Merge branch 'main' into worktree-accept-ra-forwarding

client/internal/acl/manager.go

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
+	"github.com/mitchellh/hashstructure/v2"
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
 	nberrors "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/errors"
@@ -30,11 +31,13 @@ type Manager interface {
 
 // DefaultManager uses firewall manager to handle
 type DefaultManager struct {
-	firewall       firewall.Manager
-	ipsetCounter   int
-	peerRulesPairs map[id.RuleID][]firewall.Rule
-	routeRules     map[id.RuleID]struct{}
-	mutex          sync.Mutex
+	firewall           firewall.Manager
+	ipsetCounter       int
+	peerRulesPairs     map[id.RuleID][]firewall.Rule
+	routeRules         map[id.RuleID]struct{}
+	previousConfigHash uint64
+	hasAppliedConfig   bool
+	mutex              sync.Mutex
 }
 
 func NewDefaultManager(fm firewall.Manager) *DefaultManager {
@@ -57,6 +60,23 @@ func (d *DefaultManager) ApplyFiltering(networkMap *mgmProto.NetworkMap, dnsRout
 		return
 	}
 
+	// Skip the full rebuild + flush when the inputs that drive the firewall
+	// state are byte-for-byte identical to the last successfully applied
+	// update. Management re-sends the same network map far more often than it
+	// actually changes (account-wide updates, peer meta churn), and rebuilding
+	// every peer/route ACL and flushing the firewall on every such sync is the
+	// dominant client-side cost when nothing changed. Mirrors the same guard the
+	// DNS server already uses (previousConfigHash). Only the fields ApplyFiltering
+	// consumes participate in the hash, so an unrelated map change cannot mask a
+	// real ACL change.
+	hash, err := d.firewallConfigHash(networkMap, dnsRouteFeatureFlag)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Errorf("unable to hash firewall configuration, applying unconditionally: %v", err)
+	} else if d.hasAppliedConfig && d.previousConfigHash == hash {
+		log.Debugf("not applying the firewall configuration update as there is nothing new (hash: %d)", hash)
+		return
+	}
+
 	start := time.Now()
 	defer func() {
 		total := 0
@@ -70,13 +90,49 @@ func (d *DefaultManager) ApplyFiltering(networkMap *mgmProto.NetworkMap, dnsRout
 
 	d.applyPeerACLs(networkMap)
 
-	if err := d.applyRouteACLs(networkMap.RoutesFirewallRules, dnsRouteFeatureFlag); err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("Failed to apply route ACLs: %v", err)
+	routeErr := d.applyRouteACLs(networkMap.RoutesFirewallRules, dnsRouteFeatureFlag)
+	if routeErr != nil {
+		log.Errorf("Failed to apply route ACLs: %v", routeErr)
 	}
 
-	if err := d.firewall.Flush(); err != nil {
-		log.Error("failed to flush firewall rules: ", err)
+	flushErr := d.firewall.Flush()
+	if flushErr != nil {
+		log.Error("failed to flush firewall rules: ", flushErr)
 	}
+
+	// Only remember the hash once the firewall actually reflects this config.
+	// If applying or flushing failed, leave the previous hash untouched so the
+	// next (possibly identical) update is not skipped and gets a chance to
+	// reconcile the firewall state.
+	if err == nil && routeErr == nil && flushErr == nil {
+		d.previousConfigHash = hash
+		d.hasAppliedConfig = true
+	} else {
+		d.hasAppliedConfig = false
+	}
+}
+
+// firewallConfigHash hashes exactly the inputs ApplyFiltering uses to build the
+// firewall state, so an identical hash means an identical resulting ruleset.
+func (d *DefaultManager) firewallConfigHash(networkMap *mgmProto.NetworkMap, dnsRouteFeatureFlag bool) (uint64, error) {
+	return hashstructure.Hash(struct {
+		PeerRules            []*mgmProto.FirewallRule
+		PeerRulesIsEmpty     bool
+		RouteRules           []*mgmProto.RouteFirewallRule
+		RouteRulesIsEmpty    bool
+		DNSRouteFeatureFlag  bool
+	}{
+		PeerRules:           networkMap.GetFirewallRules(),
+		PeerRulesIsEmpty:    networkMap.GetFirewallRulesIsEmpty(),
+		RouteRules:          networkMap.GetRoutesFirewallRules(),
+		RouteRulesIsEmpty:   networkMap.GetRoutesFirewallRulesIsEmpty(),
+		DNSRouteFeatureFlag: dnsRouteFeatureFlag,
+	}, hashstructure.FormatV2, &hashstructure.HashOptions{
+		ZeroNil:         true,
+		IgnoreZeroValue: true,
+		SlicesAsSets:    true,
+		UseStringer:     true,
+	})
 }
 
 func (d *DefaultManager) applyPeerACLs(networkMap *mgmProto.NetworkMap) {

client/internal/acl/manager_test.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package acl
 
 import (
+	"fmt"
 	"net/netip"
 	"testing"
 
@@ -485,3 +486,149 @@ func TestPortInfoEmpty(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+// TestApplyFilteringSkipsUnchangedConfig verifies that an identical network map
+// re-applied is recognized as a no-op (hash unchanged), while a real change to
+// any firewall-relevant input forces a re-apply (hash changes). This is the
+// guard that prevents a full ruleset rebuild + flush on every redundant sync.
+func TestApplyFilteringSkipsUnchangedConfig(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("NB_WG_KERNEL_DISABLED", "true")
+	t.Setenv(firewall.EnvForceUserspaceFirewall, "true")
+
+	ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
+	defer ctrl.Finish()
+
+	ifaceMock := mocks.NewMockIFaceMapper(ctrl)
+	ifaceMock.EXPECT().IsUserspaceBind().Return(true).AnyTimes()
+	ifaceMock.EXPECT().SetFilter(gomock.Any())
+	network := netip.MustParsePrefix("172.0.0.1/32")
+	ifaceMock.EXPECT().Name().Return("lo").AnyTimes()
+	ifaceMock.EXPECT().Address().Return(wgaddr.Address{
+		IP:      network.Addr(),
+		Network: network,
+	}).AnyTimes()
+	ifaceMock.EXPECT().GetWGDevice().Return(nil).AnyTimes()
+
+	fw, err := firewall.NewFirewall(ifaceMock, nil, flowLogger, false, iface.DefaultMTU)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defer func() {
+		require.NoError(t, fw.Close(nil))
+	}()
+
+	acl := NewDefaultManager(fw)
+
+	networkMap := &mgmProto.NetworkMap{
+		FirewallRules: []*mgmProto.FirewallRule{
+			{
+				PeerIP:    "10.93.0.1",
+				Direction: mgmProto.RuleDirection_IN,
+				Action:    mgmProto.RuleAction_ACCEPT,
+				Protocol:  mgmProto.RuleProtocol_TCP,
+				Port:      "22",
+			},
+		},
+		FirewallRulesIsEmpty: false,
+	}
+
+	acl.ApplyFiltering(networkMap, false)
+	require.True(t, acl.hasAppliedConfig, "config should be marked applied after first apply")
+	firstHash := acl.previousConfigHash
+	require.NotZero(t, firstHash)
+
+	// Re-applying the identical map must not change the recorded hash: the
+	// expensive rebuild path was skipped.
+	acl.ApplyFiltering(networkMap, false)
+	assert.Equal(t, firstHash, acl.previousConfigHash,
+		"identical re-apply must be a no-op (hash unchanged)")
+
+	// A real change must produce a different hash and re-apply.
+	networkMap.FirewallRules[0].Action = mgmProto.RuleAction_DROP
+	acl.ApplyFiltering(networkMap, false)
+	assert.NotEqual(t, firstHash, acl.previousConfigHash,
+		"changing a rule's action must force a re-apply (hash changed)")
+
+	// The dnsRouteFeatureFlag also participates in the hash.
+	changedHash := acl.previousConfigHash
+	acl.ApplyFiltering(networkMap, true)
+	assert.NotEqual(t, changedHash, acl.previousConfigHash,
+		"flipping dnsRouteFeatureFlag must force a re-apply (hash changed)")
+}
+
+func buildNetworkMap(peerRules, routeRules int) *mgmProto.NetworkMap {
+	nm := &mgmProto.NetworkMap{
+		FirewallRulesIsEmpty:      peerRules == 0,
+		RoutesFirewallRulesIsEmpty: routeRules == 0,
+	}
+	for i := range peerRules {
+		nm.FirewallRules = append(nm.FirewallRules, &mgmProto.FirewallRule{
+			PeerIP:    fmt.Sprintf("10.%d.%d.%d", i>>16&0xff, i>>8&0xff, i&0xff),
+			Direction: mgmProto.RuleDirection_IN,
+			Action:    mgmProto.RuleAction_ACCEPT,
+			Protocol:  mgmProto.RuleProtocol_TCP,
+			Port:      fmt.Sprintf("%d", 1024+i%64511),
+		})
+	}
+	for i := range routeRules {
+		nm.RoutesFirewallRules = append(nm.RoutesFirewallRules, &mgmProto.RouteFirewallRule{
+			Destination:  fmt.Sprintf("192.168.%d.0/24", i%256),
+			SourceRanges: []string{fmt.Sprintf("10.0.%d.0/24", i%256)},
+			Action:       mgmProto.RuleAction_ACCEPT,
+			Protocol:     mgmProto.RuleProtocol_ALL,
+		})
+	}
+	return nm
+}
+
+func BenchmarkFirewallConfigHash_Small(b *testing.B) {
+	d := &DefaultManager{}
+	nm := buildNetworkMap(10, 5)
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for b.Loop() {
+		_, _ = d.firewallConfigHash(nm, false)
+	}
+}
+
+func BenchmarkFirewallConfigHash_Medium(b *testing.B) {
+	d := &DefaultManager{}
+	nm := buildNetworkMap(100, 50)
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for b.Loop() {
+		_, _ = d.firewallConfigHash(nm, false)
+	}
+}
+
+func BenchmarkFirewallConfigHash_Large(b *testing.B) {
+	d := &DefaultManager{}
+	nm := buildNetworkMap(1000, 200)
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for b.Loop() {
+		_, _ = d.firewallConfigHash(nm, false)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestFirewallConfigHashDeterministic verifies the hash is stable for equal
+// inputs and order-independent for the rule slices (management does not
+// guarantee rule order).
+func TestFirewallConfigHashDeterministic(t *testing.T) {
+	d := &DefaultManager{}
+
+	nm1 := &mgmProto.NetworkMap{
+		FirewallRules: []*mgmProto.FirewallRule{
+			{PeerIP: "10.0.0.1", Direction: mgmProto.RuleDirection_IN, Action: mgmProto.RuleAction_ACCEPT, Protocol: mgmProto.RuleProtocol_TCP, Port: "22"},
+			{PeerIP: "10.0.0.2", Direction: mgmProto.RuleDirection_IN, Action: mgmProto.RuleAction_DROP, Protocol: mgmProto.RuleProtocol_TCP, Port: "80"},
+		},
+	}
+	// Same rules, reversed order.
+	nm2 := &mgmProto.NetworkMap{
+		FirewallRules: []*mgmProto.FirewallRule{
+			nm1.FirewallRules[1],
+			nm1.FirewallRules[0],
+		},
+	}
+
+	h1, err := d.firewallConfigHash(nm1, false)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	h2, err := d.firewallConfigHash(nm2, false)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, h1, h2, "hash must be order-independent for rule slices")
+}

client/internal/auth/auth.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package auth
 import (
 	"context"
 	"net/url"
+	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 
@@ -21,6 +22,25 @@ import (
 	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
 )
 
+// peerLoginExpiredMsg is the exact phrase the management server returns
+// when a previously SSO-enrolled peer's login has expired. Sourced from
+// shared/management/status/error.go (NewPeerLoginExpiredError). Matched
+// by substring so a future server-side rewording that keeps the phrase
+// still triggers the friendly fallback in Login().
+const peerLoginExpiredMsg = "peer login has expired"
+
+// errSetupKeyOnSSOExpiredPeer replaces the raw management error when the
+// user runs `netbird login -k <setup-key>` against a peer that was
+// originally enrolled via SSO. Wrapped in a PermissionDenied gRPC status
+// so callers' existing isPermissionDenied / isAuthError checks still
+// classify it correctly (early-exit from retry backoff, StatusNeedsLogin
+// in the server state machine).
+var errSetupKeyOnSSOExpiredPeer = status.Error(
+	codes.PermissionDenied,
+	"this peer was originally enrolled via SSO and its session has expired. "+
+		"Setup keys can only enrol new peers — run `netbird up` (interactive SSO) to re-login.",
+)
+
 // Auth manages authentication operations with the management server
 // It maintains a long-lived connection and automatically handles reconnection with backoff
 type Auth struct {
@@ -184,6 +204,15 @@ func (a *Auth) Login(ctx context.Context, setupKey string, jwtToken string) (err
 			log.Debugf("peer registration required")
 			_, err = a.registerPeer(client, ctx, setupKey, jwtToken, pubSSHKey)
 			if err != nil {
+				// The peer pub-key is already on file with the management
+				// server (originally enrolled via SSO) and the session has
+				// expired. The setup-key path can only enrol new peers, so
+				// retrying with -k will keep failing. Replace the raw mgm
+				// message with an actionable hint that tells the user to
+				// re-authenticate via SSO instead.
+				if setupKey != "" && jwtToken == "" && isPeerLoginExpired(err) {
+					err = errSetupKeyOnSSOExpiredPeer
+				}
 				isAuthError = isPermissionDenied(err)
 				return err
 			}
@@ -322,7 +351,7 @@ func (a *Auth) setSystemInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
 		a.config.BlockLANAccess,
 		a.config.BlockInbound,
 		a.config.DisableIPv6,
-		a.config.LazyConnectionEnabled,
+		a.config.SyncMessageVersion,
 		a.config.EnableSSHRoot,
 		a.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
 		a.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,
@@ -474,3 +503,16 @@ func isLoginNeeded(err error) bool {
 func isRegistrationNeeded(err error) bool {
 	return isPermissionDenied(err)
 }
+
+// isPeerLoginExpired reports whether err is the management server's
+// "peer login has expired" PermissionDenied response. Used by Login to
+// detect the case where the caller passed a setup-key but the peer is
+// actually an SSO-enrolled record whose session needs refreshing — the
+// setup-key path cannot help there.
+func isPeerLoginExpired(err error) bool {
+	if !isPermissionDenied(err) {
+		return false
+	}
+	s, _ := status.FromError(err)
+	return strings.Contains(s.Message(), peerLoginExpiredMsg)
+}

client/internal/auth/auth_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
+)
+
+func TestIsPeerLoginExpired(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name string
+		err  error
+		want bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "nil",
+			err:  nil,
+			want: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "plain error (not a gRPC status)",
+			err:  errors.New("network read: connection reset"),
+			want: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "PermissionDenied with different message",
+			err:  status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "user is blocked"),
+			want: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "Unauthenticated with the expected phrase",
+			// Wrong status code — must still return false.
+			err:  status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "peer login has expired, please log in once more"),
+			want: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "exact server message",
+			err:  status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "peer login has expired, please log in once more"),
+			want: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "phrase as substring",
+			// Future-proofing: if mgm reworords but keeps the phrase,
+			// the friendly fallback must still kick in.
+			err:  status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "session refused: peer login has expired (account=foo)"),
+			want: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			if got := isPeerLoginExpired(tc.err); got != tc.want {
+				t.Fatalf("isPeerLoginExpired(%v) = %v, want %v", tc.err, got, tc.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestErrSetupKeyOnSSOExpiredPeer(t *testing.T) {
+	// Sentinel must surface as PermissionDenied so the upstream
+	// isPermissionDenied / isAuthError checks classify it correctly
+	// (short-circuit retry backoff, set StatusNeedsLogin).
+	if !isPermissionDenied(errSetupKeyOnSSOExpiredPeer) {
+		t.Fatalf("errSetupKeyOnSSOExpiredPeer must be a PermissionDenied gRPC error")
+	}
+
+	// Message must actually mention SSO and `netbird up` so it is
+	// actionable for the end user. Loose substring checks keep the
+	// test resilient to copy edits.
+	s, _ := status.FromError(errSetupKeyOnSSOExpiredPeer)
+	msg := strings.ToLower(s.Message())
+	for _, want := range []string{"sso", "netbird up"} {
+		if !strings.Contains(msg, want) {
+			t.Errorf("sentinel message should contain %q, got %q", want, s.Message())
+		}
+	}
+}

client/internal/auth/device_flow.go

@@ -259,12 +259,18 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
 	ticker := time.NewTicker(interval)
 	defer ticker.Stop()
 
+	log.Infof("device flow: waiting for user authorization, polling token endpoint every %s, code expires in %s", interval, timeout)
+
+	start := time.Now()
+	polls := 0
+
 	for {
 		select {
 		case <-waitCtx.Done():
 			return TokenInfo{}, waitCtx.Err()
 		case <-ticker.C:
 
+			polls++
 			tokenResponse, err := d.requestToken(info)
 			if err != nil {
 				return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("parsing token response failed with error: %v", err)
@@ -272,10 +278,12 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
 
 			if tokenResponse.Error != "" {
 				if tokenResponse.Error == "authorization_pending" {
+					log.Tracef("device flow: authorization still pending after poll %d", polls)
 					continue
 				} else if tokenResponse.Error == "slow_down" {
 					interval += (3 * time.Second)
 					ticker.Reset(interval)
+					log.Infof("device flow: IdP requested slow_down, polling interval increased to %s", interval)
 					continue
 				}
 
@@ -291,11 +299,12 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
 				UseIDToken:   d.providerConfig.UseIDToken,
 			}
 
-			err = isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
+			err = validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
 			if err != nil {
 				return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("validate access token failed with error: %v", err)
 			}
 
+			log.Infof("device flow: user authorization confirmed after %d polls in %s", polls, time.Since(start).Round(time.Second))
 			return tokenInfo, err
 		}
 	}

client/internal/auth/pending_flow.go

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// PendingFlow stores an in-progress OAuth flow between the RPC that
+// initiates it (returns the verification URI to the UI) and the RPC
+// that waits for the user to complete it. The flow handle, the
+// device-code info, and the absolute expiry are kept together so the
+// waiting RPC can validate the device code and reuse the same flow.
+//
+// PendingFlow is safe for concurrent use; callers must not access the
+// stored fields directly.
+type PendingFlow struct {
+	mu         sync.Mutex
+	flow       OAuthFlow
+	info       AuthFlowInfo
+	expiresAt  time.Time
+	waitCancel context.CancelFunc
+}
+
+// NewPendingFlow returns an empty PendingFlow ready to be populated by Set.
+func NewPendingFlow() *PendingFlow {
+	return &PendingFlow{}
+}
+
+// Set stores the flow and its authorization info, computing the absolute
+// expiry from info.ExpiresIn (seconds, as returned by the IdP).
+func (p *PendingFlow) Set(flow OAuthFlow, info AuthFlowInfo) {
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	defer p.mu.Unlock()
+	p.flow = flow
+	p.info = info
+	p.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(time.Duration(info.ExpiresIn) * time.Second)
+}
+
+// Get returns the stored flow, info, and whether a flow is currently
+// pending. Returns (nil, zero, false) after Clear or before Set.
+func (p *PendingFlow) Get() (OAuthFlow, AuthFlowInfo, bool) {
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	defer p.mu.Unlock()
+	if p.flow == nil {
+		return nil, AuthFlowInfo{}, false
+	}
+	return p.flow, p.info, true
+}
+
+// ExpiresAt returns the absolute expiry of the pending flow. Returns
+// the zero time when no flow is pending.
+func (p *PendingFlow) ExpiresAt() time.Time {
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	defer p.mu.Unlock()
+	return p.expiresAt
+}
+
+// SetWaitCancel records the cancel function for the goroutine currently
+// blocked in WaitToken so a new RequestAuth can preempt it.
+func (p *PendingFlow) SetWaitCancel(cancel context.CancelFunc) {
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	defer p.mu.Unlock()
+	p.waitCancel = cancel
+}
+
+// CancelWait invokes and clears the stored wait-cancel, if any. Safe to
+// call when no wait is in progress.
+func (p *PendingFlow) CancelWait() {
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	cancel := p.waitCancel
+	p.waitCancel = nil
+	p.mu.Unlock()
+	if cancel != nil {
+		cancel()
+	}
+}
+
+// Clear resets the pending flow to empty. Any stored wait-cancel is
+// dropped without being invoked — call CancelWait first if the waiting
+// goroutine must be stopped.
+func (p *PendingFlow) Clear() {
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	defer p.mu.Unlock()
+	p.flow = nil
+	p.info = AuthFlowInfo{}
+	p.expiresAt = time.Time{}
+	p.waitCancel = nil
+}

client/internal/auth/pkce_flow.go

@@ -188,6 +188,8 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowInfo
 	waitCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, timeout)
 	defer cancel()
 
+	log.Infof("pkce flow: waiting for authorization callback on %s, timeout %s", p.oAuthConfig.RedirectURL, timeout)
+
 	tokenChan := make(chan *oauth2.Token, 1)
 	errChan := make(chan error, 1)
 
@@ -221,6 +223,7 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowInfo
 func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) startServer(server *http.Server, tokenChan chan<- *oauth2.Token, errChan chan<- error) {
 	mux := http.NewServeMux()
 	mux.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		log.Infof("pkce flow: received authorization callback from IdP")
 		cert := p.providerConfig.ClientCertPair
 		if cert != nil {
 			tr := &http.Transport{
@@ -271,11 +274,18 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) handleRequest(req *http.Request) (*oauth2.Token,
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("authentication failed: missing code")
 	}
 
-	return p.oAuthConfig.Exchange(
+	exchangeStart := time.Now()
+	token, err := p.oAuthConfig.Exchange(
 		req.Context(),
 		code,
 		oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", p.codeVerifier),
 	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	log.Infof("pkce flow: authorization code exchanged for token in %s", time.Since(exchangeStart).Round(time.Millisecond))
+	return token, nil
 }
 
 func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo, error) {
@@ -296,7 +306,7 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
 		audience = p.providerConfig.ClientID
 	}
 
-	if err := isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
+	if err := validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
 		return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("authentication failed: invalid access token - %w", err)
 	}
 
@@ -310,6 +320,11 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
 	return tokenInfo, nil
 }
 
+// parseEmailFromIDToken extracts the email (or name) claim from an ID token
+// without verifying its signature. The value is best-effort and used only as a
+// UX convenience (login hint prefill and display); it never drives an
+// authorization decision. The authoritative identity is established server-side
+// from the signature-verified token.
 func parseEmailFromIDToken(token string) (string, error) {
 	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
 	if len(parts) < 2 {
@@ -360,7 +375,13 @@ func isRedirectURLPortUsed(redirectURL string, excludedRanges []excludedPortRang
 		return true
 	}
 
-	addr := fmt.Sprintf(":%s", port)
+	// FreeBSD 15 disables connecting to INADDR_ANY (0.0.0.0) as a localhost
+	// alias by default, ensure explicit ip for localhost.
+	host := parsedURL.Hostname()
+	if host == "" {
+		host = "127.0.0.1"
+	}
+	addr := net.JoinHostPort(host, port)
 	conn, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", addr, 3*time.Second)
 	if err != nil {
 		return false

client/internal/auth/sessionwatch/event.go

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+package sessionwatch
+
+import (
+	"strconv"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// internal event kinds are no longer exposed: the watcher drives the Sink
+// directly (NotifyStateChange on deadline change/clear, PublishEvent at
+// each warning lead). Tests use a mock Sink to observe what the watcher
+// emits.
+
+// Metadata keys attached by the daemon to session-warning SystemEvents.
+// The UI tray reads these to build a locale-aware notification without
+// relying on the daemon's locale-less UserMessage string, and to
+// disambiguate the T-WarningLead notification from the T-FinalWarningLead
+// fallback that auto-opens the SessionAboutToExpire dialog.
+const (
+	// MetaSessionWarning is set to "true" on both warning events (T-10 and
+	// T-2) so the UI can detect a session-warning SystemEvent without
+	// matching on the message text. Use MetaSessionFinal to distinguish
+	// the two.
+	MetaSessionWarning = "session_warning"
+	// MetaSessionFinal is set to "true" on the T-FinalWarningLead event
+	// only. Consumers that need to auto-open the SessionAboutToExpire
+	// dialog gate on this; T-WarningLead events leave the field unset.
+	MetaSessionFinal = "session_final_warning"
+	// MetaSessionExpiresAt carries the absolute UTC deadline encoded with
+	// FormatExpiresAt; consumers must decode with ParseExpiresAt so a
+	// future format change stays a single edit.
+	MetaSessionExpiresAt = "session_expires_at"
+	// MetaSessionLeadMinutes carries the lead in whole minutes (WarningLead
+	// for the T-10 event, FinalWarningLead for the T-2 event) so the UI
+	// can show "expires in ~N minutes" without hardcoding either constant.
+	MetaSessionLeadMinutes = "lead_minutes"
+	// MetaSessionDeadlineRejected is attached to the ERROR/AUTHENTICATION
+	// SystemEvent the daemon emits when it discards a deadline from the
+	// management server (pre-epoch, too far in the future, or past the
+	// clock-skew tolerance). The value is the rejection reason string.
+	// userMessage is left empty; the UI detects the event via this key
+	// and builds a localized notification — same pattern as the session
+	// warnings above.
+	MetaSessionDeadlineRejected = "session_deadline_rejected"
+)
+
+// expiresAtLayout is the wire format used for MetaSessionExpiresAt.
+// Producer and consumers both go through FormatExpiresAt/ParseExpiresAt
+// so this layout stays a single source of truth.
+const expiresAtLayout = time.RFC3339
+
+// FormatExpiresAt encodes a deadline for MetaSessionExpiresAt. Always
+// emits UTC so a consumer in another timezone reads the same wall-clock
+// deadline.
+func FormatExpiresAt(t time.Time) string {
+	return t.UTC().Format(expiresAtLayout)
+}
+
+// ParseExpiresAt decodes the MetaSessionExpiresAt value back to a UTC
+// time. Returns an error when the field is empty or malformed; the
+// caller decides whether to fall back (zero value) or propagate.
+func ParseExpiresAt(s string) (time.Time, error) {
+	t, err := time.Parse(expiresAtLayout, s)
+	if err != nil {
+		return time.Time{}, err
+	}
+	return t.UTC(), nil
+}
+
+// FormatLeadMinutes encodes a lead duration for MetaSessionLeadMinutes
+// as the integer count of whole minutes. Sub-minute residuals are
+// truncated — the field is informational ("expires in ~N minutes") and
+// fractional minutes don't change what the UI displays.
+func FormatLeadMinutes(d time.Duration) string {
+	return strconv.Itoa(int(d / time.Minute))
+}
+
+// ParseLeadMinutes decodes a MetaSessionLeadMinutes value. Returns 0
+// and the parse error for malformed input; consumers that prefer a
+// silent fallback can simply ignore the error.
+func ParseLeadMinutes(s string) (int, error) {
+	return strconv.Atoi(s)
+}

client/internal/auth/sessionwatch/watcher.go

@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
+// Package sessionwatch tracks the SSO session expiry deadline that the
+// management server publishes via LoginResponse / SyncResponse and fires
+// two warning events at fixed lead times before expiry: an interactive
+// T-WarningLead notification and a dismiss-gated T-FinalWarningLead
+// fallback dialog.
+//
+// The watcher is idempotent: Update may be called as often as the network
+// map snapshots arrive. Repeating the same deadline is a no-op; a new
+// deadline reschedules the timers and arms a fresh warning cycle.
+//
+// Warning firing is edge-detected. Each unique deadline value fires each
+// warning callback at most once.
+package sessionwatch
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	cProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
+)
+
+const (
+	maxPastHorizon = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
+
+	// maxDeadlineHorizon caps how far in the future an accepted deadline
+	// can sit. A timestamp beyond this is almost certainly a protocol
+	// glitch, and silently arming a 100-year timer would hide the bug.
+	maxDeadlineHorizon = 10 * 365 * 24 * time.Hour
+
+	// WarningLead is how far before expiry the first (interactive)
+	// warning fires. Drives the T-10 OS notification with
+	// Extend/Dismiss actions.
+	WarningLead = 10 * time.Minute
+
+	// FinalWarningLead is how far before expiry the fallback final
+	// warning fires. Drives the auto-opened SessionAboutToExpire dialog,
+	// but only when the user has not dismissed the T-WarningLead warning
+	// for the same deadline. Must be strictly less than WarningLead.
+	FinalWarningLead = 2 * time.Minute
+)
+
+var (
+	// ErrDeadlineBeforeEpoch is returned by Update when the supplied
+	// deadline pre-dates 1970-01-01.
+	ErrDeadlineBeforeEpoch = errors.New("session deadline before unix epoch")
+
+	// ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture is returned by Update when the supplied
+	// deadline is more than maxDeadlineHorizon in the future.
+	ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture = errors.New("session deadline too far in the future")
+
+	// ErrDeadlineInPast is returned by Update when the supplied deadline
+	// is more than maxPastHorizon in the past.
+	ErrDeadlineInPast = errors.New("session deadline in the past")
+)
+
+// StatusRecorder is the side-effect surface the watcher drives on every
+// state transition. Production wires this to peer.Status (SetSessionExpiresAt
+// for deadline change/clear, PublishEvent for the two warnings); tests pass
+// a fake recorder so the same surface is observable without an engine.
+//
+// While the watcher runs, it owns the deadline propagated to the recorder:
+// every set, clear and sanity-check rejection routes the value through
+// SetSessionExpiresAt, so the SubscribeStatus snapshot the UI reads can
+// never drift from the watcher's timer state. (SetSessionExpiresAt fans
+// out its own state-change notification, so no separate notify is needed.)
+// The recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped watcher;
+// Close deliberately leaves the recorder value in place so transient engine
+// restarts don't blank it — the client run loop clears it on real teardown.
+//
+// PublishEvent's signature mirrors peer.Status.PublishEvent: the watcher
+// composes the metadata internally so the wire format (MetaSession*) is
+// owned by sessionwatch, not the caller.
+type StatusRecorder interface {
+	SetSessionExpiresAt(deadline time.Time)
+	PublishEvent(
+		severity cProto.SystemEvent_Severity,
+		category cProto.SystemEvent_Category,
+		message string,
+		userMessage string,
+		metadata map[string]string,
+	)
+}
+
+// Watcher observes the latest session deadline and fires two warnings
+// before it expires: the interactive T-WarningLead notification, and the
+// fallback T-FinalWarningLead dialog (suppressed when the user dismissed
+// the first one for the same deadline). Safe for concurrent use.
+type Watcher struct {
+	lead      time.Duration
+	finalLead time.Duration
+
+	mu           sync.Mutex
+	current      time.Time
+	timer        *time.Timer
+	finalTimer   *time.Timer
+	firedAt      time.Time // deadline value the T-WarningLead callback last fired against
+	finalFiredAt time.Time // deadline value the T-FinalWarningLead callback last fired against
+	dismissedAt  time.Time // deadline value the user dismissed via Dismiss(); gates fireFinal
+	closed       bool
+	recorder     StatusRecorder
+}
+
+// New returns a watcher with the package defaults WarningLead and
+// FinalWarningLead. Pass nil for recorder to silence side effects (handy
+// in unit tests that exercise sanity checks without observing the publish
+// path).
+func New(recorder StatusRecorder) *Watcher {
+	return NewWithLeads(WarningLead, FinalWarningLead, recorder)
+}
+
+// NewWithLeads returns a watcher with custom lead times. Useful for tests.
+// final must be strictly less than lead; otherwise both timers fire in the
+// wrong order or simultaneously and the UI flow breaks. A zero final lead
+// disables the final-warning timer entirely (see armTimerLocked) so a
+// millisecond-scale deadline doesn't flush both timers in one tick.
+func NewWithLeads(lead, final time.Duration, recorder StatusRecorder) *Watcher {
+	return &Watcher{
+		lead:      lead,
+		finalLead: final,
+		recorder:  recorder,
+	}
+}
+
+// Update sets the latest deadline. Pass the zero time to clear (e.g. when
+// a Sync push from the server omits the field because login expiration
+// was disabled).
+//
+// Same-value updates are no-ops. A different non-zero value cancels any
+// pending timer, resets the "already fired" guards, and — when the
+// deadline lies in the future — arms fresh warning timers. A deadline
+// already in the past (within maxPastHorizon) is recorded as-is with no
+// timers: the session has expired and consumers render it that way.
+//
+// Returns one of the sentinel Err* values when the deadline fails the
+// sanity checks (pre-epoch, far future, or past beyond maxPastHorizon).
+// In every error case the watcher first clears its state so it stays
+// consistent with what the caller will push into its other sinks (e.g.
+// applySessionDeadline forces a zero deadline into the status recorder
+// after a non-nil error).
+func (w *Watcher) Update(deadline time.Time) error {
+	w.mu.Lock()
+	if w.closed {
+		w.mu.Unlock()
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if deadline.IsZero() {
+		w.clearLocked()
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	now := time.Now()
+	switch {
+	case deadline.Before(time.Unix(0, 0)):
+		w.clearLocked()
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrDeadlineBeforeEpoch, deadline)
+	case deadline.After(now.Add(maxDeadlineHorizon)):
+		w.clearLocked()
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture, deadline)
+	case deadline.Before(now.Add(-maxPastHorizon)):
+		w.clearLocked()
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v (now=%v)", ErrDeadlineInPast, deadline, now)
+	}
+
+	if deadline.Equal(w.current) {
+		w.mu.Unlock()
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	w.stopTimerLocked()
+	w.current = deadline
+	// Reset every per-deadline guard so a refreshed deadline arms a fresh
+	// warning cycle: both edge triggers and the user Dismiss decision
+	// (the user agreed to the old deadline expiring; a new deadline
+	// restarts the contract).
+	w.firedAt = time.Time{}
+	w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
+	w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
+
+	if deadline.After(now) {
+		w.armTimerLocked(deadline)
+	}
+	recorder := w.recorder
+	w.mu.Unlock()
+	if recorder != nil {
+		recorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(deadline)
+	}
+	log.Infof("auth session deadline set to: %s (in %s)", deadline.Format(time.RFC3339), time.Until(deadline).Round(time.Second))
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Deadline returns the most recently observed deadline. Zero when no
+// deadline is currently tracked.
+func (w *Watcher) Deadline() time.Time {
+	w.mu.Lock()
+	defer w.mu.Unlock()
+	return w.current
+}
+
+// Dismiss records the user's "Dismiss" action against the current deadline
+// and suppresses the upcoming final-warning callback for that deadline.
+// Idempotent: repeated calls are no-ops. A subsequent Update with a fresh
+// deadline resets the dismissal so the final-warning cycle re-arms.
+//
+// No-op when the watcher holds no deadline or has been closed.
+func (w *Watcher) Dismiss() {
+	w.mu.Lock()
+	defer w.mu.Unlock()
+	if w.closed || w.current.IsZero() {
+		return
+	}
+	if w.dismissedAt.Equal(w.current) {
+		return
+	}
+	w.dismissedAt = w.current
+	// Cancel the armed final-warning timer eagerly. fireFinal would also
+	// gate on dismissedAt, but stopping the timer avoids a wakeup with
+	// nothing to do and makes the intent visible.
+	if w.finalTimer != nil {
+		w.finalTimer.Stop()
+		w.finalTimer = nil
+	}
+	log.Infof("auth session final-warning dismissed for deadline %s", w.current.Format(time.RFC3339))
+}
+
+// Close stops any pending timer. Update calls after Close are ignored.
+// The recorder keeps its deadline: the watcher is engine-scoped and closes
+// on every engine restart (network change, sleep/wake, stream errors)
+// while the SSO deadline stays valid across those, so clearing here would
+// blank the UI's "expires in" row on every transient reconnect. The
+// client run loop clears the server-scoped recorder when it exits for
+// real (Down, profile switch, permanent login failure).
+func (w *Watcher) Close() {
+	w.mu.Lock()
+	defer w.mu.Unlock()
+	if w.closed {
+		return
+	}
+	w.closed = true
+	w.stopTimerLocked()
+	w.current = time.Time{}
+	w.firedAt = time.Time{}
+	w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
+	w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
+}
+
+// clearLocked drops the tracked deadline and notifies the recorder so
+// downstream consumers (SubscribeStatus stream, UI) drop their anchor.
+// The caller must hold w.mu; this helper releases it before invoking
+// the recorder.
+func (w *Watcher) clearLocked() {
+	if w.current.IsZero() {
+		w.mu.Unlock()
+		return
+	}
+	w.stopTimerLocked()
+	w.current = time.Time{}
+	w.firedAt = time.Time{}
+	w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
+	w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
+	recorder := w.recorder
+	w.mu.Unlock()
+	if recorder != nil {
+		recorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
+	}
+	log.Infof("auth session deadline cleared")
+}
+
+func (w *Watcher) stopTimerLocked() {
+	if w.timer != nil {
+		w.timer.Stop()
+		w.timer = nil
+	}
+	if w.finalTimer != nil {
+		w.finalTimer.Stop()
+		w.finalTimer = nil
+	}
+}
+
+func (w *Watcher) armTimerLocked(deadline time.Time) {
+	w.timer = armOneShotLocked(deadline.Add(-w.lead), func() { w.fire(deadline) })
+	// finalLead <= 0 disables the final-warning timer entirely. Used by
+	// tests that predate the final-warning fallback so a millisecond-scale
+	// deadline does not flush both timers at once.
+	if w.finalLead > 0 {
+		w.finalTimer = armOneShotLocked(deadline.Add(-w.finalLead), func() { w.fireFinal(deadline) })
+	}
+}
+
+func (w *Watcher) fire(armedFor time.Time) {
+	w.mu.Lock()
+	if w.closed || !w.current.Equal(armedFor) {
+		// Deadline moved while we were waiting (e.g. a successful extend).
+		// The reschedule path armed a fresh timer; this one is stale.
+		w.mu.Unlock()
+		return
+	}
+	if !w.firedAt.IsZero() && w.firedAt.Equal(armedFor) {
+		w.mu.Unlock()
+		return
+	}
+	w.firedAt = armedFor
+	recorder := w.recorder
+	w.mu.Unlock()
+	if recorder == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	log.Infof("auth session expiry soon warning fired")
+	publishWarning(recorder, armedFor, false)
+}
+
+// fireFinal mirrors fire for the T-FinalWarningLead timer with an extra
+// dismiss-gate: if the user dismissed the T-WarningLead notification for
+// this deadline, the final warning is suppressed entirely.
+func (w *Watcher) fireFinal(armedFor time.Time) {
+	w.mu.Lock()
+	if w.closed || !w.current.Equal(armedFor) {
+		w.mu.Unlock()
+		return
+	}
+	if !w.finalFiredAt.IsZero() && w.finalFiredAt.Equal(armedFor) {
+		w.mu.Unlock()
+		return
+	}
+	if w.dismissedAt.Equal(armedFor) {
+		w.mu.Unlock()
+		log.Infof("auth session final-warning skipped (dismissed by user)")
+		return
+	}
+	w.finalFiredAt = armedFor
+	recorder := w.recorder
+	w.mu.Unlock()
+	if recorder == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	log.Infof("auth session final-warning fired")
+	publishWarning(recorder, armedFor, true)
+}
+
+// armOneShotLocked schedules cb at fireAt. When fireAt is already in the
+// past it dispatches on the next scheduler tick so a state-change recorder
+// notification (invoked after w.mu is released) lands first. Caller must
+// hold w.mu.
+func armOneShotLocked(fireAt time.Time, cb func()) *time.Timer {
+	delay := time.Until(fireAt)
+	if delay <= 0 {
+		return time.AfterFunc(0, cb)
+	}
+	return time.AfterFunc(delay, cb)
+}
+
+// publishWarning composes the SystemEvent for a watcher-fired warning and
+// pushes it through the recorder. Severity is CRITICAL on both — bypassing
+// the user's Notifications toggle is deliberate: missing the warning
+// window forces the post-mortem SessionExpired flow (tunnel torn down,
+// lock icon, manual re-login), which is the UX we are trying to avoid.
+func publishWarning(recorder StatusRecorder, deadline time.Time, final bool) {
+	lead := WarningLead
+	message := "session expiry warning"
+	meta := map[string]string{
+		MetaSessionWarning:   "true",
+		MetaSessionExpiresAt: FormatExpiresAt(deadline),
+	}
+	if final {
+		lead = FinalWarningLead
+		message = "session expiry final warning"
+		meta[MetaSessionFinal] = "true"
+	}
+	meta[MetaSessionLeadMinutes] = FormatLeadMinutes(lead)
+
+	recorder.PublishEvent(
+		cProto.SystemEvent_CRITICAL,
+		cProto.SystemEvent_AUTHENTICATION,
+		message,
+		"",
+		meta,
+	)
+}

