[management, proxy] scope agent-network model allowlist per policy/group and provider (#6905)

## Describe your changes

The model-allowlist guardrail was merged into one account-wide union and
enforced flat on every request, ignoring which policy/group/provider
authorised it. With multiple policies — especially a mix of guardrailed
and un-guardrailed ones — this caused:

- **false-allow**: a model allowlisted for one group/provider leaked to
any caller; and
- **false-deny**: an un-guardrailed policy (intended unrestricted) was
blocked by another policy's allowlist.

Enforcement is now policy/group-aware, mirroring `llm_limit_check`:

- **Management (`SelectPolicyForRequest`) is authoritative.** It uses
the request model (already carried in
`CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest.model`, previously ignored) to keep only
applicable policies whose guardrails permit the model; no
allowlist-enabled guardrail = unrestricted. Denies
`llm_policy.model_blocked` when policies govern the (provider, groups)
but none permits the model.
- **Proxy `llm_guardrail` becomes a per-provider fail-closed backstop.**
The synthesiser emits an allowlist only for providers every authorising
policy restricts; the middleware keys off the resolved provider id and
keeps unknown-model fail-closed.
This commit is contained in:
Maycon Santos
2026-07-27 20:43:59 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 9b4a5df925
commit bab5572a74
25 changed files with 2148 additions and 154 deletions
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ no mocks. Tests: `TestChain_AllowPath_StampsAttributionAndRecordsCounter`
| `llm_router` | `{providers: [{id, models, upstream_scheme, upstream_host, upstream_path?, auth_header_name, auth_header_value, allowed_group_ids}]}` |
| `llm_limit_check` | `{}` — pulls `MgmtClient` from `FactoryContext` |
| `llm_identity_inject` | `{providers: [{provider_id, header_pair?|json_metadata?, extra_headers?}]}` |
| `llm_guardrail` | `{model_allowlist: []string, prompt_capture: {enabled, redact_pii}}` |
| `llm_guardrail` | `{provider_allowlists: {providerID: []string}, prompt_capture: {enabled, redact_pii}}` — allowlist keyed by resolved provider id; a provider absent from the map is unrestricted (fail-closed backstop; authoritative per-policy/group check is management's `CheckLLMPolicyLimits`) |
| `llm_response_parser` | `{redact_pii?, capture_completion?: *bool}` |
| `cost_meter` | `{pricing_path?}` (basename inside data-dir; defaults `pricing.yaml`) |
| `llm_limit_record` | `{}` — same pattern as `llm_limit_check` |