:gosec // metadata key name, not a credential
metaKeyOutputTokens = "llm.output_tokens" //nolint:gosec // metadata key name, not a credential
metaKeyTotalTokens = "llm.total_tokens" //nolint:gosec // metadata key name, not a credential
metaKeyCachedInputTokens = "llm.cached_input_tokens" //nolint:gosec // metadata key name, not a credential
metaKeyCacheCreationTokens = "llm.cache_creation_tokens" //nolint:gosec // metadata key name, not a credential
metaKeyCostUSDInput = "cost.usd_input"
metaKeyCostUSDCachedInput = "cost.usd_cached_input"
metaKeyCostUSDCacheCreate = "cost.usd_cache_creation"
metaKeyCostUSDOutput = "cost.usd_output"
metaKeyStream = "llm.stream"
metaKeySessionID = "llm.session_id"
metaKeyAuthorisingGroups = "llm.authorising_groups"
metaKeyRequestPrompt = "llm.request_prompt"
metaKeyResponseCompletion = "llm.response_completion"
)
// IngestAccessLog flattens the metadata-bearing reverse-proxy access-log entry
@@ -108,20 +113,25 @@ func flattenAccessLog(e *accesslogs.AccessLogEntry) (*types.AgentNetworkAccessLo
BytesUpload: e.BytesUpload,
BytesDownload: e.BytesDownload,
Provider: meta[metaKeyProvider],
Model: meta[metaKeyModel],
SessionID: meta[metaKeySessionID],
ResolvedProviderID: meta[metaKeyResolvedProviderID],
SelectedPolicyID: meta[metaKeySelectedPolicyID],
Decision: meta[metaKeyPolicyDecision],
DenyReason: meta[metaKeyPolicyReason],
InputTokens: parseMetaInt(meta, metaKeyInputTokens),
OutputTokens: parseMetaInt(meta, metaKeyOutputTokens),
TotalTokens: parseMetaInt(meta, metaKeyTotalTokens),
CostUSD: parseMetaFloat(meta, metaKeyCostUSDTotal),
Stream: parseMetaBool(meta, metaKeyStream),
RequestPrompt: meta[metaKeyRequestPrompt],
ResponseCompletion: meta[metaKeyResponseCompletion],
Provider: meta[metaKeyProvider],
Model: meta[metaKeyModel],
SessionID: meta[metaKeySessionID],
ResolvedProviderID: meta[metaKeyResolvedProviderID],
SelectedPolicyID: meta[metaKeySelectedPolicyID],
Decision: meta[metaKeyPolicyDecision],
DenyReason: meta[metaKeyPolicyReason],
InputTokens: parseMetaInt(meta, metaKeyInputTokens),
OutputTokens: parseMetaInt(meta, metaKeyOutputTokens),
TotalTokens: parseMetaInt(meta, metaKeyTotalTokens),
CachedInputTokens: parseMetaInt(meta, metaKeyCachedInputTokens),
CacheCreationTokens: parseMetaInt(meta, metaKeyCacheCreationTokens),
InputCostUSD: parseMetaFloat(meta, metaKeyCostUSDInput),
CachedInputCostUSD: parseMetaFloat(meta, metaKeyCostUSDCachedInput),
CacheCreationCostUSD: parseMetaFloat(meta, metaKeyCostUSDCacheCreate),
OutputCostUSD: parseMetaFloat(meta, metaKeyCostUSDOutput),
Stream: parseMetaBool(meta, metaKeyStream),
RequestPrompt: meta[metaKeyRequestPrompt],
ResponseCompletion: meta[metaKeyResponseCompletion],
}
var groups []types.AgentNetworkAccessLogGroup
@@ -140,18 +150,23 @@ func flattenAccessLog(e *accesslogs.AccessLogEntry) (*types.AgentNetworkAccessLo
// log's ID so the two correlate.
func usageFromFlattenedLog(e *types.AgentNetworkAccessLog, groups []types.AgentNetworkAccessLogGroup) (*types.AgentNetworkUsage, []types.AgentNetworkUsageGroup) {
usage := &types.AgentNetworkUsage{
ID: e.ID,
AccountID: e.AccountID,
Timestamp: e.Timestamp,
UserID: e.UserID,
ResolvedProviderID: e.ResolvedProviderID,
Provider: e.Provider,
Model: e.Model,
SessionID: e.SessionID,
InputTokens: e.InputTokens,
OutputTokens: e.OutputTokens,
TotalTokens: e.TotalTokens,
CostUSD: e.CostUSD,
ID: e.ID,
AccountID: e.AccountID,
Timestamp: e.Timestamp,
UserID: e.UserID,
ResolvedProviderID: e.ResolvedProviderID,
Provider: e.Provider,
Model: e.Model,
SessionID: e.SessionID,
InputTokens: e.InputTokens,
OutputTokens: e.OutputTokens,
TotalTokens: e.TotalTokens,
CachedInputTokens: e.CachedInputTokens,
CacheCreationTokens: e.CacheCreationTokens,
InputCostUSD: e.InputCostUSD,
CachedInputCostUSD: e.CachedInputCostUSD,
CacheCreationCostUSD: e.CacheCreationCostUSD,
OutputCostUSD: e.OutputCostUSD,
}
usageGroups := make([]types.AgentNetworkUsageGroup, 0, len(groups))