client/internal/auth/sessionwatch/watcher_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,529 @@
+package sessionwatch
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	cProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
+)
+
+// fakeRecorder satisfies StatusRecorder and records every call so tests
+// can observe what the watcher emits. SetSessionExpiresAt and PublishEvent
+// land in the same ordered events slice (with the Kind distinguishing
+// them) so tests that care about ordering still work. lastDeadline holds
+// the most recent value passed to SetSessionExpiresAt so tests can assert
+// the recorder ended up cleared/set as expected.
+type fakeRecorder struct {
+	mu           sync.Mutex
+	events       []event
+	lastDeadline time.Time
+}
+
+type eventKind int
+
+const (
+	stateChange eventKind = iota
+	publish
+)
+
+type event struct {
+	kind eventKind
+	// Set only for publish events.
+	severity cProto.SystemEvent_Severity
+	category cProto.SystemEvent_Category
+	message  string
+	meta     map[string]string
+}
+
+// SetSessionExpiresAt mirrors peer.Status: a same-value write is a no-op,
+// a real change records the new value and fans out a state-change (the
+// production recorder calls notifyStateChange internally). The baseline
+// is the zero time, so an initial clear before any deadline is set emits
+// nothing — matching the real recorder.
+func (r *fakeRecorder) SetSessionExpiresAt(deadline time.Time) {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	if r.lastDeadline.Equal(deadline) {
+		return
+	}
+	r.lastDeadline = deadline
+	r.events = append(r.events, event{kind: stateChange})
+}
+
+func (r *fakeRecorder) deadline() time.Time {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	return r.lastDeadline
+}
+
+func (r *fakeRecorder) PublishEvent(
+	severity cProto.SystemEvent_Severity,
+	category cProto.SystemEvent_Category,
+	message string,
+	_ string,
+	metadata map[string]string,
+) {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	r.events = append(r.events, event{
+		kind:     publish,
+		severity: severity,
+		category: category,
+		message:  message,
+		meta:     metadata,
+	})
+}
+
+func (r *fakeRecorder) snapshot() []event {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	out := make([]event, len(r.events))
+	copy(out, r.events)
+	return out
+}
+
+func (e event) isFinalWarning() bool {
+	return e.kind == publish && e.meta[MetaSessionFinal] == "true"
+}
+
+func (e event) isWarning() bool {
+	return e.kind == publish && e.meta[MetaSessionWarning] == "true" && e.meta[MetaSessionFinal] != "true"
+}
+
+func countWhere(events []event, pred func(event) bool) int {
+	n := 0
+	for _, e := range events {
+		if pred(e) {
+			n++
+		}
+	}
+	return n
+}
+
+func waitForEvents(t *testing.T, r *fakeRecorder, want int) []event {
+	t.Helper()
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(500 * time.Millisecond)
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		if got := r.snapshot(); len(got) >= want {
+			return got
+		}
+		time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	got := r.snapshot()
+	t.Fatalf("timed out waiting for %d events, got %d: %+v", want, len(got), got)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// newWatcher builds a watcher with the final timer disabled (finalLead=0),
+// matching the lead-only behaviour the pre-final-warning tests assume.
+func newWatcher(lead time.Duration, r *fakeRecorder) *Watcher {
+	return NewWithLeads(lead, 0, r)
+}
+
+func TestUpdateZeroBeforeAnythingIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	_ = w.Update(time.Time{})
+
+	if got := r.snapshot(); len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected no events on initial zero, got %+v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUpdateNonZeroFiresStateChange(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	d := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+	_ = w.Update(d)
+
+	events := waitForEvents(t, r, 1)
+	if events[0].kind != stateChange {
+		t.Fatalf("expected stateChange, got %+v", events[0])
+	}
+	if !w.Deadline().Equal(d) {
+		t.Fatalf("deadline mismatch: %v vs %v", w.Deadline(), d)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSameDeadlineIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	d := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+	_ = w.Update(d)
+	_ = w.Update(d)
+	_ = w.Update(d)
+
+	events := waitForEvents(t, r, 1)
+	if len(events) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected exactly 1 event for repeated same deadline, got %d: %+v", len(events), events)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWarningFiresOnceWithinLeadWindow(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	lead := 50 * time.Millisecond
+	w := newWatcher(lead, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	// Deadline 80ms out — warning should fire after ~30ms.
+	d := time.Now().Add(80 * time.Millisecond)
+	_ = w.Update(d)
+
+	events := waitForEvents(t, r, 2)
+	if events[0].kind != stateChange {
+		t.Fatalf("event[0] should be stateChange, got %+v", events[0])
+	}
+	if !events[1].isWarning() {
+		t.Fatalf("event[1] should be a warning publish, got %+v", events[1])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWarningFiresImmediatelyWhenAlreadyInsideWindow(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(time.Hour, r) // lead > delta => fire immediately
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	d := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Millisecond)
+	_ = w.Update(d)
+
+	events := waitForEvents(t, r, 2)
+	if !events[1].isWarning() {
+		t.Fatalf("expected immediate warning publish, got %+v", events[1])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNewDeadlineCancelsPriorTimer(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	lead := 50 * time.Millisecond
+	w := newWatcher(lead, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	first := time.Now().Add(80 * time.Millisecond) // would fire warning ~30ms in
+	_ = w.Update(first)
+
+	// Replace with a far-future deadline before the warning fires.
+	time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
+	second := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+	_ = w.Update(second)
+
+	// Wait past when first's warning would have fired.
+	time.Sleep(80 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	if n := countWhere(r.snapshot(), event.isWarning); n != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("warning fired for cancelled deadline: %+v", r.snapshot())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRefreshAfterFireArmsNewWarning(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	lead := 150 * time.Millisecond
+	w := newWatcher(lead, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	// Warning fires ~20ms in; the deadline itself stays 150ms away so the
+	// replacement below lands well before it.
+	first := time.Now().Add(170 * time.Millisecond)
+	_ = w.Update(first)
+
+	// Wait for stateChange + warning of the first cycle.
+	waitForEvents(t, r, 2)
+
+	// Simulate a successful extend: brand new deadline.
+	second := time.Now().Add(60 * time.Millisecond)
+	_ = w.Update(second)
+
+	// 4 events total: stateChange, warning (first), stateChange, warning (second).
+	events := waitForEvents(t, r, 4)
+	if events[2].kind != stateChange {
+		t.Fatalf("event[2] should be stateChange for the new deadline, got %+v", events[2])
+	}
+	if !events[3].isWarning() {
+		t.Fatalf("event[3] should be a warning publish for the new deadline, got %+v", events[3])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUpdateZeroAfterNonZeroClearsState(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(time.Hour, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	d := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Hour)
+	_ = w.Update(d)
+	waitForEvents(t, r, 1)
+
+	_ = w.Update(time.Time{})
+
+	events := waitForEvents(t, r, 2)
+	if events[1].kind != stateChange {
+		t.Fatalf("expected stateChange on clear, got %+v", events[1])
+	}
+	if !w.Deadline().IsZero() {
+		t.Fatalf("Deadline should be zero after clear")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUpdateRejectsBeforeEpoch(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	good := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+	if err := w.Update(good); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed Update: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	err := w.Update(time.Unix(-100, 0))
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrDeadlineBeforeEpoch) {
+		t.Fatalf("want ErrDeadlineBeforeEpoch, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if !w.Deadline().IsZero() {
+		t.Fatalf("rejected pre-epoch update must clear deadline; got %v", w.Deadline())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUpdateRejectsTooFarFuture(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	good := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+	if err := w.Update(good); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed Update: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(50 * 365 * 24 * time.Hour))
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture) {
+		t.Fatalf("want ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if !w.Deadline().IsZero() {
+		t.Fatalf("rejected far-future update must clear deadline; got %v", w.Deadline())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUpdateRecentPastRecordedAsExpired(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	d := time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour)
+	if err := w.Update(d); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("recent-past Update should succeed, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if !w.Deadline().Equal(d) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected deadline to be recorded, got %v want %v", w.Deadline(), d)
+	}
+	if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
+		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline = %v, want %v", got, d)
+	}
+
+	time.Sleep(80 * time.Millisecond)
+	if n := countWhere(r.snapshot(), func(e event) bool { return e.kind == publish }); n != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("no warning events may fire for an already-past deadline, got %+v", r.snapshot())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	good := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+	if err := w.Update(good); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed Update: %v", err)
+	}
+	// Drain the stateChange from the seed.
+	waitForEvents(t, r, 1)
+
+	err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(-31 * 24 * time.Hour))
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrDeadlineInPast) {
+		t.Fatalf("want ErrDeadlineInPast, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if !w.Deadline().IsZero() {
+		t.Fatalf("rejected ancient-past update must clear the deadline, got %v", w.Deadline())
+	}
+	events := waitForEvents(t, r, 2)
+	if events[1].kind != stateChange {
+		t.Fatalf("expected stateChange on clear, got %+v", events[1])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCloseSilencesUpdates(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
+	w.Close()
+
+	if err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Update after Close: want nil, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := r.snapshot(); len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected no events after Close, got %+v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline pins the reconnect-flap fix: the watcher
+// closes on every engine restart (network change, sleep/wake) while the
+// SSO deadline stays valid across those, so Close must leave the
+// server-scoped recorder's value in place. The client run loop clears the
+// recorder when it exits for real.
+func TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(time.Hour, r)
+
+	d := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Hour)
+	if err := w.Update(d); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed Update: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
+		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline after Update = %v, want %v", got, d)
+	}
+
+	w.Close()
+
+	if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
+		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline after Close = %v, want %v", got, d)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCloseWithoutDeadlineLeavesRecorderUntouched guards the symmetric
+// case: closing a watcher that never held a deadline must not emit a
+// redundant clear (the recorder may legitimately hold a value written by
+// some other path; the watcher only owns what it set).
+func TestCloseWithoutDeadlineLeavesRecorderUntouched(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(time.Hour, r)
+
+	w.Close()
+
+	if got := r.snapshot(); len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected no events from Close on an empty watcher, got %+v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFinalWarningFiresAfterRegularWarning(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	// Warning fires at deadline-80ms, final at deadline-30ms.
+	w := NewWithLeads(80*time.Millisecond, 30*time.Millisecond, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	d := time.Now().Add(100 * time.Millisecond)
+	_ = w.Update(d)
+
+	// Expect stateChange + warning + final-warning.
+	events := waitForEvents(t, r, 3)
+
+	if countWhere(events, func(e event) bool { return e.kind == stateChange }) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected exactly 1 stateChange, got %+v", events)
+	}
+	if countWhere(events, event.isWarning) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected exactly 1 warning publish, got %+v", events)
+	}
+	if countWhere(events, event.isFinalWarning) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected exactly 1 final-warning publish, got %+v", events)
+	}
+
+	// Warning must precede final (same deadline, longer lead fires first).
+	var wIdx, fIdx int
+	for i, e := range events {
+		switch {
+		case e.isWarning():
+			wIdx = i
+		case e.isFinalWarning():
+			fIdx = i
+		}
+	}
+	if wIdx > fIdx {
+		t.Fatalf("warning must publish before final-warning, got order %+v", events)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDismissSuppressesFinalWarning(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := NewWithLeads(80*time.Millisecond, 30*time.Millisecond, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	d := time.Now().Add(100 * time.Millisecond)
+	_ = w.Update(d)
+
+	// Wait for the warning publish so we know we're inside the warning
+	// window, then dismiss before the final timer would fire.
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(500 * time.Millisecond)
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		if countWhere(r.snapshot(), event.isWarning) >= 1 {
+			break
+		}
+		time.Sleep(2 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	if countWhere(r.snapshot(), event.isWarning) < 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("warning did not publish in time, events=%+v", r.snapshot())
+	}
+
+	w.Dismiss()
+
+	// Now wait past when the final would have fired.
+	time.Sleep(120 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	if n := countWhere(r.snapshot(), event.isFinalWarning); n != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("final-warning published after Dismiss(), events=%+v", r.snapshot())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDismissResetByNewDeadline(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := NewWithLeads(80*time.Millisecond, 30*time.Millisecond, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	first := time.Now().Add(100 * time.Millisecond)
+	_ = w.Update(first)
+
+	// Dismiss against the first deadline.
+	w.Dismiss()
+
+	// Replace with a fresh deadline before the first's timers complete.
+	time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+	second := time.Now().Add(100 * time.Millisecond)
+	_ = w.Update(second)
+
+	// The second cycle must publish a final-warning (the dismiss state
+	// did not carry over).
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(500 * time.Millisecond)
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		if countWhere(r.snapshot(), event.isFinalWarning) >= 1 {
+			break
+		}
+		time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	if countWhere(r.snapshot(), event.isFinalWarning) < 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("final-warning did not publish on fresh deadline after Dismiss reset, events=%+v", r.snapshot())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDismissBeforeUpdateIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := NewWithLeads(80*time.Millisecond, 30*time.Millisecond, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	// No deadline tracked yet; Dismiss must be a no-op (no panic, no state).
+	w.Dismiss()
+
+	d := time.Now().Add(100 * time.Millisecond)
+	_ = w.Update(d)
+
+	// Final warning should still publish — Dismiss only acts on the current
+	// deadline, and there was none at the time of the call.
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(500 * time.Millisecond)
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		if countWhere(r.snapshot(), event.isFinalWarning) >= 1 {
+			return
+		}
+		time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	t.Fatalf("final-warning did not publish after no-op pre-Update Dismiss, events=%+v", r.snapshot())
+}

client/internal/auth/util.go

@@ -20,14 +20,26 @@ func randomBytesInHex(count int) (string, error) {
 	return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil
 }
 
-// isValidAccessToken is a simple validation of the access token
-func isValidAccessToken(token string, audience string) error {
+// validateTokenAudience checks that the token is a well-formed JWT whose
+// audience claim matches the expected audience.
+//
+// It does NOT verify the token's cryptographic signature and therefore must not
+// be treated as an authenticity check. The token is obtained by the client
+// directly from the IdP token endpoint over TLS, and its signature is verified
+// server-side by the management server against the IdP's JWKS
+// (see shared/auth/jwt/validator.go). This function is only a client-side
+// sanity check that the returned token targets the expected audience.
+func validateTokenAudience(token string, audience string) error {
 	if token == "" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("token received is empty")
 	}
 
-	encodedClaims := strings.Split(token, ".")[1]
-	claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(encodedClaims)
+	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
+	if len(parts) != 3 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("token is not a well-formed JWT")
+	}
+
+	claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}

client/internal/auth/util_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// makeJWT builds an unsigned JWT-shaped string (header.payload.signature) with
+// the given claims payload. The signature part is arbitrary because
+// validateTokenAudience intentionally does not verify it.
+func makeJWT(t *testing.T, claims map[string]interface{}) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	header := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}`))
+	payloadBytes, err := json.Marshal(claims)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("marshal claims: %v", err)
+	}
+	payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(payloadBytes)
+	return header + "." + payload + ".unverified-signature"
+}
+
+func TestValidateTokenAudience(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name     string
+		token    string
+		audience string
+		wantErr  bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:     "empty token",
+			token:    "",
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "not a JWT - no dots",
+			token:    "notajwt",
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "not a JWT - two parts only",
+			token:    "header.payload",
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "matching string audience",
+			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "netbird"}),
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "mismatching string audience",
+			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "other"}),
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "matching audience in array",
+			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"other", "netbird"}}),
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "mismatching audience array",
+			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"a", "b"}}),
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "missing audience claim",
+			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"sub": "user"}),
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "invalid base64 payload",
+			token:    "header.!!!not-base64!!!.sig",
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			err := validateTokenAudience(tc.token, tc.audience)
+			if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
+				t.Fatalf("expected error, got nil")
+			}
+			if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("expected no error, got %v", err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic guards the regression where a non-empty
+// token without the JWT dot structure caused an index-out-of-range panic.
+func TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic(t *testing.T) {
+	inputs := []string{"a", ".", "a.", "aaaa", "no-dots-here"}
+	for _, in := range inputs {
+		if err := validateTokenAudience(in, "netbird"); err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("expected error for malformed token %q, got nil", in)
+		}
+	}
+}

client/internal/conn_mgr.go

@@ -16,6 +16,16 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
 )
 
+// lazyForce is the resolved local decision for lazy connections, layered above the
+// management feature flag. lazyForceNone defers to management.
+type lazyForce int
+
+const (
+	lazyForceNone lazyForce = iota
+	lazyForceOn
+	lazyForceOff
+)
+
 // ConnMgr coordinates both lazy connections (established on-demand) and permanent peer connections.
 //
 // The connection manager is responsible for:
@@ -24,47 +34,69 @@ import (
 // - Handling connection establishment based on peer signaling
 //
 // The implementation is not thread-safe; it is protected by engine.syncMsgMux.
+// The only exception is ActivatePeer, which is safe for concurrent use so the
+// DNS warm-up path can call it without contending on the engine mutex.
 type ConnMgr struct {
 	peerStore        *peerstore.Store
 	statusRecorder   *peer.Status
 	iface            lazyconn.WGIface
-	enabledLocally   bool
+	force            lazyForce
 	rosenpassEnabled bool
 
 	lazyConnMgr *manager.Manager
+	// lazyConnMgrMu guards the lazyConnMgr pointer for readers outside the
+	// engine loop (ActivatePeer). Writers hold it in addition to
+	// engine.syncMsgMux; all other reads stay under engine.syncMsgMux only.
+	lazyConnMgrMu sync.RWMutex
+
+	// reconcileRoutedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its lazy wake endpoint is
+	// (re)armed (Mode A at arm time). Injected by the engine; nil disables the reconcile.
+	reconcileRoutedIPs func(peerKey string) error
 
 	wg            sync.WaitGroup
 	lazyCtx       context.Context
 	lazyCtxCancel context.CancelFunc
 }
 
+// SetRoutedIPsReconciler injects the callback used to re-apply a peer's routed allowed IPs when
+// its lazy wake endpoint is (re)armed. Must be called before the lazy manager starts.
+func (e *ConnMgr) SetRoutedIPsReconciler(fn func(peerKey string) error) {
+	e.reconcileRoutedIPs = fn
+}
+
 func NewConnMgr(engineConfig *EngineConfig, statusRecorder *peer.Status, peerStore *peerstore.Store, iface lazyconn.WGIface) *ConnMgr {
 	e := &ConnMgr{
 		peerStore:        peerStore,
 		statusRecorder:   statusRecorder,
 		iface:            iface,
+		force:            resolveLazyForce(engineConfig.LazyConnection),
 		rosenpassEnabled: engineConfig.RosenpassEnabled,
 	}
-	if engineConfig.LazyConnectionEnabled || lazyconn.IsLazyConnEnabledByEnv() {
-		e.enabledLocally = true
-	}
 	return e
 }
 
-// Start initializes the connection manager and starts the lazy connection manager if enabled by env var or cmd line option.
+// Start initializes the connection manager. It starts the lazy connection manager when a
+// local override forces it on; with no local override it waits for the management feature flag.
 func (e *ConnMgr) Start(ctx context.Context) {
 	if e.lazyConnMgr != nil {
 		log.Errorf("lazy connection manager is already started")
 		return
 	}
 
-	if !e.enabledLocally {
-		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is disabled")
+	switch e.force {
+	case lazyForceOff:
+		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is disabled by local override (%s or MDM policy)", lazyconn.EnvLazyConn)
+		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
+		return
+	case lazyForceNone:
+		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is managed by the management feature flag")
+		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
 		return
 	}
 
 	if e.rosenpassEnabled {
 		log.Warnf("rosenpass connection manager is enabled, lazy connection manager will not be started")
+		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -76,8 +108,8 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) Start(ctx context.Context) {
 // If enabled, it initializes the lazy connection manager and start it. Do not need to call Start() again.
 // If disabled, then it closes the lazy connection manager and open the connections to all peers.
 func (e *ConnMgr) UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag(ctx context.Context, enabled bool) error {
-	// do not disable lazy connection manager if it was enabled by env var
-	if e.enabledLocally {
+	// a local override (NB_LAZY_CONN or local config) takes precedence over management
+	if e.force != lazyForceNone {
 		return nil
 	}
 
@@ -89,15 +121,17 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag(ctx context.Context, enabled bool) er
 
 		if e.rosenpassEnabled {
 			log.Infof("rosenpass connection manager is enabled, lazy connection manager will not be started")
+			e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
 			return nil
 		}
 
-		log.Warnf("lazy connection manager is enabled by management feature flag")
+		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is enabled by the management feature flag")
 		e.initLazyManager(ctx)
 		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(true)
 		return e.addPeersToLazyConnManager()
 	} else {
 		if e.lazyConnMgr == nil {
+			e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
 			return nil
 		}
 		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is disabled by management feature flag")
@@ -220,12 +254,20 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) RemovePeerConn(peerKey string) {
 	conn.Log.Infof("removed peer from lazy conn manager")
 }
 
+// ActivatePeer wakes an idle lazy connection. Unlike the rest of ConnMgr it is
+// safe for concurrent use: the lazy manager pointer is read under lazyConnMgrMu
+// and the manager itself is internally synchronized, so callers outside the
+// engine loop (DNS warm-up) do not need engine.syncMsgMux.
 func (e *ConnMgr) ActivatePeer(ctx context.Context, conn *peer.Conn) {
-	if !e.isStartedWithLazyMgr() {
+	e.lazyConnMgrMu.RLock()
+	lazyConnMgr := e.lazyConnMgr
+	started := lazyConnMgr != nil && e.lazyCtxCancel != nil
+	e.lazyConnMgrMu.RUnlock()
+	if !started {
 		return
 	}
 
-	if found := e.lazyConnMgr.ActivatePeer(conn.GetKey()); found {
+	if found := lazyConnMgr.ActivatePeer(conn.GetKey()); found {
 		if err := conn.Open(ctx); err != nil {
 			conn.Log.Errorf("failed to open connection: %v", err)
 		}
@@ -250,16 +292,22 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) Close() {
 
 	e.lazyCtxCancel()
 	e.wg.Wait()
+
+	e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()
 	e.lazyConnMgr = nil
+	e.lazyConnMgrMu.Unlock()
 }
 
 func (e *ConnMgr) initLazyManager(engineCtx context.Context) {
 	cfg := manager.Config{
 		InactivityThreshold: inactivityThresholdEnv(),
+		ReconcileAllowedIPs: e.reconcileRoutedIPs,
 	}
-	e.lazyConnMgr = manager.NewManager(cfg, engineCtx, e.peerStore, e.iface)
 
+	e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()
+	e.lazyConnMgr = manager.NewManager(cfg, engineCtx, e.peerStore, e.iface)
 	e.lazyCtx, e.lazyCtxCancel = context.WithCancel(engineCtx)
+	e.lazyConnMgrMu.Unlock()
 
 	e.wg.Add(1)
 	go func() {
@@ -298,7 +346,10 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) closeManager(ctx context.Context) {
 
 	e.lazyCtxCancel()
 	e.wg.Wait()
+
+	e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()
 	e.lazyConnMgr = nil
+	e.lazyConnMgrMu.Unlock()
 
 	for _, peerID := range e.peerStore.PeersPubKey() {
 		e.peerStore.PeerConnOpen(ctx, peerID)
@@ -309,17 +360,45 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) isStartedWithLazyMgr() bool {
 	return e.lazyConnMgr != nil && e.lazyCtxCancel != nil
 }
 
+// resolveLazyForce determines the local override. NB_LAZY_CONN takes precedence; when it
+// is unset the MDM policy override (mdmState) applies. Either wins in both directions over
+// the management feature flag; StateUnset for both defers to management.
+func resolveLazyForce(mdmState lazyconn.State) lazyForce {
+	state := lazyconn.EnvState()
+	if state == lazyconn.StateUnset {
+		state = mdmState
+	}
+
+	switch state {
+	case lazyconn.StateOn:
+		return lazyForceOn
+	case lazyconn.StateOff:
+		return lazyForceOff
+	default:
+		return lazyForceNone
+	}
+}
+
 func inactivityThresholdEnv() *time.Duration {
 	envValue := os.Getenv(lazyconn.EnvInactivityThreshold)
 	if envValue == "" {
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	parsedMinutes, err := strconv.Atoi(envValue)
-	if err != nil || parsedMinutes <= 0 {
-		return nil
+	// Documented format: a Go duration such as "30m" or "1h".
+	if d, err := time.ParseDuration(envValue); err == nil {
+		if d <= 0 {
+			return nil
+		}
+		return &d
 	}
 
-	d := time.Duration(parsedMinutes) * time.Minute
-	return &d
+	// Backwards compatibility: a bare integer used to be interpreted as minutes.
+	if parsedMinutes, err := strconv.Atoi(envValue); err == nil && parsedMinutes > 0 {
+		d := time.Duration(parsedMinutes) * time.Minute
+		return &d
+	}
+
+	log.Warnf("invalid %s value %q: expected a Go duration such as 30m or 1h", lazyconn.EnvInactivityThreshold, envValue)
+	return nil
 }

client/internal/conn_mgr_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+package internal
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net"
+	"net/netip"
+	"os"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/lazyconn"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/monotime"
+)
+
+func TestResolveLazyForce(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name   string
+		env    string
+		envSet bool
+		mdm    lazyconn.State
+		want   lazyForce
+	}{
+		{name: "env unset, mdm unset -> defer to management", mdm: lazyconn.StateUnset, want: lazyForceNone},
+		{name: "env on -> force on", env: "on", envSet: true, mdm: lazyconn.StateUnset, want: lazyForceOn},
+		{name: "env off -> force off", env: "off", envSet: true, mdm: lazyconn.StateUnset, want: lazyForceOff},
+		{name: "env unset, mdm on -> force on", mdm: lazyconn.StateOn, want: lazyForceOn},
+		{name: "env unset, mdm off -> force off", mdm: lazyconn.StateOff, want: lazyForceOff},
+		{name: "env on beats mdm off", env: "on", envSet: true, mdm: lazyconn.StateOff, want: lazyForceOn},
+		{name: "env off beats mdm on", env: "off", envSet: true, mdm: lazyconn.StateOn, want: lazyForceOff},
+		{name: "unrecognized env, mdm on -> mdm wins", env: "auto", envSet: true, mdm: lazyconn.StateOn, want: lazyForceOn},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Setenv(lazyconn.EnvLazyConn, tt.env)
+			if !tt.envSet {
+				os.Unsetenv(lazyconn.EnvLazyConn)
+			}
+
+			if got := resolveLazyForce(tt.mdm); got != tt.want {
+				t.Fatalf("resolveLazyForce(%v) = %v, want %v", tt.mdm, got, tt.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+type mockLazyWGIface struct{}
+
+func (mockLazyWGIface) RemovePeer(string) error { return nil }
+func (mockLazyWGIface) UpdatePeer(string, []netip.Prefix, time.Duration, *net.UDPAddr, *wgtypes.Key) error {
+	return nil
+}
+func (mockLazyWGIface) IsUserspaceBind() bool                    { return false }
+func (mockLazyWGIface) Address() wgaddr.Address                  { return wgaddr.Address{} }
+func (mockLazyWGIface) LastActivities() map[string]monotime.Time { return nil }
+func (mockLazyWGIface) MTU() uint16                              { return 1280 }
+
+// TestConnMgr_ActivatePeerConcurrentWithLifecycle exercises ActivatePeer from
+// non-engine goroutines (the DNS warm-up path) racing the manager lifecycle,
+// which stays on the engine loop. Run with -race: it fails if ActivatePeer
+// still requires engine.syncMsgMux for safety.
+func TestConnMgr_ActivatePeerConcurrentWithLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv(lazyconn.EnvLazyConn, "on")
+
+	status := peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm")
+	store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
+	connMgr := NewConnMgr(&EngineConfig{}, status, store, mockLazyWGIface{})
+
+	conn := newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA")
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+	connMgr.Start(ctx)
+
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for range 4 {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			for {
+				select {
+				case <-done:
+					return
+				default:
+					connMgr.ActivatePeer(ctx, conn)
+				}
+			}
+		}()
+	}
+
+	// Let the activators spin against the started manager, then tear it down
+	// underneath them and let them spin against the stopped manager.
+	time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
+	connMgr.Close()
+	time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	close(done)
+	wg.Wait()
+}
+
+func TestInactivityThresholdEnv(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		val  string
+		want *time.Duration
+	}{
+		{name: "unset", val: "", want: nil},
+		{name: "go duration minutes", val: "30m", want: durPtr(30 * time.Minute)},
+		{name: "go duration hours", val: "1h", want: durPtr(time.Hour)},
+		{name: "go duration seconds", val: "90s", want: durPtr(90 * time.Second)},
+		{name: "bare integer is minutes (backwards compat)", val: "5", want: durPtr(5 * time.Minute)},
+		{name: "zero duration", val: "0s", want: nil},
+		{name: "zero integer", val: "0", want: nil},
+		{name: "negative duration", val: "-5m", want: nil},
+		{name: "garbage", val: "abc", want: nil},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Setenv(lazyconn.EnvInactivityThreshold, tc.val)
+			got := inactivityThresholdEnv()
+			switch {
+			case tc.want == nil && got != nil:
+				t.Fatalf("want nil, got %v", *got)
+			case tc.want != nil && got == nil:
+				t.Fatalf("want %v, got nil", *tc.want)
+			case tc.want != nil && *got != *tc.want:
+				t.Fatalf("want %v, got %v", *tc.want, *got)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func durPtr(d time.Duration) *time.Duration { return &d }

client/internal/connect.go

@@ -6,10 +6,12 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"runtime"
 	"runtime/debug"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/cenkalti/backoff/v4"
@@ -25,12 +27,14 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/netstack"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/lazyconn"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/listener"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/metrics"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/statemanager"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/stdnet"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/tunnelnotifier"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/updater"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/updater/installer"
 	nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
@@ -53,6 +57,10 @@ var androidRunOverride func(c *ConnectClient, runningChan chan struct{}, logPath
 
 type ConnectClient struct {
 	ctx            context.Context
+	runCancel      context.CancelFunc
+	runExited      chan struct{}
+	runOnce        sync.Once
+	runStarted     atomic.Bool
 	config         *profilemanager.Config
 	statusRecorder *peer.Status
 
@@ -69,8 +77,14 @@ func NewConnectClient(
 	config *profilemanager.Config,
 	statusRecorder *peer.Status,
 ) *ConnectClient {
+	// Derive the run context here so Stop owns the cancel that unblocks the run
+	// loop. runCancel is set once at construction, so Stop can call it without
+	// racing the run loop's startup. Callers therefore need not cancel before Stop.
+	runCtx, runCancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
 	return &ConnectClient{
-		ctx:            ctx,
+		ctx:            runCtx,
+		runCancel:      runCancel,
+		runExited:      make(chan struct{}),
 		config:         config,
 		statusRecorder: statusRecorder,
 		engineMutex:    sync.Mutex{},
@@ -99,11 +113,14 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) RunOnAndroid(
 	stateFilePath string,
 	cacheDir string,
 ) error {
+	notifier := tunnelnotifier.New(networkChangeListener, nil)
+	defer notifier.Close()
+
 	// in case of non Android os these variables will be nil
 	mobileDependency := MobileDependency{
 		TunAdapter:            tunAdapter,
 		IFaceDiscover:         iFaceDiscover,
-		NetworkChangeListener: networkChangeListener,
+		NetworkChangeListener: notifier,
 		HostDNSAddresses:      dnsAddresses,
 		DnsReadyListener:      dnsReadyListener,
 		StateFilePath:         stateFilePath,
@@ -117,20 +134,31 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) RunOniOS(
 	networkChangeListener listener.NetworkChangeListener,
 	dnsManager dns.IosDnsManager,
 	stateFilePath string,
+	cacheDir string,
+	logFilePath string,
 ) error {
 	// Set GC percent to 5% to reduce memory usage as iOS only allows 50MB of memory for the extension.
 	debug.SetGCPercent(5)
 
+	notifier := tunnelnotifier.New(networkChangeListener, dnsManager)
+	defer notifier.Close()
+
 	mobileDependency := MobileDependency{
 		FileDescriptor:        fileDescriptor,
-		NetworkChangeListener: networkChangeListener,
-		DnsManager:            dnsManager,
+		NetworkChangeListener: notifier,
+		DnsManager:            notifier,
 		StateFilePath:         stateFilePath,
+		TempDir:               cacheDir,
 	}
-	return c.run(mobileDependency, nil, "")
+	return c.run(mobileDependency, nil, logFilePath)
 }
 
 func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan struct{}, logPath string) error {
+	// Mark the loop as started and signal exit on return so Stop can wait for
+	// the loop to finish (and skip the wait if the loop never ran).
+	c.runStarted.Store(true)
+	defer c.runOnce.Do(func() { close(c.runExited) })
+
 	defer func() {
 		if r := recover(); r != nil {
 			rec := c.statusRecorder
@@ -236,7 +264,10 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan
 		log.Errorf("failed to clean up temporary installer file: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	defer c.statusRecorder.ClientStop()
+	defer func() {
+		c.statusRecorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
+		c.statusRecorder.ClientStop()
+	}()
 	operation := func() error {
 		// if context cancelled we not start new backoff cycle
 		if c.ctx.Err() != nil {
@@ -256,6 +287,15 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan
 		log.Debugf("connecting to the Management service %s", c.config.ManagementURL.Host)
 		mgmClient, err := mgm.NewClient(engineCtx, c.config.ManagementURL.Host, myPrivateKey, mgmTlsEnabled)
 		if err != nil {
+			// On daemon shutdown / Down() the parent context is cancelled
+			// and the dial fails with "context canceled". Wrapping that
+			// into state would leave the snapshot stuck at Connecting+err
+			// until the backoff loop wakes up — instead let the operation
+			// return cleanly so the deferred state.Set(StatusIdle) takes
+			// effect on the next iteration.
+			if c.ctx.Err() != nil {
+				return nil
+			}
 			return wrapErr(gstatus.Errorf(codes.FailedPrecondition, "failed connecting to Management Service : %s", err))
 		}
 		mgmNotifier := statusRecorderToMgmConnStateNotifier(c.statusRecorder)
@@ -286,7 +326,7 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan
 			log.Debug(err)
 			if s, ok := gstatus.FromError(err); ok && (s.Code() == codes.PermissionDenied) {
 				state.Set(StatusNeedsLogin)
-				_ = c.Stop()
+				c.runCancel()
 				return backoff.Permanent(wrapErr(err)) // unrecoverable error
 			}
 			return wrapErr(err)
@@ -294,6 +334,10 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan
 		c.clientMetrics.RecordLoginDuration(engineCtx, time.Since(loginStarted), true)
 		c.statusRecorder.MarkManagementConnected()
 
+		if metricsConfig := loginResp.GetNetbirdConfig().GetMetrics(); metricsConfig != nil {
+			c.clientMetrics.UpdatePushFromMgm(c.ctx, metricsConfig.GetEnabled())
+		}
+
 		localPeerState := peer.LocalPeerState{
 			IP:              loginResp.GetPeerConfig().GetAddress(),
 			PubKey:          myPrivateKey.PublicKey().String(),
@@ -346,6 +390,11 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan
 			return wrapErr(err)
 		}
 		engineConfig.TempDir = mobileDependency.TempDir
+		// Leave StateDir empty when there is no state path so a disk-backed
+		// syncstore falls back to os.TempDir() instead of filepath.Dir("") == ".".
+		if path != "" {
+			engineConfig.StateDir = filepath.Dir(path)
+		}
 
 		relayManager := relayClient.NewManager(engineCtx, relayURLs, myPrivateKey.PublicKey().String(), engineConfig.MTU)
 		c.statusRecorder.SetRelayMgr(relayManager)
@@ -374,6 +423,7 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan
 			StateManager:   stateManager,
 			UpdateManager:  c.updateManager,
 			ClientMetrics:  c.clientMetrics,
+			MetricsCtx:     c.ctx,
 		}, mobileDependency)
 		engine.SetSyncResponsePersistence(c.persistSyncResponse)
 		c.engine = engine
@@ -384,6 +434,10 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan
 			return wrapErr(err)
 		}
 
+		// Seed the session-expiry deadline from the LoginResponse. Subsequent
+		// changes flow in through SyncResponse and are applied in handleSync.
+		engine.ApplySessionDeadline(loginResp.GetSessionExpiresAt())
+
 		log.Infof("Netbird engine started, the IP is: %s", peerConfig.GetAddress())
 		state.Set(StatusConnected)
 
@@ -401,14 +455,10 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan
 		c.engine = nil
 		c.engineMutex.Unlock()
 
-		// todo: consider to remove this condition. Is not thread safe.
-		// We should always call Stop(), but we need to verify that it is idempotent
-		if engine.wgInterface != nil {
-			log.Infof("ensuring %s is removed, Netbird engine context cancelled", engine.wgInterface.Name())
+		log.Infof("ensuring wg interface is removed, Netbird engine context cancelled")
 
-			if err := engine.Stop(); err != nil {
-				log.Errorf("Failed to stop engine: %v", err)
-			}
+		if err := engine.Stop(); err != nil {
+			log.Errorf("Failed to stop engine: %v", err)
 		}
 		c.statusRecorder.ClientTeardown()
 
@@ -424,12 +474,16 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan
 	}
 
 	c.statusRecorder.ClientStart()
-	err = backoff.Retry(operation, backOff)
+	// Wrap the backoff with c.ctx so Down()/actCancel propagates into the
+	// inter-attempt sleep — otherwise a 15s MaxInterval can keep the retry
+	// loop alive long after the caller asked to give up, leaving the
+	// status stream stuck at Connecting.
+	err = backoff.Retry(operation, backoff.WithContext(backOff, c.ctx))
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Debugf("exiting client retry loop due to unrecoverable error: %s", err)
 		if s, ok := gstatus.FromError(err); ok && (s.Code() == codes.PermissionDenied) {
 			state.Set(StatusNeedsLogin)
-			_ = c.Stop()
+			c.runCancel()
 		}
 		return err
 	}
@@ -507,11 +561,9 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) Status() StatusType {
 }
 
 func (c *ConnectClient) Stop() error {
-	engine := c.Engine()
-	if engine != nil {
-		if err := engine.Stop(); err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("stop engine: %w", err)
-		}
+	c.runCancel()
+	if c.runStarted.Load() {
+		<-c.runExited
 	}
 	return nil
 }
@@ -576,8 +628,9 @@ func createEngineConfig(key wgtypes.Key, config *profilemanager.Config, peerConf
 		BlockLANAccess:      config.BlockLANAccess,
 		BlockInbound:        config.BlockInbound,
 		DisableIPv6:         config.DisableIPv6,
+		SyncMessageVersion:  config.SyncMessageVersion,
 
-		LazyConnectionEnabled: config.LazyConnectionEnabled,
+		LazyConnection: lazyconn.ParseState(config.LazyConnection),
 