View File

@@ -28,17 +28,22 @@ func newIngestTestEntry() *accesslogs.AccessLogEntry {
UserId: "user-1",
AgentNetwork: true,
Metadata: map[string]string{
metaKeyProvider: "openai",
metaKeyModel: "gpt-5.4",
metaKeyResolvedProviderID: "prov-1",
metaKeySessionID: "sess-1",
metaKeyInputTokens: "100",
metaKeyOutputTokens: "50",
metaKeyTotalTokens: "150",
metaKeyCostUSDTotal: "0.0123",
metaKeyStream: "true",
metaKeyRequestPrompt: "hello",
metaKeyResponseCompletion: "world",
metaKeyProvider: "openai",
metaKeyModel: "gpt-5.4",
metaKeyResolvedProviderID: "prov-1",
metaKeySessionID: "sess-1",
metaKeyInputTokens: "100",
metaKeyOutputTokens: "50",
metaKeyTotalTokens: "1174",
metaKeyCachedInputTokens: "256",
metaKeyCacheCreationTokens: "768",
metaKeyCostUSDInput: "0.0071",
metaKeyCostUSDCachedInput: "0.0009",
metaKeyCostUSDCacheCreate: "0.0020",
metaKeyCostUSDOutput: "0.0023",
metaKeyStream: "true",
metaKeyRequestPrompt: "hello",
metaKeyResponseCompletion: "world",
// repeated id must be de-duplicated before the group rows insert.
metaKeyAuthorisingGroups: "grp-eng,grp-eng,grp-ops",
},
@@ -65,7 +70,19 @@ func TestIngestAccessLog_RealStore_LogCollectionOff(t *testing.T) {
require.Len(t, usage, 1, "usage row must be written even with log collection off")
assert.Equal(t, int64(100), usage[0].InputTokens, "input tokens must round-trip from metadata")
assert.Equal(t, int64(50), usage[0].OutputTokens, "output tokens must round-trip from metadata")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0123, usage[0].CostUSD, 1e-9, "cost must round-trip from metadata")
assert.Equal(t, int64(256), usage[0].CachedInputTokens, "cache-read tokens must round-trip from metadata")
assert.Equal(t, int64(768), usage[0].CacheCreationTokens, "cache-write tokens must round-trip from metadata")
// The per-bucket breakdown is the only cost state stored, and must survive
// the write/read cycle as real columns — usage rows are the only cost
// record for accounts with log collection off, so a dropped column here
// loses the split permanently.
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0071, usage[0].InputCostUSD, 1e-9, "input cost must round-trip from metadata")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0009, usage[0].CachedInputCostUSD, 1e-9, "cache-read cost must round-trip from metadata")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0020, usage[0].CacheCreationCostUSD, 1e-9, "cache-write cost must round-trip from metadata")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0023, usage[0].OutputCostUSD, 1e-9, "output cost must round-trip from metadata")
// Aggregates are derived from the stored columns, never stored themselves.
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0123, usage[0].TotalCostUSD(), 1e-9, "total is derived from the stored buckets")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0029, usage[0].CacheCostUSD(), 1e-9, "cache cost is derived from the two cache buckets")
logs, _, err := s.GetAgentNetworkAccessLogs(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, testAccountID, types.AgentNetworkAccessLogFilter{})
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -96,6 +113,14 @@ func TestIngestAccessLog_RealStore_LogCollectionOn(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, int64(1), total, "exactly one access-log row expected")
require.Len(t, logs, 1, "full access-log row must be written when log collection is on")
assert.Equal(t, "gpt-5.4", logs[0].Model, "model must flatten from metadata")
assert.Equal(t, int64(256), logs[0].CachedInputTokens, "cache-read tokens must flatten from metadata")
assert.Equal(t, int64(768), logs[0].CacheCreationTokens, "cache-write tokens must flatten from metadata")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0029, logs[0].CacheCostUSD(), 1e-9, "cache cost is derived from the two cache buckets")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0123, logs[0].TotalCostUSD(), 1e-9, "total is derived from the stored buckets")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0071, logs[0].InputCostUSD, 1e-9, "input cost must flatten from metadata")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0009, logs[0].CachedInputCostUSD, 1e-9, "cache-read cost must flatten from metadata")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0020, logs[0].CacheCreationCostUSD, 1e-9, "cache-write cost must flatten from metadata")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0023, logs[0].OutputCostUSD, 1e-9, "output cost must flatten from metadata")
assert.Equal(t, "hello", logs[0].RequestPrompt, "prompt must be retained when log collection is on")
assert.Equal(t, "world", logs[0].ResponseCompletion, "completion must be retained when log collection is on")
assert.True(t, logs[0].Stream, "stream flag must flatten from metadata")

View File

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ func accessLogRow(id, sessionID string, ts time.Time, opts ...func(*types.AgentN
InputTokens: 100,
OutputTokens: 50,
TotalTokens: 150,
CostUSD: 0.01,
InputCostUSD: 0.01,
}
for _, o := range opts {
o(e)
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ func withTokens(in, out, total int64, cost float64) func(*types.AgentNetworkAcce
e.InputTokens = in
e.OutputTokens = out
e.TotalTokens = total
e.CostUSD = cost
e.InputCostUSD = cost
}
}
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ func TestAccessLogSessions_FoldAndAggregate(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, int64(310), a.InputTokens, "input tokens summed")
assert.Equal(t, int64(135), a.OutputTokens, "output tokens summed")
assert.Equal(t, int64(445), a.TotalTokens, "total tokens summed")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.031, a.CostUSD, 1e-9, "cost summed")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.031, a.TotalCostUSD(), 1e-9, "cost summed")
assert.Equal(t, "deny", a.Decision, "any deny makes the session a deny")
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"openai", "anthropic"}, a.Providers, "distinct providers")
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"gpt-5.4", "claude-haiku-4-5"}, a.Models, "distinct models")

View File

@@ -420,6 +420,47 @@ var providers = []Provider{
{ID: "mistral-embed", Label: "Mistral Embed", InputPer1k: 0.0001, OutputPer1k: 0, ContextWindow: 8192},
},
},
{
ID: "kimi_api",
Kind: KindProvider,
Name: "Kimi (Moonshot AI) API",
Description: "Kimi K3 / K2 models via the Moonshot AI platform",
DefaultHost: "api.moonshot.ai",
AuthHeaderName: "Authorization",
AuthHeaderTemplate: "Bearer ${API_KEY}",
DefaultContentType: "application/json",
BrandColor: "#1A1A2E",
// ParserID empty on purpose: Moonshot serves two body shapes on
// the same host and key, and the proxy's URL sniffer dispatches
// both (same pattern as Bifrost). /v1/chat/completions matches
// OpenAIParser; the Anthropic-compatible endpoint the official
// Claude Code guide uses (/anthropic/v1/messages) contains
// "/v1/messages" and matches AnthropicParser. Pinning "openai"
// here would misparse the Claude Code path — the primary way
// teams consume Kimi for coding today. Both endpoints accept the
// same Moonshot key via Authorization: Bearer (Claude Code's
// ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN rides that header too).
//
// api.moonshot.ai is the international platform; mainland-China
// accounts live on api.moonshot.cn with separate billing —
// operators there override the host on the provider record. The
// kimi.com subscription coding endpoint (api.kimi.com/coding,
// model id "k3") is account-bound seat licensing rather than a
// meterable platform key, so it's deliberately not the default.
ParserID: "",
// Pricing per Moonshot's platform rates at K3 launch (July 2026):
// $3/$15 per MTok with $0.30 cached input, flat across the 1M-token
// window. kimi-k3 is the ONLY model the platform serves newer
// accounts — K2-era ids (kimi-k2-thinking) and even the kimi-latest
// alias return resource_not_found_error, verified live 2026-07-21 —
// so it's the only catalog entry. Grandfathered accounts with K2
// access can still type those ids on the provider's model rows.
// The consumer app's "K3 Swarm Max" mode is not an API SKU, so it
// doesn't appear here.
Models: []Model{
{ID: "kimi-k3", Label: "Kimi K3", InputPer1k: 0.003, OutputPer1k: 0.015, ContextWindow: 1000000},
},
},
{
ID: "litellm_proxy",
Kind: KindGateway,

View File

@@ -85,12 +85,17 @@ type Manager interface {
// PolicySelectionInput is the per-request selection envelope. The
// proxy populates it from CapturedData (account, user, groups) plus
// the provider llm_router resolved.
// the provider llm_router resolved and the model it extracted.
type PolicySelectionInput struct {
AccountID string
UserID string
GroupIDs []string
ProviderID string
// Model is the already-normalised upstream model id the proxy extracted
// (parser strips Bedrock region/version, Vertex @version), so a
// case-insensitive compare suffices. Empty = undetermined → not permitted
// (fail closed).
Model string
}
// PolicySelectionResult names the policy that "pays" for this request