 		MTU:     selectMTU(config.MTU, peerConfig.Mtu),
 		LogPath: logPath,
@@ -651,7 +704,7 @@ func loginToManagement(ctx context.Context, client mgm.Client, pubSSHKey []byte,
 		config.BlockLANAccess,
 		config.BlockInbound,
 		config.DisableIPv6,
-		config.LazyConnectionEnabled,
+		config.SyncMessageVersion,
 		config.EnableSSHRoot,
 		config.EnableSSHSFTP,
 		config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,

client/internal/daemonaddr/owner.go

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+package daemonaddr
+
+// DaemonRunsAsSelf reports whether the daemon listening at addr runs as this very
+// user. That is what makes an unprivileged daemon authorize this process for the
+// changes it otherwise restricts to root or an administrator, so a client can tell
+// up front whether those controls are usable instead of letting a save fail.
+//
+// It is answered from the ownership of the socket or pipe the daemon created, so it
+// costs no round trip and needs no cooperation from the daemon. Ownership that
+// cannot be read is reported as false, including for a TCP address, so a caller
+// reading this as "the daemon would allow it" fails closed. The daemon remains the
+// only thing that authorizes anything: this only decides what a client offers.
+func DaemonRunsAsSelf(addr string) bool {
+	return daemonRunsAsSelf(addr)
+}

client/internal/daemonaddr/owner_unix.go

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+//go:build !windows
+
+package daemonaddr
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"syscall"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+)
+
+// daemonRunsAsSelf compares the owner of the daemon's Unix socket with this
+// process's uid. Root is not treated specially here: a root caller is privileged
+// on its own merits, and a root-owned socket says nothing about the caller.
+func daemonRunsAsSelf(addr string) bool {
+	path, ok := strings.CutPrefix(addr, "unix://")
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	info, err := os.Stat(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Debugf("stat daemon socket %s: %v", path, err)
+		return false
+	}
+
+	// Only a socket says anything about a daemon. A directory or a leftover
+	// regular file at that path is not one, and reading it as "the daemon runs as
+	// us" would offer controls the daemon then refuses.
+	if info.Mode()&os.ModeSocket == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	stat, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	return stat.Uid == uint32(os.Getuid())
+}

client/internal/daemonaddr/owner_unix_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+//go:build !windows
+
+package daemonaddr
+
+import (
+	"net"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// A socket this user created means the daemon runs as this user, which is the
+// rootless case where the daemon delegates its authority to its own identity.
+func TestDaemonRunsAsSelf_OwnSocket(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "netbird.sock")
+	ln, err := net.Listen("unix", path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		if err := ln.Close(); err != nil {
+			t.Logf("close listener: %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+
+	if !DaemonRunsAsSelf("unix://" + path) {
+		t.Error("a socket owned by this user must count as the daemon running as us")
+	}
+}
+
+// Everything that is not a readable socket of ours has to answer false, because
+// the caller reads a true as "the daemon would authorize me".
+func TestDaemonRunsAsSelf_FailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	// A socket owned by another user, which is what a root-run daemon looks like
+	// to an unprivileged client. Only assertable when we are not root ourselves.
+	rootOwned := "unix:///var/run/netbird.sock"
+	if _, err := os.Stat("/var/run/netbird.sock"); err == nil && os.Getuid() != 0 {
+		if DaemonRunsAsSelf(rootOwned) {
+			t.Error("a socket owned by another user must not count as ours")
+		}
+	}
+
+	for name, addr := range map[string]string{
+		"missing socket":  "unix://" + filepath.Join(dir, "absent.sock"),
+		"tcp address":     "tcp://127.0.0.1:41731",
+		"named pipe":      "npipe://netbird",
+		"empty":           "",
+		"no scheme":       filepath.Join(dir, "absent.sock"),
+		"directory":       "unix://" + dir,
+		"unknown scheme":  "http://localhost:8080",
+		"scheme only":     "unix://",
+		"relative socket": "unix://netbird.sock",
+	} {
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			if DaemonRunsAsSelf(addr) {
+				t.Errorf("%q must not count as a daemon running as us", addr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

client/internal/daemonaddr/owner_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package daemonaddr
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strings"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
+)
+
+// daemonRunsAsSelf reads the owner of the daemon's pipe. A daemon running as the
+// service account owns its pipe as LocalSystem, and an elevated one as
+// BUILTIN\Administrators, so only a daemon the user started themselves matches.
+func daemonRunsAsSelf(addr string) bool {
+	name, ok := strings.CutPrefix(addr, pipeScheme)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	for _, path := range PipePaths(name) {
+		// Bounded: this runs on the UI's path for deciding which controls to
+		// offer, so a pipe that does not answer promptly must not stall it. A
+		// timeout leaves the caller unprivileged, which only disables controls.
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), probeTimeout)
+		conn, err := dialPipe(ctx, path)
+		cancel()
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		owned := ipcauth.PipeOwnedBySelf(conn)
+		if cerr := conn.Close(); cerr != nil {
+			log.Debugf("close daemon pipe %s after ownership check: %v", path, cerr)
+		}
+		return owned
+	}
+
+	return false
+}

client/internal/daemonaddr/pipe.go

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package daemonaddr
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net"
+	"runtime"
+	"strings"
+
+	"google.golang.org/grpc"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
+)
+
+const (
+	// WindowsPipeAddr is the default daemon address on Windows. A named pipe
+	// carries the connecting process's token, which loopback TCP does not, so
+	// it is the only Windows transport on which the daemon can tell who is
+	// calling it.
+	WindowsPipeAddr = "npipe://netbird"
+
+	// legacyWindowsAddr is the loopback-TCP address the Windows daemon used
+	// before named-pipe support.
+	legacyWindowsAddr = "tcp://127.0.0.1:41731"
+
+	pipeScheme = "npipe://"
+
+	// protectedPrefix is the NPFS namespace in which only LocalSystem and
+	// members of BUILTIN\Administrators may create a pipe. A daemon running as
+	// the service account creates its pipe there so that an unprivileged process
+	// cannot pre-create the name, which would keep the daemon from starting and
+	// leave callers talking to the squatter. Opening such a pipe needs no
+	// privilege, so unprivileged clients still reach the daemon.
+	protectedPrefix = `ProtectedPrefix\Administrators\`
+)
+
+// DialTarget returns the gRPC dial target and transport options for a daemon
+// address. The npipe scheme needs a context dialer because gRPC has no
+// named-pipe resolver; unix and tcp are handled by gRPC itself.
+func DialTarget(addr string) (string, []grpc.DialOption) {
+	opts := []grpc.DialOption{grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials())}
+
+	if name, ok := strings.CutPrefix(addr, pipeScheme); ok {
+		paths := PipePaths(name)
+		opts = append(opts, grpc.WithContextDialer(func(ctx context.Context, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
+			return dialPipePaths(ctx, paths)
+		}))
+		return "passthrough:///netbird-daemon-pipe", opts
+	}
+
+	return strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://"), opts
+}
+
+// PipePath maps an npipe address name ("netbird", from "npipe://netbird") to a
+// Windows named-pipe path (\\.\pipe\netbird). A fully qualified path is left as
+// is.
+func PipePath(name string) string {
+	if strings.HasPrefix(name, `\\`) {
+		return name
+	}
+	return `\\.\pipe\` + name
+}
+
+// PipePaths returns the paths a daemon control pipe may live at for an npipe
+// address name, in the order both sides must try them: the protected name first,
+// then the plain one.
+//
+// The daemon serves the first it can create, which is the protected name when it
+// runs as the service account and the plain one when it runs as an ordinary user,
+// as it does in netstack mode. Clients therefore have to try both, and because a
+// client cannot tell from the name alone who created the pipe, the plain name is
+// only usable once the server's identity has been checked: see
+// verifyPipeServer.
+//
+// A fully qualified path is what the operator asked for and is used as is.
+func PipePaths(name string) []string {
+	if strings.HasPrefix(name, `\\`) {
+		return []string{name}
+	}
+	return []string{PipePath(protectedPrefix + name), PipePath(name)}
+}
+
+// IsProtectedPipePath reports whether a pipe path is in the namespace only an
+// administrator or LocalSystem can create in, which is what lets a client trust
+// such a pipe from its name alone.
+func IsProtectedPipePath(path string) bool {
+	return strings.HasPrefix(path, `\\.\pipe\`+protectedPrefix)
+}
+
+// MigrateLegacy upgrades the pre-named-pipe Windows daemon address to the named
+// pipe, reporting whether it rewrote the address. Existing installs persist the
+// daemon address, so without this an upgraded daemon would keep listening on
+// loopback TCP, where callers carry no identity and privileged operations would
+// have to be refused for everyone. Only the exact legacy default is rewritten:
+// a deliberately chosen custom address is left alone.
+func MigrateLegacy(addr string) (string, bool) {
+	return migrateLegacyForOS(runtime.GOOS, addr)
+}
+
+func migrateLegacyForOS(goos, addr string) (string, bool) {
+	if goos == "windows" && addr == legacyWindowsAddr {
+		return WindowsPipeAddr, true
+	}
+	return addr, false
+}

client/internal/daemonaddr/pipe_other.go

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+//go:build !windows
+
+package daemonaddr
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+)
+
+// dialPipePaths is Windows-only: no other platform serves the daemon on a named
+// pipe.
+func dialPipePaths(context.Context, []string) (net.Conn, error) {
+	return nil, fmt.Errorf("named pipes are only supported on Windows")
+}

client/internal/daemonaddr/pipe_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+package daemonaddr
+
+import (
+	"slices"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// The protected name must be tried before the plain one on both sides: it is the
+// one an unprivileged process cannot create, so preferring it is what keeps a
+// squatter from owning the name the service daemon would otherwise use.
+func TestPipePaths_PrefersTheProtectedName(t *testing.T) {
+	got := PipePaths("netbird")
+	want := []string{
+		`\\.\pipe\ProtectedPrefix\Administrators\netbird`,
+		`\\.\pipe\netbird`,
+	}
+	if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
+		t.Errorf("PipePaths = %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// An operator who passes a full path chose exactly one pipe, so neither side may
+// look anywhere else.
+func TestPipePaths_QualifiedPathIsUsedAsIs(t *testing.T) {
+	path := `\\.\pipe\custom-netbird`
+	got := PipePaths(path)
+	if !slices.Equal(got, []string{path}) {
+		t.Errorf("PipePaths = %q, want just %q", got, path)
+	}
+}

client/internal/daemonaddr/pipe_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package daemonaddr
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+
+	"github.com/Microsoft/go-winio"
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
+)
+
+// dialPipePaths connects to the first path that answers with a pipe server this
+// client may trust, and returns the last error when none does.
+func dialPipePaths(ctx context.Context, paths []string) (net.Conn, error) {
+	var lastErr error
+	for _, path := range paths {
+		conn, err := dialPipe(ctx, path)
+		if err != nil {
+			log.Debugf("dial daemon pipe %s: %v", path, err)
+			lastErr = err
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// A pipe in the protected namespace could only have been created by an
+		// administrator or LocalSystem, so its name is the guarantee. Any other
+		// name has to be checked, because any local user can create one.
+		if !IsProtectedPipePath(path) {
+			if err := ipcauth.PipeServerTrusted(conn); err != nil {
+				if closeErr := conn.Close(); closeErr != nil {
+					log.Debugf("close untrusted pipe %s: %v", path, closeErr)
+				}
+				lastErr = fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", path, err)
+				continue
+			}
+		}
+
+		return conn, nil
+	}
+
+	if lastErr == nil {
+		lastErr = errors.New("no daemon pipe to connect to")
+	}
+	return nil, lastErr
+}
+
+// dialPipe connects to the daemon control pipe at SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION.
+// winio's plain DialPipe connects at SECURITY_ANONYMOUS, under which the daemon
+// cannot read the caller's token at all. Identification lets the daemon read the
+// caller's SID and groups without granting it the ability to act as the caller.
+func dialPipe(ctx context.Context, path string) (net.Conn, error) {
+	access := uint32(windows.GENERIC_READ | windows.GENERIC_WRITE)
+	return winio.DialPipeAccessImpLevel(ctx, path, access, winio.PipeImpLevelIdentification)
+}

client/internal/daemonaddr/resolve_pipe_other.go

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+//go:build !windows
+
+package daemonaddr
+
+// ResolveDaemonAddr is a no-op off Windows, where there is no named-pipe
+// default to fall back from.
+func ResolveDaemonAddr(addr string) string {
+	return addr
+}

client/internal/daemonaddr/resolve_pipe_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package daemonaddr
+
+import (
+	"net"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/Microsoft/go-winio"
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+)
+
+// probeTimeout bounds each transport probe. Both are local, so a daemon that is
+// listening answers immediately and one that is not fails immediately.
+const probeTimeout = 300 * time.Millisecond
+
+// ResolveDaemonAddr keeps a client on the named pipe and never silently moves it
+// off. When the pipe does not answer it checks the legacy loopback TCP address, so
+// a client meeting a daemon that has not restarted since the upgrade can say what
+// is wrong, but it does not connect there.
+//
+// Using that address automatically would be a downgrade the user never asked for:
+// any local process can bind 127.0.0.1 while the daemon is not listening, and the
+// transport carries no caller identity, so a client that accepted whatever answered
+// would hand a setup key, a pre-shared key or an SSO prompt to a local impostor. An
+// operator who needs the legacy address during the upgrade window can still pass
+// --daemon-addr explicitly, which is a deliberate choice and still refuses the
+// privileged operations.
+//
+// Only the pipe address is resolved. A custom address is left alone, though passing
+// --daemon-addr npipe://netbird explicitly is indistinguishable from the default
+// here, so it is treated the same way.
+func ResolveDaemonAddr(addr string) string {
+	if addr != WindowsPipeAddr {
+		return addr
+	}
+
+	for _, path := range PipePaths("netbird") {
+		if pipeAvailable(path) {
+			return addr
+		}
+	}
+
+	if tcpAvailable(legacyWindowsAddr) {
+		log.Warnf("the daemon is not serving %s, but something is listening on the legacy %s. "+
+			"Restart the NetBird service so it serves the pipe. That address is not used automatically: "+
+			"any local user can bind it and it carries no caller identity, so pass --daemon-addr %s "+
+			"explicitly if you accept that",
+			WindowsPipeAddr, legacyWindowsAddr, legacyWindowsAddr)
+	}
+
+	return addr
+}
+
+func pipeAvailable(path string) bool {
+	timeout := probeTimeout
+	conn, err := winio.DialPipe(path, &timeout)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	if err := conn.Close(); err != nil {
+		log.Debugf("close daemon pipe probe: %v", err)
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func tcpAvailable(addr string) bool {
+	host := addr
+	if _, after, ok := strings.Cut(addr, "://"); ok {
+		host = after
+	}
+
+	conn, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", host, probeTimeout)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	if err := conn.Close(); err != nil {
+		log.Debugf("close daemon TCP probe: %v", err)
+	}
+	return true
+}

client/internal/debug/debug.go

@@ -232,6 +232,12 @@ const (
 	errorLogFile  = "netbird.err"
 	stdoutLogFile = "netbird.out"
 
+	// Rotated-log glob prefixes (base log name without extension) passed to
+	// addRotatedLogFiles. The daemon's own log and the GUI log live in the same
+	// dir, so the prefixes must be disjoint to keep their rotated siblings apart.
+	clientLogPrefix = "client"
+	uiLogPrefix     = "gui-client"
+
 	darwinErrorLogPath  = "/var/log/netbird.out.log"
 	darwinStdoutLogPath = "/var/log/netbird.err.log"
 )
@@ -241,6 +247,20 @@ type MetricsExporter interface {
 	Export(w io.Writer) error
 }
 
+// LogOpener opens a log file for inclusion in the bundle. It exists so that log
+// files whose path was supplied by an IPC caller can be opened under a check
+// the daemon defines, instead of being opened with the daemon's privileges
+// unconditionally.
+type LogOpener func(path string) (*os.File, error)
+
+func openLogFile(path string) (*os.File, error) {
+	f, err := os.Open(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("open %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	return f, nil
+}
+
 type BundleGenerator struct {
 	anonymizer *anonymize.Anonymizer
 
@@ -249,11 +269,16 @@ type BundleGenerator struct {
 	statusRecorder *peer.Status
 	syncResponse   *mgmProto.SyncResponse
 	logPath        string
+	uiLogPath      string
+	uiLogOpener    LogOpener
 	tempDir        string
+	statePath      string
 	cpuProfile     []byte
 	capturePath    string
 	refreshStatus  func() // Optional callback to refresh status before bundle generation
 	clientMetrics  MetricsExporter
+	daemonVersion  string
+	cliVersion     string
 
 	anonymize         bool
 	includeSystemInfo bool
@@ -273,11 +298,21 @@ type GeneratorDependencies struct {
 	StatusRecorder *peer.Status
 	SyncResponse   *mgmProto.SyncResponse
 	LogPath        string
-	TempDir        string // Directory for temporary bundle zip files. If empty, os.TempDir() is used.
-	CPUProfile     []byte
-	CapturePath    string
-	RefreshStatus  func()
-	ClientMetrics  MetricsExporter
+	UILogPath      string // Absolute path to the desktop UI's gui-client.log, reported via RegisterUILog. Empty if no UI registered one.
+	// UILogOpener opens the UI log and its rotated siblings. The path comes from
+	// a local IPC caller, so the daemon must not open it with plain os.Open: the
+	// opener is where the caller's right to that file is enforced. Defaults to
+	// os.Open, which is only correct where the path is not caller-supplied
+	// (mobile).
+	UILogOpener   LogOpener
+	TempDir       string // Directory for temporary bundle zip files. If empty, os.TempDir() is used.
+	StatePath     string // Path to the state file. If empty, the ServiceManager default path is used.
+	CPUProfile    []byte
+	CapturePath   string
+	RefreshStatus func()
+	ClientMetrics MetricsExporter
+	DaemonVersion string
+	CliVersion    string
 }
 
 func NewBundleGenerator(deps GeneratorDependencies, cfg BundleConfig) *BundleGenerator {
@@ -287,6 +322,11 @@ func NewBundleGenerator(deps GeneratorDependencies, cfg BundleConfig) *BundleGen
 		logFileCount = 1
 	}
 
+	uiLogOpener := deps.UILogOpener
+	if uiLogOpener == nil {
+		uiLogOpener = openLogFile
+	}
+
 	return &BundleGenerator{
 		anonymizer: anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses()),
 
@@ -294,11 +334,16 @@ func NewBundleGenerator(deps GeneratorDependencies, cfg BundleConfig) *BundleGen
 		statusRecorder: deps.StatusRecorder,
 		syncResponse:   deps.SyncResponse,
 		logPath:        deps.LogPath,
+		uiLogPath:      deps.UILogPath,
+		uiLogOpener:    uiLogOpener,
 		tempDir:        deps.TempDir,
+		statePath:      deps.StatePath,
 		cpuProfile:     deps.CPUProfile,
 		capturePath:    deps.CapturePath,
 		refreshStatus:  deps.RefreshStatus,
 		clientMetrics:  deps.ClientMetrics,
+		daemonVersion:  deps.DaemonVersion,
+		cliVersion:     deps.CliVersion,
 
 		anonymize:         cfg.Anonymize,
 		includeSystemInfo: cfg.IncludeSystemInfo,
@@ -402,6 +447,10 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) createArchive() error {
 		log.Errorf("failed to add logs to debug bundle: %v", err)
 	}
 
+	if err := g.addUILog(); err != nil {
+		log.Errorf("failed to add UI log to debug bundle: %v", err)
+	}
+
 	if err := g.addUpdateLogs(); err != nil {
 		log.Errorf("failed to add updater logs: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -457,11 +506,12 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addStatus() error {
 
 		fullStatus := g.statusRecorder.GetFullStatus()
 		protoFullStatus := nbstatus.ToProtoFullStatus(fullStatus)
-		protoFullStatus.Events = g.statusRecorder.GetEventHistory()
 		overview := nbstatus.ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(protoFullStatus, nbstatus.ConvertOptions{
-			Anonymize:   g.anonymize,
-			ProfileName: profName,
+			Anonymize:     g.anonymize,
+			ProfileName:   profName,
+			DaemonVersion: g.daemonVersion,
 		})
+		overview.CliVersion = g.cliVersion
 		statusOutput := overview.FullDetailSummary()
 
 		statusReader := strings.NewReader(statusOutput)
@@ -508,6 +558,14 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addConfig() error {
 		}
 	}
 
+	// Surface the set of MDM-enforced keys so a support engineer reading
+	// the bundle can tell which field values are user-set vs MDM-overridden.
+	// Same semantics as the mDMManagedFields list returned by the
+	// GetConfig RPC consumed by `netbird debug config`.
+	if managed := g.internalConfig.Policy().ManagedKeys(); len(managed) > 0 {
+		configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("MDMManagedFields: %v\n", managed))
+	}
+
 	configReader := strings.NewReader(configContent.String())
 	if err := g.addFileToZip(configReader, "config.txt"); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("add config file to zip: %w", err)
@@ -644,6 +702,7 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addCommonConfigFields(configContent *strings.Builder)
 	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("BlockLANAccess: %v\n", g.internalConfig.BlockLANAccess))
 	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("BlockInbound: %v\n", g.internalConfig.BlockInbound))
 	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableIPv6: %v\n", g.internalConfig.DisableIPv6))
+	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("SyncMessageVersion: %v\n", g.internalConfig.SyncMessageVersion))
 
 	if g.internalConfig.DisableNotifications != nil {
 		configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableNotifications: %v\n", *g.internalConfig.DisableNotifications))
@@ -662,7 +721,7 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addCommonConfigFields(configContent *strings.Builder)
 		configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("ClientCertKeyPath: %s\n", g.internalConfig.ClientCertKeyPath))
 	}
 
-	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("LazyConnectionEnabled: %v\n", g.internalConfig.LazyConnectionEnabled))
+	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("LazyConnection: %q\n", g.internalConfig.LazyConnection))
 	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("MTU: %d\n", g.internalConfig.MTU))
 }
 
@@ -798,6 +857,8 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addSyncResponse() error {
 		AllowPartial:    true,
 	}
 
+	g.maskSecrets()
+
 	jsonBytes, err := options.Marshal(g.syncResponse)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("generate json: %w", err)
@@ -810,9 +871,33 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addSyncResponse() error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+func (g *BundleGenerator) maskSecrets() {
+	if g.syncResponse == nil || g.syncResponse.NetbirdConfig == nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if g.syncResponse.NetbirdConfig.Flow != nil {
+		g.syncResponse.NetbirdConfig.Flow.TokenPayload = maskedValue
+
+	}
+
+	if g.syncResponse.NetbirdConfig.Relay != nil {
+		g.syncResponse.NetbirdConfig.Relay.TokenPayload = maskedValue
+	}
+
+	for i := range g.syncResponse.NetbirdConfig.Turns {
+		if g.syncResponse.NetbirdConfig.Turns[i] != nil {
+			g.syncResponse.NetbirdConfig.Turns[i].Password = maskedValue
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func (g *BundleGenerator) addStateFile() error {
-	sm := profilemanager.NewServiceManager("")
-	path := sm.GetStatePath()
+	path := g.statePath
+	if path == "" {
+		sm := profilemanager.NewServiceManager("")
+		path = sm.GetStatePath()
+	}
 	if path == "" {
 		return nil
 	}
@@ -937,11 +1022,11 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addLogfile() error {
 
 	logDir := filepath.Dir(g.logPath)
 
-	if err := g.addSingleLogfile(g.logPath, clientLogFile); err != nil {
+	if err := g.addSingleLogfile(openLogFile, g.logPath, clientLogFile); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("add client log file to zip: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	g.addRotatedLogFiles(logDir)
+	g.addRotatedLogFiles(openLogFile, logDir, clientLogPrefix)
 
 	stdErrLogPath := filepath.Join(logDir, errorLogFile)
 	stdoutLogPath := filepath.Join(logDir, stdoutLogFile)
@@ -950,20 +1035,39 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addLogfile() error {
 		stdoutLogPath = darwinStdoutLogPath
 	}
 
-	if err := g.addSingleLogfile(stdErrLogPath, errorLogFile); err != nil {
+	if err := g.addSingleLogfile(openLogFile, stdErrLogPath, errorLogFile); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf("Failed to add %s to zip: %v", errorLogFile, err)
 	}
 
-	if err := g.addSingleLogfile(stdoutLogPath, stdoutLogFile); err != nil {
+	if err := g.addSingleLogfile(openLogFile, stdoutLogPath, stdoutLogFile); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf("Failed to add %s to zip: %v", stdoutLogFile, err)
 	}
 
 	return nil
 }
 
+// addUILog adds the desktop UI's gui-client.log (and its rotated siblings) to
+// the bundle. The path is reported by the UI via RegisterUILog; empty when no
+// UI registered one (e.g. headless / server). Missing file is non-fatal — the
+// UI only writes it while the daemon is in debug, so it's often absent.
+func (g *BundleGenerator) addUILog() error {
+	if g.uiLogPath == "" {
+		log.Debugf("no UI log path registered, skipping in debug bundle")
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if err := g.addSingleLogfile(g.uiLogOpener, g.uiLogPath, configs.UILogFile); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("add UI log file to zip: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	g.addRotatedLogFiles(g.uiLogOpener, filepath.Dir(g.uiLogPath), uiLogPrefix)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
 // addSingleLogfile adds a single log file to the archive
-func (g *BundleGenerator) addSingleLogfile(logPath, targetName string) error {
-	logFile, err := os.Open(logPath)
+func (g *BundleGenerator) addSingleLogfile(open LogOpener, logPath, targetName string) error {
+	logFile, err := open(logPath)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("open log file %s: %w", targetName, err)
 	}
@@ -988,8 +1092,8 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addSingleLogfile(logPath, targetName string) error {
 }
 
 // addSingleLogFileGz adds a single gzipped log file to the archive
-func (g *BundleGenerator) addSingleLogFileGz(logPath, targetName string) error {
-	f, err := os.Open(logPath)
+func (g *BundleGenerator) addSingleLogFileGz(open LogOpener, logPath, targetName string) error {
+	f, err := open(logPath)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("open gz log file %s: %w", targetName, err)
 	}
@@ -1033,13 +1137,16 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addSingleLogFileGz(logPath, targetName string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// addRotatedLogFiles adds rotated log files to the bundle based on logFileCount
-func (g *BundleGenerator) addRotatedLogFiles(logDir string) {
+// addRotatedLogFiles adds rotated log files to the bundle based on logFileCount.
+// prefix is the base log name without extension (e.g. "client", "gui-client");
+// the glob matches both files rotated by us and by logrotate on linux.
+func (g *BundleGenerator) addRotatedLogFiles(open LogOpener, logDir, prefix string) {
 	if g.logFileCount == 0 {
 		return
 	}
 
-	pattern := filepath.Join(logDir, "client-*.log.gz")
+	// This pattern matches both logs rotated by us and logrotate on linux
+	pattern := filepath.Join(logDir, prefix+"*.log.*")
 	files, err := filepath.Glob(pattern)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Warnf("failed to glob rotated logs: %v", err)
@@ -1072,7 +1179,12 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addRotatedLogFiles(logDir string) {
 
 	for i := 0; i < maxFiles; i++ {
 		name := filepath.Base(files[i])
-		if err := g.addSingleLogFileGz(files[i], name); err != nil {
+		if strings.HasSuffix(name, ".gz") {
+			err = g.addSingleLogFileGz(open, files[i], name)
+		} else {
+			err = g.addSingleLogfile(open, files[i], name)
+		}
+		if err != nil {
 			log.Warnf("failed to add rotated log %s: %v", name, err)
 		}
 	}

client/internal/debug/debug_ios.go

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+//go:build ios
+
+package debug
+
+import (
+	"path/filepath"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+)
+
+// swiftLogFile is the Swift app log written by the iOS app into the same log
+// directory as the Go client log, so it can be collected into the bundle.
+const swiftLogFile = "swift-log.log"
+
+// addPlatformLog collects logs for the iOS debug bundle. iOS has no logcat or
+// systemd journal, so we rely on file-based logs. addLogfile handles the Go
+// client log (logPath) with rotation, the stderr/stdout companions and
+// anonymization. The iOS app writes its own Swift log into the same directory,
+// so we add it alongside the Go log.
+func (g *BundleGenerator) addPlatformLog() error {
+	if err := g.addLogfile(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if g.logPath == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	swiftLogPath := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(g.logPath), swiftLogFile)
+	if err := g.addSingleLogfile(openLogFile, swiftLogPath, swiftLogFile); err != nil {
+		// The Swift log is best-effort: the app may not have written it yet.
+		log.Warnf("failed to add %s to debug bundle: %v", swiftLogFile, err)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}

client/internal/debug/debug_logfiles_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+package debug
+
+import (
+	"archive/zip"
+	"bytes"
+	"compress/gzip"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// TestAddRotatedLogFiles_PicksUpAllVariants asserts that the rotated-log
+// glob picks up logs rotated by timberjack (gzipped) and by logrotate (plain
+// and gzipped), and skips unrelated files.
+func TestAddRotatedLogFiles_PicksUpAllVariants(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(dir, "client.log"), "active log\n")
+	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(dir, "other.log"), "unrelated\n")
+
+	timberjackRotated := "client-2026-05-21T10-30-45.000.log.gz"
+	writeGzFile(t, filepath.Join(dir, timberjackRotated), "timberjack rotated content\n")
+
+	logrotatePlain := "client.log.1"
+	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(dir, logrotatePlain), "logrotate plain content\n")
+
+	logrotateGz := "client.log.2.gz"
+	writeGzFile(t, filepath.Join(dir, logrotateGz), "logrotate gz content\n")
+
+	names := runAddRotatedLogFiles(t, dir, 10)
+
+	require.Contains(t, names, timberjackRotated, "timberjack rotated file should be in bundle")
+	require.Contains(t, names, logrotatePlain, "logrotate plain rotated file should be in bundle")
+	require.Contains(t, names, logrotateGz, "logrotate gzipped rotated file should be in bundle")
+	require.NotContains(t, names, "client.log", "active log should not be added by addRotatedLogFiles")
+	require.NotContains(t, names, "other.log", "unrelated files should not be in bundle")
+}
+
+// TestAddRotatedLogFiles_GUIPrefix asserts the prefix parameter scopes the glob
+// to the GUI log: gui-client.log.* rotated siblings are picked up and the
+// daemon's own client.log.* are not (and vice versa, covered above). This is
+// the load-bearing check for the gui-client.log bundle collection — the old
+// "client*.log.*" glob would have missed gui-client rotations.
+func TestAddRotatedLogFiles_GUIPrefix(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(dir, "gui-client.log.1"), "gui rotated\n")
+	writeGzFile(t, filepath.Join(dir, "gui-client.log.2.gz"), "gui rotated gz\n")
+	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(dir, "client.log.1"), "daemon rotated\n")
+
+	names := runAddRotatedLogFilesPrefix(t, dir, "gui-client", 10)
+
+	require.Contains(t, names, "gui-client.log.1", "gui-client rotated file should be in bundle")
+	require.Contains(t, names, "gui-client.log.2.gz", "gui-client gz rotated file should be in bundle")
+	require.NotContains(t, names, "client.log.1", "daemon rotated file must not match the gui-client prefix")
+}
+
+// TestAddRotatedLogFiles_RespectsLogFileCount asserts that only the newest
+// logFileCount rotated files are bundled, ordered by mtime.
+func TestAddRotatedLogFiles_RespectsLogFileCount(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	oldest := filepath.Join(dir, "client.log.3")
+	middle := filepath.Join(dir, "client.log.2")
+	newest := filepath.Join(dir, "client.log.1")
+	writeFile(t, oldest, "old\n")
+	writeFile(t, middle, "mid\n")
+	writeFile(t, newest, "new\n")
+
+	now := time.Now()
+	require.NoError(t, os.Chtimes(oldest, now.Add(-2*time.Hour), now.Add(-2*time.Hour)))
+	require.NoError(t, os.Chtimes(middle, now.Add(-1*time.Hour), now.Add(-1*time.Hour)))
+	require.NoError(t, os.Chtimes(newest, now, now))
+
+	names := runAddRotatedLogFiles(t, dir, 2)
+
+	require.Contains(t, names, "client.log.1")
+	require.Contains(t, names, "client.log.2")
+	require.NotContains(t, names, "client.log.3", "oldest file should be dropped when logFileCount=2")
+}
+
+// runAddRotatedLogFiles calls addRotatedLogFiles against a fresh in-memory
+// zip writer and returns the set of entry names that ended up in the archive.
+func runAddRotatedLogFiles(t *testing.T, dir string, logFileCount uint32) map[string]struct{} {
+	return runAddRotatedLogFilesPrefix(t, dir, "client", logFileCount)
+}
+
+func runAddRotatedLogFilesPrefix(t *testing.T, dir, prefix string, logFileCount uint32) map[string]struct{} {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	g := &BundleGenerator{
+		archive:      zip.NewWriter(&buf),
+		logFileCount: logFileCount,
+	}
+	g.addRotatedLogFiles(openLogFile, dir, prefix)
+	require.NoError(t, g.archive.Close())
+
+	zr, err := zip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(buf.Bytes()), int64(buf.Len()))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	names := make(map[string]struct{}, len(zr.File))
+	for _, f := range zr.File {
+		names[f.Name] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	return names
+}
+
+func writeFile(t *testing.T, path, content string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0o644))
+}
+
+func writeGzFile(t *testing.T, path, content string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	gw := gzip.NewWriter(&buf)
+	_, err := io.WriteString(gw, content)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, gw.Close())
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, buf.Bytes(), 0o644))
+}

client/internal/debug/debug_nonandroid.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//go:build !android
+//go:build !android && !ios
 
 package debug
 

client/internal/debug/debug_test.go

@@ -843,6 +843,8 @@ func TestAddConfig_AllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T) {
 		"PreSharedKey":      "sensitive: WireGuard pre-shared key",
 		"SSHKey":            "sensitive: SSH private key",
 		"ClientCertKeyPair": "non-config: parsed cert pair, not serialized",
+		"Name":              "non-config: profile name is not needed for debug purposes",
+		"policy":            "non-config: in-memory MDM policy snapshot, surfaced via Config.Policy() / GetConfigResponse.MDMManagedFields",
 	}
 
 	mURL, _ := url.Parse("https://api.example.com:443")
@@ -883,8 +885,10 @@ func TestAddConfig_AllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T) {
 		DNSRouteInterval:              5 * time.Second,
 		ClientCertPath:                "/tmp/cert",
 		ClientCertKeyPath:             "/tmp/key",
-		LazyConnectionEnabled:         true,
+		LazyConnection:                "on",
 		MTU:                           1280,
+		DisableIPv6:                   true,
+		SyncMessageVersion:            func(v int) *int { return &v }(1),
 	}
 
 	for _, anonymize := range []bool{false, true} {

client/internal/debug/uilog_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package debug
+
+import (
+	"archive/zip"
+	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/configs"
+)
+
+// bundleEntries generates a bundle with the given generator and returns the
+// set of entry names in the resulting archive.
+func bundleEntries(t *testing.T, g *BundleGenerator) map[string]struct{} {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	path, err := g.Generate()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Remove(path) })
+
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	zr, err := zip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(data), int64(len(data)))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	names := make(map[string]struct{}, len(zr.File))
+	for _, f := range zr.File {
+		names[f.Name] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	return names
+}
+
+func TestBundleIncludesUILogWhenOpenerAllows(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), configs.UILogFile)
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("gui log"), 0600))
+
+	g := NewBundleGenerator(GeneratorDependencies{
+		UILogPath:   path,
+		UILogOpener: openLogFile,
+	}, BundleConfig{})
+
+	require.Contains(t, bundleEntries(t, g), configs.UILogFile)
+}
+
+// A UILogOpener that refuses (as the ownership check does for a foreign file)
+// keeps the UI log out of the bundle without failing bundle generation.
+func TestBundleExcludesUILogWhenOpenerRefuses(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), configs.UILogFile)
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("secret"), 0600))
+
+	g := NewBundleGenerator(GeneratorDependencies{
+		UILogPath: path,
+		UILogOpener: func(string) (*os.File, error) {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("not owned by the caller")
+		},
+	}, BundleConfig{})
+
+	require.NotContains(t, bundleEntries(t, g), configs.UILogFile)
+}

client/internal/debug/upload.go

@@ -3,10 +3,12 @@ package debug
 import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/tls"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
+	neturl "net/url"
 	"os"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/upload-server/types"
@@ -14,20 +16,80 @@ import (
 
 const maxBundleUploadSize = 50 * 1024 * 1024
 
-func UploadDebugBundle(ctx context.Context, url, managementURL, filePath string) (key string, err error) {
-	response, err := getUploadURL(ctx, url, managementURL)
+// requireHTTPS refuses any URL the daemon would fetch or upload to that is not
+// https. The daemon runs as root and the bundle carries its logs and state, so a
+// plaintext hop is a place to intercept the bundle or the presigned redirect.
+// The server-side gate already enforces this for the desktop path; this also
+// covers the mobile and job-runner callers that reach this package directly.
+// Skipped when the caller opted into an insecure upload (self-hosted server).
+func requireHTTPS(what, rawURL string) error {
+	parsed, err := neturl.Parse(rawURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("parse %s: %w", what, err)
+	}
+	if parsed.Scheme != "https" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s must use https, got scheme %q", what, parsed.Scheme)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// uploadClient returns the HTTP client for the upload requests. The default
+// client verifies TLS and refuses a redirect that would downgrade to a non-https
+// hop, so a bundle can never leave over http after an https start. The insecure
+// variant accepts http and untrusted certificates, and is only reachable for a
+// privileged caller that passed --upload-bundle-insecure (see
+// requirePrivilegeForUploadURL).
+func uploadClient(insecure bool) *http.Client {
+	if !insecure {
+		return &http.Client{CheckRedirect: rejectInsecureRedirect}
+	}
+	return &http.Client{
+		Transport: &http.Transport{
+			//nolint:gosec // opt-in, privileged, self-hosted upload servers
+			TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12},
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// rejectInsecureRedirect refuses a redirect to a non-https target and keeps the
+// standard library's 10-hop limit that a custom CheckRedirect would otherwise
+// disable.
+func rejectInsecureRedirect(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
+	if req.URL.Scheme != "https" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect to non-https URL %s", req.URL.Redacted())
+	}
+	if len(via) >= 10 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("stopped after 10 redirects")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func UploadDebugBundle(ctx context.Context, url, managementURL, filePath string, insecure bool) (key string, err error) {
+	if !insecure {
+		if err := requireHTTPS("upload service URL", url); err != nil {
+			return "", err
+		}
+	}
+
+	response, err := getUploadURL(ctx, url, managementURL, insecure)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", err
 	}
 
-	err = upload(ctx, filePath, response)
+	if !insecure {
+		if err := requireHTTPS("upload URL from service", response.URL); err != nil {
+			return "", err
+		}
+	}
+
+	err = upload(ctx, filePath, response, insecure)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", err
 	}
 	return response.Key, nil
 }
 
-func upload(ctx context.Context, filePath string, response *types.GetURLResponse) error {
+func upload(ctx context.Context, filePath string, response *types.GetURLResponse, insecure bool) error {
 	fileData, err := os.Open(filePath)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("open file: %w", err)
@@ -52,7 +114,7 @@ func upload(ctx context.Context, filePath string, response *types.GetURLResponse
 	req.ContentLength = stat.Size()
 	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
 
-	putResp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+	putResp, err := uploadClient(insecure).Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("upload failed: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -65,16 +127,23 @@ func upload(ctx context.Context, filePath string, response *types.GetURLResponse
 	return nil
 }
 
-func getUploadURL(ctx context.Context, url string, managementURL string) (*types.GetURLResponse, error) {
-	id := getURLHash(managementURL)
-	getReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url+"?id="+id, nil)
+func getUploadURL(ctx context.Context, serviceURL string, managementURL string, insecure bool) (*types.GetURLResponse, error) {
+	parsed, err := neturl.Parse(serviceURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse upload service URL: %w", err)
+	}
+	q := parsed.Query()
+	q.Set("id", getURLHash(managementURL))
+	parsed.RawQuery = q.Encode()
+
+	getReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", parsed.String(), nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("create GET request: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	getReq.Header.Set(types.ClientHeader, types.ClientHeaderValue)
 