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"math"
"sort"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
@@ -35,6 +36,10 @@ const (
denyCodeAccountTokenCapExceeded = "llm_account.token_cap_exceeded"
//nolint:gosec // account deny code label, not a credential
denyCodeAccountBudgetCapExceeded = "llm_account.budget_cap_exceeded"
// denyCodeModelBlocked is returned when policies govern the request's
// (provider, caller-groups) but none permits the model. Matches the proxy
// guardrail's code so both layers surface the same label.
denyCodeModelBlocked = "llm_policy.model_blocked"
)
// consumptionCache holds the consumption counters prefetched for one
@@ -159,6 +164,25 @@ func (m *managerImpl) SelectPolicyForRequest(ctx context.Context, in PolicySelec
}
candidates := filterApplicablePolicies(policies, in)
// Model-allowlist gate scoped to the matched policies: keep candidates whose
// guardrails permit the model (none enabled = unrestricted), deny when
// policies apply but none permits it. Skip the load when none has a guardrail.
if len(candidates) > 0 && anyPolicyHasGuardrails(candidates) {
guardrailsByID, gErr := m.loadGuardrailsByID(ctx, in.AccountID)
if gErr != nil {
return nil, gErr
}
permitted := filterModelPermittedPolicies(candidates, guardrailsByID, in.Model)
if len(permitted) == 0 {
return &PolicySelectionResult{
Allow: false,
DenyCode: denyCodeModelBlocked,
DenyReason: modelBlockedReason(in.Model),
}, nil
}
candidates = permitted
}
// Prefetch every consumption counter the ceiling + candidate policies will
// read, in a single store round-trip, then score against the cache.
cache, err := m.prefetchConsumption(ctx, in, rules, candidates, now)
@@ -250,6 +274,90 @@ func filterApplicablePolicies(policies []*types.Policy, in PolicySelectionInput)
return out
}
// anyPolicyHasGuardrails reports whether any policy references at least one
// guardrail, so the selector can skip loading guardrails when none do.
func anyPolicyHasGuardrails(policies []*types.Policy) bool {
for _, p := range policies {
if p != nil && len(p.GuardrailIDs) > 0 {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// loadGuardrailsByID loads the account's guardrails indexed by ID. Used by the
// model-allowlist gate to resolve each candidate policy's attached guardrails.
func (m *managerImpl) loadGuardrailsByID(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (map[string]*types.Guardrail, error) {
guardrails, err := m.store.GetAccountAgentNetworkGuardrails(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("list account guardrails: %w", err)
}
byID := make(map[string]*types.Guardrail, len(guardrails))
for _, g := range guardrails {
if g != nil {
byID[g.ID] = g
}
}
return byID, nil
}
// filterModelPermittedPolicies returns the subset of policies whose guardrails
// permit the model. Order is preserved so downstream scoring is unaffected.
func filterModelPermittedPolicies(policies []*types.Policy, byID map[string]*types.Guardrail, model string) []*types.Policy {
out := make([]*types.Policy, 0, len(policies))
for _, p := range policies {
if policyPermitsModel(p, byID, model) {
out = append(out, p)
}
}
return out
}
// policyPermitsModel reports whether a policy permits the model. No
// allowlist-enabled guardrail = unrestricted (permits any, incl. empty);
// otherwise the model must be in the union of its allowlists, so an
// empty/undetermined model fails closed.
func policyPermitsModel(p *types.Policy, byID map[string]*types.Guardrail, model string) bool {
if p == nil {
return false
}
wanted := normaliseModelID(model)
restricted := false
for _, gID := range p.GuardrailIDs {
g, ok := byID[gID]
if !ok || g == nil || !g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled {
continue
}
restricted = true
if wanted == "" {
continue
}
for _, allowed := range g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models {
if normaliseModelID(allowed) == wanted {
return true
}
}
}
return !restricted
}
// normaliseModelID lowercases and trims a model identifier so the allowlist
// compare is case-insensitive and trim-tolerant. Mirrors the proxy guardrail's
// normaliseModel so both layers agree on what "same model" means.
func normaliseModelID(model string) string {
return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(model))
}
// modelBlockedReason builds the human-readable deny reason for a model-allowlist
// rejection. The model is quoted when known; an undetermined model is reported
// as such so the access log distinguishes "wrong model" from "no model".
func modelBlockedReason(model string) string {
if normaliseModelID(model) == "" {
return "request model could not be determined for the policy allowlist"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("model %q is not permitted by any applicable policy allowlist", model)
}
// candidate is the per-policy intermediate the selector ranks. A
// policy that's been exhausted on any enabled cap never makes it
// into this slice; the selector's deny envelope carries the latest

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/golang/mock/gomock"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
)
// guardedPolicy builds an enabled, uncapped policy that authorises sourceGroups
// to reach providerID under the given guardrails. Uncapped keeps the selector's
// headroom scoring trivial so these tests isolate the model-allowlist gate.
func guardedPolicy(id, account string, sourceGroups []string, providerID string, guardrailIDs ...string) *types.Policy {
return &types.Policy{
ID: id,
AccountID: account,
Enabled: true,
SourceGroups: sourceGroups,
DestinationProviderIDs: []string{providerID},
GuardrailIDs: guardrailIDs,
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
}
}
// allowlistGuardrail builds a guardrail whose model allowlist is enabled and
// carries the given models.
func allowlistGuardrail(id, account string, models ...string) *types.Guardrail {
return &types.Guardrail{
ID: id,
AccountID: account,
Checks: types.GuardrailChecks{
ModelAllowlist: types.GuardrailModelAllowlist{Enabled: true, Models: models},
},
}
}
func expectPolicies(mockStore *store.MockStore, account string, policies ...*types.Policy) {
mockStore.EXPECT().
GetAccountAgentNetworkPolicies(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), account).
Return(policies, nil)
}
func expectGuardrails(mockStore *store.MockStore, account string, guardrails ...*types.Guardrail) {
mockStore.EXPECT().
GetAccountAgentNetworkGuardrails(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), account).
Return(guardrails, nil)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_ModelBlockedByAllowlist proves the authoritative allowlist
// decision: a policy authorises the (provider, group) but restricts the model,
// and the requested model isn't on the list, so the request is denied.
func TestSelectPolicy_ModelBlockedByAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"))
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
UserID: "user-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, res.Allow, "a model outside the only applicable policy's allowlist must be denied")
assert.Equal(t, denyCodeModelBlocked, res.DenyCode, "deny code must be model_blocked")
assert.NotEmpty(t, res.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
}
// TestSelectPolicy_ModelAllowedByAllowlist is the allow counterpart: the model
// is on the applicable policy's allowlist, so selection proceeds normally.
func TestSelectPolicy_ModelAllowedByAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o", "claude-opus-4"))
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
UserID: "user-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "a model on the applicable policy's allowlist must be allowed")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_CaseInsensitiveModelMatch proves the compare tolerates case
// and surrounding whitespace, matching the proxy guardrail's normalisation.
func TestSelectPolicy_CaseInsensitiveModelMatch(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", " GPT-4o "))
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "gpt-4o",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "case/whitespace variants must match the allowlist entry")
}
// TestSelectPolicy_UnguardedPolicyIsUnrestricted is the false-deny fix: when two
// policies authorise the same (provider, group) and one has no guardrail, that
// policy makes the request unrestricted — not caught by the other's allowlist.
func TestSelectPolicy_UnguardedPolicyIsUnrestricted(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
restricted := guardedPolicy("pol-restricted", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
open := guardedPolicy("pol-open", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1") // no guardrail
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", restricted, open)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"))
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "an un-guardrailed policy for the same (provider, group) must leave the request unrestricted")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-open", res.SelectedPolicyID, "the unrestricted policy must be the one that pays")
}
// TestSelectPolicy_AllowlistDoesNotLeakAcrossGroups is the false-allow fix: a
// model allowlisted only for grp-b must not be usable by a grp-a caller. The
// selector considers only policies applicable to the caller's groups.
func TestSelectPolicy_AllowlistDoesNotLeakAcrossGroups(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
polA := guardedPolicy("pol-a", "acc-1", []string{"grp-a"}, "prov-1", "g-a")
polB := guardedPolicy("pol-b", "acc-1", []string{"grp-b"}, "prov-1", "g-b")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", polA, polB)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1",
allowlistGuardrail("g-a", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"),
allowlistGuardrail("g-b", "acc-1", "claude-opus-4"),
)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-a"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4", // only allowed for grp-b
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, res.Allow, "grp-b's allowlisted model must not leak to a grp-a caller")
assert.Equal(t, denyCodeModelBlocked, res.DenyCode)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_UndeterminedModelFailsClosed proves the fail-closed contract
// mirrors the proxy: with a restricted applicable policy and an empty model
// (e.g. a path-routed shape the parser couldn't map), the request is denied.
func TestSelectPolicy_UndeterminedModelFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"))
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "", // undetermined
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, res.Allow, "an undetermined model must fail closed against a restricted policy")
assert.Equal(t, denyCodeModelBlocked, res.DenyCode)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_DisabledAllowlistDoesNotRestrict proves a guardrail whose
// model allowlist is disabled imposes no model restriction, even though the
// policy references it.
func TestSelectPolicy_DisabledAllowlistDoesNotRestrict(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
disabled := &types.Guardrail{
ID: "g-1",
AccountID: "acc-1",
Checks: types.GuardrailChecks{
ModelAllowlist: types.GuardrailModelAllowlist{Enabled: false, Models: []string{"gpt-4o"}},
},
}
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", disabled)
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "anything-goes",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "a disabled allowlist must not restrict the model")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_UnionAcrossPolicyGuardrails proves a policy with multiple
// allowlist guardrails permits the union of their models (not just the first).
func TestSelectPolicy_UnionAcrossPolicyGuardrails(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1", "g-2")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1",
allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"),
allowlistGuardrail("g-2", "acc-1", "claude-opus-4"),
)
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4", // only in the second guardrail's list
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "a model in any of the policy's allowlist guardrails must be permitted")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_GuardrailLookupErrorPropagates proves a store failure while
// resolving the candidate policies' guardrails surfaces as an error, not a
// silent allow/deny.
func TestSelectPolicy_GuardrailLookupErrorPropagates(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
mockStore.EXPECT().
GetAccountAgentNetworkGuardrails(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), "acc-1").
Return(nil, errors.New("store unavailable"))
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "gpt-4o",
})
require.Error(t, err, "a guardrail-lookup failure must surface as an error")
assert.Nil(t, res)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_MissingGuardrailReferenceTreatedAsUnrestricted proves a
// policy referencing a guardrail ID absent from the account's set (a stale
// reference) imposes no model restriction — same as no guardrail.
func TestSelectPolicy_MissingGuardrailReferenceTreatedAsUnrestricted(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-missing")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1")
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "anything-goes",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "an orphaned guardrail reference must not restrict the model")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_PartialCandidatesPermittedAfterModelFilter proves the model
// gate narrows candidates before cap scoring: the permitting policy is selected
// even though the blocked one has a larger, more attractive cap.
func TestSelectPolicy_PartialCandidatesPermittedAfterModelFilter(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
polBig := guardedPolicy("pol-big", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-restrict")
polBig.Limits = types.PolicyLimits{
TokenLimit: types.PolicyTokenLimit{Enabled: true, GroupCap: 1_000_000, WindowSeconds: 3600},
}
polSmall := guardedPolicy("pol-small", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-permit")
polSmall.Limits = types.PolicyLimits{
TokenLimit: types.PolicyTokenLimit{Enabled: true, GroupCap: 100, WindowSeconds: 3600},
}
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", polBig, polSmall)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1",
allowlistGuardrail("g-restrict", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"),
allowlistGuardrail("g-permit", "acc-1", "claude-opus-4"),
)
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4", // only pol-small's guardrail permits this
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow)
assert.Equal(t, "pol-small", res.SelectedPolicyID,
"the model filter must exclude pol-big before cap scoring")
}

View File

@@ -235,7 +235,12 @@ func SynthesizeServices(ctx context.Context, s store.Store, accountID string) ([
mergedGuardrails := mergeGuardrails(enabledPolicies, guardrailsByID)
applyAccountCollectionControls(&mergedGuardrails, settings)
guardrailJSON, err := marshalGuardrailConfig(mergedGuardrails)
// The proxy guardrail is a per-provider fail-closed backstop; the
// authoritative per-policy/group decision is management's
// SelectPolicyForRequest. A provider lands in this map only when every
// authorising policy restricts models.
providerAllowlists := buildProviderAllowlists(enabledPolicies, guardrailsByID)
guardrailJSON, err := marshalGuardrailConfig(providerAllowlists, mergedGuardrails.PromptCapture)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -780,10 +785,12 @@ func buildMiddlewareChain(routerCfgJSON, identityInjectJSON, guardrailJSON []byt
// guardrailConfig is the JSON shape the proxy-side llm_guardrail
// middleware expects. Mirrors the proxy registration documented in
// the management→proxy contract.
// the management→proxy contract. provider_allowlists is keyed by the
// resolved provider id llm_router stamps; a provider absent from the map is
// unrestricted at the proxy layer.
type guardrailConfig struct {
ModelAllowlist []string `json:"model_allowlist,omitempty"`
PromptCapture guardrailPromptCapture `json:"prompt_capture"`
ProviderAllowlists map[string][]string `json:"provider_allowlists,omitempty"`
PromptCapture guardrailPromptCapture `json:"prompt_capture"`
}
type guardrailPromptCapture struct {
@@ -828,13 +835,10 @@ func applyAccountCollectionControls(merged *MergedGuardrails, settings *types.Se
merged.PromptCapture.RedactPii = settings.RedactPii || merged.PromptCapture.RedactPii
}
func marshalGuardrailConfig(merged MergedGuardrails) ([]byte, error) {
func marshalGuardrailConfig(providerAllowlists map[string][]string, capture MergedPromptCapture) ([]byte, error) {
cfg := guardrailConfig{
ModelAllowlist: merged.ModelAllowlist,
PromptCapture: guardrailPromptCapture{
Enabled: merged.PromptCapture.Enabled,
RedactPii: merged.PromptCapture.RedactPii,
},
ProviderAllowlists: providerAllowlists,
PromptCapture: guardrailPromptCapture(capture),
}
out, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
if err != nil {
@@ -843,6 +847,74 @@ func marshalGuardrailConfig(merged MergedGuardrails) ([]byte, error) {
return out, nil
}
// buildProviderAllowlists returns the proxy's per-provider backstop: a provider
// is included only when every authorising policy restricts models (their union);
// if any leaves it unrestricted it is omitted, so management decides per group.
func buildProviderAllowlists(policies []*types.Policy, byID map[string]*types.Guardrail) map[string][]string {
type providerAcc struct {
models map[string]struct{}
anyUnrestricted bool
}
accs := make(map[string]*providerAcc)
for _, p := range policies {
if p == nil {
continue
}
restricted, models := policyModelAllowlist(p, byID)
for _, providerID := range p.DestinationProviderIDs {
if providerID == "" {
continue
}
acc, ok := accs[providerID]
if !ok {
acc = &providerAcc{models: make(map[string]struct{})}
accs[providerID] = acc
}
if !restricted {
acc.anyUnrestricted = true
continue
}
for _, m := range models {
acc.models[m] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
out := make(map[string][]string, len(accs))
for providerID, acc := range accs {
if acc.anyUnrestricted {
continue
}
models := make([]string, 0, len(acc.models))
for m := range acc.models {
models = append(models, m)
}
sort.Strings(models)
out[providerID] = models
}
return out
}
// policyModelAllowlist reports whether a policy restricts models (has an
// allowlist-enabled guardrail) and the union of allowed models. Models are
// verbatim; the proxy factory lowercases/trims them at decode time.
func policyModelAllowlist(p *types.Policy, byID map[string]*types.Guardrail) (bool, []string) {
restricted := false
var models []string
for _, gID := range p.GuardrailIDs {
g, ok := byID[gID]
if !ok || g == nil || !g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled {
continue
}
restricted = true
for _, m := range g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models {
if m != "" {
models = append(models, m)
}
}
}
return restricted, models
}
// buildAccountService composes the per-account gateway Service. The
// target carries the noop placeholder URL — the router middleware
// rewrites every request to the matched provider's upstream before the
@@ -986,38 +1058,11 @@ func unionSourceGroups(policies []*types.Policy) []string {
return out
}
// MergedGuardrails is the JSON shape passed to the proxy via the
// guardrail middleware's config_json. Mirrors the proxy-side
// expectations and is intentionally distinct from
// types.GuardrailChecks so we can evolve either side independently.
// MergedGuardrails is the synthesiser's fold target. Only prompt capture is
// merged here — the model allowlist is emitted per-provider, and
// token/budget/retention moved onto Policy.Limits and account Settings.
type MergedGuardrails struct {
ModelAllowlist []string `json:"model_allowlist,omitempty"`
TokenLimits MergedTokenLimits `json:"token_limits"`
Budget MergedBudget `json:"budget"`
PromptCapture MergedPromptCapture `json:"prompt_capture"`
Retention MergedRetention `json:"retention"`
}
type MergedTokenLimits struct {
Hourly *MergedTokenWindow `json:"hourly,omitempty"`
Daily *MergedTokenWindow `json:"daily,omitempty"`
Monthly *MergedTokenWindow `json:"monthly,omitempty"`
}
type MergedTokenWindow struct {
MaxInputTokens int `json:"max_input_tokens,omitempty"`
MaxOutputTokens int `json:"max_output_tokens,omitempty"`
}
type MergedBudget struct {
Hourly *MergedBudgetWindow `json:"hourly,omitempty"`
Daily *MergedBudgetWindow `json:"daily,omitempty"`
Monthly *MergedBudgetWindow `json:"monthly,omitempty"`
}
type MergedBudgetWindow struct {
SoftCapUSD float64 `json:"soft_cap_usd,omitempty"`
HardCapUSD float64 `json:"hard_cap_usd,omitempty"`
PromptCapture MergedPromptCapture
}
type MergedPromptCapture struct {
@@ -1025,64 +1070,31 @@ type MergedPromptCapture struct {
RedactPii bool `json:"redact_pii"`
}
type MergedRetention struct {
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
Days int `json:"days"`
}
// mergeGuardrails computes the effective guardrail spec applied at the
// proxy, given the referencing policies and the account's guardrail
// catalogue. Policy enabled-ness is the caller's responsibility — only
// enabled policies should be passed in.
// mergeGuardrails folds the referencing policies' guardrails into the
// prompt-capture decision only. The model allowlist is enforced per-policy/group
// in management and shipped per-provider; token/budget/retention live off
// guardrails now.
//
// Merge rules:
// - Model allowlist: union of allowlists across policies that enable it.