-	resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(getReq)
+	resp, err := uploadClient(insecure).Do(getReq)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("get presigned URL: %w", err)
 	}

client/internal/debug/upload_test.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"testing"
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ func TestUpload(t *testing.T) {
 	fileContent := []byte("test file content")
 	err := os.WriteFile(file, fileContent, 0640)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
-	key, err := UploadDebugBundle(context.Background(), testURL+types.GetURLPath, testURL, file)
+	key, err := UploadDebugBundle(context.Background(), testURL+types.GetURLPath, testURL, file, true)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	id := getURLHash(testURL)
 	require.Contains(t, key, id+"/")
@@ -79,3 +80,47 @@ func waitForServer(t *testing.T, addr string) {
 	}
 	t.Fatalf("server did not start listening on %s in time", addr)
 }
+
+func TestRequireHTTPS(t *testing.T) {
+	require.NoError(t, requireHTTPS("upload URL", "https://upload.example/path"))
+	require.Error(t, requireHTTPS("upload URL", "http://upload.example/path"))
+	require.Error(t, requireHTTPS("upload URL", "ftp://upload.example/path"))
+	require.Error(t, requireHTTPS("upload URL", "://malformed"))
+}
+
+func TestRejectInsecureRedirect(t *testing.T) {
+	httpsReq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://a.example/", nil)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, rejectInsecureRedirect(httpsReq, nil), "https redirect target must be allowed")
+
+	httpReq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://a.example/", nil)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Error(t, rejectInsecureRedirect(httpReq, nil), "http redirect target must be refused")
+
+	require.Error(t, rejectInsecureRedirect(httpsReq, make([]*http.Request, 10)), "the 10-redirect limit must be enforced")
+}
+
+// The secure client refuses to follow an https response that redirects to http,
+// so a bundle can't be downgraded onto plaintext mid-flight.
+func TestUploadClientRefusesHTTPSToHTTPRedirect(t *testing.T) {
+	plain := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(plain.Close)
+
+	secure := httptest.NewTLSServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		http.Redirect(w, r, plain.URL, http.StatusFound)
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(secure.Close)
+
+	client := uploadClient(false)
+	// Trust the test server's cert without disabling verification globally.
+	client.Transport = secure.Client().Transport
+
+	resp, err := client.Get(secure.URL)
+	if resp != nil {
+		_ = resp.Body.Close()
+	}
+	require.Error(t, err, "redirect from https to http must be refused")
+	require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "non-https")
+}

client/internal/dns/handler_chain.go

@@ -339,8 +339,7 @@ func (c *HandlerChain) isHandlerMatch(qname string, entry HandlerEntry) bool {
 	case entry.Pattern == ".":
 		return true
 	case entry.IsWildcard:
-		parts := strings.Split(strings.TrimSuffix(qname, entry.Pattern), ".")
-		return len(parts) >= 2 && strings.HasSuffix(qname, entry.Pattern)
+		return strings.HasSuffix(qname, "."+entry.Pattern)
 	default:
 		// For non-wildcard patterns:
 		// If handler wants subdomain matching, allow suffix match

client/internal/dns/handler_chain_test.go

@@ -164,6 +164,54 @@ func TestHandlerChain_ServeDNS_DomainMatching(t *testing.T) {
 			matchSubdomains: true,
 			shouldMatch:     true,
 		},
+		{
+			name:            "wildcard label-boundary mismatch (suffix overlap)",
+			handlerDomain:   "*.b.test.",
+			queryDomain:     "x.ab.test.",
+			isWildcard:      true,
+			matchSubdomains: false,
+			shouldMatch:     false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "wildcard label-boundary match",
+			handlerDomain:   "*.b.test.",
+			queryDomain:     "x.b.test.",
+			isWildcard:      true,
+			matchSubdomains: false,
+			shouldMatch:     true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "wildcard multi-label match",
+			handlerDomain:   "*.b.test.",
+			queryDomain:     "x.y.b.test.",
+			isWildcard:      true,
+			matchSubdomains: false,
+			shouldMatch:     true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "wildcard no match on multi-label apex",
+			handlerDomain:   "*.b.test.",
+			queryDomain:     "b.test.",
+			isWildcard:      true,
+			matchSubdomains: false,
+			shouldMatch:     false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "wildcard no match on unrelated suffix containment",
+			handlerDomain:   "*.example.com.",
+			queryDomain:     "notexample.com.",
+			isWildcard:      true,
+			matchSubdomains: false,
+			shouldMatch:     false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "wildcard accepts pattern registered without trailing dot",
+			handlerDomain:   "*.b.test",
+			queryDomain:     "x.b.test.",
+			isWildcard:      true,
+			matchSubdomains: false,
+			shouldMatch:     true,
+		},
 	}
 
 	for _, tt := range tests {
@@ -273,6 +321,19 @@ func TestHandlerChain_ServeDNS_OverlappingDomains(t *testing.T) {
 			expectedCalls:   1,
 			expectedHandler: 2, // highest priority matching handler should be called
 		},
+		{
+			name: "overlapping wildcard suffixes route to correct handler",
+			handlers: []struct {
+				pattern  string
+				priority int
+			}{
+				{pattern: "*.b.test.", priority: nbdns.PriorityDNSRoute},
+				{pattern: "*.ab.test.", priority: nbdns.PriorityDNSRoute},
+			},
+			queryDomain:     "app.ab.test.",
+			expectedCalls:   1,
+			expectedHandler: 1,
+		},
 		{
 			name: "root zone with specific domain",
 			handlers: []struct {

client/internal/dns/interface_index.go

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+package dns
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+)
+
+func getInterfaceIndex(interfaceName string) (int, error) {
+	iface, err := net.InterfaceByName(interfaceName)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("lookup interface %q: %w", interfaceName, err)
+	}
+
+	return iface.Index, nil
+}

client/internal/dns/interface_index_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+package dns
+
+import (
+	"net"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestGetInterfaceIndexExisting(t *testing.T) {
+	interfaces, err := net.Interfaces()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("list network interfaces: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(interfaces) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("expected at least one network interface")
+	}
+
+	iface := interfaces[0]
+	index, err := getInterfaceIndex(iface.Name)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("look up existing interface %q: %v", iface.Name, err)
+	}
+	if index != iface.Index {
+		t.Fatalf("expected interface index %d, got %d", iface.Index, index)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGetInterfaceIndexMissing(t *testing.T) {
+	index, err := getInterfaceIndex("netbird-interface-that-does-not-exist")
+	if index != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected missing interface index to be 0, got %d", index)
+	}
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected missing interface lookup to return an error")
+	}
+}

client/internal/dns/local/local.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
+	"os"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
@@ -26,6 +27,55 @@ type resolver interface {
 	LookupNetIP(ctx context.Context, network, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error)
 }
 
+// PeerConnectivity reports whether a tunnel IP belongs to a peer the
+// client knows about and whether that peer is currently connected. The
+// local resolver uses this to suppress A/AAAA answers whose RDATA points
+// at a disconnected peer (typical case: a synthesized private-service
+// record pointing at an embedded proxy peer that just went offline).
+//
+// known=false means the IP isn't in the local peerstore at all — the
+// record is left alone (it points at something outside our mesh, e.g.
+// a non-peer upstream).
+type PeerConnectivity interface {
+	IsConnectedByIP(ip netip.Addr) (known, connected bool)
+}
+
+// PeerActivator wakes lazy-connection peers on demand. The local resolver calls
+// it with the tunnel IPs an answer points at, so a peer that is idle (lazily
+// disconnected) starts connecting at DNS-resolution time rather than racing the
+// client's first request packet. nil disables warm-up.
+type PeerActivator interface {
+	// ActivatePeersByIP triggers wake-up for the peer(s) owning addrs and blocks
+	// until one is connected or ctx (a short per-query budget) expires. It is a
+	// fast no-op for unknown or already-connected addresses.
+	ActivatePeersByIP(ctx context.Context, addrs []netip.Addr)
+}
+
+const (
+	defaultLazyWarmupTimeout = 2 * time.Second
+	envLazyWarmupTimeout     = "NB_DNS_LAZY_WARMUP_TIMEOUT"
+)
+
+// lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv returns the per-query budget for waking a
+// lazy-connection peer a DNS answer points at. Tunable via
+// NB_DNS_LAZY_WARMUP_TIMEOUT (a Go duration). Parsed once at construction time.
+func lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv() time.Duration {
+	v := os.Getenv(envLazyWarmupTimeout)
+	if v == "" {
+		return defaultLazyWarmupTimeout
+	}
+	d, err := time.ParseDuration(v)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("invalid %s value %q, using default %s: %v", envLazyWarmupTimeout, v, defaultLazyWarmupTimeout, err)
+		return defaultLazyWarmupTimeout
+	}
+	if d <= 0 {
+		log.Warnf("non-positive %s value %q, using default %s", envLazyWarmupTimeout, v, defaultLazyWarmupTimeout)
+		return defaultLazyWarmupTimeout
+	}
+	return d
+}
+
 type Resolver struct {
 	mu      sync.RWMutex
 	records map[dns.Question][]dns.RR
@@ -33,6 +83,17 @@ type Resolver struct {
 	// zones maps zone domain -> NonAuthoritative (true = non-authoritative, user-created zone)
 	zones    map[domain.Domain]bool
 	resolver resolver
+	// peerConn, when non-nil, is consulted on every A/AAAA answer to
+	// drop records pointing at disconnected peers. nil disables the
+	// filter and preserves the legacy "return whatever is registered"
+	// behaviour for callers that never wire a status source.
+	peerConn PeerConnectivity
+	// peerActivator, when non-nil, is called at resolution time to warm the
+	// lazy connection to the peer(s) an answer points at. nil disables warm-up.
+	peerActivator PeerActivator
+	// warmupTimeout is the per-query budget for the lazy-connection warm-up
+	// wait, resolved from the environment once at construction time.
+	warmupTimeout time.Duration
 
 	ctx    context.Context
 	cancel context.CancelFunc
@@ -41,14 +102,32 @@ type Resolver struct {
 func NewResolver() *Resolver {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	return &Resolver{
-		records: make(map[dns.Question][]dns.RR),
-		domains: make(map[domain.Domain]struct{}),
-		zones:   make(map[domain.Domain]bool),
-		ctx:     ctx,
-		cancel:  cancel,
+		records:       make(map[dns.Question][]dns.RR),
+		domains:       make(map[domain.Domain]struct{}),
+		zones:         make(map[domain.Domain]bool),
+		warmupTimeout: lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv(),
+		ctx:           ctx,
+		cancel:        cancel,
 	}
 }
 
+// SetPeerConnectivity wires the per-IP connectivity check used to filter
+// out A/AAAA answers pointing at disconnected peers. Pass nil to disable.
+// Safe to call multiple times; the latest value wins.
+func (d *Resolver) SetPeerConnectivity(p PeerConnectivity) {
+	d.mu.Lock()
+	defer d.mu.Unlock()
+	d.peerConn = p
+}
+
+// SetPeerActivator wires the DNS-time lazy-connection warm-up. Pass nil to
+// disable. Safe to call multiple times; the latest value wins.
+func (d *Resolver) SetPeerActivator(a PeerActivator) {
+	d.mu.Lock()
+	defer d.mu.Unlock()
+	d.peerActivator = a
+}
+
 func (d *Resolver) MatchSubdomains() bool {
 	return true
 }
@@ -95,6 +174,10 @@ func (d *Resolver) ServeDNS(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
 	replyMessage.RecursionAvailable = true
 
 	result := d.lookupRecords(logger, question)
+	// Warm before filtering: activation flips a lazily-idle target to connected,
+	// which then lets it survive the disconnected-peer filter below.
+	d.warmLazyPeers(question, result.records)
+	result.records = d.filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers(logger, question, result.records)
 	replyMessage.Authoritative = !result.hasExternalData
 	replyMessage.Answer = result.records
 	replyMessage.Rcode = d.determineRcode(question, result)
@@ -436,6 +519,113 @@ func (d *Resolver) logDNSError(logger *log.Entry, hostname string, qtype uint16,
 	}
 }
 
+// filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers drops A/AAAA records whose RDATA matches
+// a known but disconnected peer. The synthesized private-service zones
+// emit one A record per connected proxy peer in a cluster; when a peer
+// goes offline, the server-side refresh removes the record from the
+// next netmap, but the client may still hold the previous netmap for a
+// short window. This filter is the local belt to that braces — even on
+// the stale netmap, the resolver hides the offline target.
+//
+// Records pointing at unknown IPs (outside the local peerstore, e.g.
+// non-mesh upstreams) are never dropped. Non-A/AAAA records pass
+// through untouched.
+//
+// Escape hatch: if filtering would leave the answer empty AND at least
+// one record was filtered, the original list is returned. Better to
+// hand the client a record that may not respond than NXDOMAIN it
+// completely when every proxy peer is offline (the upstream may still
+// be reachable some other way, or the peerstore may be stale).
+func (d *Resolver) filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers(logger *log.Entry, question dns.Question, records []dns.RR) []dns.RR {
+	if len(records) < 2 {
+		return records
+	}
+	d.mu.RLock()
+	checker := d.peerConn
+	d.mu.RUnlock()
+	if checker == nil {
+		return records
+	}
+
+	kept := make([]dns.RR, 0, len(records))
+	var dropped int
+	for _, rr := range records {
+		ip, ok := extractRecordAddr(rr)
+		if !ok {
+			kept = append(kept, rr)
+			continue
+		}
+		known, connected := checker.IsConnectedByIP(ip)
+		if known && !connected {
+			dropped++
+			continue
+		}
+		kept = append(kept, rr)
+	}
+	if dropped == 0 {
+		return records
+	}
+	if len(kept) == 0 {
+		logger.Debugf("all %d answers for %s point at disconnected peers; returning the original list", dropped, question.Name)
+		return records
+	}
+	logger.Tracef("dropped %d disconnected-peer answer(s) for %s, returning %d", dropped, question.Name, len(kept))
+	return kept
+}
+
+// warmLazyPeers triggers lazy-connection wake-up for the peers a resolved
+// answer points at and waits briefly for one to connect, so the caller's first
+// request doesn't race the connection establishment. Warm-up is scoped to
+// match-only (non-authoritative) zones — the synthesized private-service zones
+// and user-created zones whose records point at specific peers. The account's
+// peer zone is authoritative, so plain peer-name lookups never trigger warm-up;
+// otherwise resolving any peer's name would wake its idle connection, defeating
+// laziness mesh-wide. No-op when no activator is wired (lazy connections
+// disabled) or the answer carries no peer IPs.
+func (d *Resolver) warmLazyPeers(question dns.Question, records []dns.RR) {
+	if len(records) < 2 {
+		return
+	}
+	d.mu.RLock()
+	activator := d.peerActivator
+	var nonAuth, found bool
+	if activator != nil {
+		nonAuth, found = d.findZone(question.Name)
+	}
+	d.mu.RUnlock()
+	if activator == nil || !found || !nonAuth {
+		return
+	}
+
+	var addrs []netip.Addr
+	for _, rr := range records {
+		if addr, ok := extractRecordAddr(rr); ok {
+			addrs = append(addrs, addr)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(addrs) == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(d.ctx, d.warmupTimeout)
+	defer cancel()
+	activator.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, addrs)
+}
+
+// extractRecordAddr returns the IP address carried by an A or AAAA record.
+// ok is false for any other record type or a record with no address.
+func extractRecordAddr(rr dns.RR) (netip.Addr, bool) {
+	switch r := rr.(type) {
+	case *dns.A:
+		addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(r.A)
+		return addr.Unmap(), ok
+	case *dns.AAAA:
+		addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(r.AAAA)
+		return addr.Unmap(), ok
+	}
+	return netip.Addr{}, false
+}
+
 // Update replaces all zones and their records
 func (d *Resolver) Update(customZones []nbdns.CustomZone) {
 	d.mu.Lock()

client/internal/dns/local/local_test.go

@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@ func (m *mockResolver) LookupNetIP(ctx context.Context, network, host string) ([
 	return nil, nil
 }
 
+// mockPeerConnectivity returns canned (known, connected) results per IP.
+// Used by the disconnected-peer filter tests below. IPs not in the map
+// are reported as unknown so the filter leaves them alone.
+type mockPeerConnectivity struct {
+	byIP map[string]struct{ known, connected bool }
+}
+
+func (m mockPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip netip.Addr) (known, connected bool) {
+	v, ok := m.byIP[ip.String()]
+	if !ok {
+		return false, false
+	}
+	return v.known, v.connected
+}
+
 func TestLocalResolver_ServeDNS(t *testing.T) {
 	recordA := nbdns.SimpleRecord{
 		Name:  "peera.netbird.cloud.",
@@ -2652,3 +2667,125 @@ func BenchmarkIsInManagedZone_ManyZones(b *testing.B) {
 		resolver.isInManagedZone(qname)
 	}
 }
+
+// TestLocalResolver_FilterDisconnectedPeerAnswers verifies the
+// connectivity-aware filtering layered on top of lookupRecords:
+// when an A record's IP belongs to a known peer that's disconnected,
+// the record is dropped from the answer. Records for unknown IPs pass
+// through. If filtering would empty the answer entirely and at least
+// one record was dropped, the original list is restored (escape hatch
+// for the "all proxies offline" case).
+func TestLocalResolver_FilterDisconnectedPeerAnswers(t *testing.T) {
+	zone := "svc.cluster.netbird."
+	connectedRec := nbdns.SimpleRecord{
+		Name:  zone,
+		Type:  int(dns.TypeA),
+		Class: nbdns.DefaultClass,
+		TTL:   5,
+		RData: "100.64.0.10",
+	}
+	disconnectedRec := nbdns.SimpleRecord{
+		Name:  zone,
+		Type:  int(dns.TypeA),
+		Class: nbdns.DefaultClass,
+		TTL:   5,
+		RData: "100.64.0.11",
+	}
+	unknownRec := nbdns.SimpleRecord{
+		Name:  zone,
+		Type:  int(dns.TypeA),
+		Class: nbdns.DefaultClass,
+		TTL:   5,
+		RData: "203.0.113.5",
+	}
+
+	type ipState struct{ known, connected bool }
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		records     []nbdns.SimpleRecord
+		connByIP    map[string]ipState
+		wantInOrder []string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:    "drops disconnected peer, keeps connected",
+			records: []nbdns.SimpleRecord{connectedRec, disconnectedRec},
+			connByIP: map[string]ipState{
+				"100.64.0.10": {known: true, connected: true},
+				"100.64.0.11": {known: true, connected: false},
+			},
+			wantInOrder: []string{"100.64.0.10"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "unknown IPs pass through untouched",
+			records: []nbdns.SimpleRecord{unknownRec, disconnectedRec},
+			connByIP: map[string]ipState{
+				"100.64.0.11": {known: true, connected: false},
+			},
+			wantInOrder: []string{"203.0.113.5"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "all disconnected falls back to original list",
+			records: []nbdns.SimpleRecord{disconnectedRec, connectedRec},
+			connByIP: map[string]ipState{
+				"100.64.0.10": {known: true, connected: false},
+				"100.64.0.11": {known: true, connected: false},
+			},
+			wantInOrder: []string{"100.64.0.11", "100.64.0.10"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "no checker wired returns all records",
+			records:     []nbdns.SimpleRecord{connectedRec, disconnectedRec},
+			connByIP:    nil,
+			wantInOrder: []string{"100.64.0.10", "100.64.0.11"},
+		},
+		{
+			// A single answer is never filtered: dropping it would only
+			// trigger the empty-answer escape hatch, so the fast path
+			// returns it untouched.
+			name:    "single disconnected answer passes through",
+			records: []nbdns.SimpleRecord{disconnectedRec},
+			connByIP: map[string]ipState{
+				"100.64.0.11": {known: true, connected: false},
+			},
+			wantInOrder: []string{"100.64.0.11"},
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			resolver := NewResolver()
+			if tc.connByIP != nil {
+				cm := mockPeerConnectivity{byIP: make(map[string]struct{ known, connected bool }, len(tc.connByIP))}
+				for ip, st := range tc.connByIP {
+					cm.byIP[ip] = struct{ known, connected bool }{st.known, st.connected}
+				}
+				resolver.SetPeerConnectivity(cm)
+			}
+			resolver.Update([]nbdns.CustomZone{{
+				Domain:           strings.TrimSuffix(zone, "."),
+				Records:          tc.records,
+				NonAuthoritative: true,
+			}})
+
+			var got *dns.Msg
+			writer := &test.MockResponseWriter{
+				WriteMsgFunc: func(m *dns.Msg) error {
+					got = m
+					return nil
+				},
+			}
+			req := new(dns.Msg).SetQuestion(zone, dns.TypeA)
+			resolver.ServeDNS(writer, req)
+
+			require.NotNil(t, got, "resolver must produce a response")
+			require.Len(t, got.Answer, len(tc.wantInOrder),
+				"answer count must match expected: %v", tc.wantInOrder)
+			for i, want := range tc.wantInOrder {
+				a, ok := got.Answer[i].(*dns.A)
+				require.True(t, ok, "answer[%d] must be an A record", i)
+				assert.Equal(t, want, a.A.String(),
+					"answer[%d] expected %s got %s", i, want, a.A.String())
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

client/internal/dns/local/warmup_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+package local
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net"
+	"net/netip"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/miekg/dns"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/test"
+	nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
+)
+
+// recordingActivator records the addresses it was asked to warm and returns
+// immediately, so ServeDNS is not blocked by the test.
+type recordingActivator struct {
+	mu     sync.Mutex
+	called bool
+	addrs  []netip.Addr
+}
+
+func (r *recordingActivator) ActivatePeersByIP(_ context.Context, addrs []netip.Addr) {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	r.called = true
+	r.addrs = append(r.addrs, addrs...)
+}
+
+func serveA(t *testing.T, resolver *Resolver, name string) *dns.Msg {
+	t.Helper()
+	var resp *dns.Msg
+	w := &test.MockResponseWriter{WriteMsgFunc: func(m *dns.Msg) error { resp = m; return nil }}
+	resolver.ServeDNS(w, new(dns.Msg).SetQuestion(name, dns.TypeA))
+	return resp
+}
+
+// serviceZone registers rec in a match-only (non-authoritative) zone, the shape
+// the synthesized private-service zones arrive in.
+func serviceZone(t *testing.T, resolver *Resolver, zone string, records ...nbdns.SimpleRecord) {
+	t.Helper()
+	resolver.Update([]nbdns.CustomZone{{
+		Domain:           zone,
+		Records:          records,
+		NonAuthoritative: true,
+	}})
+}
+
+func TestLocalResolver_WarmsLazyPeerOnResolve(t *testing.T) {
+	// Warm-up fires only for multi-record answers (the HA / round-robin shape of
+	// the synthesized private-service zones), so register two peer targets.
+	const name = "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud."
+	recs := []nbdns.SimpleRecord{
+		{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"},
+		{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.8"},
+	}
+	resolver := NewResolver()
+	serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud", recs...)
+
+	act := &recordingActivator{}
+	resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
+
+	resp := serveA(t, resolver, name)
+	require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must answer")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A records")
+
+	act.mu.Lock()
+	defer act.mu.Unlock()
+	assert.True(t, act.called, "activator must be invoked for a multi-record service-zone answer")
+	assert.Contains(t, act.addrs, netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.7"), "activator must receive the first peer IP")
+	assert.Contains(t, act.addrs, netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.8"), "activator must receive the second peer IP")
+}
+
+func TestLocalResolver_NoWarmupForSingleRecord(t *testing.T) {
+	// A single-record answer does not trigger warm-up; the resolver only warms
+	// multi-record answers.
+	rec := nbdns.SimpleRecord{Name: "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud.", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"}
+	resolver := NewResolver()
+	serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud", rec)
+
+	act := &recordingActivator{}
+	resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
+
+	resp := serveA(t, resolver, rec.Name)
+	require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must answer")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A record")
+
+	act.mu.Lock()
+	defer act.mu.Unlock()
+	assert.False(t, act.called, "activator must not be invoked for a single-record answer")
+}
+
+func TestLocalResolver_NoActivatorNoWarmup(t *testing.T) {
+	// With no activator wired the resolver behaves exactly as before.
+	rec := nbdns.SimpleRecord{Name: "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud.", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"}
+	resolver := NewResolver()
+	serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud", rec)
+
+	resp := serveA(t, resolver, rec.Name)
+	require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must still answer without an activator")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A record")
+}
+
+func TestLocalResolver_NoWarmupForMissingRecord(t *testing.T) {
+	// A query that resolves to nothing must not invoke the activator (no IPs).
+	resolver := NewResolver()
+	serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud",
+		nbdns.SimpleRecord{Name: "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud.", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"})
+
+	act := &recordingActivator{}
+	resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
+
+	serveA(t, resolver, "absent.proxy.netbird.cloud.")
+
+	act.mu.Lock()
+	defer act.mu.Unlock()
+	assert.False(t, act.called, "activator must not be invoked when there is no answer")
+}
+
+func TestLocalResolver_NoWarmupInAuthoritativeZone(t *testing.T) {
+	// The account's peer zone is authoritative; resolving a peer's name there
+	// must not wake its lazy connection — warm-up is scoped to match-only
+	// (non-authoritative) zones such as the synthesized private-service zones.
+	// Use a multi-record answer so the authoritative-zone scoping is the only
+	// reason warm-up is skipped, not the single-record guard.
+	const name = "peer.netbird.cloud."
+	recs := []nbdns.SimpleRecord{
+		{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.9"},
+		{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.10"},
+	}
+	resolver := NewResolver()
+	resolver.Update([]nbdns.CustomZone{{
+		Domain:  "netbird.cloud",
+		Records: recs,
+	}})
+
+	act := &recordingActivator{}
+	resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
+
+	resp := serveA(t, resolver, name)
+	require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must answer")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A records")
+
+	act.mu.Lock()
+	defer act.mu.Unlock()
+	assert.False(t, act.called, "activator must not be invoked for authoritative-zone answers")
+}
+
+func TestLazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name   string
+		value  string
+		envSet bool
+		want   time.Duration
+	}{
+		{name: "unset uses default", want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
+		{name: "valid overrides", value: "5s", envSet: true, want: 5 * time.Second},
+		{name: "invalid falls back", value: "not-a-duration", envSet: true, want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
+		{name: "negative falls back", value: "-1s", envSet: true, want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
+		{name: "zero falls back", value: "0s", envSet: true, want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			if tt.envSet {
+				t.Setenv(envLazyWarmupTimeout, tt.value)
+			}
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.want, lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv())
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.want, NewResolver().warmupTimeout, "constructor must resolve the timeout once")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExtractRecordAddr(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("A record yields unmapped v4", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// net.ParseIP returns the 16-byte v4-in-v6 form, the same shape
+		// miekg/dns stores after parsing an A record; the extracted address
+		// must compare equal to a plain v4 netip.Addr.
+		addr, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.A{A: net.ParseIP("100.64.0.7")})
+		require.True(t, ok)
+		assert.True(t, addr.Is4())
+		assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.7"), addr)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("AAAA record yields v6", func(t *testing.T) {
+		addr, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.AAAA{AAAA: net.ParseIP("fd00::1")})
+		require.True(t, ok)
+		assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"), addr)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("A record without address", func(t *testing.T) {
+		_, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.A{})
+		assert.False(t, ok)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("non-address record", func(t *testing.T) {
+		_, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.CNAME{Target: "target.netbird.cloud."})
+		assert.False(t, ok)
+	})
+}

client/internal/dns/mgmt/mgmt.go

@@ -51,13 +51,20 @@ type cachedRecord struct {
 }
 
 // Resolver caches critical NetBird infrastructure domains.
-// records, refreshing, mgmtDomain and serverDomains are all guarded by mutex.
+// records, refreshing, failedResolves, mgmtDomain and serverDomains are all
+// guarded by mutex.
 type Resolver struct {
 	records       map[dns.Question]*cachedRecord
 	mgmtDomain    *domain.Domain
 	serverDomains *dnsconfig.ServerDomains
 	mutex         sync.RWMutex
 
+	// failedResolves records the last failed initial resolve per domain so a
+	// domain that never resolves isn't retried on every server-domains update
+	// until refreshBackoff elapses. Entries are cleared on success and pruned
+	// to the current server-domains set.
+	failedResolves map[domain.Domain]time.Time
+
 	chain            ChainResolver
 	chainMaxPriority int
 	refreshGroup     singleflight.Group
@@ -76,9 +83,10 @@ type Resolver struct {
 // NewResolver creates a new management domains cache resolver.
 func NewResolver() *Resolver {
 	return &Resolver{
-		records:    make(map[dns.Question]*cachedRecord),
-		refreshing: make(map[dns.Question]*atomic.Bool),
-		cacheTTL:   resolveCacheTTL(),
+		records:        make(map[dns.Question]*cachedRecord),
+		refreshing:     make(map[dns.Question]*atomic.Bool),
+		failedResolves: make(map[domain.Domain]time.Time),
+		cacheTTL:       resolveCacheTTL(),
 	}
 }
 
@@ -173,7 +181,9 @@ func (m *Resolver) continueToNext(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
 
 // AddDomain resolves a domain and stores its A/AAAA records in the cache.
 // A family that resolves NODATA (nil err, zero records) evicts any stale
-// entry for that qtype.
+// entry for that qtype. When one family hard-errors while the other succeeds,
+// the resolved family is still cached but AddDomain returns an error so the
+// caller retries the incomplete resolve rather than treating it as complete.
 func (m *Resolver) AddDomain(ctx context.Context, d domain.Domain) error {
 	dnsName := strings.ToLower(dns.Fqdn(d.PunycodeString()))
 
@@ -203,6 +213,10 @@ func (m *Resolver) AddDomain(ctx context.Context, d domain.Domain) error {
 	log.Debugf("added/updated domain=%s with %d A records and %d AAAA records",
 		d.SafeString(), len(aRecords), len(aaaaRecords))
 
+	if errA != nil || errAAAA != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("resolve %s: incomplete, a family failed: %w", d.SafeString(), errors.Join(errA, errAAAA))
+	}
+
 	return nil
 }
 
@@ -462,6 +476,7 @@ func (m *Resolver) RemoveDomain(d domain.Domain) error {
 	delete(m.records, qAAAA)
 	delete(m.refreshing, qA)
 	delete(m.refreshing, qAAAA)
+	delete(m.failedResolves, d)
 
 	log.Debugf("removed domain=%s from cache", d.SafeString())
 	return nil
@@ -505,6 +520,7 @@ func (m *Resolver) UpdateFromServerDomains(ctx context.Context, serverDomains dn
 		allDomains := m.extractDomainsFromServerDomains(updatedServerDomains)
 		currentDomains := m.GetCachedDomains()
 		removedDomains = m.removeStaleDomains(currentDomains, allDomains)
+		m.pruneFailedResolves(allDomains)
 	}
 
 	m.addNewDomains(ctx, newDomains)
@@ -577,13 +593,85 @@ func (m *Resolver) isManagementDomain(domain domain.Domain) bool {
 	return m.mgmtDomain != nil && domain == *m.mgmtDomain
 }
 
-// addNewDomains resolves and caches all domains from the update
+// addNewDomains resolves and caches domains that are not yet in the cache,
+// running the lookups concurrently. Domains already cached are skipped and left
+// to the stale-while-revalidate refresh path, so a sync never re-resolves them
+// synchronously: once NetBird owns the OS resolver the resolve runs through the
+// handler chain and would otherwise dial the managed upstreams under the engine
+// sync lock on every update.
 func (m *Resolver) addNewDomains(ctx context.Context, newDomains domain.List) {
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	seen := make(map[domain.Domain]struct{}, len(newDomains))
 	for _, newDomain := range newDomains {
-		if err := m.AddDomain(ctx, newDomain); err != nil {
-			log.Warnf("failed to add/update domain=%s: %v", newDomain.SafeString(), err)
-		} else {
-			log.Debugf("added/updated management cache domain=%s", newDomain.SafeString())
+		if _, dup := seen[newDomain]; dup {
+			continue
+		}
+		seen[newDomain] = struct{}{}
+
+		if !m.needsResolve(newDomain) {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(d domain.Domain) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			if err := m.AddDomain(ctx, d); err != nil {
+				m.markResolveFailed(d)
+				log.Warnf("failed to add/update domain=%s: %v", d.SafeString(), err)
+				return
+			}
+			m.clearResolveFailed(d)
+			log.Debugf("added/updated management cache domain=%s", d.SafeString())
+		}(newDomain)
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+}
+
+// needsResolve reports whether d should be resolved now. A recent failed or
+// incomplete resolve gates retries on the backoff even when one family is
+// already cached, so a transiently-failed family is retried instead of being
+// treated as fully resolved. Otherwise a domain with any cached record is left
+// to the stale-while-revalidate refresh path.
+func (m *Resolver) needsResolve(d domain.Domain) bool {
+	dnsName := strings.ToLower(dns.Fqdn(d.PunycodeString()))
+
+	m.mutex.RLock()
+	defer m.mutex.RUnlock()
+
+	if failedAt, ok := m.failedResolves[d]; ok {
+		return time.Since(failedAt) >= refreshBackoff
+	}
+
+	for _, qtype := range []uint16{dns.TypeA, dns.TypeAAAA} {
+		q := dns.Question{Name: dnsName, Qtype: qtype, Qclass: dns.ClassINET}
+		if _, ok := m.records[q]; ok {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func (m *Resolver) markResolveFailed(d domain.Domain) {
+	m.mutex.Lock()
+	m.failedResolves[d] = time.Now()
+	m.mutex.Unlock()
+}
+
+func (m *Resolver) clearResolveFailed(d domain.Domain) {
+	m.mutex.Lock()
+	delete(m.failedResolves, d)
+	m.mutex.Unlock()
+}
+
+// pruneFailedResolves drops failure markers for domains no longer present in
+// the server-domains set, keeping the map bounded to the current set (a
+// failed-only domain has no cached record, so RemoveDomain never sees it).
+func (m *Resolver) pruneFailedResolves(domains domain.List) {
+	m.mutex.Lock()
+	defer m.mutex.Unlock()
+	for d := range m.failedResolves {
+		if !slices.Contains(domains, d) {
+			delete(m.failedResolves, d)
 		}
 	}
 }

client/internal/dns/mgmt/mgmt_refresh_test.go

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ type fakeChain struct {
 	mu       sync.Mutex
 	calls    map[string]int
 	answers  map[string][]dns.RR
+	qErr     map[string]error
 	err      error
 	hasRoot  bool
 	onLookup func()
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ func newFakeChain() *fakeChain {
 	return &fakeChain{
 		calls:   map[string]int{},
 		answers: map[string][]dns.RR{},
+		qErr:    map[string]error{},
 		hasRoot: true,
 	}
 }
@@ -47,6 +49,9 @@ func (f *fakeChain) ResolveInternal(ctx context.Context, msg *dns.Msg, maxPriori
 	f.calls[key]++
 	answers := f.answers[key]
 	err := f.err
+	if err == nil {
+		err = f.qErr[key]
+	}
 	onLookup := f.onLookup
 	f.mu.Unlock()
 
@@ -75,6 +80,12 @@ func (f *fakeChain) setAnswer(name string, qtype uint16, ip string) {
 	}
 }
 
+func (f *fakeChain) setErr(name string, qtype uint16, err error) {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	defer f.mu.Unlock()
+	f.qErr[name+"|"+dns.TypeToString[qtype]] = err
+}
+
 func (f *fakeChain) callCount(name string, qtype uint16) int {
 	f.mu.Lock()
 	defer f.mu.Unlock()

client/internal/dns/mgmt/mgmt_resolve_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+package mgmt
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/miekg/dns"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	dnsconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/config"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
+)
+
+// A domain already in the cache must not be re-resolved on a subsequent server
+// domains update; it is left to the stale-while-revalidate refresh path.
+func TestResolver_UpdateFromServerDomains_SkipsCached(t *testing.T) {
+	r := NewResolver()
+	chain := newFakeChain()
+	chain.setAnswer("signal.example.com.", dns.TypeA, "10.0.0.2")
+	r.SetChainResolver(chain, 50)
+
+	sd := dnsconfig.ServerDomains{Signal: domain.Domain("signal.example.com")}
+
+	_, err := r.UpdateFromServerDomains(context.Background(), sd)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, 1, chain.callCount("signal.example.com.", dns.TypeA),
+		"first update must resolve the domain")
+
+	_, err = r.UpdateFromServerDomains(context.Background(), sd)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, chain.callCount("signal.example.com.", dns.TypeA),
+		"cached domain must not be re-resolved on a subsequent update")
+}
+
+// New domains in a single update must resolve concurrently rather than serially.
+func TestResolver_AddNewDomains_ResolvesConcurrently(t *testing.T) {
+	r := NewResolver()
+	chain := newFakeChain()
+
+	var inflight, maxInflight atomic.Int32
+	chain.onLookup = func() {
+		n := inflight.Add(1)
+		for {
+			old := maxInflight.Load()
+			if n <= old || maxInflight.CompareAndSwap(old, n) {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
+		inflight.Add(-1)
+	}
+
+	relays := []domain.Domain{"a.example.com", "b.example.com", "c.example.com", "d.example.com"}
+	for _, d := range relays {
+		chain.setAnswer(dns.Fqdn(string(d)), dns.TypeA, "10.0.0.2")
+	}
+	r.SetChainResolver(chain, 50)
+
+	start := time.Now()
+	_, err := r.UpdateFromServerDomains(context.Background(), dnsconfig.ServerDomains{Relay: relays})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	elapsed := time.Since(start)
+
+	assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, int(maxInflight.Load()), 2, "domains must resolve concurrently")
+	// Serial resolution of 4 domains would take at least 4*50ms; concurrent is far less.
+	assert.Less(t, elapsed, 300*time.Millisecond, "resolution should not be serial")
+}
+
+// A domain that fails to resolve must not be retried on every update; the
+// failure backoff suppresses re-resolution until it expires.
+func TestResolver_UpdateFromServerDomains_BacksOffFailures(t *testing.T) {
+	r := NewResolver()
+	chain := newFakeChain()
+	chain.err = errors.New("resolve boom")
+	r.SetChainResolver(chain, 50)
+
+	sd := dnsconfig.ServerDomains{Signal: domain.Domain("signal.example.com")}
+
+	_, err := r.UpdateFromServerDomains(context.Background(), sd)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, 1, chain.callCount("signal.example.com.", dns.TypeA),
+		"first update must attempt the resolve")
+
+	_, err = r.UpdateFromServerDomains(context.Background(), sd)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, chain.callCount("signal.example.com.", dns.TypeA),
+		"failed resolve must back off and not retry on the next update")
+}
+
+// A domain listed under more than one server-domain type (e.g. STUN and TURN on
+// the same host) must be resolved once per update, not once per occurrence.
+func TestResolver_AddNewDomains_DedupesDuplicateDomains(t *testing.T) {
+	r := NewResolver()
+	chain := newFakeChain()
+	chain.setAnswer("dup.example.com.", dns.TypeA, "10.0.0.9")
+	r.SetChainResolver(chain, 50)
+
+	sd := dnsconfig.ServerDomains{
+		Stuns: []domain.Domain{"dup.example.com"},
+		Turns: []domain.Domain{"dup.example.com"},
+	}
+
+	_, err := r.UpdateFromServerDomains(context.Background(), sd)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, chain.callCount("dup.example.com.", dns.TypeA),
+		"a domain appearing under multiple server-domain types must resolve once")
+}
+
+// A failure marker must be dropped once its domain leaves the server-domains set
+// so the map stays bounded to the current set.
+func TestResolver_UpdateFromServerDomains_PrunesFailedResolves(t *testing.T) {
+	r := NewResolver()
+	chain := newFakeChain()
+	chain.err = errors.New("resolve boom")
+	r.SetChainResolver(chain, 50)
+
+	_, err := r.UpdateFromServerDomains(context.Background(), dnsconfig.ServerDomains{Signal: domain.Domain("gone.example.com")})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	r.mutex.RLock()
+	_, marked := r.failedResolves[domain.Domain("gone.example.com")]
+	r.mutex.RUnlock()
+	require.True(t, marked, "failed resolve must be recorded")
+
+	_, err = r.UpdateFromServerDomains(context.Background(), dnsconfig.ServerDomains{Signal: domain.Domain("other.example.com")})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	r.mutex.RLock()
+	_, stillMarked := r.failedResolves[domain.Domain("gone.example.com")]
+	r.mutex.RUnlock()
+	assert.False(t, stillMarked, "failure marker for a domain no longer in the set must be pruned")
+}
+
+// When one family hard-errors while the other resolves, the domain is cached
+// for the working family but recorded as incomplete so the failed family is
+// retried under backoff instead of being treated as fully resolved forever.
+func TestResolver_AddNewDomains_RetriesPartialFamilyFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	d := domain.Domain("relay.example.com")
+	r := NewResolver()
+	chain := newFakeChain()
+	chain.setAnswer("relay.example.com.", dns.TypeA, "10.0.0.2")
+	chain.setErr("relay.example.com.", dns.TypeAAAA, errors.New("servfail"))
+	r.SetChainResolver(chain, 50)
+
+	_, err := r.UpdateFromServerDomains(context.Background(), dnsconfig.ServerDomains{Relay: []domain.Domain{d}})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	r.mutex.RLock()
+	_, aCached := r.records[dns.Question{Name: "relay.example.com.", Qtype: dns.TypeA, Qclass: dns.ClassINET}]
+	_, marked := r.failedResolves[d]
+	r.mutex.RUnlock()
+	require.True(t, aCached, "the working family must still be cached")
+	require.True(t, marked, "a partial failure must be recorded so the failed family is retried")
+
+	assert.False(t, r.needsResolve(d), "within the backoff window the domain is not retried")
+
+	r.mutex.Lock()
+	r.failedResolves[d] = time.Now().Add(-2 * refreshBackoff)
+	r.mutex.Unlock()
+	assert.True(t, r.needsResolve(d), "after the backoff elapses the domain is retried to pick up the missing family")
+}
+
+// A family that returns NODATA (legitimately absent, e.g. an IPv4-only host) is
+// not a failure: the domain must not be marked for retry, otherwise it would be
+// re-resolved on every sync.
+func TestResolver_AddNewDomains_NodataIsNotFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	d := domain.Domain("v4only.example.com")
+	r := NewResolver()
+	chain := newFakeChain()
+	chain.setAnswer("v4only.example.com.", dns.TypeA, "10.0.0.2")
+	r.SetChainResolver(chain, 50)
+
+	_, err := r.UpdateFromServerDomains(context.Background(), dnsconfig.ServerDomains{Relay: []domain.Domain{d}})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	r.mutex.RLock()
+	_, marked := r.failedResolves[d]
+	r.mutex.RUnlock()
+	assert.False(t, marked, "a NODATA family must not be recorded as a failure")
+	assert.False(t, r.needsResolve(d), "an IPv4-only host must not be re-resolved on later syncs")
+}

client/internal/dns/mock_server.go

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/miekg/dns"
 
 	dnsconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/config"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/local"
 	nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
@@ -92,6 +93,11 @@ func (m *MockServer) SetFirewall(Firewall) {
 	// Mock implementation - no-op
 }
 