// - Token / Budget: most-restrictive (min of non-zero caps) per window.
// - Prompt capture: enabled if any policy enables it; redact_pii sticks
// if any enabling policy turns it on.
// - Retention: enabled if any enables it; smallest non-zero days wins.
// Merge rule — prompt capture: enabled if any policy enables it; redact_pii
// sticks if any enabling policy turns it on.
func mergeGuardrails(policies []*types.Policy, byID map[string]*types.Guardrail) MergedGuardrails {
merged := MergedGuardrails{}
allowlist := make(map[string]struct{})
allowlistEnabled := false
for _, policy := range policies {
for _, gID := range policy.GuardrailIDs {
g, ok := byID[gID]
if !ok || g == nil {
continue
}
mergeGuardrail(g, &merged, allowlist, &allowlistEnabled)
mergeGuardrail(g, &merged)
}
}
if allowlistEnabled {
merged.ModelAllowlist = make([]string, 0, len(allowlist))
for m := range allowlist {
merged.ModelAllowlist = append(merged.ModelAllowlist, m)
}
sort.Strings(merged.ModelAllowlist)
}
return merged
}
// mergeGuardrail folds a single guardrail's enabled checks into the
// running merge: model-allowlist models join the shared set (and flip
// allowlistEnabled), and prompt-capture / redact-pii stick once any
// enabling guardrail turns them on.
//
// TokenLimits, Budget, and Retention have moved off guardrails — token
// and budget caps now live on the Policy itself (Policy.Limits) and
// retention moves to account-level Settings — so they are not merged here.
func mergeGuardrail(g *types.Guardrail, merged *MergedGuardrails, allowlist map[string]struct{}, allowlistEnabled *bool) {
if g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled {
*allowlistEnabled = true
for _, m := range g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models {
if m != "" {
allowlist[m] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
// mergeGuardrail folds a single guardrail's prompt-capture settings into the
// running merge: enabled / redact-pii stick once any enabling guardrail turns
// them on.
func mergeGuardrail(g *types.Guardrail, merged *MergedGuardrails) {
if g.Checks.PromptCapture.Enabled {
merged.PromptCapture.Enabled = true
if g.Checks.PromptCapture.RedactPii {

View File

@@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ func TestSynthesizeServices_RealStore_PromptCaptureAccountIsSoleControl(t *testi
require.Len(t, services, 1)
cfg := decodeServiceGuardrailConfig(t, services[0])
assert.Equal(t, []string{"gpt-5.4"}, cfg.ModelAllowlist,
"model allowlist is a pure policy guardrail and must always reach the config")
assert.Equal(t, map[string][]string{"prov-1": {"gpt-5.4"}}, cfg.ProviderAllowlists,
"model allowlist is a pure policy guardrail and must reach the per-provider config")
assert.False(t, cfg.PromptCapture.Enabled,
"prompt capture must be off when the account toggle is off, even with a capture-enabled guardrail")
}
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ func TestSynthesizeServices_RealStore_NoGuardrail_CaptureOff(t *testing.T) {
require.Len(t, services, 1, "exactly one synth service expected")
cfg := decodeServiceGuardrailConfig(t, services[0])
assert.Empty(t, cfg.ModelAllowlist, "no guardrail → no allowlist")
assert.Empty(t, cfg.ProviderAllowlists, "no guardrail → provider unrestricted (absent from map)")
assert.False(t, cfg.PromptCapture.Enabled, "no guardrail → prompt capture off by default")
assert.False(t, cfg.PromptCapture.RedactPii, "no guardrail → redact off by default")
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
package agentnetwork
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
)
// policyForProviders builds an enabled policy authorising the given providers
// under the given guardrails (both optional). Groups are irrelevant to
// buildProviderAllowlists, which keys purely on destination provider.
func policyForProviders(id string, guardrailIDs []string, providerIDs ...string) *types.Policy {
return &types.Policy{
ID: id,
Enabled: true,
DestinationProviderIDs: providerIDs,
GuardrailIDs: guardrailIDs,
}
}
func TestBuildProviderAllowlists(t *testing.T) {
byID := map[string]*types.Guardrail{
"g-4o": allowlistGuardrail("g-4o", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"),
"g-opus": allowlistGuardrail("g-opus", "acc-1", "claude-opus-4"),
"g-disabled": {ID: "g-disabled", Checks: types.GuardrailChecks{ModelAllowlist: types.GuardrailModelAllowlist{Enabled: false, Models: []string{"gpt-4o"}}}},
}
t.Run("all authorising policies restrict yields per-provider union", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-4o"}, "prov-x"),
policyForProviders("p2", []string{"g-opus"}, "prov-x"),
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.Equal(t, map[string][]string{"prov-x": {"claude-opus-4", "gpt-4o"}}, got,
"a provider every policy restricts carries the sorted union of their models")
})
t.Run("any un-guardrailed policy leaves the provider unrestricted (omitted)", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-4o"}, "prov-x"),
policyForProviders("p2", nil, "prov-x"), // no guardrail
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.NotContains(t, got, "prov-x",
"a provider reachable by an un-guardrailed policy must be omitted so the proxy treats it as unrestricted")
})
t.Run("a disabled allowlist counts as unrestricted", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-disabled"}, "prov-x"),
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.NotContains(t, got, "prov-x",
"a policy whose only guardrail has a disabled allowlist is unrestricted")
})
t.Run("providers are isolated from one another", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-4o"}, "prov-x"),
policyForProviders("p2", []string{"g-opus"}, "prov-y"),
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"gpt-4o"}, got["prov-x"], "prov-x keeps only its own model")
assert.Equal(t, []string{"claude-opus-4"}, got["prov-y"], "prov-y keeps only its own model")
})
t.Run("one policy authorising two providers restricts both", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-4o"}, "prov-x", "prov-y"),
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"gpt-4o"}, got["prov-x"])
assert.Equal(t, []string{"gpt-4o"}, got["prov-y"])
})
t.Run("union across a single policy's guardrails", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-4o", "g-opus"}, "prov-x"),
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"claude-opus-4", "gpt-4o"}, got["prov-x"],
"a policy's own multiple allowlist guardrails union together")
})
t.Run("an enabled allowlist with no models denies everything", func(t *testing.T) {
empty := map[string]*types.Guardrail{"g-empty": allowlistGuardrail("g-empty", "acc-1")}
got := buildProviderAllowlists([]*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-empty"}, "prov-x"),
}, empty)
assert.Equal(t, map[string][]string{"prov-x": {}}, got,
"an enabled-but-empty allowlist is restricted with an empty set, not unrestricted")
})
}