+// SetPeerActivator mock implementation of SetPeerActivator from Server interface
+func (m *MockServer) SetPeerActivator(local.PeerActivator) {
+	// Mock implementation - no-op
+}
+
 // BeginBatch mock implementation of BeginBatch from Server interface
 func (m *MockServer) BeginBatch() {
 	// Mock implementation - no-op

client/internal/dns/notifier.go

@@ -51,7 +51,5 @@ func (n *notifier) notify() {
 		return
 	}
 
-	go func(l listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
-		l.OnNetworkChanged("")
-	}(n.listener)
+	n.listener.OnNetworkChanged("")
 }

client/internal/dns/resutil/resolve.go

@@ -8,12 +8,17 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
+	"slices"
 	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/miekg/dns"
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 )
 
+// errNoSuitableAddress mirrors the unexported error string the net package
+// uses when a resolved host has no addresses of the requested family.
+const errNoSuitableAddress = "no suitable address found"
+
 // GenerateRequestID creates a random 8-character hex string for request tracing.
 func GenerateRequestID() string {
 	bytes := make([]byte, 4)
@@ -126,6 +131,14 @@ func LookupIP(ctx context.Context, r resolver, network, host string, qtype uint1
 }
 
 func getRcodeForError(ctx context.Context, r resolver, host string, qtype uint16, err error) int {
+	// The net package returns this AddrError when the host resolves but has
+	// no addresses of the requested family. The domain exists, so answer
+	// NODATA instead of SERVFAIL.
+	var addrErr *net.AddrError
+	if errors.As(err, &addrErr) && addrErr.Err == errNoSuitableAddress {
+		return dns.RcodeSuccess
+	}
+
 	var dnsErr *net.DNSError
 	if !errors.As(err, &dnsErr) {
 		return dns.RcodeServerFailure
@@ -155,7 +168,10 @@ func getRcodeForNotFound(ctx context.Context, r resolver, domain string, origina
 	case dns.TypeA:
 		alternativeNetwork = "ip6"
 	default:
-		return dns.RcodeNameError
+		// Non-address types reach LookupIP only unexpectedly; without an
+		// address pair to probe we cannot prove the name is absent, so answer
+		// NODATA rather than a poisoning NXDOMAIN.
+		return dns.RcodeSuccess
 	}
 
 	if _, err := r.LookupNetIP(ctx, alternativeNetwork, domain); err != nil {
@@ -172,6 +188,230 @@ func getRcodeForNotFound(ctx context.Context, r resolver, domain string, origina
 	return dns.RcodeSuccess
 }
 
+// RecordResolver is the host resolver surface used to forward non-address
+// record queries. net.DefaultResolver satisfies it.
+type RecordResolver interface {
+	LookupMX(ctx context.Context, name string) ([]*net.MX, error)
+	LookupTXT(ctx context.Context, name string) ([]string, error)
+	LookupNS(ctx context.Context, name string) ([]*net.NS, error)
+	LookupSRV(ctx context.Context, service, proto, name string) (string, []*net.SRV, error)
+	LookupCNAME(ctx context.Context, host string) (string, error)
+	LookupAddr(ctx context.Context, addr string) ([]string, error)
+}
+
+// LookupRecords resolves a non-address DNS record type through the host
+// resolver and returns the resource records and the DNS rcode. Types the host
+// resolver cannot answer (anything not covered by the net.Resolver Lookup*
+// methods) yield NODATA so that a routed name is never poisoned with NXDOMAIN
+// for an unsupported type.
+func LookupRecords(ctx context.Context, r RecordResolver, name string, qtype uint16, ttl uint32) ([]dns.RR, int) {
+	fqdn := dns.Fqdn(name)
+
+	switch qtype {
+	case dns.TypeMX:
+		return lookupMX(ctx, r, name, fqdn, ttl)
+	case dns.TypeTXT:
+		return lookupTXT(ctx, r, name, fqdn, ttl)
+	case dns.TypeNS:
+		return lookupNS(ctx, r, name, fqdn, ttl)
+	case dns.TypeSRV:
+		return lookupSRV(ctx, r, name, fqdn, ttl)
+	case dns.TypeCNAME:
+		return lookupCNAME(ctx, r, name, fqdn, ttl)
+	case dns.TypePTR:
+		return lookupPTR(ctx, r, name, fqdn, ttl)
+	default:
+		return nil, dns.RcodeSuccess
+	}
+}
+
+func recordHeader(fqdn string, rrtype uint16, ttl uint32) dns.RR_Header {
+	return dns.RR_Header{Name: fqdn, Rrtype: rrtype, Class: dns.ClassINET, Ttl: ttl}
+}
+
+func lookupMX(ctx context.Context, r RecordResolver, name, fqdn string, ttl uint32) ([]dns.RR, int) {
+	recs, err := r.LookupMX(ctx, name)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, rcodeForRecordError(err)
+	}
+	rrs := make([]dns.RR, 0, len(recs))
+	for _, mx := range recs {
+		rrs = append(rrs, &dns.MX{
+			Hdr:        recordHeader(fqdn, dns.TypeMX, ttl),
+			Preference: mx.Pref,
+			Mx:         dns.Fqdn(mx.Host),
+		})
+	}
+	return rrs, dns.RcodeSuccess
+}
+
+func lookupTXT(ctx context.Context, r RecordResolver, name, fqdn string, ttl uint32) ([]dns.RR, int) {
+	recs, err := r.LookupTXT(ctx, name)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, rcodeForRecordError(err)
+	}
+	rrs := make([]dns.RR, 0, len(recs))
+	for _, txt := range recs {
+		rrs = append(rrs, &dns.TXT{
+			Hdr: recordHeader(fqdn, dns.TypeTXT, ttl),
+			Txt: chunkTXT(txt),
+		})
+	}
+	return rrs, dns.RcodeSuccess
+}
+
+func lookupNS(ctx context.Context, r RecordResolver, name, fqdn string, ttl uint32) ([]dns.RR, int) {
+	recs, err := r.LookupNS(ctx, name)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, rcodeForRecordError(err)
+	}
+	rrs := make([]dns.RR, 0, len(recs))
+	for _, ns := range recs {
+		rrs = append(rrs, &dns.NS{
+			Hdr: recordHeader(fqdn, dns.TypeNS, ttl),
+			Ns:  dns.Fqdn(ns.Host),
+		})
+	}
+	return rrs, dns.RcodeSuccess
+}
+
+func lookupSRV(ctx context.Context, r RecordResolver, name, fqdn string, ttl uint32) ([]dns.RR, int) {
+	_, recs, err := r.LookupSRV(ctx, "", "", name)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, rcodeForRecordError(err)
+	}
+	rrs := make([]dns.RR, 0, len(recs))
+	for _, srv := range recs {
+		rrs = append(rrs, &dns.SRV{
+			Hdr:      recordHeader(fqdn, dns.TypeSRV, ttl),
+			Priority: srv.Priority,
+			Weight:   srv.Weight,
+			Port:     srv.Port,
+			Target:   dns.Fqdn(srv.Target),
+		})
+	}
+	return rrs, dns.RcodeSuccess
+}
+
+func lookupCNAME(ctx context.Context, r RecordResolver, name, fqdn string, ttl uint32) ([]dns.RR, int) {
+	cname, err := r.LookupCNAME(ctx, name)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, rcodeForRecordError(err)
+	}
+	// LookupCNAME returns the queried name itself when the name resolves but
+	// has no CNAME record; that is a NODATA result, not a CNAME.
+	if strings.EqualFold(dns.Fqdn(cname), fqdn) {
+		return nil, dns.RcodeSuccess
+	}
+	return []dns.RR{&dns.CNAME{
+		Hdr:    recordHeader(fqdn, dns.TypeCNAME, ttl),
+		Target: dns.Fqdn(cname),
+	}}, dns.RcodeSuccess
+}
+
+func lookupPTR(ctx context.Context, r RecordResolver, name, fqdn string, ttl uint32) ([]dns.RR, int) {
+	addr, ok := ptrQueryAddr(name)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, dns.RcodeSuccess
+	}
+	names, err := r.LookupAddr(ctx, addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, rcodeForRecordError(err)
+	}
+	rrs := make([]dns.RR, 0, len(names))
+	for _, n := range names {
+		rrs = append(rrs, &dns.PTR{
+			Hdr: recordHeader(fqdn, dns.TypePTR, ttl),
+			Ptr: dns.Fqdn(n),
+		})
+	}
+	return rrs, dns.RcodeSuccess
+}
+
+// ptrQueryAddr converts a reverse-DNS query name (in-addr.arpa or ip6.arpa)
+// into the address string expected by net.Resolver.LookupAddr. It reports false
+// when the name is not a well-formed reverse name.
+func ptrQueryAddr(qname string) (string, bool) {
+	name := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.ToLower(dns.Fqdn(qname)), ".")
+
+	switch {
+	case strings.HasSuffix(name, ".in-addr.arpa"):
+		return parseInAddrArpa(strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".in-addr.arpa"))
+	case strings.HasSuffix(name, ".ip6.arpa"):
+		return parseIP6Arpa(strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".ip6.arpa"))
+	default:
+		return "", false
+	}
+}
+
+// parseInAddrArpa turns the label portion of an in-addr.arpa name into an IPv4
+// address string, reporting false when it is not a well-formed reverse name.
+func parseInAddrArpa(labelPart string) (string, bool) {
+	labels := strings.Split(labelPart, ".")
+	if len(labels) != 4 {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	slices.Reverse(labels)
+	addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(strings.Join(labels, "."))
+	if err != nil || !addr.Is4() {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	return addr.String(), true
+}
+
+// parseIP6Arpa turns the nibble portion of an ip6.arpa name into an IPv6
+// address string, reporting false when it is not a well-formed reverse name.
+func parseIP6Arpa(nibblePart string) (string, bool) {
+	nibbles := strings.Split(nibblePart, ".")
+	if len(nibbles) != 32 {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	slices.Reverse(nibbles)
+	var sb strings.Builder
+	for i, n := range nibbles {
+		if i > 0 && i%4 == 0 {
+			sb.WriteByte(':')
+		}
+		sb.WriteString(n)
+	}
+	addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(sb.String())
+	if err != nil || !addr.Is6() {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	return addr.String(), true
+}
+
+// rcodeForRecordError maps a non-address lookup error to a DNS rcode. A
+// not-found result becomes NODATA rather than NXDOMAIN: net.DNSError.IsNotFound
+// does not distinguish a missing name from a name that exists only with records
+// of other types, so the name cannot be proven absent and must not be poisoned.
+func rcodeForRecordError(err error) int {
+	var dnsErr *net.DNSError
+	if errors.As(err, &dnsErr) && dnsErr.IsNotFound {
+		return dns.RcodeSuccess
+	}
+	return dns.RcodeServerFailure
+}
+
+// chunkTXT splits a TXT string into character-strings no longer than 255 bytes
+// so the record can be packed. The chunks form one TXT resource record.
+func chunkTXT(s string) []string {
+	const maxLen = 255
+	if len(s) <= maxLen {
+		return []string{s}
+	}
+
+	var chunks []string
+	for len(s) > maxLen {
+		chunks = append(chunks, s[:maxLen])
+		s = s[maxLen:]
+	}
+	if len(s) > 0 {
+		chunks = append(chunks, s)
+	}
+	return chunks
+}
+
 // FormatAnswers formats DNS resource records for logging.
 func FormatAnswers(answers []dns.RR) string {
 	if len(answers) == 0 {
@@ -195,3 +435,35 @@ func FormatAnswers(answers []dns.RR) string {
 	}
 	return "[" + strings.Join(parts, ", ") + "]"
 }
+
+// StripOPT removes any OPT pseudo-RRs from the message's Extra section. Per
+// RFC 6891 a responder must not include an OPT RR toward a client that did not
+// advertise EDNS0.
+func StripOPT(msg *dns.Msg) {
+	if len(msg.Extra) == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	out := msg.Extra[:0]
+	for _, rr := range msg.Extra {
+		if _, ok := rr.(*dns.OPT); ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		out = append(out, rr)
+	}
+	msg.Extra = out
+}
+
+// ExtractEDE returns the first Extended DNS Error (RFC 8914) option carried in
+// the message, if present.
+func ExtractEDE(msg *dns.Msg) (*dns.EDNS0_EDE, bool) {
+	opt := msg.IsEdns0()
+	if opt == nil {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	for _, o := range opt.Option {
+		if ede, ok := o.(*dns.EDNS0_EDE); ok {
+			return ede, true
+		}
+	}
+	return nil, false
+}

client/internal/dns/resutil/resolve_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
+package resutil
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"net"
+	"net/netip"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/miekg/dns"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+type mockResolver struct {
+	// results maps network ("ip4"/"ip6") to the lookup outcome.
+	results map[string]mockLookup
+}
+
+type mockLookup struct {
+	ips []netip.Addr
+	err error
+}
+
+func (m *mockResolver) LookupNetIP(_ context.Context, network, _ string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
+	res, ok := m.results[network]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, errors.New("unexpected network: " + network)
+	}
+	return res.ips, res.err
+}
+
+func TestLookupIP_Success(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &mockResolver{results: map[string]mockLookup{
+		"ip4": {ips: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("::ffff:192.0.2.1")}},
+	}}
+
+	result := LookupIP(context.Background(), r, "ip4", "example.com.", dns.TypeA)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, result.Rcode, "successful lookup should return NOERROR")
+	require.Len(t, result.IPs, 1, "should return the resolved address")
+	assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1"), result.IPs[0], "v4-mapped address should be unmapped")
+}
+
+func TestLookupIP_NoSuitableAddress(t *testing.T) {
+	// The net package returns this AddrError when the host resolves but has
+	// no addresses of the requested family (e.g. AAAA query for a v4-only
+	// hosts file entry). The domain exists, so this is NODATA, not SERVFAIL.
+	r := &mockResolver{results: map[string]mockLookup{
+		"ip6": {err: &net.AddrError{Err: "no suitable address found", Addr: "example.com."}},
+	}}
+
+	result := LookupIP(context.Background(), r, "ip6", "example.com.", dns.TypeAAAA)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, result.Rcode, "no suitable address should map to NODATA")
+	assert.Empty(t, result.IPs, "NODATA response should carry no addresses")
+}
+
+// TestErrNoSuitableAddressMatchesNetPackage pins our copy of the error string
+// to what the net package actually emits. A literal IP of the wrong family
+// takes the same filterAddrList path as a resolved hostname, without network
+// access.
+func TestErrNoSuitableAddressMatchesNetPackage(t *testing.T) {
+	_, err := (&net.Resolver{}).LookupNetIP(context.Background(), "ip6", "192.0.2.1")
+	require.Error(t, err)
+
+	var addrErr *net.AddrError
+	require.ErrorAs(t, err, &addrErr, "wrong-family lookup should return AddrError")
+	assert.Equal(t, errNoSuitableAddress, addrErr.Err, "net package error string should match our constant")
+}
+
+func TestLookupIP_OtherAddrError(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &mockResolver{results: map[string]mockLookup{
+		"ip4": {err: &net.AddrError{Err: "some other address problem", Addr: "example.com."}},
+	}}
+
+	result := LookupIP(context.Background(), r, "ip4", "example.com.", dns.TypeA)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeServerFailure, result.Rcode, "unrecognized AddrError should map to SERVFAIL")
+}
+
+func TestLookupIP_NotFoundNXDomain(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &mockResolver{results: map[string]mockLookup{
+		"ip4": {err: &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: "example.com.", IsNotFound: true}},
+		"ip6": {err: &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: "example.com.", IsNotFound: true}},
+	}}
+
+	result := LookupIP(context.Background(), r, "ip4", "example.com.", dns.TypeA)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeNameError, result.Rcode, "not found for both families should map to NXDOMAIN")
+}
+
+func TestLookupIP_NotFoundNoData(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &mockResolver{results: map[string]mockLookup{
+		"ip6": {err: &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: "example.com.", IsNotFound: true}},
+		"ip4": {ips: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1")}},
+	}}
+
+	result := LookupIP(context.Background(), r, "ip6", "example.com.", dns.TypeAAAA)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, result.Rcode, "not found with the other family present should map to NODATA")
+}
+
+func TestLookupIP_GenericError(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &mockResolver{results: map[string]mockLookup{
+		"ip4": {err: errors.New("connection refused")},
+	}}
+
+	result := LookupIP(context.Background(), r, "ip4", "example.com.", dns.TypeA)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeServerFailure, result.Rcode, "generic error should map to SERVFAIL")
+}
+
+func TestLookupIP_DNSErrorNotIsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &mockResolver{results: map[string]mockLookup{
+		"ip4": {err: &net.DNSError{Err: "server misbehaving", Name: "example.com.", IsTemporary: true}},
+	}}
+
+	result := LookupIP(context.Background(), r, "ip4", "example.com.", dns.TypeA)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeServerFailure, result.Rcode, "upstream failure should map to SERVFAIL")
+}
+
+func TestPtrQueryAddr(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name   string
+		qname  string
+		want   string
+		wantOK bool
+	}{
+		{name: "ipv4", qname: "4.3.2.1.in-addr.arpa.", want: "1.2.3.4", wantOK: true},
+		{name: "ipv4 no trailing dot", qname: "1.0.0.127.in-addr.arpa", want: "127.0.0.1", wantOK: true},
+		{
+			name:   "ipv6",
+			qname:  "1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.",
+			want:   "2001:db8::1",
+			wantOK: true,
+		},
+		{name: "ipv4 wrong label count", qname: "2.1.in-addr.arpa.", wantOK: false},
+		{name: "ipv6 wrong nibble count", qname: "1.0.ip6.arpa.", wantOK: false},
+		{name: "not a reverse name", qname: "example.com.", wantOK: false},
+		{name: "ipv4 bad octet", qname: "4.3.2.999.in-addr.arpa.", wantOK: false},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got, ok := ptrQueryAddr(tt.qname)
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.wantOK, ok, "parse success mismatch")
+			if tt.wantOK {
+				assert.Equal(t, tt.want, got, "parsed address mismatch")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+type mockRecordResolver struct {
+	mx    []*net.MX
+	txt   []string
+	ns    []*net.NS
+	srv   []*net.SRV
+	cname string
+	ptr   []string
+	err   error
+}
+
+func (m *mockRecordResolver) LookupMX(context.Context, string) ([]*net.MX, error) {
+	return m.mx, m.err
+}
+func (m *mockRecordResolver) LookupTXT(context.Context, string) ([]string, error) {
+	return m.txt, m.err
+}
+func (m *mockRecordResolver) LookupNS(context.Context, string) ([]*net.NS, error) {
+	return m.ns, m.err
+}
+func (m *mockRecordResolver) LookupSRV(context.Context, string, string, string) (string, []*net.SRV, error) {
+	return "", m.srv, m.err
+}
+func (m *mockRecordResolver) LookupCNAME(context.Context, string) (string, error) {
+	return m.cname, m.err
+}
+func (m *mockRecordResolver) LookupAddr(context.Context, string) ([]string, error) {
+	return m.ptr, m.err
+}
+
+func TestLookupRecords(t *testing.T) {
+	notFound := &net.DNSError{IsNotFound: true, Name: "example.com."}
+
+	t.Run("MX success", func(t *testing.T) {
+		r := &mockRecordResolver{mx: []*net.MX{{Host: "mail.example.com.", Pref: 10}}}
+		rrs, rcode := LookupRecords(context.Background(), r, "example.com.", dns.TypeMX, 300)
+		assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, rcode)
+		require.Len(t, rrs, 1)
+		assert.Equal(t, "mail.example.com.", rrs[0].(*dns.MX).Mx)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("TXT short string is one character-string", func(t *testing.T) {
+		r := &mockRecordResolver{txt: []string{"v=spf1 -all"}}
+		rrs, rcode := LookupRecords(context.Background(), r, "example.com.", dns.TypeTXT, 300)
+		assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, rcode)
+		require.Len(t, rrs, 1)
+		assert.Equal(t, []string{"v=spf1 -all"}, rrs[0].(*dns.TXT).Txt)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("TXT chunks long strings", func(t *testing.T) {
+		long := strings.Repeat("a", 300)
+		r := &mockRecordResolver{txt: []string{long}}
+		rrs, rcode := LookupRecords(context.Background(), r, "example.com.", dns.TypeTXT, 300)
+		assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, rcode)
+		require.Len(t, rrs, 1)
+		txt := rrs[0].(*dns.TXT).Txt
+		require.Len(t, txt, 2, "300-byte string should split into two character-strings")
+		assert.Equal(t, 255, len(txt[0]))
+		assert.Equal(t, 45, len(txt[1]))
+	})
+
+	t.Run("NS success", func(t *testing.T) {
+		r := &mockRecordResolver{ns: []*net.NS{{Host: "ns1.example.com."}}}
+		rrs, rcode := LookupRecords(context.Background(), r, "example.com.", dns.TypeNS, 300)
+		assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, rcode)
+		require.Len(t, rrs, 1)
+		assert.Equal(t, "ns1.example.com.", rrs[0].(*dns.NS).Ns)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("SRV success", func(t *testing.T) {
+		r := &mockRecordResolver{srv: []*net.SRV{{Target: "sip.example.com.", Port: 5060}}}
+		rrs, rcode := LookupRecords(context.Background(), r, "_sip._tcp.example.com.", dns.TypeSRV, 300)
+		assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, rcode)
+		require.Len(t, rrs, 1)
+		assert.Equal(t, uint16(5060), rrs[0].(*dns.SRV).Port)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("CNAME success", func(t *testing.T) {
+		r := &mockRecordResolver{cname: "target.example.com."}
+		rrs, rcode := LookupRecords(context.Background(), r, "www.example.com.", dns.TypeCNAME, 300)
+		assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, rcode)
+		require.Len(t, rrs, 1)
+		assert.Equal(t, "target.example.com.", rrs[0].(*dns.CNAME).Target)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("CNAME equal to name is NODATA", func(t *testing.T) {
+		r := &mockRecordResolver{cname: "example.com."}
+		rrs, rcode := LookupRecords(context.Background(), r, "example.com.", dns.TypeCNAME, 300)
+		assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, rcode)
+		assert.Empty(t, rrs, "self-referential CNAME is NODATA")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("PTR success", func(t *testing.T) {
+		r := &mockRecordResolver{ptr: []string{"host.example.com."}}
+		rrs, rcode := LookupRecords(context.Background(), r, "4.3.2.1.in-addr.arpa.", dns.TypePTR, 300)
+		assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, rcode)
+		require.Len(t, rrs, 1)
+		assert.Equal(t, "host.example.com.", rrs[0].(*dns.PTR).Ptr)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("PTR malformed name is NODATA", func(t *testing.T) {
+		r := &mockRecordResolver{}
+		rrs, rcode := LookupRecords(context.Background(), r, "example.com.", dns.TypePTR, 300)
+		assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, rcode)
+		assert.Empty(t, rrs)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("not found is NODATA never NXDOMAIN", func(t *testing.T) {
+		r := &mockRecordResolver{err: notFound}
+		_, rcode := LookupRecords(context.Background(), r, "example.com.", dns.TypeMX, 300)
+		assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, rcode, "missing record must not poison the name")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("server failure maps to SERVFAIL", func(t *testing.T) {
+		r := &mockRecordResolver{err: &net.DNSError{Err: "server misbehaving", IsTemporary: true}}
+		_, rcode := LookupRecords(context.Background(), r, "example.com.", dns.TypeMX, 300)
+		assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeServerFailure, rcode)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("unsupported type is NODATA", func(t *testing.T) {
+		r := &mockRecordResolver{}
+		rrs, rcode := LookupRecords(context.Background(), r, "example.com.", dns.TypeCAA, 300)
+		assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, rcode)
+		assert.Empty(t, rrs)
+	})
+}
+
+func TestStripOPT(t *testing.T) {
+	rm := &dns.Msg{
+		Extra: []dns.RR{
+			&dns.OPT{Hdr: dns.RR_Header{Name: ".", Rrtype: dns.TypeOPT}},
+			&dns.A{Hdr: dns.RR_Header{Name: "x.", Rrtype: dns.TypeA}, A: net.IPv4(1, 2, 3, 4)},
+		},
+	}
+	StripOPT(rm)
+	assert.Len(t, rm.Extra, 1, "OPT should be removed, A kept")
+	_, isOPT := rm.Extra[0].(*dns.OPT)
+	assert.False(t, isOPT, "remaining record must not be OPT")
+}
+
+func TestExtractEDE(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("no edns", func(t *testing.T) {
+		_, ok := ExtractEDE(&dns.Msg{})
+		assert.False(t, ok, "message without OPT has no EDE")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("edns without ede", func(t *testing.T) {
+		rm := &dns.Msg{}
+		rm.SetEdns0(4096, false)
+		_, ok := ExtractEDE(rm)
+		assert.False(t, ok, "OPT without EDE option returns false")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("with ede", func(t *testing.T) {
+		rm := &dns.Msg{}
+		opt := &dns.OPT{Hdr: dns.RR_Header{Name: ".", Rrtype: dns.TypeOPT}}
+		opt.Option = append(opt.Option, &dns.EDNS0_EDE{InfoCode: 49152, ExtraText: "upstream timeout"})
+		rm.Extra = append(rm.Extra, opt)
+
+		ede, ok := ExtractEDE(rm)
+		assert.True(t, ok, "EDE option should be found")
+		assert.Equal(t, uint16(49152), ede.InfoCode)
+		assert.Equal(t, "upstream timeout", ede.ExtraText)
+	})
+}

client/internal/dns/server.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net/netip"
 	"net/url"
+	"os"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
@@ -38,11 +39,15 @@ const (
 	// defaultWarningDelayBase is the starting grace window before a
 	// "Nameserver group unreachable" event fires for a group that's
 	// never been healthy and only has overlay upstreams with no
-	// Connected peer. Per-server and overridable; see warningDelayFor.
-	defaultWarningDelayBase = 30 * time.Second
+	// Connected peer. Per-server and overridable via envWarningDelay;
+	// see warningDelay.
+	defaultWarningDelayBase = 60 * time.Second
 	// warningDelayBonusCap caps the route-count bonus added to the
-	// base grace window. See warningDelayFor.
+	// base grace window. See warningDelay.
 	warningDelayBonusCap = 30 * time.Second
+	// envWarningDelay overrides defaultWarningDelayBase with a Go duration
+	// string (e.g. "90s", "2m"). Invalid or non-positive values are ignored.
+	envWarningDelay = "NB_DNS_HEALTH_WARNING_DELAY"
 )
 
 // errNoUsableNameservers signals that a merged-domain group has no usable
@@ -77,6 +82,7 @@ type Server interface {
 	PopulateManagementDomain(mgmtURL *url.URL) error
 	SetRouteSources(selected, active func() route.HAMap)
 	SetFirewall(Firewall)
+	SetPeerActivator(local.PeerActivator)
 }
 
 type nsGroupsByDomain struct {
@@ -135,7 +141,7 @@ type DefaultServer struct {
 	disableSys         bool
 	mux                sync.Mutex
 	service            service
-	dnsMuxMap          registeredHandlerMap
+	dnsMuxHandlers     []handlerWrapper
 	localResolver      *local.Resolver
 	wgInterface        WGIface
 	hostManager        hostManager
@@ -199,8 +205,6 @@ type handlerWrapper struct {
 	priority int
 }
 
-type registeredHandlerMap map[types.HandlerID]handlerWrapper
-
 // DefaultServerConfig holds configuration parameters for NewDefaultServer
 type DefaultServerConfig struct {
 	WgInterface    WGIface
@@ -248,7 +252,7 @@ func NewDefaultServerPermanentUpstream(
 	ds.hostsDNSHolder.set(hostsDnsList)
 	ds.permanent = true
 	ds.currentConfig = dnsConfigToHostDNSConfig(config, ds.service.RuntimeIP(), ds.service.RuntimePort())
-	ds.searchDomainNotifier = newNotifier(ds.SearchDomains())
+	ds.searchDomainNotifier = newNotifier(ds.searchDomains())
 	ds.searchDomainNotifier.setListener(listener)
 	setServerDns(ds)
 	return ds
@@ -289,7 +293,6 @@ func newDefaultServer(
 		service:           dnsService,
 		handlerChain:      handlerChain,
 		extraDomains:      make(map[domain.Domain]int),
-		dnsMuxMap:         make(registeredHandlerMap),
 		localResolver:     local.NewResolver(),
 		wgInterface:       wgInterface,
 		statusRecorder:    statusRecorder,
@@ -298,9 +301,14 @@ func newDefaultServer(
 		hostManager:       &noopHostConfigurator{},
 		mgmtCacheResolver: mgmtCacheResolver,
 		currentConfigHash: ^uint64(0), // Initialize to max uint64 to ensure first config is always applied
-		warningDelayBase:  defaultWarningDelayBase,
+		warningDelayBase:  warningDelayBaseFromEnv(),
 		healthRefresh:     make(chan struct{}, 1),
 	}
+	// Wire the local resolver against the peer status recorder so it can
+	// suppress A/AAAA answers that point at disconnected peers (typical
+	// case: synthesised private-service records pointing at an embedded
+	// proxy peer that just went offline).
+	defaultServer.localResolver.SetPeerConnectivity(localPeerConnectivity{statusRecorder})
 
 	// register with root zone, handler chain takes care of the routing
 	dnsService.RegisterMux(".", handlerChain)
@@ -323,7 +331,7 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) SetRouteSources(selected, active func() route.HAMap) {
 	type routeSettable interface {
 		setSelectedRoutes(func() route.HAMap)
 	}
-	for _, entry := range s.dnsMuxMap {
+	for _, entry := range s.dnsMuxHandlers {
 		if h, ok := entry.handler.(routeSettable); ok {
 			h.setSelectedRoutes(selected)
 		}
@@ -484,6 +492,13 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) SetFirewall(fw Firewall) {
 	}
 }
 
+// SetPeerActivator wires the DNS-time lazy-connection warm-up on the local
+// resolver. Injected after the connection manager exists (it does not at
+// DNS-server construction time). Pass nil to disable.
+func (s *DefaultServer) SetPeerActivator(a local.PeerActivator) {
+	s.localResolver.SetPeerActivator(a)
+}
+
 // Stop stops the server
 func (s *DefaultServer) Stop() {
 	s.ctxCancel()
@@ -587,6 +602,12 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) UpdateDNSServer(serial uint64, update nbdns.Config) erro
 }
 
 func (s *DefaultServer) SearchDomains() []string {
+	s.mux.Lock()
+	defer s.mux.Unlock()
+	return s.searchDomains()
+}
+
+func (s *DefaultServer) searchDomains() []string {
 	var searchDomains []string
 
 	for _, dConf := range s.currentConfig.Domains {
@@ -671,7 +692,7 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) applyConfiguration(update nbdns.Config) error {
 	}()
 
 	if s.searchDomainNotifier != nil {
-		s.searchDomainNotifier.onNewSearchDomains(s.SearchDomains())
+		s.searchDomainNotifier.onNewSearchDomains(s.searchDomains())
 	}
 
 	s.updateNSGroupStates(update.NameServerGroups)
@@ -772,13 +793,24 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) applyHostConfig() {
 // context is released rather than leaked until GC.
 func (s *DefaultServer) registerFallback() {
 	originalNameservers := s.hostManager.getOriginalNameservers()
-	if len(originalNameservers) == 0 {
+
+	serverIP := s.service.RuntimeIP()
+	var servers []netip.AddrPort
+	for _, ns := range originalNameservers {
+		if ns == serverIP {
+			log.Debugf("skipping original nameserver %s as it is the same as the server IP %s", ns, serverIP)
+			continue
+		}
+		servers = append(servers, netip.AddrPortFrom(ns, DefaultPort))
+	}
+
+	if len(servers) == 0 {
 		log.Debugf("no fallback upstreams to register; clearing PriorityFallback handler")
 		s.clearFallback()
 		return
 	}
 
-	log.Infof("registering original nameservers %v as upstream handlers with priority %d", originalNameservers, PriorityFallback)
+	log.Infof("registering original nameservers %v as upstream handlers with priority %d", servers, PriorityFallback)
 
 	handler, err := newUpstreamResolver(
 		s.ctx,
@@ -792,11 +824,6 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) registerFallback() {
 		return
 	}
 	handler.selectedRoutes = s.selectedRoutes
-
-	var servers []netip.AddrPort
-	for _, ns := range originalNameservers {
-		servers = append(servers, netip.AddrPortFrom(ns, DefaultPort))
-	}
 	handler.addRace(servers)
 
 	prev := s.fallbackHandler
@@ -967,19 +994,23 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) usableNameServers(nameServers []nbdns.NameServer) []neti
 
 func (s *DefaultServer) updateMux(muxUpdates []handlerWrapper) {
 	// this will introduce a short period of time when the server is not able to handle DNS requests
-	for _, existing := range s.dnsMuxMap {
+	for _, existing := range s.dnsMuxHandlers {
 		s.deregisterHandler([]string{existing.domain}, existing.priority)
-		existing.handler.Stop()
+		// The local resolver is a persistent singleton shared by every custom
+		// zone and reused across config updates. Its chain registrations are
+		// per-config and must be deregistered, but Stop() cancels its lookup
+		// context (breaking external CNAME-target resolution) and clears its
+		// records, so it must not be torn down here.
+		if existing.handler != s.localResolver {
+			existing.handler.Stop()
+		}
 	}
 
-	muxUpdateMap := make(registeredHandlerMap)
-
 	for _, update := range muxUpdates {
 		s.registerHandler([]string{update.domain}, update.handler, update.priority)
-		muxUpdateMap[update.handler.ID()] = update
 	}
 
-	s.dnsMuxMap = muxUpdateMap
+	s.dnsMuxHandlers = muxUpdates
 }
 
 // updateNSGroupStates records the new group set and pokes the refresher.
@@ -1143,6 +1174,26 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) projectUnhealthy(p *nsGroupProj, servers []netip.AddrPor
 	return false
 }
 
+// warningDelayBaseFromEnv returns the base grace window, honoring
+// envWarningDelay when it holds a valid positive Go duration. Invalid or
+// non-positive values fall back to defaultWarningDelayBase.
+func warningDelayBaseFromEnv() time.Duration {
+	val := os.Getenv(envWarningDelay)
+	if val == "" {
+		return defaultWarningDelayBase
+	}
+	d, err := time.ParseDuration(val)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("invalid %s value %q, using default %v: %v", envWarningDelay, val, defaultWarningDelayBase, err)
+		return defaultWarningDelayBase
+	}
+	if d <= 0 {
+		log.Warnf("%s must be positive, got %v, using default %v", envWarningDelay, d, defaultWarningDelayBase)
+		return defaultWarningDelayBase
+	}
+	return d
+}
+
 // warningDelay returns the grace window for the given selected-route
 // count. Scales gently: +1s per 100 routes, capped by
 // warningDelayBonusCap. Parallel handshakes mean handshake time grows
@@ -1193,7 +1244,7 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) groupHasImmediateUpstream(servers []netip.AddrPort, snap
 // in more than one handler.
 func (s *DefaultServer) collectUpstreamHealth() map[netip.AddrPort]UpstreamHealth {
 	merged := make(map[netip.AddrPort]UpstreamHealth)
-	for _, entry := range s.dnsMuxMap {
+	for _, entry := range s.dnsMuxHandlers {
 		reporter, ok := entry.handler.(upstreamHealthReporter)
 		if !ok {
 			continue
@@ -1386,3 +1437,25 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) PopulateManagementDomain(mgmtURL *url.URL) error {
 	}
 	return nil
 }
+
+// localPeerConnectivity adapts *peer.Status to local.PeerConnectivity so
+// the local resolver can ask "is this IP a known peer and is it
+// connected?" without taking on the peer package as a dependency.
+// A nil status recorder always reports known=false so the resolver
+// short-circuits to the legacy "return everything" path.
+type localPeerConnectivity struct {
+	status *peer.Status
+}
+
+// IsConnectedByIP looks the IP up in the peerstore and surfaces both
+// the known and connected bits. Used by Resolver.filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers.
+func (l localPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip netip.Addr) (known, connected bool) {
+	if l.status == nil {
+		return false, false
+	}
+	state, ok := l.status.PeerStateByIP(ip.String())
+	if !ok {
+		return false, false
+	}
+	return true, state.ConnStatus == peer.StatusConnected
+}

client/internal/dns/server_privileged_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
+//go:build privileged
+
+package dns
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/netip"
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/golang/mock/gomock"
+	"github.com/miekg/dns"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
+	pfmock "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/mocks"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/local"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/test"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/stdnet"
+	nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
+)
+
+func TestUpdateDNSServer(t *testing.T) {
+
+	nameServers := []nbdns.NameServer{
+		{
+			IP:     netip.MustParseAddr("8.8.8.8"),
+			NSType: nbdns.UDPNameServerType,
+			Port:   53,
+		},
+		{
+			IP:     netip.MustParseAddr("8.8.4.4"),
+			NSType: nbdns.UDPNameServerType,
+			Port:   53,
+		},
+	}
+
+	testCases := []struct {
+		name                string
+		initUpstreamMap     []handlerWrapper
+		initLocalZones      []nbdns.CustomZone
+		initSerial          uint64
+		inputSerial         uint64
+		inputUpdate         nbdns.Config
+		shouldFail          bool
+		expectedUpstreamMap []handlerWrapper
+		expectedLocalQs     []dns.Question
+	}{
+		{
+			name:            "Initial Config Should Succeed",
+			initUpstreamMap: nil,
+			initSerial:      0,
+			inputSerial:     1,
+			inputUpdate: nbdns.Config{
+				ServiceEnable: true,
+				CustomZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{
+					{
+						Domain:  "netbird.cloud",
+						Records: zoneRecords,
+					},
+				},
+				NameServerGroups: []*nbdns.NameServerGroup{
+					{
+						Domains:     []string{"netbird.io"},
+						NameServers: nameServers,
+					},
+					{
+						NameServers: nameServers,
+						Primary:     true,
+					},
+				},
+			},
+			expectedUpstreamMap: []handlerWrapper{
+				{
+					domain:   "netbird.io",
+					priority: PriorityUpstream,
+				},
+				{
+					domain:   "netbird.cloud",
+					priority: PriorityLocal,
+				},
+				{
+					domain:   nbdns.RootZone,
+					priority: PriorityDefault,
+				},
+			},
+			expectedLocalQs: []dns.Question{{Name: "peera.netbird.cloud.", Qtype: dns.TypeA, Qclass: dns.ClassINET}},
+		},
+		{
+			name:           "New Config Should Succeed",
+			initLocalZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{{Domain: "netbird.cloud", Records: []nbdns.SimpleRecord{{Name: "netbird.cloud", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "10.0.0.1"}}}},
+			initUpstreamMap: []handlerWrapper{
+				{
+					domain:   "netbird.cloud",
+					handler:  &mockHandler{},
+					priority: PriorityUpstream,
+				},
+			},
+			initSerial:  0,
+			inputSerial: 1,
+			inputUpdate: nbdns.Config{
+				ServiceEnable: true,
+				CustomZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{
+					{
+						Domain:  "netbird.cloud",
+						Records: zoneRecords,
+					},
+				},
+				NameServerGroups: []*nbdns.NameServerGroup{
+					{
+						Domains:     []string{"netbird.io"},
+						NameServers: nameServers,
+					},
+				},
+			},
+			expectedUpstreamMap: []handlerWrapper{
+				{
+					domain:   "netbird.io",
+					priority: PriorityUpstream,
+				},
+				{
+					domain:   "netbird.cloud",
+					priority: PriorityLocal,
+				},
+			},
+			expectedLocalQs: []dns.Question{{Name: zoneRecords[0].Name, Qtype: 1, Qclass: 1}},
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "Smaller Config Serial Should Be Skipped",
+			initLocalZones:  []nbdns.CustomZone{},
+			initUpstreamMap: nil,
+			initSerial:      2,
+			inputSerial:     1,
+			shouldFail:      true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "Empty NS Group Domain Or Not Primary Element Should Fail",
+			initLocalZones:  []nbdns.CustomZone{},
+			initUpstreamMap: nil,
+			initSerial:      0,
+			inputSerial:     1,
+			inputUpdate: nbdns.Config{
+				ServiceEnable: true,
+				CustomZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{
+					{
+						Domain:  "netbird.cloud",
+						Records: zoneRecords,
+					},
+				},
+				NameServerGroups: []*nbdns.NameServerGroup{
+					{
+						NameServers: nameServers,
+					},
+				},
+			},
+			shouldFail: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "Invalid NS Group Nameservers list Should Fail",
+			initLocalZones:  []nbdns.CustomZone{},
+			initUpstreamMap: nil,
+			initSerial:      0,
+			inputSerial:     1,
+			inputUpdate: nbdns.Config{
+				ServiceEnable: true,
+				CustomZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{
+					{
+						Domain:  "netbird.cloud",
+						Records: zoneRecords,
+					},
+				},
+				NameServerGroups: []*nbdns.NameServerGroup{
+					{
+						NameServers: nameServers,
+					},
+				},
+			},
+			shouldFail: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "Invalid Custom Zone Records list Should Skip",
+			initLocalZones:  []nbdns.CustomZone{},
+			initUpstreamMap: nil,
+			initSerial:      0,
+			inputSerial:     1,
+			inputUpdate: nbdns.Config{
+				ServiceEnable: true,
+				CustomZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{
+					{
+						Domain: "netbird.cloud",
+					},
+				},
+				NameServerGroups: []*nbdns.NameServerGroup{
+					{
+						NameServers: nameServers,
+						Primary:     true,
+					},
+				},
+			},
+			expectedUpstreamMap: []handlerWrapper{{
+				domain:   ".",
+				priority: PriorityDefault,
+			}},
+		},
+		{
+			name:           "Empty Config Should Succeed and Clean Maps",
+			initLocalZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{{Domain: "netbird.cloud", Records: []nbdns.SimpleRecord{{Name: "netbird.cloud", Type: int(dns.TypeA), Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "10.0.0.1"}}}},
+			initUpstreamMap: []handlerWrapper{
+				{
+					domain:   zoneRecords[0].Name,
+					handler:  &mockHandler{},
+					priority: PriorityUpstream,
+				},
+			},
+			initSerial:          0,
+			inputSerial:         1,
+			inputUpdate:         nbdns.Config{ServiceEnable: true},
+			expectedUpstreamMap: nil,
+			expectedLocalQs:     []dns.Question{},
+		},
+		{
+			name:           "Disabled Service Should clean map",
+			initLocalZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{{Domain: "netbird.cloud", Records: []nbdns.SimpleRecord{{Name: "netbird.cloud", Type: int(dns.TypeA), Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "10.0.0.1"}}}},
+			initUpstreamMap: []handlerWrapper{
+				{
+					domain:   zoneRecords[0].Name,
+					handler:  &mockHandler{},
+					priority: PriorityUpstream,
+				},
+			},
+			initSerial:          0,
+			inputSerial:         1,
+			inputUpdate:         nbdns.Config{ServiceEnable: false},
+			expectedUpstreamMap: nil,
+			expectedLocalQs:     []dns.Question{},
+		},
+	}
+
+	for n, testCase := range testCases {
+		t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			privKey, _ := wgtypes.GenerateKey()
+			newNet, err := stdnet.NewNet(context.Background(), nil)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+
+			opts := iface.WGIFaceOpts{
+				IFaceName:    fmt.Sprintf("utun230%d", n),
+				Address:      wgaddr.MustParseWGAddress(fmt.Sprintf("100.66.100.%d/32", n+1)),
+				WGPort:       33100,
+				WGPrivKey:    privKey.String(),
+				MTU:          iface.DefaultMTU,
+				TransportNet: newNet,
+			}
+
+			wgIface, err := iface.NewWGIFace(opts)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			err = wgIface.Create()
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			defer func() {
+				err = wgIface.Close()
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Log(err)
+				}
+			}()
+			dnsServer, err := NewDefaultServer(context.Background(), DefaultServerConfig{
+				WgInterface:    wgIface,
+				CustomAddress:  "",
+				StatusRecorder: peer.NewRecorder("mgm"),
+				StateManager:   nil,
+				DisableSys:     false,
+			})
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			err = dnsServer.Initialize()
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			defer func() {
+				err = dnsServer.hostManager.restoreHostDNS()
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Log(err)
+				}
+			}()
+
+			dnsServer.dnsMuxHandlers = testCase.initUpstreamMap
+			dnsServer.localResolver.Update(testCase.initLocalZones)
+			dnsServer.updateSerial = testCase.initSerial
+
+			err = dnsServer.UpdateDNSServer(testCase.inputSerial, testCase.inputUpdate)
+			if err != nil {
+				if testCase.shouldFail {
+					return
+				}
+				t.Fatalf("update dns server should not fail, got error: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			if len(dnsServer.dnsMuxHandlers) != len(testCase.expectedUpstreamMap) {
+				t.Fatalf("update upstream failed, map size is different than expected, want %d, got %d", len(testCase.expectedUpstreamMap), len(dnsServer.dnsMuxHandlers))
+			}
+
+			for _, expected := range testCase.expectedUpstreamMap {
+				found := false
+				for _, got := range dnsServer.dnsMuxHandlers {
+					if got.domain == expected.domain && got.priority == expected.priority {
+						found = true
+						break
+					}
+				}
+				if !found {
+					t.Fatalf("update upstream failed, handler for domain=%s priority=%d not found in dnsMuxHandlers: %#v", expected.domain, expected.priority, dnsServer.dnsMuxHandlers)
+				}
+			}
+
+			var responseMSG *dns.Msg
+			responseWriter := &test.MockResponseWriter{
+				WriteMsgFunc: func(m *dns.Msg) error {
+					responseMSG = m
+					return nil
+				},
+			}
+			for _, q := range testCase.expectedLocalQs {
+				dnsServer.localResolver.ServeDNS(responseWriter, &dns.Msg{
+					Question: []dns.Question{q},
+				})
+			}
+
+			if len(testCase.expectedLocalQs) > 0 {
+				assert.NotNil(t, responseMSG, "response message should not be nil")
+				assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, responseMSG.Rcode, "response code should be success")
+				assert.NotEmpty(t, responseMSG.Answer, "response message should have answers")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDNSFakeResolverHandleUpdates(t *testing.T) {
+	ov := os.Getenv("NB_WG_KERNEL_DISABLED")
+	defer t.Setenv("NB_WG_KERNEL_DISABLED", ov)
+
+	t.Setenv("NB_WG_KERNEL_DISABLED", "true")
+	newNet, err := stdnet.NewNet(context.Background(), []string{"utun2301"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("create stdnet: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	privKey, _ := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
+	opts := iface.WGIFaceOpts{
+		IFaceName:    "utun2301",
+		Address:      wgaddr.MustParseWGAddress("100.66.100.1/32"),
+		WGPort:       33100,
+		WGPrivKey:    privKey.String(),
+		MTU:          iface.DefaultMTU,
+		TransportNet: newNet,
+	}
+	wgIface, err := iface.NewWGIFace(opts)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("build interface wireguard: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	err = wgIface.Create()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("create and init wireguard interface: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if err = wgIface.Close(); err != nil {
+			t.Logf("close wireguard interface: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
+	defer ctrl.Finish()
+
+	packetfilter := pfmock.NewMockPacketFilter(ctrl)
+	packetfilter.EXPECT().FilterOutbound(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).AnyTimes()
+	packetfilter.EXPECT().SetUDPPacketHook(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).AnyTimes()
+	packetfilter.EXPECT().SetTCPPacketHook(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).AnyTimes()
+
+	if err := wgIface.SetFilter(packetfilter); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("set packet filter: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	dnsServer, err := NewDefaultServer(context.Background(), DefaultServerConfig{
+		WgInterface:    wgIface,
+		CustomAddress:  "",
+		StatusRecorder: peer.NewRecorder("mgm"),
+		StateManager:   nil,
+		DisableSys:     false,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("create DNS server: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	err = dnsServer.Initialize()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("run DNS server: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if err = dnsServer.hostManager.restoreHostDNS(); err != nil {
+			t.Logf("restore DNS settings on the host: %v", err)
+			return
+		}
+	}()
+
+	dnsServer.dnsMuxHandlers = []handlerWrapper{
+		{
+			domain:   zoneRecords[0].Name,
+			handler:  &local.Resolver{},
+			priority: PriorityUpstream,
+		},
+	}
+	dnsServer.localResolver.Update([]nbdns.CustomZone{{Domain: "netbird.cloud", Records: []nbdns.SimpleRecord{{Name: "netbird.cloud", Type: int(dns.TypeA), Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "10.0.0.1"}}}})
+	dnsServer.updateSerial = 0
+
+	nameServers := []nbdns.NameServer{
+		{
+			IP:     netip.MustParseAddr("8.8.8.8"),
+			NSType: nbdns.UDPNameServerType,
+			Port:   53,
+		},
+		{
+			IP:     netip.MustParseAddr("8.8.4.4"),
+			NSType: nbdns.UDPNameServerType,
+			Port:   53,
+		},
+	}
+
+	update := nbdns.Config{
+		ServiceEnable: true,
+		CustomZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{
+			{
+				Domain:  "netbird.cloud",
+				Records: zoneRecords,
+			},
+		},
+		NameServerGroups: []*nbdns.NameServerGroup{
+			{
+				Domains:     []string{"netbird.io"},
+				NameServers: nameServers,
+			},
+			{
+				NameServers: nameServers,
+				Primary:     true,
+			},
+		},
+	}
+
+	// Start the server with regular configuration
+	if err := dnsServer.UpdateDNSServer(1, update); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("update dns server should not fail, got error: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	update2 := update
+	update2.ServiceEnable = false
+	// Disable the server, stop the listener
+	if err := dnsServer.UpdateDNSServer(2, update2); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("update dns server should not fail, got error: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	update3 := update2
+	update3.NameServerGroups = update3.NameServerGroups[:1]
+	// But service still get updates and we checking that we handle
+	// internal state in the right way
+	if err := dnsServer.UpdateDNSServer(3, update3); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("update dns server should not fail, got error: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+}

client/internal/dns/server_test.go

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
-	"github.com/golang/mock/gomock"
 	"github.com/miekg/dns"
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -23,7 +22,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
-	pfmock "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/mocks"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/local"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/test"
@@ -104,481 +102,6 @@ func init() {
 	formatter.SetTextFormatter(log.StandardLogger())
 }
 
-func generateDummyHandler(d string, servers []nbdns.NameServer) *upstreamResolverBase {
-	var srvs []netip.AddrPort
-	for _, srv := range servers {
-		srvs = append(srvs, srv.AddrPort())
-	}
-	u := &upstreamResolverBase{
-		domain: domain.Domain(d),
-		cancel: func() {},
-	}
-	u.addRace(srvs)
-	return u
-}
-
-func TestUpdateDNSServer(t *testing.T) {
-
-	nameServers := []nbdns.NameServer{
-		{
-			IP:     netip.MustParseAddr("8.8.8.8"),
-			NSType: nbdns.UDPNameServerType,
-			Port:   53,
-		},
-		{
-			IP:     netip.MustParseAddr("8.8.4.4"),
-			NSType: nbdns.UDPNameServerType,
-			Port:   53,
-		},
-	}
-
-	dummyHandler := local.NewResolver()
-
-	testCases := []struct {
-		name                string
-		initUpstreamMap     registeredHandlerMap
-		initLocalZones      []nbdns.CustomZone
-		initSerial          uint64
-		inputSerial         uint64
-		inputUpdate         nbdns.Config
-		shouldFail          bool
-		expectedUpstreamMap registeredHandlerMap
-		expectedLocalQs     []dns.Question
-	}{
-		{
-			name:            "Initial Config Should Succeed",
-			initUpstreamMap: make(registeredHandlerMap),
-			initSerial:      0,
-			inputSerial:     1,
-			inputUpdate: nbdns.Config{
-				ServiceEnable: true,
-				CustomZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{
-					{
-						Domain:  "netbird.cloud",
-						Records: zoneRecords,
-					},
-				},
-				NameServerGroups: []*nbdns.NameServerGroup{
-					{
-						Domains:     []string{"netbird.io"},
-						NameServers: nameServers,
-					},
-					{
-						NameServers: nameServers,
-						Primary:     true,
-					},
-				},
-			},
-			expectedUpstreamMap: registeredHandlerMap{
-				generateDummyHandler("netbird.io", nameServers).ID(): handlerWrapper{
-					domain:   "netbird.io",
-					handler:  dummyHandler,
-					priority: PriorityUpstream,
-				},
-				dummyHandler.ID(): handlerWrapper{
-					domain:   "netbird.cloud",
-					handler:  dummyHandler,
-					priority: PriorityLocal,
-				},
-				generateDummyHandler(".", nameServers).ID(): handlerWrapper{
-					domain:   nbdns.RootZone,
-					handler:  dummyHandler,
-					priority: PriorityDefault,
-				},
-			},
-			expectedLocalQs: []dns.Question{{Name: "peera.netbird.cloud.", Qtype: dns.TypeA, Qclass: dns.ClassINET}},
-		},
-		{
-			name:           "New Config Should Succeed",
-			initLocalZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{{Domain: "netbird.cloud", Records: []nbdns.SimpleRecord{{Name: "netbird.cloud", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "10.0.0.1"}}}},
-			initUpstreamMap: registeredHandlerMap{
-				generateDummyHandler(zoneRecords[0].Name, nameServers).ID(): handlerWrapper{
-					domain:   "netbird.cloud",
-					handler:  dummyHandler,
-					priority: PriorityUpstream,
-				},
-			},
-			initSerial:  0,
-			inputSerial: 1,
-			inputUpdate: nbdns.Config{
-				ServiceEnable: true,
-				CustomZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{
-					{
-						Domain:  "netbird.cloud",
-						Records: zoneRecords,
-					},
-				},
-				NameServerGroups: []*nbdns.NameServerGroup{
-					{
-						Domains:     []string{"netbird.io"},
-						NameServers: nameServers,
-					},
-				},
-			},
-			expectedUpstreamMap: registeredHandlerMap{
-				generateDummyHandler("netbird.io", nameServers).ID(): handlerWrapper{
-					domain:   "netbird.io",
-					handler:  dummyHandler,
-					priority: PriorityUpstream,
-				},
-				"local-resolver": handlerWrapper{
-					domain:   "netbird.cloud",
-					handler:  dummyHandler,
-					priority: PriorityLocal,
-				},
-			},
-			expectedLocalQs: []dns.Question{{Name: zoneRecords[0].Name, Qtype: 1, Qclass: 1}},
-		},
-		{
-			name:            "Smaller Config Serial Should Be Skipped",
-			initLocalZones:  []nbdns.CustomZone{},
-			initUpstreamMap: make(registeredHandlerMap),
-			initSerial:      2,
-			inputSerial:     1,
-			shouldFail:      true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:            "Empty NS Group Domain Or Not Primary Element Should Fail",
-			initLocalZones:  []nbdns.CustomZone{},
-			initUpstreamMap: make(registeredHandlerMap),
-			initSerial:      0,
-			inputSerial:     1,
-			inputUpdate: nbdns.Config{
-				ServiceEnable: true,
-				CustomZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{
-					{
-						Domain:  "netbird.cloud",
-						Records: zoneRecords,
-					},
-				},
-				NameServerGroups: []*nbdns.NameServerGroup{
-					{
-						NameServers: nameServers,
-					},
-				},
-			},
-			shouldFail: true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:            "Invalid NS Group Nameservers list Should Fail",
-			initLocalZones:  []nbdns.CustomZone{},
-			initUpstreamMap: make(registeredHandlerMap),
-			initSerial:      0,
-			inputSerial:     1,
-			inputUpdate: nbdns.Config{
-				ServiceEnable: true,
-				CustomZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{
-					{
-						Domain:  "netbird.cloud",
-						Records: zoneRecords,
-					},
-				},
-				NameServerGroups: []*nbdns.NameServerGroup{
-					{
-						NameServers: nameServers,
-					},
-				},
-			},
-			shouldFail: true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:            "Invalid Custom Zone Records list Should Skip",
-			initLocalZones:  []nbdns.CustomZone{},
-			initUpstreamMap: make(registeredHandlerMap),
-			initSerial:      0,
-			inputSerial:     1,
-			inputUpdate: nbdns.Config{
-				ServiceEnable: true,
-				CustomZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{
-					{
-						Domain: "netbird.cloud",
-					},
-				},
-				NameServerGroups: []*nbdns.NameServerGroup{
-					{
-						NameServers: nameServers,
-						Primary:     true,
-					},
-				},
-			},
-			expectedUpstreamMap: registeredHandlerMap{generateDummyHandler(".", nameServers).ID(): handlerWrapper{
-				domain:   ".",
-				handler:  dummyHandler,
-				priority: PriorityDefault,
-			}},
-		},
-		{
-			name:           "Empty Config Should Succeed and Clean Maps",
-			initLocalZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{{Domain: "netbird.cloud", Records: []nbdns.SimpleRecord{{Name: "netbird.cloud", Type: int(dns.TypeA), Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "10.0.0.1"}}}},
-			initUpstreamMap: registeredHandlerMap{
-				generateDummyHandler(zoneRecords[0].Name, nameServers).ID(): handlerWrapper{
-					domain:   zoneRecords[0].Name,
-					handler:  dummyHandler,
-					priority: PriorityUpstream,
-				},
-			},
-			initSerial:          0,
-			inputSerial:         1,
-			inputUpdate:         nbdns.Config{ServiceEnable: true},
-			expectedUpstreamMap: make(registeredHandlerMap),
-			expectedLocalQs:     []dns.Question{},
-		},
-		{
-			name:           "Disabled Service Should clean map",
-			initLocalZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{{Domain: "netbird.cloud", Records: []nbdns.SimpleRecord{{Name: "netbird.cloud", Type: int(dns.TypeA), Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "10.0.0.1"}}}},
-			initUpstreamMap: registeredHandlerMap{
-				generateDummyHandler(zoneRecords[0].Name, nameServers).ID(): handlerWrapper{
-					domain:   zoneRecords[0].Name,
-					handler:  dummyHandler,
-					priority: PriorityUpstream,
-				},
-			},
-			initSerial:          0,
-			inputSerial:         1,
-			inputUpdate:         nbdns.Config{ServiceEnable: false},
-			expectedUpstreamMap: make(registeredHandlerMap),
-			expectedLocalQs:     []dns.Question{},
-		},
-	}
-
-	for n, testCase := range testCases {
-		t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			privKey, _ := wgtypes.GenerateKey()
-			newNet, err := stdnet.NewNet(context.Background(), nil)
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-
-			opts := iface.WGIFaceOpts{
-				IFaceName:    fmt.Sprintf("utun230%d", n),
-				Address:      wgaddr.MustParseWGAddress(fmt.Sprintf("100.66.100.%d/32", n+1)),
-				WGPort:       33100,
-				WGPrivKey:    privKey.String(),
-				MTU:          iface.DefaultMTU,
-				TransportNet: newNet,
-			}
-
-			wgIface, err := iface.NewWGIFace(opts)
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-			err = wgIface.Create()
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-			defer func() {
-				err = wgIface.Close()
-				if err != nil {
-					t.Log(err)
-				}
-			}()
-			dnsServer, err := NewDefaultServer(context.Background(), DefaultServerConfig{
-				WgInterface:    wgIface,
-				CustomAddress:  "",
-				StatusRecorder: peer.NewRecorder("mgm"),
-				StateManager:   nil,
-				DisableSys:     false,
-			})
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-			err = dnsServer.Initialize()
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-			defer func() {
-				err = dnsServer.hostManager.restoreHostDNS()
-				if err != nil {
-					t.Log(err)
-				}
-			}()
-
-			dnsServer.dnsMuxMap = testCase.initUpstreamMap
-			dnsServer.localResolver.Update(testCase.initLocalZones)
-			dnsServer.updateSerial = testCase.initSerial
-
-			err = dnsServer.UpdateDNSServer(testCase.inputSerial, testCase.inputUpdate)
-			if err != nil {
-				if testCase.shouldFail {
-					return
-				}
-				t.Fatalf("update dns server should not fail, got error: %v", err)
-			}
-
-			if len(dnsServer.dnsMuxMap) != len(testCase.expectedUpstreamMap) {
-				t.Fatalf("update upstream failed, map size is different than expected, want %d, got %d", len(testCase.expectedUpstreamMap), len(dnsServer.dnsMuxMap))
-			}
-
-			for key := range testCase.expectedUpstreamMap {
-				_, found := dnsServer.dnsMuxMap[key]
-				if !found {
-					t.Fatalf("update upstream failed, key %s was not found in the dnsMuxMap: %#v", key, dnsServer.dnsMuxMap)
-				}
-			}
-
-			var responseMSG *dns.Msg
-			responseWriter := &test.MockResponseWriter{
-				WriteMsgFunc: func(m *dns.Msg) error {
-					responseMSG = m
-					return nil
-				},
-			}
-			for _, q := range testCase.expectedLocalQs {
-				dnsServer.localResolver.ServeDNS(responseWriter, &dns.Msg{
-					Question: []dns.Question{q},
-				})
-			}
-
-			if len(testCase.expectedLocalQs) > 0 {
-				assert.NotNil(t, responseMSG, "response message should not be nil")
-				assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, responseMSG.Rcode, "response code should be success")
-				assert.NotEmpty(t, responseMSG.Answer, "response message should have answers")
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestDNSFakeResolverHandleUpdates(t *testing.T) {
-	ov := os.Getenv("NB_WG_KERNEL_DISABLED")
-	defer t.Setenv("NB_WG_KERNEL_DISABLED", ov)
-
-	t.Setenv("NB_WG_KERNEL_DISABLED", "true")
-	newNet, err := stdnet.NewNet(context.Background(), []string{"utun2301"})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("create stdnet: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	privKey, _ := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
-	opts := iface.WGIFaceOpts{
-		IFaceName:    "utun2301",
-		Address:      wgaddr.MustParseWGAddress("100.66.100.1/32"),
-		WGPort:       33100,
-		WGPrivKey:    privKey.String(),
-		MTU:          iface.DefaultMTU,
-		TransportNet: newNet,
-	}
-	wgIface, err := iface.NewWGIFace(opts)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("build interface wireguard: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	err = wgIface.Create()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("create and init wireguard interface: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-	defer func() {
-		if err = wgIface.Close(); err != nil {
-			t.Logf("close wireguard interface: %v", err)
-		}
-	}()
-
-	ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
-	defer ctrl.Finish()
-
-	packetfilter := pfmock.NewMockPacketFilter(ctrl)
-	packetfilter.EXPECT().FilterOutbound(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).AnyTimes()
-	packetfilter.EXPECT().SetUDPPacketHook(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).AnyTimes()
-	packetfilter.EXPECT().SetTCPPacketHook(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).AnyTimes()
-
-	if err := wgIface.SetFilter(packetfilter); err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("set packet filter: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	dnsServer, err := NewDefaultServer(context.Background(), DefaultServerConfig{
-		WgInterface:    wgIface,
-		CustomAddress:  "",
-		StatusRecorder: peer.NewRecorder("mgm"),
-		StateManager:   nil,
-		DisableSys:     false,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("create DNS server: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	err = dnsServer.Initialize()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("run DNS server: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-	defer func() {
-		if err = dnsServer.hostManager.restoreHostDNS(); err != nil {
-			t.Logf("restore DNS settings on the host: %v", err)
-			return
-		}
-	}()
-
-	dnsServer.dnsMuxMap = registeredHandlerMap{
-		"id1": handlerWrapper{
-			domain:   zoneRecords[0].Name,
-			handler:  &local.Resolver{},
-			priority: PriorityUpstream,
-		},
-	}
-	dnsServer.localResolver.Update([]nbdns.CustomZone{{Domain: "netbird.cloud", Records: []nbdns.SimpleRecord{{Name: "netbird.cloud", Type: int(dns.TypeA), Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "10.0.0.1"}}}})
-	dnsServer.updateSerial = 0
-
-	nameServers := []nbdns.NameServer{
-		{
-			IP:     netip.MustParseAddr("8.8.8.8"),
-			NSType: nbdns.UDPNameServerType,
-			Port:   53,
-		},
-		{
-			IP:     netip.MustParseAddr("8.8.4.4"),
-			NSType: nbdns.UDPNameServerType,
-			Port:   53,
-		},
-	}
-
-	update := nbdns.Config{
-		ServiceEnable: true,
-		CustomZones: []nbdns.CustomZone{
-			{
-				Domain:  "netbird.cloud",
-				Records: zoneRecords,
-			},
-		},
-		NameServerGroups: []*nbdns.NameServerGroup{
-			{
-				Domains:     []string{"netbird.io"},
-				NameServers: nameServers,
-			},
-			{
-				NameServers: nameServers,
-				Primary:     true,
-			},
-		},
-	}
-
-	// Start the server with regular configuration
-	if err := dnsServer.UpdateDNSServer(1, update); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("update dns server should not fail, got error: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	update2 := update
-	update2.ServiceEnable = false
-	// Disable the server, stop the listener
-	if err := dnsServer.UpdateDNSServer(2, update2); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("update dns server should not fail, got error: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	update3 := update2
-	update3.NameServerGroups = update3.NameServerGroups[:1]
-	// But service still get updates and we checking that we handle
-	// internal state in the right way
-	if err := dnsServer.UpdateDNSServer(3, update3); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("update dns server should not fail, got error: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-}
-
 func TestDNSServerStartStop(t *testing.T) {
 	testCases := []struct {
 		name     string
@@ -1029,15 +552,15 @@ func (m *mockService) RegisterMux(string, dns.Handler) {}
 func (m *mockService) DeregisterMux(string)            {}
 
 func TestDefaultServer_UpdateMux(t *testing.T) {
-	baseMatchHandlers := registeredHandlerMap{
-		"upstream-group1": {
+	baseMatchHandlers := []handlerWrapper{
+		{
 			domain: "example.com",
 			handler: &mockHandler{
 				Id: "upstream-group1",
 			},
 			priority: PriorityUpstream,
 		},
-		"upstream-group2": {
+		{
 			domain: "example.com",
 			handler: &mockHandler{
 				Id: "upstream-group2",
@@ -1046,15 +569,15 @@ func TestDefaultServer_UpdateMux(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	}
 
-	baseRootHandlers := registeredHandlerMap{
-		"upstream-root1": {
+	baseRootHandlers := []handlerWrapper{
+		{
 			domain: ".",
 			handler: &mockHandler{
 				Id: "upstream-root1",
 			},
 			priority: PriorityDefault,
 		},
-		"upstream-root2": {
+		{
 			domain: ".",
 			handler: &mockHandler{
 				Id: "upstream-root2",
@@ -1063,22 +586,22 @@ func TestDefaultServer_UpdateMux(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	}
 
-	baseMixedHandlers := registeredHandlerMap{
-		"upstream-group1": {
+	baseMixedHandlers := []handlerWrapper{
+		{
 			domain: "example.com",
 			handler: &mockHandler{
 				Id: "upstream-group1",
 			},
 			priority: PriorityUpstream,
 		},
-		"upstream-group2": {
+		{
 			domain: "example.com",
 			handler: &mockHandler{
 				Id: "upstream-group2",
 			},
 			priority: PriorityUpstream - 1,
 		},
-		"upstream-other": {
+		{
 			domain: "other.com",
 			handler: &mockHandler{
 				Id: "upstream-other",
@@ -1089,7 +612,7 @@ func TestDefaultServer_UpdateMux(t *testing.T) {
 
 	tests := []struct {
 		name             string
-		initialHandlers  registeredHandlerMap
+		initialHandlers  []handlerWrapper
 		updates          []handlerWrapper
 		expectedHandlers map[string]string // map[HandlerID]domain
 		description      string
@@ -1373,32 +896,38 @@ func TestDefaultServer_UpdateMux(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			server := &DefaultServer{
-				dnsMuxMap:    tt.initialHandlers,
-				handlerChain: NewHandlerChain(),
-				service:      &mockService{},
+				dnsMuxHandlers: tt.initialHandlers,
+				handlerChain:   NewHandlerChain(),
+				service:        &mockService{},
 			}
 
 			// Perform the update
 			server.updateMux(tt.updates)
 
 			// Verify the results
-			assert.Equal(t, len(tt.expectedHandlers), len(server.dnsMuxMap),
+			assert.Equal(t, len(tt.expectedHandlers), len(server.dnsMuxHandlers),
 				"Number of handlers after update doesn't match expected")
 
 			// Check each expected handler
 			for id, expectedDomain := range tt.expectedHandlers {
-				handler, exists := server.dnsMuxMap[types.HandlerID(id)]
-				assert.True(t, exists, "Expected handler %s not found", id)
-				if exists {
-					assert.Equal(t, expectedDomain, handler.domain,
+				var found *handlerWrapper
+				for i := range server.dnsMuxHandlers {
+					if server.dnsMuxHandlers[i].handler.ID() == types.HandlerID(id) {
+						found = &server.dnsMuxHandlers[i]
+						break
+					}
+				}
+				assert.NotNil(t, found, "Expected handler %s not found", id)
+				if found != nil {
+					assert.Equal(t, expectedDomain, found.domain,
 						"Domain mismatch for handler %s", id)
 				}
 			}
 
 			// Verify no unexpected handlers exist
-			for HandlerID := range server.dnsMuxMap {
-				_, expected := tt.expectedHandlers[string(HandlerID)]
-				assert.True(t, expected, "Unexpected handler found: %s", HandlerID)
+			for _, entry := range server.dnsMuxHandlers {
+				_, expected := tt.expectedHandlers[string(entry.handler.ID())]
+				assert.True(t, expected, "Unexpected handler found: %s", entry.handler.ID())
 			}
 
 			// Verify the handlerChain state and order
@@ -1413,7 +942,7 @@ func TestDefaultServer_UpdateMux(t *testing.T) {
 
 				// Verify handler exists in mux
 				foundInMux := false
-				for _, muxEntry := range server.dnsMuxMap {
+				for _, muxEntry := range server.dnsMuxHandlers {
 					if chainEntry.Handler == muxEntry.handler &&
 						chainEntry.Priority == muxEntry.priority &&
 						chainEntry.Pattern == dns.Fqdn(muxEntry.domain) {
@@ -1422,12 +951,108 @@ func TestDefaultServer_UpdateMux(t *testing.T) {
 					}
 				}
 				assert.True(t, foundInMux,
-					"Handler in chain not found in dnsMuxMap")
+					"Handler in chain not found in dnsMuxHandlers")
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 
+// chainHasPattern reports whether the handler chain holds an entry registered
+// for the given fqdn pattern at the given priority.
+func chainHasPattern(s *DefaultServer, pattern string, priority int) bool {
+	for _, h := range s.handlerChain.handlers {
+		if h.OrigPattern == pattern && h.Priority == priority {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// TestDefaultServer_UpdateMux_SharedHandlerZoneRemoval verifies that updateMux
+// tracks each (handler, domain) registration independently when one handler
+// serves multiple zones. Every custom zone is served by the same handler
+// instance (the local resolver, whose ID is the constant "local-resolver"), so
+// removing one zone must deregister exactly that zone's chain entry and leave
+// the others in place. Tracking registrations by handler ID alone collapses all
+// zones onto one entry, leaving removed zones in the chain to answer
+// authoritatively with no records.
+func TestDefaultServer_UpdateMux_SharedHandlerZoneRemoval(t *testing.T) {
+	// One handler serves every custom zone, mirroring s.localResolver.
+	shared := &mockHandler{Id: "local-resolver"}
+
+	server := &DefaultServer{
+		handlerChain: NewHandlerChain(),
+		service:      &mockService{},
+	}
+
+	// Two custom zones under the same handler. The surviving zone is registered
+	// last, mirroring the management emission order.
+	server.updateMux([]handlerWrapper{
+		{domain: "userzone.test", handler: shared, priority: PriorityLocal},
+		{domain: "peerzone.test", handler: shared, priority: PriorityLocal},
+	})
+
+	require.True(t, chainHasPattern(server, "userzone.test.", PriorityLocal),
+		"userzone.test should be registered after the first update")
+	require.True(t, chainHasPattern(server, "peerzone.test.", PriorityLocal),
+		"peerzone.test should be registered after the first update")
+
+	// Remove one zone, keep the other.
+	server.updateMux([]handlerWrapper{
+		{domain: "peerzone.test", handler: shared, priority: PriorityLocal},
+	})
+
+	assert.True(t, chainHasPattern(server, "peerzone.test.", PriorityLocal),
+		"peerzone.test should remain after removing userzone.test")
+	assert.False(t, chainHasPattern(server, "userzone.test.", PriorityLocal),
+		"userzone.test handler must be deregistered, not leaked in the chain")
+}
+
+// TestDefaultServer_UpdateMux_PreservesLocalResolver verifies that updateMux
+// does not tear down the shared local resolver during reconfiguration. The
+// resolver is a process-lifetime singleton reused across config updates;
+// Stop() cancels its lookup context (breaking external CNAME-target
+// resolution) and clears its records. updateMux must deregister its chain
+// entries without stopping it. Records surviving a teardown update is the
+// observable proxy: Stop() would have cleared them.
+func TestDefaultServer_UpdateMux_PreservesLocalResolver(t *testing.T) {
+	resolver := local.NewResolver()
+	require.NoError(t, resolver.RegisterRecord(nbdns.SimpleRecord{
+		Name:  "peer.netbird.cloud.",
+		Type:  int(dns.TypeA),
+		Class: nbdns.DefaultClass,
+		TTL:   300,
+		RData: "10.0.0.1",
+	}))
+
+	server := &DefaultServer{
+		handlerChain:  NewHandlerChain(),
+		service:       &mockService{},
+		localResolver: resolver,
+	}
+
+	server.updateMux([]handlerWrapper{
+		{domain: "netbird.cloud", handler: resolver, priority: PriorityLocal},
+	})
+
+	// Remove the zone. The resolver must survive so its records and lookup
+	// context stay intact for the next registration.
+	server.updateMux(nil)
+
+	var response *dns.Msg
+	resolver.ServeDNS(&test.MockResponseWriter{
+		WriteMsgFunc: func(m *dns.Msg) error {
+			response = m
+			return nil
+		},
+	}, &dns.Msg{Question: []dns.Question{{Name: "peer.netbird.cloud.", Qtype: dns.TypeA, Qclass: dns.ClassINET}}})
+
+	require.NotNil(t, response, "local resolver should answer after teardown")
+	assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, response.Rcode,
+		"local resolver records must survive teardown; updateMux must not Stop() the shared resolver")
+	assert.NotEmpty(t, response.Answer, "answer should contain the surviving record")
+}
+
 func TestExtraDomains(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []struct {
 		name                string
@@ -2049,7 +1674,6 @@ func TestBuildUpstreamHandler_MergesGroupsPerDomain(t *testing.T) {
 		localResolver: local.NewResolver(),
 		handlerChain:  NewHandlerChain(),
 		hostManager:   &noopHostConfigurator{},
-		dnsMuxMap:     make(registeredHandlerMap),
 	}
 
 	groups := []*nbdns.NameServerGroup{
@@ -2207,7 +1831,7 @@ func TestEvaluateNSGroupHealth(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// healthStubHandler is a minimal dnsMuxMap entry that exposes a fixed
+// healthStubHandler is a minimal dnsMuxHandlers entry that exposes a fixed
 // UpstreamHealth snapshot, letting tests drive recomputeNSGroupStates
 // without spinning up real handlers.
 type healthStubHandler struct {
@@ -2283,12 +1907,11 @@ func newProjTestFixture(t *testing.T) *projTestFixture {
 		ctx:              context.Background(),
 		wgInterface:      &mocWGIface{},
 		statusRecorder:   recorder,
-		dnsMuxMap:        make(registeredHandlerMap),
 		selectedRoutes:   func() route.HAMap { return fx.selected },
 		activeRoutes:     func() route.HAMap { return fx.active },
 		warningDelayBase: defaultWarningDelayBase,
 	}
-	fx.server.dnsMuxMap["example.com"] = handlerWrapper{domain: "example.com", handler: fx.stub, priority: PriorityUpstream}
+	fx.server.dnsMuxHandlers = []handlerWrapper{{domain: "example.com", handler: fx.stub, priority: PriorityUpstream}}
 
 	fx.server.mux.Lock()
 	fx.server.updateNSGroupStates([]*nbdns.NameServerGroup{fx.group})
@@ -2395,7 +2018,6 @@ func TestProjection_OverlayAddrNoRouteDelaysWarning(t *testing.T) {
 		ctx:              context.Background(),
 		wgInterface:      &mocWGIface{},
 		statusRecorder:   recorder,
-		dnsMuxMap:        make(registeredHandlerMap),
 		selectedRoutes:   func() route.HAMap { return nil },
 		activeRoutes:     func() route.HAMap { return nil },
 		warningDelayBase: 50 * time.Millisecond,
@@ -2407,7 +2029,7 @@ func TestProjection_OverlayAddrNoRouteDelaysWarning(t *testing.T) {
 	stub := &healthStubHandler{health: map[netip.AddrPort]UpstreamHealth{
 		overlayPeer: {LastFail: time.Now(), LastErr: "timeout"},
 	}}
-	server.dnsMuxMap["example.com"] = handlerWrapper{domain: "example.com", handler: stub, priority: PriorityUpstream}
+	server.dnsMuxHandlers = []handlerWrapper{{domain: "example.com", handler: stub, priority: PriorityUpstream}}
 
 	server.mux.Lock()
 	server.updateNSGroupStates([]*nbdns.NameServerGroup{group})
@@ -2444,7 +2066,6 @@ func TestProjection_StopClearsHealthState(t *testing.T) {
 		service:           NewServiceViaMemory(wgIface),
 		hostManager:       &noopHostConfigurator{},
 		extraDomains:      map[domain.Domain]int{},
-		dnsMuxMap:         make(registeredHandlerMap),
 		statusRecorder:    peer.NewRecorder("mgm"),
 		selectedRoutes:    func() route.HAMap { return nil },
 		activeRoutes:      func() route.HAMap { return nil },
@@ -2459,7 +2080,7 @@ func TestProjection_StopClearsHealthState(t *testing.T) {
 		NameServers: []nbdns.NameServer{{IP: srv.Addr(), NSType: nbdns.UDPNameServerType, Port: int(srv.Port())}},
 	}
 	stub := &healthStubHandler{health: map[netip.AddrPort]UpstreamHealth{srv: {LastOk: time.Now()}}}
-	server.dnsMuxMap["example.com"] = handlerWrapper{domain: "example.com", handler: stub, priority: PriorityUpstream}
+	server.dnsMuxHandlers = []handlerWrapper{{domain: "example.com", handler: stub, priority: PriorityUpstream}}
 
 	server.mux.Lock()
 	server.updateNSGroupStates([]*nbdns.NameServerGroup{group})
@@ -2484,6 +2105,32 @@ func TestProjection_StopClearsHealthState(t *testing.T) {
 // rule 3: startup failures while the peer is handshaking, then the peer
 // comes up and a query succeeds before the grace window elapses. No
 // warning should ever have fired, and no recovery either.
+func TestWarningDelayBaseFromEnv(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		set  bool
+		val  string
+		want time.Duration
+	}{
+		{name: "unset uses default", set: false, want: defaultWarningDelayBase},
+		{name: "valid override", set: true, val: "90s", want: 90 * time.Second},
+		{name: "valid minutes", set: true, val: "2m", want: 2 * time.Minute},
+		{name: "invalid falls back", set: true, val: "notaduration", want: defaultWarningDelayBase},
+		{name: "zero falls back", set: true, val: "0s", want: defaultWarningDelayBase},
+		{name: "negative falls back", set: true, val: "-30s", want: defaultWarningDelayBase},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Setenv(envWarningDelay, tc.val)
+			if !tc.set {
+				os.Unsetenv(envWarningDelay)
+			}
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.want, warningDelayBaseFromEnv(), "grace window base")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestProjection_OverlayRecoversDuringGrace(t *testing.T) {
 	fx := newProjTestFixture(t)
 	fx.server.warningDelayBase = 200 * time.Millisecond
@@ -2595,7 +2242,6 @@ func TestProjection_MixedGroupEmitsImmediately(t *testing.T) {
 	server := &DefaultServer{
 		ctx:              context.Background(),
 		statusRecorder:   recorder,
-		dnsMuxMap:        make(registeredHandlerMap),
 		selectedRoutes:   func() route.HAMap { return overlayMap },
 		activeRoutes:     func() route.HAMap { return nil },
 		warningDelayBase: time.Hour,
@@ -2613,7 +2259,7 @@ func TestProjection_MixedGroupEmitsImmediately(t *testing.T) {
 			overlay: {LastFail: time.Now(), LastErr: "timeout"},
 		},
 	}
-	server.dnsMuxMap["example.com"] = handlerWrapper{domain: "example.com", handler: stub, priority: PriorityUpstream}
+	server.dnsMuxHandlers = []handlerWrapper{{domain: "example.com", handler: stub, priority: PriorityUpstream}}
 
 	server.mux.Lock()
 	server.updateNSGroupStates([]*nbdns.NameServerGroup{group})
@@ -2640,7 +2286,6 @@ func TestDNSLoopPrevention(t *testing.T) {
 		localResolver: local.NewResolver(),
 		handlerChain:  NewHandlerChain(),
 		hostManager:   &noopHostConfigurator{},
-		dnsMuxMap:     make(registeredHandlerMap),
 	}
 
 	tests := []struct {

client/internal/dns/service_listener.go

@@ -292,18 +292,16 @@ func (s *serviceViaListener) generateFreePort() (uint16, error) {
 		return customPort, nil
 	}
 