View File

@@ -1031,8 +1031,12 @@ func TestSynthesizeServices_GuardrailMerge_AllowlistUnion_LimitsRestrictive(t *t
var cfg guardrailConfig
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(guardrailJSON, &cfg), "guardrail config must unmarshal cleanly")
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"gpt-5.4-mini", "gpt-5.4-pro"}, cfg.ModelAllowlist,
"model allowlist union must keep both models")
// Both policies restrict the same provider, so the per-provider backstop
// carries the union of their models — a coarse gate that management's
// per-policy/group check narrows; it only blocks models outside the union
// when management is down.
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"gpt-5.4-mini", "gpt-5.4-pro"}, cfg.ProviderAllowlists["prov-1"],
"per-provider allowlist union must keep both models")
}
func TestSynthesizeServices_BackfillsMissingSessionKeys(t *testing.T) {

View File

@@ -41,8 +41,24 @@ type AgentNetworkAccessLog struct {
InputTokens int64
OutputTokens int64
TotalTokens int64
CostUSD float64
Stream bool
// Prompt-cache buckets: read + write token counts.
CachedInputTokens int64
CacheCreationTokens int64
// Per-bucket cost breakdown — one column per token bucket the provider
// bills separately. These four are the only cost state stored: the total
// and the cache portion are derived on read (TotalCostUSD / CacheCostUSD)
// rather than stored alongside, so a stored aggregate can never drift out
// of step with the components it summarises.
//
// default:0 matters on upgrade: these columns are ALTER TABLE ADD COLUMN
// on an existing table, and without it every historical row holds NULL —
// which a raw SUM()/scan into float64 can't read. The default backfills
// them as 0, so pre-upgrade rows report an unknown split, not an error.
InputCostUSD float64 `gorm:"not null;default:0"`
CachedInputCostUSD float64 `gorm:"not null;default:0"`
CacheCreationCostUSD float64 `gorm:"not null;default:0"`
OutputCostUSD float64 `gorm:"not null;default:0"`
Stream bool
// Prompt capture. Only populated when prompt collection is enabled
// (account master switch AND policy guardrail). Heavy free text.
@@ -60,19 +76,44 @@ type AgentNetworkAccessLog struct {
// the reverse-proxy AccessLogEntry table.
func (AgentNetworkAccessLog) TableName() string { return "agent_network_access_log" }
// CostUSDSQLExpr is the SQL sum of the per-bucket cost columns — the total cost
// of a row. Used wherever a query has to sort or aggregate on total cost now
// that no cost_usd column is stored. Plain arithmetic over NOT NULL columns, so
// it stays portable across SQLite and Postgres.
const CostUSDSQLExpr = "(input_cost_usd + cached_input_cost_usd + cache_creation_cost_usd + output_cost_usd)"
// TotalCostUSD is the request's total cost: the sum of the four per-bucket
// costs. Derived rather than stored so it cannot disagree with the breakdown.
func (a *AgentNetworkAccessLog) TotalCostUSD() float64 {
return a.InputCostUSD + a.CachedInputCostUSD + a.CacheCreationCostUSD + a.OutputCostUSD
}
// CacheCostUSD is the portion of the total billed for prompt-cache buckets:
// cache reads plus cache writes.
func (a *AgentNetworkAccessLog) CacheCostUSD() float64 {
return a.CachedInputCostUSD + a.CacheCreationCostUSD
}
// ToAPIResponse renders the flattened entry as the API representation.
func (a *AgentNetworkAccessLog) ToAPIResponse() api.AgentNetworkAccessLog {
out := api.AgentNetworkAccessLog{
Id: a.ID,
ServiceId: a.ServiceID,
Timestamp: a.Timestamp,
StatusCode: a.StatusCode,
DurationMs: int(a.Duration.Milliseconds()),
InputTokens: a.InputTokens,
OutputTokens: a.OutputTokens,
TotalTokens: a.TotalTokens,
CostUsd: a.CostUSD,
Stream: &a.Stream,
Id: a.ID,
ServiceId: a.ServiceID,
Timestamp: a.Timestamp,
StatusCode: a.StatusCode,
DurationMs: int(a.Duration.Milliseconds()),
InputTokens: a.InputTokens,
OutputTokens: a.OutputTokens,
TotalTokens: a.TotalTokens,
CachedInputTokens: a.CachedInputTokens,
CacheCreationTokens: a.CacheCreationTokens,
InputCostUsd: a.InputCostUSD,
CachedInputCostUsd: a.CachedInputCostUSD,
CacheCreationCostUsd: a.CacheCreationCostUSD,
OutputCostUsd: a.OutputCostUSD,
CostUsd: a.TotalCostUSD(),
CacheCostUsd: a.CacheCostUSD(),
Stream: &a.Stream,
}
out.UserId = strPtr(a.UserID)
@@ -112,20 +153,36 @@ func strPtr(s string) *string {
// summary plus its ordered entries. Assembled in Go from a page of entries — it
// is not a stored table.
type AgentNetworkAccessLogSession struct {
SessionID string // empty for a session-less (singleton) request
UserID string
GroupIDs []string // union of the entries' authorising groups
StartedAt time.Time
EndedAt time.Time
RequestCount int
InputTokens int64
OutputTokens int64
TotalTokens int64
CostUSD float64
Providers []string // distinct vendors seen in the session
Models []string // distinct models seen in the session
Decision string // "deny" if any entry was denied, else "allow"
Entries []*AgentNetworkAccessLog
SessionID string // empty for a session-less (singleton) request
UserID string
GroupIDs []string // union of the entries' authorising groups
StartedAt time.Time
EndedAt time.Time
RequestCount int
InputTokens int64
OutputTokens int64
TotalTokens int64
CachedInputTokens int64
CacheCreationTokens int64
InputCostUSD float64
CachedInputCostUSD float64
CacheCreationCostUSD float64
OutputCostUSD float64
Providers []string // distinct vendors seen in the session
Models []string // distinct models seen in the session
Decision string // "deny" if any entry was denied, else "allow"
Entries []*AgentNetworkAccessLog
}
// TotalCostUSD is the session's total cost: the sum of the four per-bucket
// costs accumulated across its entries.
func (sess *AgentNetworkAccessLogSession) TotalCostUSD() float64 {
return sess.InputCostUSD + sess.CachedInputCostUSD + sess.CacheCreationCostUSD + sess.OutputCostUSD
}
// CacheCostUSD is the session's prompt-cache spend: cache reads plus writes.
func (sess *AgentNetworkAccessLogSession) CacheCostUSD() float64 {
return sess.CachedInputCostUSD + sess.CacheCreationCostUSD
}
// sessionKey is the grouping key for an entry: its session id, or — when the
@@ -205,7 +262,12 @@ func (sess *AgentNetworkAccessLogSession) foldEntry(sk *sessionSeen, e *AgentNet
sess.InputTokens += e.InputTokens
sess.OutputTokens += e.OutputTokens
sess.TotalTokens += e.TotalTokens
sess.CostUSD += e.CostUSD
sess.CachedInputTokens += e.CachedInputTokens
sess.CacheCreationTokens += e.CacheCreationTokens
sess.InputCostUSD += e.InputCostUSD
sess.CachedInputCostUSD += e.CachedInputCostUSD
sess.CacheCreationCostUSD += e.CacheCreationCostUSD
sess.OutputCostUSD += e.OutputCostUSD
if e.Timestamp.Before(sess.StartedAt) {
sess.StartedAt = e.Timestamp
}
@@ -248,15 +310,22 @@ func (sess *AgentNetworkAccessLogSession) ToAPIResponse() api.AgentNetworkAccess
}
out := api.AgentNetworkAccessLogSession{
StartedAt: sess.StartedAt,
EndedAt: sess.EndedAt,
RequestCount: sess.RequestCount,
InputTokens: sess.InputTokens,
OutputTokens: sess.OutputTokens,
TotalTokens: sess.TotalTokens,
CostUsd: sess.CostUSD,
Decision: sess.Decision,
Entries: entries,
StartedAt: sess.StartedAt,
EndedAt: sess.EndedAt,
RequestCount: sess.RequestCount,
InputTokens: sess.InputTokens,
OutputTokens: sess.OutputTokens,
TotalTokens: sess.TotalTokens,
CachedInputTokens: sess.CachedInputTokens,
CacheCreationTokens: sess.CacheCreationTokens,
InputCostUsd: sess.InputCostUSD,
CachedInputCostUsd: sess.CachedInputCostUSD,
CacheCreationCostUsd: sess.CacheCreationCostUSD,
OutputCostUsd: sess.OutputCostUSD,
CostUsd: sess.TotalCostUSD(),
CacheCostUsd: sess.CacheCostUSD(),
Decision: sess.Decision,
Entries: entries,
}
out.SessionId = strPtr(sess.SessionID)
out.UserId = strPtr(sess.UserID)