-	udpAddr := net.UDPAddrFromAddrPort(netip.MustParseAddrPort("0.0.0.0:0"))
-	probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", udpAddr)
+	probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp4", &net.UDPAddr{})
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Debugf("failed to bind random port for DNS: %s", err)
 		return 0, err
 	}
 
-	addrPort := netip.MustParseAddrPort(probeListener.LocalAddr().String()) // might panic if address is incorrect
-	err = probeListener.Close()
-	if err != nil {
+	port := uint16(probeListener.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr).Port)
+	if err = probeListener.Close(); err != nil {
 		log.Debugf("failed to free up DNS port: %s", err)
 		return 0, err
 	}
-	return addrPort.Port(), nil
+	return port, nil
 }

client/internal/dns/upstream.go

@@ -443,29 +443,32 @@ func (u *upstreamResolverBase) queryUpstream(parentCtx context.Context, r *dns.M
 		return raceResult{}, &upstreamFailure{upstream: upstream, reason: "no response"}
 	}
 
+	// A valid response means the upstream is reachable, whatever the Rcode.
+	u.markUpstreamOk(upstream)
+
 	proto := ""
 	if upstreamProto != nil {
 		proto = upstreamProto.protocol
 	}
 
 	if rm.Rcode == dns.RcodeServerFailure || rm.Rcode == dns.RcodeRefused {
+		// SERVFAIL and REFUSED are per-question outcomes (DNSSEC-bogus names,
+		// refused zones, transient recursion errors), not reachability
+		// problems: fail over for a better answer but keep the upstream healthy.
 		if code, ok := nonRetryableEDE(rm); ok {
 			if !hadEdns {
-				stripOPT(rm)
+				resutil.StripOPT(rm)
 			}
-			u.markUpstreamOk(upstream)
 			return raceResult{msg: rm, upstream: upstream, protocol: proto, ede: edeName(code)}, nil
 		}
 		reason := dns.RcodeToString[rm.Rcode]
-		u.markUpstreamFail(upstream, reason)
 		return raceResult{}, &upstreamFailure{upstream: upstream, reason: reason}
 	}
 
 	if !hadEdns {
-		stripOPT(rm)
+		resutil.StripOPT(rm)
 	}
 
-	u.markUpstreamOk(upstream)
 	return raceResult{msg: rm, upstream: upstream, protocol: proto}, nil
 }
 
@@ -520,22 +523,6 @@ func upstreamUDPSize() uint16 {
 	return dns.MinMsgSize
 }
 
-// stripOPT removes any OPT pseudo-RRs from the response's Extra section so
-// the response complies with RFC 6891 when the client did not advertise EDNS0.
-func stripOPT(rm *dns.Msg) {
-	if len(rm.Extra) == 0 {
-		return
-	}
-	out := rm.Extra[:0]
-	for _, rr := range rm.Extra {
-		if _, ok := rr.(*dns.OPT); ok {
-			continue
-		}
-		out = append(out, rr)
-	}
-	rm.Extra = out
-}
-
 func (u *upstreamResolverBase) handleUpstreamError(err error, upstream netip.AddrPort, startTime time.Time) *upstreamFailure {
 	if !errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) && !isTimeout(err) {
 		return &upstreamFailure{upstream: upstream, reason: err.Error()}

client/internal/dns/upstream_ios.go

@@ -130,8 +130,3 @@ func GetClientPrivate(iface privateClientIface, upstreamIP netip.Addr, dialTimeo
 	}
 	return client, nil
 }
-
-func getInterfaceIndex(interfaceName string) (int, error) {
-	iface, err := net.InterfaceByName(interfaceName)
-	return iface.Index, err
-}

client/internal/dns/upstream_test.go

@@ -517,6 +517,78 @@ func TestUpstreamResolver_HealthTracking(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.NotContains(t, health, bad, "sibling upstream should not be queried when primary answers")
 }
 
+// TestUpstreamResolver_HealthTracking_ResponseMeansReachable verifies that an
+// upstream which answers with SERVFAIL or REFUSED is recorded as healthy:
+// those are per-question outcomes from a reachable server and must not mark
+// the upstream unhealthy. Only transport failures (timeouts) do.
+func TestUpstreamResolver_HealthTracking_ResponseMeansReachable(t *testing.T) {
+	a := netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.10:53")
+	b := netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.11:53")
+	timeoutErr := &net.OpError{Op: "read", Err: fmt.Errorf("i/o timeout")}
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		respA       mockUpstreamResponse
+		respB       mockUpstreamResponse
+		wantHealthy bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:        "both SERVFAIL are reachable",
+			respA:       mockUpstreamResponse{msg: buildMockResponse(dns.RcodeServerFailure, "")},
+			respB:       mockUpstreamResponse{msg: buildMockResponse(dns.RcodeServerFailure, "")},
+			wantHealthy: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "both REFUSED are reachable",
+			respA:       mockUpstreamResponse{msg: buildMockResponse(dns.RcodeRefused, "")},
+			respB:       mockUpstreamResponse{msg: buildMockResponse(dns.RcodeRefused, "")},
+			wantHealthy: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "timeout marks unhealthy",
+			respA:       mockUpstreamResponse{err: timeoutErr},
+			respB:       mockUpstreamResponse{err: timeoutErr},
+			wantHealthy: false,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			mockClient := &mockUpstreamResolverPerServer{
+				responses: map[string]mockUpstreamResponse{
+					a.String(): tc.respA,
+					b.String(): tc.respB,
+				},
+				rtt: time.Millisecond,
+			}
+
+			ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+			defer cancel()
+
+			resolver := &upstreamResolverBase{
+				ctx:             ctx,
+				upstreamClient:  mockClient,
+				upstreamTimeout: UpstreamTimeout,
+			}
+			resolver.addRace([]netip.AddrPort{a, b})
+
+			responseWriter := &test.MockResponseWriter{WriteMsgFunc: func(m *dns.Msg) error { return nil }}
+			resolver.ServeDNS(responseWriter, new(dns.Msg).SetQuestion("example.com.", dns.TypeA))
+
+			health := resolver.UpstreamHealth()
+			require.Contains(t, health, a, "primary upstream should have a health record")
+			if tc.wantHealthy {
+				assert.False(t, health[a].LastOk.IsZero(), "responding upstream should have LastOk set")
+				assert.True(t, health[a].LastFail.IsZero(), "responding upstream should not be marked failed")
+				assert.Empty(t, health[a].LastErr, "responding upstream should have no error")
+			} else {
+				assert.False(t, health[a].LastFail.IsZero(), "timed-out upstream should be marked failed")
+				assert.NotEmpty(t, health[a].LastErr, "timed-out upstream should record an error")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestFormatFailures(t *testing.T) {
 	testCases := []struct {
 		name     string
@@ -913,19 +985,6 @@ func TestEDEName(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, "EDE 9999", edeName(9999), "unknown code falls back to numeric")
 }
 
-func TestStripOPT(t *testing.T) {
-	rm := &dns.Msg{
-		Extra: []dns.RR{
-			&dns.OPT{Hdr: dns.RR_Header{Name: ".", Rrtype: dns.TypeOPT}},
-			&dns.A{Hdr: dns.RR_Header{Name: "x.", Rrtype: dns.TypeA}, A: net.IPv4(1, 2, 3, 4)},
-		},
-	}
-	stripOPT(rm)
-	assert.Len(t, rm.Extra, 1, "OPT should be removed, A kept")
-	_, isOPT := rm.Extra[0].(*dns.OPT)
-	assert.False(t, isOPT, "remaining record must not be OPT")
-}
-
 func TestUpstreamResolver_NonRetryableEDEShortCircuits(t *testing.T) {
 	upstream1 := netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:53")
 	upstream2 := netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.2:53")

client/internal/dns_peer_activator.go

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+package internal
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/netip"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
+)
+
+const dnsActivationPollInterval = 50 * time.Millisecond
+
+// dnsPeerActivator wakes lazy-connection peers from the DNS resolution path. It
+// implements dns/local.PeerActivator. DNS queries run on their own goroutines,
+// so it only touches state that is safe for concurrent use — ConnMgr.ActivatePeer,
+// peerstore.Store and peer.Status — and never takes the engine's syncMsgMux,
+// keeping DNS resolution from contending with network-map processing.
+type dnsPeerActivator struct {
+	connMgr   *ConnMgr
+	peerStore *peerstore.Store
+	status    *peer.Status
+	// ctx is the engine's long-lived context. The connection dial is tied to it
+	// (not the per-query DNS wait budget) so a handshake that outlasts the wait
+	// still completes in the background rather than being cancelled at the deadline.
+	ctx context.Context
+}
+
+// ActivatePeersByIP triggers wake-up for the peer(s) owning addrs and waits
+// until one is connected or ctx (the per-query DNS wait budget) expires.
+// Activation itself is tied to the engine's long-lived context so the dial
+// survives a wait that times out. Unknown or already-connected addresses are
+// skipped, so the steady-state (warm) path adds no latency.
+func (a *dnsPeerActivator) ActivatePeersByIP(ctx context.Context, addrs []netip.Addr) {
+	if a == nil || a.connMgr == nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	var pending []string
+	for _, addr := range addrs {
+		ip := addr.String()
+		st, ok := a.status.PeerStateByIP(ip)
+		if !ok || st.ConnStatus == peer.StatusConnected {
+			continue
+		}
+		conn, ok := a.peerStore.PeerConn(st.PubKey)
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		a.connMgr.ActivatePeer(a.ctx, conn)
+		pending = append(pending, ip)
+	}
+
+	if len(pending) == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	a.waitConnected(ctx, pending)
+}
+
+// waitConnected blocks until any of ips reports a connected peer or ctx expires.
+func (a *dnsPeerActivator) waitConnected(ctx context.Context, ips []string) {
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(dnsActivationPollInterval)
+	defer ticker.Stop()
+	for {
+		for _, ip := range ips {
+			if st, ok := a.status.PeerStateByIP(ip); ok && st.ConnStatus == peer.StatusConnected {
+				return
+			}
+		}
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		case <-ticker.C:
+		}
+	}
+}

client/internal/dns_peer_activator_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+package internal
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
+)
+
+func newTestPeerConn(t *testing.T, key string) *peer.Conn {
+	t.Helper()
+	conn, err := peer.NewConn(peer.ConnConfig{
+		Key:      key,
+		LocalKey: "local",
+		WgConfig: peer.WgConfig{
+			AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.1/32")},
+		},
+	}, peer.ServiceDependencies{})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	return conn
+}
+
+func newTestDNSPeerActivator(t *testing.T) (*dnsPeerActivator, *peer.Status, *peerstore.Store) {
+	t.Helper()
+	status := peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm")
+	store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
+	// ConnMgr without Start: the lazy manager is nil, so ActivatePeer is a
+	// no-op — these tests exercise the activator's skip/wait logic.
+	connMgr := NewConnMgr(&EngineConfig{}, status, store, nil)
+	return &dnsPeerActivator{
+		connMgr:   connMgr,
+		peerStore: store,
+		status:    status,
+		ctx:       context.Background(),
+	}, status, store
+}
+
+func TestDNSPeerActivator_NilSafe(t *testing.T) {
+	var a *dnsPeerActivator
+	a.ActivatePeersByIP(context.Background(), []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
+}
+
+// TestDNSPeerActivator_SkipsUnknownAndConnectedPeers verifies the steady-state
+// (warm) path adds no latency: already-connected and unknown addresses never
+// enter the wait loop.
+func TestDNSPeerActivator_SkipsUnknownAndConnectedPeers(t *testing.T) {
+	a, status, store := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
+
+	require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", "fd00::1"))
+	require.NoError(t, status.UpdatePeerState(peer.State{PubKey: "peerA", ConnStatus: peer.StatusConnected}))
+	store.AddPeerConn("peerA", newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA"))
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	start := time.Now()
+	a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{
+		netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1"),  // known, connected -> skipped
+		netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),     // known via IPv6, connected -> skipped
+		netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.99"), // unknown -> skipped
+	})
+	require.Less(t, time.Since(start), time.Second, "no pending peer must mean no wait")
+}
+
+// TestDNSPeerActivator_WaitsForPendingPeerToConnect verifies the wait loop
+// returns as soon as a pending peer reports connected, well before the
+// per-query budget expires.
+func TestDNSPeerActivator_WaitsForPendingPeerToConnect(t *testing.T) {
+	a, status, store := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
+
+	require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", ""))
+	store.AddPeerConn("peerA", newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA"))
+
+	go func() {
+		time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond)
+		_ = status.UpdatePeerState(peer.State{PubKey: "peerA", ConnStatus: peer.StatusConnected})
+	}()
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	start := time.Now()
+	a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
+	elapsed := time.Since(start)
+
+	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, elapsed, 100*time.Millisecond, "must wait for the pending peer")
+	require.Less(t, elapsed, 5*time.Second, "must return on connect, not at the deadline")
+}
+
+// TestDNSPeerActivator_ReturnsAtBudgetWhenPeerStaysIdle verifies a peer that
+// never connects releases the DNS response at the per-query budget instead of
+// blocking it indefinitely.
+func TestDNSPeerActivator_ReturnsAtBudgetWhenPeerStaysIdle(t *testing.T) {
+	a, status, store := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
+
+	require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", ""))
+	store.AddPeerConn("peerA", newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA"))
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 300*time.Millisecond)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	start := time.Now()
+	a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
+	elapsed := time.Since(start)
+
+	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, elapsed, 250*time.Millisecond, "must wait out the budget for a pending peer")
+	require.Less(t, elapsed, 5*time.Second, "must not block past the budget")
+}
+
+// TestDNSPeerActivator_NoWaitWithoutPeerConn verifies a known-but-idle peer
+// with no connection object in the store is not waited on: there is nothing to
+// activate, so waiting could only ever time out.
+func TestDNSPeerActivator_NoWaitWithoutPeerConn(t *testing.T) {
+	a, status, _ := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
+
+	require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", ""))
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	start := time.Now()
+	a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
+	require.Less(t, time.Since(start), time.Second, "peer without a conn must not be waited on")
+}

client/internal/dnsfwd/forwarder.go

@@ -26,8 +26,23 @@ import (
 const errResolveFailed = "failed to resolve query for domain=%s: %v"
 const upstreamTimeout = 15 * time.Second
 
+// EDE info codes the forwarder emits on upstream failures so the querying
+// client can see the reason without inspecting this peer's logs. They live in
+// the RFC 8914 Private Use range (49152-65535); the Go resolver never exposes a
+// real upstream EDE here, so these cannot collide with a genuine code.
+const (
+	edeNetbirdUpstreamTimeout uint16 = 49152
+	edeNetbirdUpstreamFailure uint16 = 49153
+)
+
 type resolver interface {
 	LookupNetIP(ctx context.Context, network, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error)
+	LookupMX(ctx context.Context, name string) ([]*net.MX, error)
+	LookupTXT(ctx context.Context, name string) ([]string, error)
+	LookupNS(ctx context.Context, name string) ([]*net.NS, error)
+	LookupSRV(ctx context.Context, service, proto, name string) (string, []*net.SRV, error)
+	LookupCNAME(ctx context.Context, host string) (string, error)
+	LookupAddr(ctx context.Context, addr string) ([]string, error)
 }
 
 type firewaller interface {
@@ -201,12 +216,6 @@ func (f *DNSForwarder) handleDNSQuery(logger *log.Entry, w dns.ResponseWriter, q
 		qname, dns.TypeToString[question.Qtype], dns.ClassToString[question.Qclass])
 
 	resp := query.SetReply(query)
-	network := resutil.NetworkForQtype(question.Qtype)
-	if network == "" {
-		resp.Rcode = dns.RcodeNotImplemented
-		f.writeResponse(logger, w, resp, qname, startTime)
-		return
-	}
 
 	mostSpecificResId, matchingEntries := f.getMatchingEntries(strings.TrimSuffix(qname, "."))
 	if mostSpecificResId == "" {
@@ -218,9 +227,46 @@ func (f *DNSForwarder) handleDNSQuery(logger *log.Entry, w dns.ResponseWriter, q
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), upstreamTimeout)
 	defer cancel()
 
+	reqHasEdns := query.IsEdns0() != nil
+
+	switch question.Qtype {
+	case dns.TypeA, dns.TypeAAAA:
+		f.handleAddressQuery(ctx, logger, w, resp, mostSpecificResId, matchingEntries, reqHasEdns, startTime)
+	case dns.TypeMX, dns.TypeTXT, dns.TypeNS, dns.TypeSRV, dns.TypeCNAME, dns.TypePTR:
+		f.handleRecordQuery(ctx, logger, w, resp, startTime)
+	default:
+		// The domain is routed here, so any other type is answered NODATA
+		// (NOERROR, empty answer) rather than falling back to a resolver that
+		// would poison the name with NXDOMAIN. The Extended DNS Error lets a
+		// client tell this capability-driven NODATA apart from an
+		// authoritative one. The OPT pseudo-record must not appear unless the
+		// query advertised EDNS0.
+		if reqHasEdns {
+			attachEDE(resp, dns.ExtendedErrorCodeNotSupported, "netbird forwarder: unsupported query type")
+		}
+		f.writeResponse(logger, w, resp, qname, startTime)
+	}
+}
+
+// handleAddressQuery resolves A/AAAA queries, programs the firewall sets and
+// resolved-IP state, and caches the answer for resilience on upstream failure.
+func (f *DNSForwarder) handleAddressQuery(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	logger *log.Entry,
+	w dns.ResponseWriter,
+	resp *dns.Msg,
+	mostSpecificResId route.ResID,
+	matchingEntries []*ForwarderEntry,
+	reqHasEdns bool,
+	startTime time.Time,
+) {
+	question := resp.Question[0]
+	qname := strings.ToLower(question.Name)
+
+	network := resutil.NetworkForQtype(question.Qtype)
 	result := resutil.LookupIP(ctx, f.resolver, network, qname, question.Qtype)
 	if result.Err != nil {
-		f.handleDNSError(ctx, logger, w, question, resp, qname, result, startTime)
+		f.handleDNSError(ctx, logger, w, question, resp, qname, result, reqHasEdns, startTime)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -231,6 +277,25 @@ func (f *DNSForwarder) handleDNSQuery(logger *log.Entry, w dns.ResponseWriter, q
 	f.writeResponse(logger, w, resp, qname, startTime)
 }
 
+// handleRecordQuery resolves non-address record types (MX, TXT, NS, SRV,
+// CNAME, PTR) through the host resolver. Missing records are answered NODATA so
+// the routed name is never poisoned with NXDOMAIN.
+func (f *DNSForwarder) handleRecordQuery(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	logger *log.Entry,
+	w dns.ResponseWriter,
+	resp *dns.Msg,
+	startTime time.Time,
+) {
+	question := resp.Question[0]
+	qname := strings.ToLower(question.Name)
+
+	records, rcode := resutil.LookupRecords(ctx, f.resolver, qname, question.Qtype, f.ttl)
+	resp.Rcode = rcode
+	resp.Answer = append(resp.Answer, records...)
+	f.writeResponse(logger, w, resp, qname, startTime)
+}
+
 func (f *DNSForwarder) writeResponse(logger *log.Entry, w dns.ResponseWriter, resp *dns.Msg, qname string, startTime time.Time) {
 	if err := w.WriteMsg(resp); err != nil {
 		logger.Errorf("failed to write DNS response: %v", err)
@@ -333,6 +398,7 @@ func (f *DNSForwarder) handleDNSError(
 	resp *dns.Msg,
 	domain string,
 	result resutil.LookupResult,
+	reqHasEdns bool,
 	startTime time.Time,
 ) {
 	qType := question.Qtype
@@ -374,6 +440,10 @@ func (f *DNSForwarder) handleDNSError(
 		logger.Warnf(errResolveFailed, domain, result.Err)
 	}
 
+	if reqHasEdns {
+		attachEDE(resp, edeCodeFor(dnsErr), edeText(dnsErr))
+	}
+
 	f.writeResponse(logger, w, resp, domain, startTime)
 }
 
@@ -414,3 +484,33 @@ func (f *DNSForwarder) getMatchingEntries(domain string) (route.ResID, []*Forwar
 
 	return selectedResId, matches
 }
+
+// edeCodeFor maps an upstream lookup error to the NetBird EDE info code.
+func edeCodeFor(dnsErr *net.DNSError) uint16 {
+	if dnsErr != nil && dnsErr.IsTimeout {
+		return edeNetbirdUpstreamTimeout
+	}
+	return edeNetbirdUpstreamFailure
+}
+
+// edeText builds the EDE extra-text describing the class of upstream failure.
+// It deliberately omits the upstream server address, which may be an internal
+// resolver and is exposed to any client permitted to use the route; the full
+// detail stays in the forwarder's local log.
+func edeText(dnsErr *net.DNSError) string {
+	if dnsErr != nil && dnsErr.IsTimeout {
+		return "netbird forwarder: upstream timeout"
+	}
+	return "netbird forwarder: upstream failure"
+}
+
+// attachEDE adds an Extended DNS Error (RFC 8914) option to the response,
+// creating the OPT pseudo-record if the response does not already carry one.
+func attachEDE(resp *dns.Msg, code uint16, text string) {
+	opt := resp.IsEdns0()
+	if opt == nil {
+		resp.SetEdns0(dns.DefaultMsgSize, false)
+		opt = resp.IsEdns0()
+	}
+	opt.Option = append(opt.Option, &dns.EDNS0_EDE{InfoCode: code, ExtraText: text})
+}

client/internal/dnsfwd/forwarder_test.go

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
 	firewall "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/resutil"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/test"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
@@ -132,6 +133,41 @@ func (m *MockResolver) LookupNetIP(ctx context.Context, network, host string) ([
 	return args.Get(0).([]netip.Addr), args.Error(1)
 }
 
+func (m *MockResolver) LookupMX(ctx context.Context, name string) ([]*net.MX, error) {
+	args := m.Called(ctx, name)
+	recs, _ := args.Get(0).([]*net.MX)
+	return recs, args.Error(1)
+}
+
+func (m *MockResolver) LookupTXT(ctx context.Context, name string) ([]string, error) {
+	args := m.Called(ctx, name)
+	recs, _ := args.Get(0).([]string)
+	return recs, args.Error(1)
+}
+
+func (m *MockResolver) LookupNS(ctx context.Context, name string) ([]*net.NS, error) {
+	args := m.Called(ctx, name)
+	recs, _ := args.Get(0).([]*net.NS)
+	return recs, args.Error(1)
+}
+
+func (m *MockResolver) LookupSRV(ctx context.Context, service, proto, name string) (string, []*net.SRV, error) {
+	args := m.Called(ctx, service, proto, name)
+	recs, _ := args.Get(1).([]*net.SRV)
+	return args.String(0), recs, args.Error(2)
+}
+
+func (m *MockResolver) LookupCNAME(ctx context.Context, host string) (string, error) {
+	args := m.Called(ctx, host)
+	return args.String(0), args.Error(1)
+}
+
+func (m *MockResolver) LookupAddr(ctx context.Context, addr string) ([]string, error) {
+	args := m.Called(ctx, addr)
+	recs, _ := args.Get(0).([]string)
+	return recs, args.Error(1)
+}
+
 func TestDNSForwarder_SubdomainAccessLogic(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []struct {
 		name             string
@@ -544,12 +580,15 @@ func TestDNSForwarder_MultipleIPsInSingleUpdate(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestDNSForwarder_ResponseCodes(t *testing.T) {
+	// A type with no net.Resolver Lookup method (CAA) must answer NODATA
+	// (NOERROR, empty) rather than NXDOMAIN/NOTIMP to avoid poisoning the name.
 	tests := []struct {
 		name         string
 		queryType    uint16
 		queryDomain  string
 		configured   string
 		expectedCode int
+		expectEDE    bool
 		description  string
 	}{
 		{
@@ -561,28 +600,13 @@ func TestDNSForwarder_ResponseCodes(t *testing.T) {
 			description:  "RFC compliant REFUSED for unauthorized queries",
 		},
 		{
-			name:         "unsupported query type returns NOTIMP",
-			queryType:    dns.TypeMX,
+			name:         "unsupported query type returns NODATA",
+			queryType:    dns.TypeCAA,
 			queryDomain:  "example.com",
 			configured:   "example.com",
-			expectedCode: dns.RcodeNotImplemented,
-			description:  "RFC compliant NOTIMP for unsupported types",
-		},
-		{
-			name:         "CNAME query returns NOTIMP",
-			queryType:    dns.TypeCNAME,
-			queryDomain:  "example.com",
-			configured:   "example.com",
-			expectedCode: dns.RcodeNotImplemented,
-			description:  "CNAME queries not supported",
-		},
-		{
-			name:         "TXT query returns NOTIMP",
-			queryType:    dns.TypeTXT,
-			queryDomain:  "example.com",
-			configured:   "example.com",
-			expectedCode: dns.RcodeNotImplemented,
-			description:  "TXT queries not supported",
+			expectedCode: dns.RcodeSuccess,
+			expectEDE:    true,
+			description:  "Unsupported types answer NODATA, not NXDOMAIN/NOTIMP",
 		},
 	}
 
@@ -598,6 +622,7 @@ func TestDNSForwarder_ResponseCodes(t *testing.T) {
 
 			query := &dns.Msg{}
 			query.SetQuestion(dns.Fqdn(tt.queryDomain), tt.queryType)
+			query.SetEdns0(dns.DefaultMsgSize, false)
 
 			// Capture the written response
 			var writtenResp *dns.Msg
@@ -613,6 +638,288 @@ func TestDNSForwarder_ResponseCodes(t *testing.T) {
 			// Check the response written to the writer
 			require.NotNil(t, writtenResp, "Expected response to be written")
 			assert.Equal(t, tt.expectedCode, writtenResp.Rcode, tt.description)
+			assert.Empty(t, writtenResp.Answer, "Non-address response should carry no answers")
+
+			if tt.expectEDE {
+				require.NotNil(t, writtenResp.IsEdns0(), "EDNS0 client should get an OPT in the reply")
+				assert.True(t, hasEDE(writtenResp, dns.ExtendedErrorCodeNotSupported),
+					"unsupported type NODATA should carry EDE Not Supported")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func hasEDE(m *dns.Msg, code uint16) bool {
+	opt := m.IsEdns0()
+	if opt == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, o := range opt.Option {
+		if ede, ok := o.(*dns.EDNS0_EDE); ok && ede.InfoCode == code {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func TestDNSForwarder_RecordQueries(t *testing.T) {
+	notFound := &net.DNSError{IsNotFound: true, Name: "example.com"}
+
+	t.Run("MX records are forwarded", func(t *testing.T) {
+		mockResolver := &MockResolver{}
+		forwarder := newRecordTestForwarder(t, mockResolver, "example.com")
+
+		mockResolver.On("LookupMX", mock.Anything, "example.com.").
+			Return([]*net.MX{{Host: "mail.example.com.", Pref: 10}}, nil).Once()
+
+		resp := runRecordQuery(t, forwarder, "example.com", dns.TypeMX)
+		require.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, resp.Rcode)
+		require.Len(t, resp.Answer, 1)
+		mx, ok := resp.Answer[0].(*dns.MX)
+		require.True(t, ok, "answer should be an MX record")
+		assert.Equal(t, uint16(10), mx.Preference)
+		assert.Equal(t, "mail.example.com.", mx.Mx)
+		mockResolver.AssertExpectations(t)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("missing MX is NODATA not NXDOMAIN", func(t *testing.T) {
+		mockResolver := &MockResolver{}
+		forwarder := newRecordTestForwarder(t, mockResolver, "example.com")
+
+		// A not-found cannot prove the name is absent (it may exist with only
+		// other record types), so it must answer NODATA, never NXDOMAIN.
+		mockResolver.On("LookupMX", mock.Anything, "example.com.").
+			Return(nil, notFound).Once()
+
+		resp := runRecordQuery(t, forwarder, "example.com", dns.TypeMX)
+		assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, resp.Rcode, "missing record must be NODATA")
+		assert.Empty(t, resp.Answer)
+		mockResolver.AssertExpectations(t)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("NS records are forwarded", func(t *testing.T) {
+		mockResolver := &MockResolver{}
+		forwarder := newRecordTestForwarder(t, mockResolver, "example.com")
+
+		mockResolver.On("LookupNS", mock.Anything, "example.com.").
+			Return([]*net.NS{{Host: "ns1.example.com."}}, nil).Once()
+
+		resp := runRecordQuery(t, forwarder, "example.com", dns.TypeNS)
+		require.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, resp.Rcode)
+		require.Len(t, resp.Answer, 1)
+		ns, ok := resp.Answer[0].(*dns.NS)
+		require.True(t, ok, "answer should be an NS record")
+		assert.Equal(t, "ns1.example.com.", ns.Ns)
+		mockResolver.AssertExpectations(t)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("missing NS is NODATA", func(t *testing.T) {
+		mockResolver := &MockResolver{}
+		forwarder := newRecordTestForwarder(t, mockResolver, "example.com")
+
+		mockResolver.On("LookupNS", mock.Anything, "example.com.").
+			Return(nil, notFound).Once()
+
+		resp := runRecordQuery(t, forwarder, "example.com", dns.TypeNS)
+		assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, resp.Rcode)
+		assert.Empty(t, resp.Answer)
+		mockResolver.AssertExpectations(t)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("SRV records are forwarded", func(t *testing.T) {
+		mockResolver := &MockResolver{}
+		forwarder := newRecordTestForwarder(t, mockResolver, "_sip._tcp.example.com")
+
+		mockResolver.On("LookupSRV", mock.Anything, "", "", "_sip._tcp.example.com.").
+			Return("", []*net.SRV{{Target: "sip.example.com.", Port: 5060, Priority: 10, Weight: 5}}, nil).Once()
+
+		resp := runRecordQuery(t, forwarder, "_sip._tcp.example.com", dns.TypeSRV)
+		require.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, resp.Rcode)
+		require.Len(t, resp.Answer, 1)
+		srv, ok := resp.Answer[0].(*dns.SRV)
+		require.True(t, ok, "answer should be an SRV record")
+		assert.Equal(t, "sip.example.com.", srv.Target)
+		assert.Equal(t, uint16(5060), srv.Port)
+		assert.Equal(t, uint16(10), srv.Priority)
+		mockResolver.AssertExpectations(t)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("missing SRV is NODATA", func(t *testing.T) {
+		mockResolver := &MockResolver{}
+		forwarder := newRecordTestForwarder(t, mockResolver, "_sip._tcp.example.com")
+
+		mockResolver.On("LookupSRV", mock.Anything, "", "", "_sip._tcp.example.com.").
+			Return("", nil, notFound).Once()
+
+		resp := runRecordQuery(t, forwarder, "_sip._tcp.example.com", dns.TypeSRV)
+		assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, resp.Rcode)
+		assert.Empty(t, resp.Answer)
+		mockResolver.AssertExpectations(t)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("TXT records are forwarded", func(t *testing.T) {
+		mockResolver := &MockResolver{}
+		forwarder := newRecordTestForwarder(t, mockResolver, "example.com")
+
+		mockResolver.On("LookupTXT", mock.Anything, "example.com.").
+			Return([]string{"v=spf1 -all"}, nil).Once()
+
+		resp := runRecordQuery(t, forwarder, "example.com", dns.TypeTXT)
+		require.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, resp.Rcode)
+		require.Len(t, resp.Answer, 1)
+		txt, ok := resp.Answer[0].(*dns.TXT)
+		require.True(t, ok, "answer should be a TXT record")
+		assert.Equal(t, []string{"v=spf1 -all"}, txt.Txt)
+		mockResolver.AssertExpectations(t)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("CNAME record is forwarded", func(t *testing.T) {
+		mockResolver := &MockResolver{}
+		forwarder := newRecordTestForwarder(t, mockResolver, "www.example.com")
+
+		mockResolver.On("LookupCNAME", mock.Anything, "www.example.com.").
+			Return("target.example.com.", nil).Once()
+
+		resp := runRecordQuery(t, forwarder, "www.example.com", dns.TypeCNAME)
+		require.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, resp.Rcode)
+		require.Len(t, resp.Answer, 1)
+		cname, ok := resp.Answer[0].(*dns.CNAME)
+		require.True(t, ok, "answer should be a CNAME record")
+		assert.Equal(t, "target.example.com.", cname.Target)
+		mockResolver.AssertExpectations(t)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("CNAME equal to the name is NODATA", func(t *testing.T) {
+		mockResolver := &MockResolver{}
+		forwarder := newRecordTestForwarder(t, mockResolver, "example.com")
+
+		// No CNAME exists: LookupCNAME echoes the queried name back.
+		mockResolver.On("LookupCNAME", mock.Anything, "example.com.").
+			Return("example.com.", nil).Once()
+
+		resp := runRecordQuery(t, forwarder, "example.com", dns.TypeCNAME)
+		assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, resp.Rcode)
+		assert.Empty(t, resp.Answer, "self-referential CNAME means no CNAME record")
+		mockResolver.AssertExpectations(t)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("PTR record is forwarded", func(t *testing.T) {
+		mockResolver := &MockResolver{}
+		forwarder := newRecordTestForwarder(t, mockResolver, "*.in-addr.arpa")
+
+		// The reverse name is parsed back to the address LookupAddr expects.
+		mockResolver.On("LookupAddr", mock.Anything, "1.2.3.4").
+			Return([]string{"host.example.com."}, nil).Once()
+
+		resp := runRecordQuery(t, forwarder, "4.3.2.1.in-addr.arpa", dns.TypePTR)
+		require.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, resp.Rcode)
+		require.Len(t, resp.Answer, 1)
+		ptr, ok := resp.Answer[0].(*dns.PTR)
+		require.True(t, ok, "answer should be a PTR record")
+		assert.Equal(t, "host.example.com.", ptr.Ptr)
+		mockResolver.AssertExpectations(t)
+	})
+}
+
+func newRecordTestForwarder(t *testing.T, r resolver, configured string) *DNSForwarder {
+	t.Helper()
+	forwarder := NewDNSForwarder(netip.MustParseAddrPort("127.0.0.1:0"), 300, nil, &peer.Status{}, nil)
+	forwarder.resolver = r
+
+	d, err := domain.FromString(configured)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	forwarder.UpdateDomains([]*ForwarderEntry{{Domain: d, ResID: "test-res"}})
+	return forwarder
+}
+
+func runRecordQuery(t *testing.T, forwarder *DNSForwarder, qname string, qtype uint16) *dns.Msg {
+	t.Helper()
+	query := &dns.Msg{}
+	query.SetQuestion(dns.Fqdn(qname), qtype)
+
+	mockWriter := &test.MockResponseWriter{}
+	forwarder.handleDNSQuery(log.NewEntry(log.StandardLogger()), mockWriter, query, time.Now())
+
+	resp := mockWriter.GetLastResponse()
+	require.NotNil(t, resp, "expected response to be written")
+	return resp
+}
+
+func TestDNSForwarder_UpstreamFailureEDE(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		lookupErr   error
+		reqEdns     bool
+		wantEDE     bool
+		wantCode    uint16
+		wantTextHas string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:        "timeout with edns0",
+			lookupErr:   &net.DNSError{Err: "i/o timeout", Server: "10.0.0.53:53", IsTimeout: true},
+			reqEdns:     true,
+			wantEDE:     true,
+			wantCode:    edeNetbirdUpstreamTimeout,
+			wantTextHas: "netbird forwarder: upstream timeout",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "server failure with edns0",
+			lookupErr:   &net.DNSError{Err: "server misbehaving", Server: "10.0.0.53:53"},
+			reqEdns:     true,
+			wantEDE:     true,
+			wantCode:    edeNetbirdUpstreamFailure,
+			wantTextHas: "netbird forwarder: upstream failure",
+		},
+		{
+			name:      "no edns0 in request omits ede",
+			lookupErr: &net.DNSError{Err: "server misbehaving", Server: "10.0.0.53:53"},
+			reqEdns:   false,
+			wantEDE:   false,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			mockResolver := &MockResolver{}
+			forwarder := NewDNSForwarder(netip.MustParseAddrPort("127.0.0.1:0"), 300, nil, &peer.Status{}, nil)
+			forwarder.resolver = mockResolver
+
+			d, err := domain.FromString("example.com")
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			forwarder.UpdateDomains([]*ForwarderEntry{{Domain: d, ResID: "test-res"}})
+
+			mockResolver.On("LookupNetIP", mock.Anything, "ip4", "example.com.").
+				Return([]netip.Addr(nil), tt.lookupErr).Once()
+
+			query := &dns.Msg{}
+			query.SetQuestion("example.com.", dns.TypeA)
+			if tt.reqEdns {
+				query.SetEdns0(dns.DefaultMsgSize, false)
+			}
+
+			var writtenResp *dns.Msg
+			mockWriter := &test.MockResponseWriter{
+				WriteMsgFunc: func(m *dns.Msg) error {
+					writtenResp = m
+					return nil
+				},
+			}
+
+			forwarder.handleDNSQuery(log.NewEntry(log.StandardLogger()), mockWriter, query, time.Now())
+			mockResolver.AssertExpectations(t)
+
+			require.NotNil(t, writtenResp, "expected a response")
+			assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeServerFailure, writtenResp.Rcode, "upstream failure must be SERVFAIL")
+
+			ede, ok := resutil.ExtractEDE(writtenResp)
+			if !tt.wantEDE {
+				assert.False(t, ok, "response must not carry EDE")
+				return
+			}
+			require.True(t, ok, "response must carry EDE")
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.wantCode, ede.InfoCode, "EDE info code")
+			assert.Contains(t, ede.ExtraText, tt.wantTextHas, "EDE extra-text")
+			assert.NotContains(t, ede.ExtraText, "10.0.0.53", "must not leak upstream server address")
 		})
 	}
 }

client/internal/ebpf/ebpf/src/dns_fwd.c

@@ -52,11 +52,14 @@ int xdp_dns_fwd(struct iphdr  *ip, struct udphdr *udp) {
 
     if (udp->dest == GENERAL_DNS_PORT && ip->daddr == dns_ip) {
         udp->dest = dns_port;
+        // Clear the now-stale checksum; zero means "not computed" for IPv4.
+        udp->check = 0;
         return XDP_PASS;
     }
 
     if (udp->source == dns_port && ip->saddr == dns_ip) {
         udp->source = GENERAL_DNS_PORT;
+        udp->check = 0;
         return XDP_PASS;
     }
 

client/internal/ebpf/ebpf/src/wg_proxy.c

@@ -50,5 +50,11 @@ int xdp_wg_proxy(struct iphdr  *ip, struct udphdr *udp) {
     __be16 new_dst_port = htons(proxy_port);
     udp->dest = new_dst_port;
     udp->source = new_src_port;
+
+    // The ports are covered by the UDP checksum. This is an IPv4 loopback hop
+    // and the payload is already integrity-protected, so clear the checksum (a
+    // zero UDP checksum means "not computed" for IPv4) rather than leave a
+    // stale value the kernel would drop as UDP_CSUM.
+    udp->check = 0;
 	return XDP_PASS;
 }