View File

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ var accessLogSortFields = map[string]string{
"provider": "provider",
"status_code": "status_code",
"duration": "duration",
"cost_usd": "cost_usd",
"cost_usd": CostUSDSQLExpr,
"total_tokens": "total_tokens",
"user_id": "user_id",
"decision": "decision",
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ var accessLogSortFields = map[string]string{
var sessionSortExprs = map[string]string{ //nolint:gosec // G101 false positive: "total_tokens" sort key, not a credential
"timestamp": "MAX(timestamp)",
"started_at": "MIN(timestamp)",
"cost_usd": "SUM(cost_usd)",
"cost_usd": "SUM" + CostUSDSQLExpr,
"total_tokens": "SUM(total_tokens)",
"duration": "SUM(duration)",
"request_count": "COUNT(*)",

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
package types
import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// costRow builds an access-log entry carrying only a cost breakdown — the rest
// of the row is irrelevant to the summation identities under test.
func costRow(id, session string, ts time.Time, in, cachedIn, cacheCreate, out float64) *AgentNetworkAccessLog {
return &AgentNetworkAccessLog{
ID: id,
SessionID: session,
Timestamp: ts,
InputCostUSD: in,
CachedInputCostUSD: cachedIn,
CacheCreationCostUSD: cacheCreate,
OutputCostUSD: out,
}
}
// TestAPIResponse_CostComponentsSumToAggregates is the contract a client adding
// up an API response depends on: within a single rendered object, the four
// per-bucket fields sum to cost_usd, and the two cache fields sum to
// cache_cost_usd. Uses rates that are not exactly representable in binary
// floating point, so the identity is checked against real arithmetic rather
// than round numbers.
func TestAPIResponse_CostComponentsSumToAggregates(t *testing.T) {
row := costRow("r1", "s1", time.Now(), 0.000768, 0.0002304, 0.00192, 0.003)
api := row.ToAPIResponse()
assert.InDelta(t, api.InputCostUsd+api.CachedInputCostUsd+api.CacheCreationCostUsd+api.OutputCostUsd,
api.CostUsd, 1e-12, "rendered buckets must sum to the rendered cost_usd")
assert.InDelta(t, api.CachedInputCostUsd+api.CacheCreationCostUsd, api.CacheCostUsd, 1e-12,
"rendered cache buckets must sum to the rendered cache_cost_usd")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0059184, api.CostUsd, 1e-12, "total is the exact sum, not a separately rounded figure")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0021504, api.CacheCostUsd, 1e-12, "cache cost is the exact sum of the two cache buckets")
}
// TestSessionSummary_SumsMatchSummedEntries proves a session summary equals the
// sum of the entries it renders: a client that adds up the entries itself must
// land on the same number the summary reports, per bucket and in total.
func TestSessionSummary_SumsMatchSummedEntries(t *testing.T) {
base := time.Date(2026, 5, 5, 10, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
entries := []*AgentNetworkAccessLog{
costRow("r1", "s1", base, 0.000768, 0.0002304, 0.00192, 0.003),
costRow("r2", "s1", base.Add(time.Minute), 0.000625, 0.0009375, 0, 0.005),
costRow("r3", "s1", base.Add(2*time.Minute), 0.0000016, 0, 0, 0.0000032),
}
sessions := FoldAccessLogSessions([]string{"s1"}, entries)
require.Len(t, sessions, 1)
sess := sessions[0].ToAPIResponse()
var wantInput, wantCachedInput, wantCacheCreation, wantOutput float64
for _, e := range entries {
wantInput += e.InputCostUSD
wantCachedInput += e.CachedInputCostUSD
wantCacheCreation += e.CacheCreationCostUSD
wantOutput += e.OutputCostUSD
}
assert.InDelta(t, wantInput, sess.InputCostUsd, 1e-12, "session input cost is the sum of its entries")
assert.InDelta(t, wantCachedInput, sess.CachedInputCostUsd, 1e-12, "session cache-read cost is the sum of its entries")
assert.InDelta(t, wantCacheCreation, sess.CacheCreationCostUsd, 1e-12, "session cache-write cost is the sum of its entries")
assert.InDelta(t, wantOutput, sess.OutputCostUsd, 1e-12, "session output cost is the sum of its entries")
assert.InDelta(t, wantInput+wantCachedInput+wantCacheCreation+wantOutput, sess.CostUsd, 1e-12,
"session total equals the summed entry buckets")
// Summing the rendered entries must give the same answer as reading the
// summary — the property a UI relies on when it totals a table itself.
var fromEntries float64
for _, e := range sess.Entries {
fromEntries += e.CostUsd
}
assert.InDelta(t, sess.CostUsd, fromEntries, 1e-12, "summary total must match the summed rendered entries")
// The sub-microdollar row must still contribute; it would vanish under
// 6-decimal quantisation.
assert.Greater(t, sess.InputCostUsd, 0.001393, "small-cost rows must not be quantised away")
}
// TestUsageBuckets_SumsMatchSummedRows proves the same identity one level up:
// a usage bucket equals the sum of the ledger rows folded into it, and the
// buckets together equal the whole range.
func TestUsageBuckets_SumsMatchSummedRows(t *testing.T) {
day1 := time.Date(2026, 5, 5, 9, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
day2 := time.Date(2026, 5, 6, 9, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
rows := []*AgentNetworkUsage{
{ID: "u1", Timestamp: day1, InputCostUSD: 0.000768, CachedInputCostUSD: 0.0002304, CacheCreationCostUSD: 0.00192, OutputCostUSD: 0.003},
{ID: "u2", Timestamp: day1.Add(time.Hour), InputCostUSD: 0.000625, CachedInputCostUSD: 0.0009375, OutputCostUSD: 0.005},
{ID: "u3", Timestamp: day2, InputCostUSD: 0.0000016, OutputCostUSD: 0.0000032},
}
buckets := AggregateUsageByGranularity(rows, UsageGranularityDay)
require.Len(t, buckets, 2, "two distinct days expected")
var total, cache float64
for _, b := range buckets {
api := b.ToAPIResponse()
assert.InDelta(t, api.InputCostUsd+api.CachedInputCostUsd+api.CacheCreationCostUsd+api.OutputCostUsd,
api.CostUsd, 1e-12, "each bucket's components must sum to its cost_usd")
total += api.CostUsd
cache += api.CacheCostUsd
}
var wantTotal, wantCache float64
for _, r := range rows {
wantTotal += r.TotalCostUSD()
wantCache += r.CacheCostUSD()
}
assert.InDelta(t, wantTotal, total, 1e-12, "buckets must sum to the total across all ledger rows")
assert.InDelta(t, wantCache, cache, 1e-12, "buckets must sum to the cache spend across all ledger rows")
// A month bucket over the same rows must total identically — regrouping
// changes the partition, never the sum.
monthly := AggregateUsageByGranularity(rows, UsageGranularityMonth)
require.Len(t, monthly, 1)
assert.InDelta(t, wantTotal, monthly[0].ToAPIResponse().CostUsd, 1e-12,
"re-bucketing at a different granularity must preserve the total")
}

View File

@@ -25,8 +25,19 @@ type AgentNetworkUsage struct {
InputTokens int64
OutputTokens int64
TotalTokens int64
CostUSD float64
CreatedAt time.Time
// Prompt-cache buckets: read + write token counts.
CachedInputTokens int64
CacheCreationTokens int64
// Per-bucket cost breakdown, mirroring AgentNetworkAccessLog — the only
// cost state stored; total and cache portion are derived on read. Kept on
// the usage ledger too so spend can be attributed per bucket even for
// accounts with log collection turned off. See AgentNetworkAccessLog for
// why the columns carry a zero default.
InputCostUSD float64 `gorm:"not null;default:0"`
CachedInputCostUSD float64 `gorm:"not null;default:0"`
CacheCreationCostUSD float64 `gorm:"not null;default:0"`
OutputCostUSD float64 `gorm:"not null;default:0"`
CreatedAt time.Time
}
// TableName keeps usage records in their own stripped table. Named
@@ -34,6 +45,17 @@ type AgentNetworkUsage struct {
// agent_network_usage table in a shared database.
func (AgentNetworkUsage) TableName() string { return "agent_network_request_usage" }
// TotalCostUSD is the request's total cost: the sum of the four per-bucket
// costs. Derived rather than stored so it cannot disagree with the breakdown.
func (u *AgentNetworkUsage) TotalCostUSD() float64 {
return u.InputCostUSD + u.CachedInputCostUSD + u.CacheCreationCostUSD + u.OutputCostUSD
}
// CacheCostUSD is the portion of the total billed for prompt-cache buckets.
func (u *AgentNetworkUsage) CacheCostUSD() float64 {
return u.CachedInputCostUSD + u.CacheCreationCostUSD
}
// AgentNetworkUsageGroup is the normalised many-to-many row linking a usage
// record to one authorising group, mirroring AgentNetworkAccessLogGroup so the
// usage overview can filter by group with a `group_id IN (...)` join.

View File

@@ -33,21 +33,45 @@ func ParseUsageGranularity(s string) UsageGranularity {
// AgentNetworkUsageBucket is one aggregated usage time bucket. PeriodStart is
// the UTC start of the bucket as YYYY-MM-DD.
type AgentNetworkUsageBucket struct {
PeriodStart string
InputTokens int64
OutputTokens int64
TotalTokens int64
CostUSD float64
PeriodStart string
InputTokens int64
OutputTokens int64
TotalTokens int64
CachedInputTokens int64
CacheCreationTokens int64
InputCostUSD float64
CachedInputCostUSD float64
CacheCreationCostUSD float64
OutputCostUSD float64
}
// TotalCostUSD is the bucket's total spend: the sum of the four per-bucket
// costs. Derived rather than accumulated separately so it cannot disagree with
// the components.
func (b *AgentNetworkUsageBucket) TotalCostUSD() float64 {
return b.InputCostUSD + b.CachedInputCostUSD + b.CacheCreationCostUSD + b.OutputCostUSD
}
// CacheCostUSD is the bucket's prompt-cache spend: cache reads plus writes.
func (b *AgentNetworkUsageBucket) CacheCostUSD() float64 {
return b.CachedInputCostUSD + b.CacheCreationCostUSD
}
// ToAPIResponse renders the bucket as the API representation.
func (b *AgentNetworkUsageBucket) ToAPIResponse() api.AgentNetworkUsageBucket {
return api.AgentNetworkUsageBucket{
PeriodStart: b.PeriodStart,
InputTokens: b.InputTokens,
OutputTokens: b.OutputTokens,
TotalTokens: b.TotalTokens,
CostUsd: b.CostUSD,
PeriodStart: b.PeriodStart,
InputTokens: b.InputTokens,
OutputTokens: b.OutputTokens,
TotalTokens: b.TotalTokens,
CachedInputTokens: b.CachedInputTokens,
CacheCreationTokens: b.CacheCreationTokens,
InputCostUsd: b.InputCostUSD,
CachedInputCostUsd: b.CachedInputCostUSD,
CacheCreationCostUsd: b.CacheCreationCostUSD,
OutputCostUsd: b.OutputCostUSD,
CostUsd: b.TotalCostUSD(),
CacheCostUsd: b.CacheCostUSD(),
}
}
@@ -84,7 +108,12 @@ func AggregateUsageByGranularity(rows []*AgentNetworkUsage, g UsageGranularity)
b.InputTokens += r.InputTokens
b.OutputTokens += r.OutputTokens
b.TotalTokens += r.TotalTokens
b.CostUSD += r.CostUSD
b.CachedInputTokens += r.CachedInputTokens
b.CacheCreationTokens += r.CacheCreationTokens
b.InputCostUSD += r.InputCostUSD
b.CachedInputCostUSD += r.CachedInputCostUSD
b.CacheCreationCostUSD += r.CacheCreationCostUSD
b.OutputCostUSD += r.OutputCostUSD
}
out := make([]*AgentNetworkUsageBucket, 0, len(byPeriod))