client/internal/engine_authsession.go

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+package internal
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth/sessionwatch"
+	cProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
+)
+
+// ApplySessionDeadline propagates the absolute SSO session deadline carried on
+// LoginResponse / SyncResponse to both the watcher (for the edge-triggered
+// warning) and the status recorder (for the SubscribeStatus / Status RPC
+// snapshot the UI consumes).
+//
+// The wire field is 3-state:
+//   - nil                        → snapshot carries no info; keep the
+//     previously-anchored deadline (no-op)
+//   - explicit zero (s=0, n=0)   → peer is not SSO-registered or expiry is
+//     disabled; clear both sinks
+//   - valid timestamp            → new deadline; arm watcher, expose on
+//     status recorder
+//
+// Deadline sanity-checks live in sessionwatch.Watcher.Update. Any rejected
+// value is treated as a clear on both sinks: the alternative — leaving the
+// previously-known deadline in place — risks the UI confidently displaying
+// a stale "expires in X" while the server has actually invalidated it.
+func (e *Engine) ApplySessionDeadline(ts *timestamppb.Timestamp) {
+	if ts == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	var deadline time.Time
+	// Explicit zero (seconds=0 AND nanos=0) is the sentinel for "disabled".
+	// Everything else flows through Watcher.Update, whose sanity-checks
+	// reject out-of-range / pre-epoch / far-future / too-stale values and
+	// clear on rejection.
+	if ts.GetSeconds() != 0 || ts.GetNanos() != 0 {
+		deadline = ts.AsTime().UTC()
+	}
+	if e.sessionWatcher == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	// Watcher.Update owns the propagation to the status recorder (the
+	// SubscribeStatus / Status snapshot the UI reads): a set writes the
+	// deadline, a clear or a sanity-check rejection writes the zero value.
+	// Keeping a single writer is what stops the recorder from drifting out
+	// of sync with the warning timers.
+	if err := e.sessionWatcher.Update(deadline); err != nil {
+		log.Errorf("auth session deadline rejected: %v, clearing", err)
+		e.statusRecorder.PublishEvent(
+			cProto.SystemEvent_ERROR,
+			cProto.SystemEvent_AUTHENTICATION,
+			"session deadline rejected",
+			"",
+			map[string]string{sessionwatch.MetaSessionDeadlineRejected: err.Error()},
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+// DismissSessionWarning records the user's "Dismiss" click on the
+// T-WarningLead interactive notification and suppresses the upcoming
+// T-FinalWarningLead fallback for the current deadline. No-op when the
+// watcher is not running or holds no deadline.
+func (e *Engine) DismissSessionWarning() {
+	if e.sessionWatcher == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	e.sessionWatcher.Dismiss()
+}
+
+// ExtendAuthSession asks the management server to refresh the SSO session
+// expiry deadline using the supplied JWT, then mirrors the new deadline into
+// the daemon's state. The tunnel is untouched; no resync, no reconnect.
+//
+// Returns the new absolute UTC deadline (or zero time when the server
+// reports the peer is not eligible for extension).
+func (e *Engine) ExtendAuthSession(ctx context.Context, jwtToken string) (time.Time, error) {
+	if jwtToken == "" {
+		return time.Time{}, errors.New("jwt token is required")
+	}
+	if e.mgmClient == nil {
+		return time.Time{}, errors.New("management client is not initialised")
+	}
+
+	info, err := system.GetInfoWithChecks(ctx, e.checks)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("failed to collect system info for session extend: %v", err)
+		info = system.GetInfo(ctx)
+	}
+
+	resp, err := e.mgmClient.ExtendAuthSession(info, jwtToken)
+	if err != nil {
+		return time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("extend auth session on management: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	e.ApplySessionDeadline(resp.GetSessionExpiresAt())
+
+	if resp.GetSessionExpiresAt().IsValid() {
+		return resp.GetSessionExpiresAt().AsTime().UTC(), nil
+	}
+	return time.Time{}, nil
+}

client/internal/engine_lazy_exclude_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+package internal
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
+	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
+)
+
+func TestPrefixesContain(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name     string
+		prefixes []string
+		addr     string
+		want     bool
+	}{
+		{name: "own overlay /32 matches", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.145", want: true},
+		{name: "addr inside routed subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: true},
+		{name: "addr outside subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.122.0.1", want: false},
+		{name: "different /32", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.146", want: false},
+		{name: "ipv6 /128 matches", prefixes: []string{"fd00::1/128"}, addr: "fd00::1", want: true},
+		{name: "no prefixes", prefixes: nil, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: false},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(tt.prefixes))
+			for _, p := range tt.prefixes {
+				prefixes = append(prefixes, netip.MustParsePrefix(p))
+			}
+			require.Equal(t, tt.want, prefixesContain(prefixes, netip.MustParseAddr(tt.addr)))
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget guards a regression: the forward-target
+// peer (the peer routing a ForwardRule.TranslatedAddress) must be excluded from
+// lazy connections, matched via the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs.
+func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget(t *testing.T) {
+	const targetPeerKey = "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc0="
+	const otherPeerKey = "dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd0="
+
+	store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
+	store.AddPeerConn(targetPeerKey, newTestConn(t, targetPeerKey, "100.110.8.145/32"))
+	store.AddPeerConn(otherPeerKey, newTestConn(t, otherPeerKey, "100.110.9.10/32"))
+
+	e := &Engine{peerStore: store}
+
+	peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
+		{WgPubKey: targetPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
+		{WgPubKey: otherPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.9.10/32"}},
+	}
+	rules := []firewallManager.ForwardRule{
+		{TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("100.110.8.145")},
+	}
+
+	excluded := e.toExcludedLazyPeers(rules, peers)
+
+	require.True(t, excluded[targetPeerKey], "forward-target peer must be excluded from lazy connections")
+	require.False(t, excluded[otherPeerKey], "non-target peer must not be excluded")
+	require.Len(t, excluded, 1)
+}
+
+func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_NoRules(t *testing.T) {
+	e := &Engine{peerStore: peerstore.NewConnStore()}
+
+	peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
+		{WgPubKey: "peer-a", AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
+	}
+
+	require.Empty(t, e.toExcludedLazyPeers(nil, peers))
+}
+
+func newTestConn(t *testing.T, key, allowedIP string) *peer.Conn {
+	t.Helper()
+	conn, err := peer.NewConn(peer.ConnConfig{
+		Key:      key,
+		WgConfig: peer.WgConfig{AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix(allowedIP)}},
+	}, peer.ServiceDependencies{})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	return conn
+}

client/internal/engine_privileged_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,565 @@
+//go:build privileged
+
+package internal
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"runtime"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/golang/mock/gomock"
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"go.opentelemetry.io/otel"
+	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/keepalive"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
+	nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
+	nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/controllers/network_map/controller"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/controllers/network_map/update_channel"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/peers"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/peers/ephemeral/manager"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/server/config"
+	nbgrpc "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/shared/grpc"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/activity"
+	nbcache "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/cache"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/groups"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/integrations/integrated_validator/validator"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/integrations/port_forwarding"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/job"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/settings"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/telemetry"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
+	mgmt "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/client"
+	mgmtProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
+	relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
+	signal "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/signal/client"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/signal/proto"
+	signalServer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/signal/server"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
+)
+
+func TestEngine_SSH(t *testing.T) {
+	key, err := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	sshKey, err := nbssh.GeneratePrivateKey(nbssh.ED25519)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(CtxInitState(context.Background()))
+	defer cancel()
+
+	relayMgr := relayClient.NewManager(ctx, nil, key.PublicKey().String(), iface.DefaultMTU)
+	engine := NewEngine(
+		ctx, cancel,
+		&EngineConfig{
+			WgIfaceName:      "utun101",
+			WgAddr:           wgaddr.MustParseWGAddress("100.64.0.1/24"),
+			WgPrivateKey:     key,
+			WgPort:           33100,
+			ServerSSHAllowed: true,
+			MTU:              iface.DefaultMTU,
+			SSHKey:           sshKey,
+		},
+		EngineServices{
+			SignalClient:   &signal.MockClient{},
+			MgmClient:      &mgmt.MockClient{},
+			RelayManager:   relayMgr,
+			StatusRecorder: peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm"),
+		},
+		MobileDependency{},
+	)
+
+	engine.dnsServer = &dns.MockServer{
+		UpdateDNSServerFunc: func(serial uint64, update nbdns.Config) error { return nil },
+	}
+
+	err = engine.Start(nil, nil)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	defer func() {
+		err := engine.Stop()
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}()
+
+	peerWithSSH := &mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{
+		WgPubKey:   "MNHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
+		AllowedIps: []string{"100.64.0.21/24"},
+		SshConfig: &mgmtProto.SSHConfig{
+			SshPubKey: []byte("ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFATYCqaQw/9id1Qkq3n16JYhDhXraI6Pc1fgB8ynEfQ"),
+		},
+	}
+
+	// SSH server is not enabled so SSH config of a remote peer should be ignored
+	networkMap := &mgmtProto.NetworkMap{
+		Serial:             6,
+		PeerConfig:         nil,
+		RemotePeers:        []*mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{peerWithSSH},
+		RemotePeersIsEmpty: false,
+	}
+
+	err = engine.updateNetworkMap(networkMap)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	assert.Nil(t, engine.sshServer)
+
+	// SSH server is enabled, therefore SSH config should be applied
+	networkMap = &mgmtProto.NetworkMap{
+		Serial: 7,
+		PeerConfig: &mgmtProto.PeerConfig{Address: "100.64.0.1/24",
+			SshConfig: &mgmtProto.SSHConfig{
+				SshEnabled: true,
+				JwtConfig: &mgmtProto.JWTConfig{
+					Issuer:       "test-issuer",
+					Audience:     "test-audience",
+					KeysLocation: "test-keys",
+					MaxTokenAge:  3600,
+				},
+			}},
+		RemotePeers:        []*mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{peerWithSSH},
+		RemotePeersIsEmpty: false,
+	}
+
+	err = engine.updateNetworkMap(networkMap)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	time.Sleep(250 * time.Millisecond)
+	assert.NotNil(t, engine.sshServer)
+
+	// now remove peer
+	networkMap = &mgmtProto.NetworkMap{
+		Serial:             8,
+		RemotePeers:        []*mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{},
+		RemotePeersIsEmpty: false,
+	}
+
+	err = engine.updateNetworkMap(networkMap)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// time.Sleep(250 * time.Millisecond)
+	assert.NotNil(t, engine.sshServer)
+
+	// now disable SSH server
+	networkMap = &mgmtProto.NetworkMap{
+		Serial: 9,
+		PeerConfig: &mgmtProto.PeerConfig{Address: "100.64.0.1/24",
+			SshConfig: &mgmtProto.SSHConfig{SshEnabled: false}},
+		RemotePeers:        []*mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{peerWithSSH},
+		RemotePeersIsEmpty: false,
+	}
+
+	err = engine.updateNetworkMap(networkMap)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	assert.Nil(t, engine.sshServer)
+}
+
+func TestEngine_Sync(t *testing.T) {
+	key, err := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(CtxInitState(context.Background()))
+	defer cancel()
+
+	// feed updates to Engine via mocked Management client
+	updates := make(chan *mgmtProto.SyncResponse)
+	defer close(updates)
+	syncFunc := func(ctx context.Context, info *system.Info, msgHandler func(msg *mgmtProto.SyncResponse) error) error {
+		for msg := range updates {
+			err := msgHandler(msg)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	relayMgr := relayClient.NewManager(ctx, nil, key.PublicKey().String(), iface.DefaultMTU)
+	engine := NewEngine(ctx, cancel, &EngineConfig{
+		WgIfaceName:  "utun103",
+		WgAddr:       wgaddr.MustParseWGAddress("100.64.0.1/24"),
+		WgPrivateKey: key,
+		WgPort:       33100,
+		MTU:          iface.DefaultMTU,
+	}, EngineServices{
+		SignalClient:   &signal.MockClient{},
+		MgmClient:      &mgmt.MockClient{SyncFunc: syncFunc},
+		RelayManager:   relayMgr,
+		StatusRecorder: peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm"),
+	}, MobileDependency{})
+	engine.ctx = ctx
+
+	engine.dnsServer = &dns.MockServer{
+		UpdateDNSServerFunc: func(serial uint64, update nbdns.Config) error { return nil },
+	}
+
+	defer func() {
+		err := engine.Stop()
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}()
+
+	err = engine.Start(nil, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	peer1 := &mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{
+		WgPubKey:   "RRHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
+		AllowedIps: []string{"100.64.0.10/24"},
+	}
+	peer2 := &mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{
+		WgPubKey:   "LLHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX9+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LlhU=",
+		AllowedIps: []string{"100.64.0.11/24"},
+	}
+	peer3 := &mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{
+		WgPubKey:   "GGHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX9+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LlhU=",
+		AllowedIps: []string{"100.64.0.12/24"},
+	}
+	// 1st update with just 1 peer and serial larger than the current serial of the engine => apply update
+	updates <- &mgmtProto.SyncResponse{
+		NetworkMap: &mgmtProto.NetworkMap{
+			Serial:             10,
+			PeerConfig:         nil,
+			RemotePeers:        []*mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{peer1, peer2, peer3},
+			RemotePeersIsEmpty: false,
+		},
+	}
+
+	timeout := time.After(time.Second * 2)
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-timeout:
+			t.Fatalf("timeout while waiting for test to finish")
+			return
+		default:
+		}
+
+		if getPeers(engine) == 3 && engine.networkSerial == 10 {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEngine_MultiplePeers(t *testing.T) {
+	// log.SetLevel(log.DebugLevel)
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(CtxInitState(context.Background()))
+	defer cancel()
+
+	sigServer, signalAddr, err := startSignal(t)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+		return
+	}
+	defer sigServer.Stop()
+	mgmtServer, mgmtAddr, err := startManagement(t, t.TempDir(), "../testdata/store.sql")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+		return
+	}
+	defer mgmtServer.GracefulStop()
+
+	setupKey := "A2C8E62B-38F5-4553-B31E-DD66C696CEBB"
+
+	mu := sync.Mutex{}
+	engines := []*Engine{}
+	numPeers := 10
+	wg := sync.WaitGroup{}
+	wg.Add(numPeers)
+	// create and start peers
+	for i := 0; i < numPeers; i++ {
+		j := i
+		go func() {
+			engine, err := createEngine(ctx, cancel, setupKey, j, mgmtAddr, signalAddr)
+			if err != nil {
+				wg.Done()
+				t.Errorf("unable to create the engine for peer %d with error %v", j, err)
+				return
+			}
+			engine.dnsServer = &dns.MockServer{}
+			mu.Lock()
+			defer mu.Unlock()
+			guid := fmt.Sprintf("{%s}", uuid.New().String())
+			device.CustomWindowsGUIDString = strings.ToLower(guid)
+			err = engine.Start(nil, nil)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("unable to start engine for peer %d with error %v", j, err)
+				wg.Done()
+				return
+			}
+			engines = append(engines, engine)
+			wg.Done()
+		}()
+	}
+
+	// wait until all have been created and started
+	wg.Wait()
+	if len(engines) != numPeers {
+		t.Fatal("not all peers were started")
+	}
+	// check whether all the peer have expected peers connected
+
+	expectedConnected := numPeers * (numPeers - 1)
+
+	// adjust according to timeouts
+	timeout := 50 * time.Second
+	timeoutChan := time.After(timeout)
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(time.Second)
+	defer ticker.Stop()
+loop:
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-timeoutChan:
+			t.Fatalf("waiting for expected connections timeout after %s", timeout.String())
+			break loop
+		case <-ticker.C:
+			totalConnected := 0
+			for _, engine := range engines {
+				totalConnected += getConnectedPeers(engine)
+			}
+			if totalConnected == expectedConnected {
+				log.Infof("total connected=%d", totalConnected)
+				break loop
+			}
+			log.Infof("total connected=%d", totalConnected)
+		}
+	}
+	// cleanup test
+	for n, peerEngine := range engines {
+		t.Logf("stopping peer with interface %s from multipeer test, loopIndex %d", peerEngine.wgInterface.Name(), n)
+		errStop := peerEngine.mgmClient.Close()
+		if errStop != nil {
+			log.Infoln("got error trying to close management clients from engine: ", errStop)
+		}
+		errStop = peerEngine.Stop()
+		if errStop != nil {
+			log.Infoln("got error trying to close testing peers engine: ", errStop)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+var (
+	kaep = keepalive.EnforcementPolicy{
+		MinTime:             15 * time.Second,
+		PermitWithoutStream: true,
+	}
+
+	kasp = keepalive.ServerParameters{
+		MaxConnectionIdle:     15 * time.Second,
+		MaxConnectionAgeGrace: 5 * time.Second,
+		Time:                  5 * time.Second,
+		Timeout:               2 * time.Second,
+	}
+)
+
+func createEngine(ctx context.Context, cancel context.CancelFunc, setupKey string, i int, mgmtAddr string, signalAddr string) (*Engine, error) {
+	key, err := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	mgmtClient, err := mgmt.NewClient(ctx, mgmtAddr, key, false)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	signalClient, err := signal.NewClient(ctx, signalAddr, key, false)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	info := system.GetInfo(ctx)
+	resp, err := mgmtClient.Register(setupKey, "", info, nil, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	var ifaceName string
+	if runtime.GOOS == "darwin" {
+		ifaceName = fmt.Sprintf("utun1%d", i)
+	} else {
+		ifaceName = fmt.Sprintf("wt%d", i)
+	}
+
+	wgPort := 33100 + i
+	conf := &EngineConfig{
+		WgIfaceName:  ifaceName,
+		WgAddr:       wgaddr.MustParseWGAddress(resp.PeerConfig.Address),
+		WgPrivateKey: key,
+		WgPort:       wgPort,
+		MTU:          iface.DefaultMTU,
+	}
+
+	relayMgr := relayClient.NewManager(ctx, nil, key.PublicKey().String(), iface.DefaultMTU)
+	e, err := NewEngine(ctx, cancel, conf, EngineServices{
+		SignalClient:   signalClient,
+		MgmClient:      mgmtClient,
+		RelayManager:   relayMgr,
+		StatusRecorder: peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm"),
+	}, MobileDependency{}), nil
+	e.ctx = ctx
+	return e, err
+}
+
+func startSignal(t *testing.T) (*grpc.Server, string, error) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	s := grpc.NewServer(grpc.KeepaliveEnforcementPolicy(kaep), grpc.KeepaliveParams(kasp))
+
+	lis, err := net.Listen("tcp", "localhost:0")
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Fatalf("failed to listen: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	srv, err := signalServer.NewServer(context.Background(), otel.Meter(""))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	proto.RegisterSignalExchangeServer(s, srv)
+
+	go func() {
+		if err = s.Serve(lis); err != nil {
+			log.Fatalf("failed to serve: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	return s, lis.Addr().String(), nil
+}
+
+func startManagement(t *testing.T, dataDir, testFile string) (*grpc.Server, string, error) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	config := &config.Config{
+		Stuns:      []*config.Host{},
+		TURNConfig: &config.TURNConfig{},
+		Relay: &config.Relay{
+			Addresses:      []string{"127.0.0.1:1234"},
+			CredentialsTTL: util.Duration{Duration: time.Hour},
+			Secret:         "222222222222222222",
+		},
+		Signal: &config.Host{
+			Proto: "http",
+			URI:   "localhost:10000",
+		},
+		Datadir:    dataDir,
+		HttpConfig: nil,
+	}
+
+	lis, err := net.Listen("tcp", "localhost:0")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	s := grpc.NewServer(grpc.KeepaliveEnforcementPolicy(kaep), grpc.KeepaliveParams(kasp))
+
+	store, cleanUp, err := store.NewTestStoreFromSQL(context.Background(), testFile, config.Datadir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(cleanUp)
+
+	eventStore := &activity.InMemoryEventStore{}
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+
+	permissionsManager := permissions.NewManager(store)
+	peersManager := peers.NewManager(store, permissionsManager)
+	jobManager := job.NewJobManager(nil, store, peersManager)
+
+	cacheStore, err := nbcache.NewStore(context.Background(), 100*time.Millisecond, 300*time.Millisecond, 100)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+
+	ia, _ := validator.NewIntegratedValidator(context.Background(), peersManager, nil, eventStore, cacheStore)
+
+	metrics, err := telemetry.NewDefaultAppMetrics(context.Background())
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
+	t.Cleanup(ctrl.Finish)
+	settingsMockManager := settings.NewMockManager(ctrl)
+	settingsMockManager.EXPECT().
+		GetSettings(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).
+		Return(&types.Settings{}, nil).
+		AnyTimes()
+	settingsMockManager.EXPECT().
+		GetExtraSettings(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).
+		Return(&types.ExtraSettings{}, nil).
+		AnyTimes()
+
+	groupsManager := groups.NewManagerMock()
+
+	updateManager := update_channel.NewPeersUpdateManager(metrics)
+	requestBuffer := server.NewAccountRequestBuffer(context.Background(), store)
+	networkMapController := controller.NewController(context.Background(), store, metrics, updateManager, requestBuffer, server.MockIntegratedValidator{}, settingsMockManager, "netbird.selfhosted", port_forwarding.NewControllerMock(), manager.NewEphemeralManager(store, peersManager), config)
+	accountManager, err := server.BuildManager(context.Background(), config, store, networkMapController, jobManager, nil, "", eventStore, nil, false, ia, metrics, port_forwarding.NewControllerMock(), settingsMockManager, permissionsManager, false, cacheStore)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+
+	secretsManager, err := nbgrpc.NewTimeBasedAuthSecretsManager(updateManager, config.TURNConfig, config.Relay, settingsMockManager, groupsManager)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	mgmtServer, err := nbgrpc.NewServer(config, accountManager, settingsMockManager, jobManager, secretsManager, nil, nil, &server.MockIntegratedValidator{}, networkMapController, nil, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	mgmtProto.RegisterManagementServiceServer(s, mgmtServer)
+	go func() {
+		if err = s.Serve(lis); err != nil {
+			log.Fatalf("failed to serve: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	return s, lis.Addr().String(), nil
+}
+
+// getConnectedPeers returns a connection Status or nil if peer connection wasn't found
+func getConnectedPeers(e *Engine) int {
+	e.syncMsgMux.Lock()
+	defer e.syncMsgMux.Unlock()
+	i := 0
+	for _, id := range e.peerStore.PeersPubKey() {
+		conn, _ := e.peerStore.PeerConn(id)
+		if conn.IsConnected() {
+			i++
+		}
+	}
+	return i
+}
+
+func getPeers(e *Engine) int {
+	e.syncMsgMux.Lock()
+	defer e.syncMsgMux.Unlock()
+
+	return len(e.peerStore.PeersPubKey())
+}

client/internal/engine_session_deadline_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+package internal
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth/sessionwatch"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
+)
+
+// TestApplySessionDeadline_ThreeState pins down the 3-state semantics of the
+// wire field carried on LoginResponse / SyncResponse:
+//
+//   - nil pointer            → no info; previously-anchored deadline survives
+//   - explicit zero value    → "expiry disabled" sentinel; both sinks cleared
+//   - valid future timestamp → new deadline propagated to both sinks
+func TestApplySessionDeadline_ThreeState(t *testing.T) {
+	newEngine := func() *Engine {
+		recorder := peer.NewRecorder("")
+		return &Engine{
+			statusRecorder: recorder,
+			sessionWatcher: sessionwatch.New(recorder),
+		}
+	}
+
+	t.Run("valid timestamp sets deadline on both sinks", func(t *testing.T) {
+		e := newEngine()
+		deadline := time.Now().Add(time.Hour).UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
+
+		e.ApplySessionDeadline(timestamppb.New(deadline))
+
+		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().Equal(deadline),
+			"status recorder should hold the new deadline")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("nil is a no-op and preserves previous deadline", func(t *testing.T) {
+		e := newEngine()
+		seeded := time.Now().Add(time.Hour).UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
+		e.ApplySessionDeadline(timestamppb.New(seeded))
+		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().Equal(seeded))
+
+		e.ApplySessionDeadline(nil)
+
+		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().Equal(seeded),
+			"nil snapshot must not disturb the existing deadline")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("explicit zero clears a previously-anchored deadline", func(t *testing.T) {
+		e := newEngine()
+		seeded := time.Now().Add(time.Hour).UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
+		e.ApplySessionDeadline(timestamppb.New(seeded))
+		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().Equal(seeded))
+
+		// Explicit zero Timestamp{} (seconds=0, nanos=0) is the
+		// "expiry disabled / not SSO" sentinel.
+		e.ApplySessionDeadline(&timestamppb.Timestamp{})
+
+		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().IsZero(),
+			"explicit zero sentinel must clear the deadline")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("invalid timestamp clears the deadline", func(t *testing.T) {
+		e := newEngine()
+		seeded := time.Now().Add(time.Hour).UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
+		e.ApplySessionDeadline(timestamppb.New(seeded))
+		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().Equal(seeded))
+
+		// Out-of-range nanos → IsValid()==false; same-meaning as the
+		// disabled sentinel for downstream sinks.
+		e.ApplySessionDeadline(&timestamppb.Timestamp{Seconds: 1, Nanos: -1})
+
+		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().IsZero(),
+			"invalid timestamp must clear the deadline")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("recently expired timestamp stays visible as expired", func(t *testing.T) {
+		e := newEngine()
+		expired := time.Now().Add(-5 * time.Minute).UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
+
+		e.ApplySessionDeadline(timestamppb.New(expired))
+
+		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().Equal(expired),
+			"recently-expired deadline must stay on the recorder so consumers render it as expired")
+	})
+}

client/internal/engine_sessionwatch.go

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+//go:build !js
+
+package internal
+
+import (
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth/sessionwatch"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
+)
+
+// newSessionWatcher returns the real SSO session expiry watcher for every
+// non-wasm build. The js/wasm build gets a no-op stub from
+// engine_sessionwatch_js.go so the sessionwatch package (and its timer
+// machinery) never links into the wasm binary.
+func newSessionWatcher(recorder *peer.Status) sessionDeadlineWatcher {
+	return sessionwatch.New(recorder)
+}

client/internal/engine_sessionwatch_js.go

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+//go:build js
+
+package internal
+
+import (
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
+)
+
+// noopSessionWatcher is the js/wasm stand-in for sessionwatch.Watcher. The
+// wasm client never runs the engine's session-warning flow (the interactive
+// T-WarningLead notification and the T-FinalWarningLead fallback dialog live
+// in the desktop UI), so linking the full sessionwatch package (timers, event
+// composition) would only bloat the binary.
+//
+// It still mirrors the deadline into the status recorder so the SubscribeStatus
+// / Status snapshot the UI consumes stays correct — only the timer-driven
+// warnings are dropped.
+type noopSessionWatcher struct {
+	recorder *peer.Status
+}
+
+func newSessionWatcher(recorder *peer.Status) sessionDeadlineWatcher {
+	return noopSessionWatcher{recorder: recorder}
+}
+
+// Update mirrors the real watcher's recorder propagation without the timers or
+// sanity-check sentinels: a valid deadline is exposed on the status snapshot,
+// the zero time clears it.
+func (w noopSessionWatcher) Update(deadline time.Time) error {
+	if w.recorder != nil {
+		w.recorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(deadline)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (noopSessionWatcher) Dismiss() {
+	// No-op: only suppresses the timer-driven final-warning, which this stub never arms.
+}
+
+func (noopSessionWatcher) Close() {
+	// No-op: no timers to stop and no state to unwind; the recorder is cleared via Update(zero).
+}

client/internal/engine_test.go

@@ -6,37 +6,18 @@ import (
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
 	"os"
-	"runtime"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
-	"github.com/golang/mock/gomock"
-	"github.com/google/uuid"
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"go.opentelemetry.io/otel"
 	wgdevice "golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/device"
 	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/tun/netstack"
 	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/keepalive"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/stdnet"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/job"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/management-integrations/integrations"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/controllers/network_map/controller"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/controllers/network_map/update_channel"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/peers"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/peers/ephemeral/manager"
-	nbgrpc "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/shared/grpc"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/server/config"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/groups"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
@@ -50,44 +31,17 @@ import (
 	icemaker "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/ice"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager"
-	nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
 	nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/activity"
-	nbcache "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/cache"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/integrations/port_forwarding"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/settings"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/telemetry"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/monotime"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
 	mgmt "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/client"
 	mgmtProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
-	relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/netiputil"
+	relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
 	signal "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/signal/client"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/signal/proto"
-	signalServer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/signal/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
 )
 
-var (
-	kaep = keepalive.EnforcementPolicy{
-		MinTime:             15 * time.Second,
-		PermitWithoutStream: true,
-	}
-
-	kasp = keepalive.ServerParameters{
-		MaxConnectionIdle:     15 * time.Second,
-		MaxConnectionAgeGrace: 5 * time.Second,
-		Time:                  5 * time.Second,
-		Timeout:               2 * time.Second,
-	}
-)
-
 type MockWGIface struct {
 	CreateFunc                 func() error
 	CreateOnAndroidFunc        func(routeRange []string, ip string, domains []string) error
@@ -224,6 +178,10 @@ func (m *MockWGIface) LastActivities() map[string]monotime.Time {
 	return nil
 }
 
+func (m *MockWGIface) MTU() uint16 {
+	return 1280
+}
+
 func (m *MockWGIface) SetPresharedKey(peerKey string, psk wgtypes.Key, updateOnly bool) error {
 	return nil
 }
@@ -234,129 +192,6 @@ func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
 	os.Exit(code)
 }
 
-func TestEngine_SSH(t *testing.T) {
-	key, err := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	sshKey, err := nbssh.GeneratePrivateKey(nbssh.ED25519)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	defer cancel()
-
-	relayMgr := relayClient.NewManager(ctx, nil, key.PublicKey().String(), iface.DefaultMTU)
-	engine := NewEngine(
-		ctx, cancel,
-		&EngineConfig{
-			WgIfaceName:      "utun101",
-			WgAddr:           wgaddr.MustParseWGAddress("100.64.0.1/24"),
-			WgPrivateKey:     key,
-			WgPort:           33100,
-			ServerSSHAllowed: true,
-			MTU:              iface.DefaultMTU,
-			SSHKey:           sshKey,
-		},
-		EngineServices{
-			SignalClient:   &signal.MockClient{},
-			MgmClient:      &mgmt.MockClient{},
-			RelayManager:   relayMgr,
-			StatusRecorder: peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm"),
-		},
-		MobileDependency{},
-	)
-
-	engine.dnsServer = &dns.MockServer{
-		UpdateDNSServerFunc: func(serial uint64, update nbdns.Config) error { return nil },
-	}
-
-	err = engine.Start(nil, nil)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	defer func() {
-		err := engine.Stop()
-		if err != nil {
-			return
-		}
-	}()
-
-	peerWithSSH := &mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{
-		WgPubKey:   "MNHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
-		AllowedIps: []string{"100.64.0.21/24"},
-		SshConfig: &mgmtProto.SSHConfig{
-			SshPubKey: []byte("ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFATYCqaQw/9id1Qkq3n16JYhDhXraI6Pc1fgB8ynEfQ"),
-		},
-	}
-
-	// SSH server is not enabled so SSH config of a remote peer should be ignored
-	networkMap := &mgmtProto.NetworkMap{
-		Serial:             6,
-		PeerConfig:         nil,
-		RemotePeers:        []*mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{peerWithSSH},
-		RemotePeersIsEmpty: false,
-	}
-
-	err = engine.updateNetworkMap(networkMap)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Nil(t, engine.sshServer)
-
-	// SSH server is enabled, therefore SSH config should be applied
-	networkMap = &mgmtProto.NetworkMap{
-		Serial: 7,
-		PeerConfig: &mgmtProto.PeerConfig{Address: "100.64.0.1/24",
-			SshConfig: &mgmtProto.SSHConfig{
-				SshEnabled: true,
-				JwtConfig: &mgmtProto.JWTConfig{
-					Issuer:       "test-issuer",
-					Audience:     "test-audience",
-					KeysLocation: "test-keys",
-					MaxTokenAge:  3600,
-				},
-			}},
-		RemotePeers:        []*mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{peerWithSSH},
-		RemotePeersIsEmpty: false,
-	}
-
-	err = engine.updateNetworkMap(networkMap)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	time.Sleep(250 * time.Millisecond)
-	assert.NotNil(t, engine.sshServer)
-
-	// now remove peer
-	networkMap = &mgmtProto.NetworkMap{
-		Serial:             8,
-		RemotePeers:        []*mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{},
-		RemotePeersIsEmpty: false,
-	}
-
-	err = engine.updateNetworkMap(networkMap)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// time.Sleep(250 * time.Millisecond)
-	assert.NotNil(t, engine.sshServer)
-
-	// now disable SSH server
-	networkMap = &mgmtProto.NetworkMap{
-		Serial: 9,
-		PeerConfig: &mgmtProto.PeerConfig{Address: "100.64.0.1/24",
-			SshConfig: &mgmtProto.SSHConfig{SshEnabled: false}},
-		RemotePeers:        []*mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{peerWithSSH},
-		RemotePeersIsEmpty: false,
-	}
-
-	err = engine.updateNetworkMap(networkMap)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Nil(t, engine.sshServer)
-}
-
 func TestEngine_SSHUpdateLogic(t *testing.T) {
 	// Test that SSH server start/stop logic works based on config
 	engine := &Engine{
@@ -426,7 +261,7 @@ func TestEngine_UpdateNetworkMap(t *testing.T) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(CtxInitState(context.Background()))
 	defer cancel()
 
 	relayMgr := relayClient.NewManager(ctx, nil, key.PublicKey().String(), iface.DefaultMTU)
@@ -631,97 +466,6 @@ func TestEngine_UpdateNetworkMap(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestEngine_Sync(t *testing.T) {
-	key, err := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	defer cancel()
-
-	// feed updates to Engine via mocked Management client
-	updates := make(chan *mgmtProto.SyncResponse)
-	defer close(updates)
-	syncFunc := func(ctx context.Context, info *system.Info, msgHandler func(msg *mgmtProto.SyncResponse) error) error {
-		for msg := range updates {
-			err := msgHandler(msg)
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-		}
-		return nil
-	}
-	relayMgr := relayClient.NewManager(ctx, nil, key.PublicKey().String(), iface.DefaultMTU)
-	engine := NewEngine(ctx, cancel, &EngineConfig{
-		WgIfaceName:  "utun103",
-		WgAddr:       wgaddr.MustParseWGAddress("100.64.0.1/24"),
-		WgPrivateKey: key,
-		WgPort:       33100,
-		MTU:          iface.DefaultMTU,
-	}, EngineServices{
-		SignalClient:   &signal.MockClient{},
-		MgmClient:      &mgmt.MockClient{SyncFunc: syncFunc},
-		RelayManager:   relayMgr,
-		StatusRecorder: peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm"),
-	}, MobileDependency{})
-	engine.ctx = ctx
-
-	engine.dnsServer = &dns.MockServer{
-		UpdateDNSServerFunc: func(serial uint64, update nbdns.Config) error { return nil },
-	}
-
-	defer func() {
-		err := engine.Stop()
-		if err != nil {
-			return
-		}
-	}()
-
-	err = engine.Start(nil, nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	peer1 := &mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{
-		WgPubKey:   "RRHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
-		AllowedIps: []string{"100.64.0.10/24"},
-	}
-	peer2 := &mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{
-		WgPubKey:   "LLHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX9+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LlhU=",
-		AllowedIps: []string{"100.64.0.11/24"},
-	}
-	peer3 := &mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{
-		WgPubKey:   "GGHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX9+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LlhU=",
-		AllowedIps: []string{"100.64.0.12/24"},
-	}
-	// 1st update with just 1 peer and serial larger than the current serial of the engine => apply update
-	updates <- &mgmtProto.SyncResponse{
-		NetworkMap: &mgmtProto.NetworkMap{
-			Serial:             10,
-			PeerConfig:         nil,
-			RemotePeers:        []*mgmtProto.RemotePeerConfig{peer1, peer2, peer3},
-			RemotePeersIsEmpty: false,
-		},
-	}
-
-	timeout := time.After(time.Second * 2)
-	for {
-		select {
-		case <-timeout:
-			t.Fatalf("timeout while waiting for test to finish")
-			return
-		default:
-		}
-
-		if getPeers(engine) == 3 && engine.networkSerial == 10 {
-			break
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 func TestEngine_UpdateNetworkMapWithRoutes(t *testing.T) {
 	testCases := []struct {
 		name                 string
@@ -817,7 +561,7 @@ func TestEngine_UpdateNetworkMapWithRoutes(t *testing.T) {
 				return
 			}
 
-			ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+			ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(CtxInitState(context.Background()))
 			defer cancel()
 
 			wgIfaceName := fmt.Sprintf("utun%d", 104+n)
@@ -1024,7 +768,7 @@ func TestEngine_UpdateNetworkMapWithDNSUpdate(t *testing.T) {
 				return
 			}
 
-			ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+			ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(CtxInitState(context.Background()))
 			defer cancel()
 
 			wgIfaceName := fmt.Sprintf("utun%d", 104+n)
@@ -1105,104 +849,6 @@ func TestEngine_UpdateNetworkMapWithDNSUpdate(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestEngine_MultiplePeers(t *testing.T) {
-	// log.SetLevel(log.DebugLevel)
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(CtxInitState(context.Background()))
-	defer cancel()
-
-	sigServer, signalAddr, err := startSignal(t)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-		return
-	}
-	defer sigServer.Stop()
-	mgmtServer, mgmtAddr, err := startManagement(t, t.TempDir(), "../testdata/store.sql")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-		return
-	}
-	defer mgmtServer.GracefulStop()
-
-	setupKey := "A2C8E62B-38F5-4553-B31E-DD66C696CEBB"
-
-	mu := sync.Mutex{}
-	engines := []*Engine{}
-	numPeers := 10
-	wg := sync.WaitGroup{}
-	wg.Add(numPeers)
-	// create and start peers
-	for i := 0; i < numPeers; i++ {
-		j := i
-		go func() {
-			engine, err := createEngine(ctx, cancel, setupKey, j, mgmtAddr, signalAddr)
-			if err != nil {
-				wg.Done()
-				t.Errorf("unable to create the engine for peer %d with error %v", j, err)
-				return
-			}
-			engine.dnsServer = &dns.MockServer{}
-			mu.Lock()
-			defer mu.Unlock()
-			guid := fmt.Sprintf("{%s}", uuid.New().String())
-			device.CustomWindowsGUIDString = strings.ToLower(guid)
-			err = engine.Start(nil, nil)
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Errorf("unable to start engine for peer %d with error %v", j, err)
-				wg.Done()
-				return
-			}
-			engines = append(engines, engine)
-			wg.Done()
-		}()
-	}
-
-	// wait until all have been created and started
-	wg.Wait()
-	if len(engines) != numPeers {
-		t.Fatal("not all peers was started")
-	}
-	// check whether all the peer have expected peers connected
-
-	expectedConnected := numPeers * (numPeers - 1)
-
-	// adjust according to timeouts
-	timeout := 50 * time.Second
-	timeoutChan := time.After(timeout)
-	ticker := time.NewTicker(time.Second)
-	defer ticker.Stop()
-loop:
-	for {
-		select {
-		case <-timeoutChan:
-			t.Fatalf("waiting for expected connections timeout after %s", timeout.String())
-			break loop
-		case <-ticker.C:
-			totalConnected := 0
-			for _, engine := range engines {
-				totalConnected += getConnectedPeers(engine)
-			}
-			if totalConnected == expectedConnected {
-				log.Infof("total connected=%d", totalConnected)
-				break loop
-			}
-			log.Infof("total connected=%d", totalConnected)
-		}
-	}
-	// cleanup test
-	for n, peerEngine := range engines {
-		t.Logf("stopping peer with interface %s from multipeer test, loopIndex %d", peerEngine.wgInterface.Name(), n)
-		errStop := peerEngine.mgmClient.Close()
-		if errStop != nil {
-			log.Infoln("got error trying to close management clients from engine: ", errStop)
-		}
-		errStop = peerEngine.Stop()
-		if errStop != nil {
-			log.Infoln("got error trying to close testing peers engine: ", errStop)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 func Test_ParseNATExternalIPMappings(t *testing.T) {
 	ifaceList, err := net.Interfaces()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -1526,187 +1172,6 @@ func TestCompareNetIPLists(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func createEngine(ctx context.Context, cancel context.CancelFunc, setupKey string, i int, mgmtAddr string, signalAddr string) (*Engine, error) {
-	key, err := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	mgmtClient, err := mgmt.NewClient(ctx, mgmtAddr, key, false)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	signalClient, err := signal.NewClient(ctx, signalAddr, key, false)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	info := system.GetInfo(ctx)
-	resp, err := mgmtClient.Register(setupKey, "", info, nil, nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	var ifaceName string
-	if runtime.GOOS == "darwin" {
-		ifaceName = fmt.Sprintf("utun1%d", i)
-	} else {
-		ifaceName = fmt.Sprintf("wt%d", i)
-	}
-
-	wgPort := 33100 + i
-	conf := &EngineConfig{
-		WgIfaceName:  ifaceName,
-		WgAddr:       wgaddr.MustParseWGAddress(resp.PeerConfig.Address),
-		WgPrivateKey: key,
-		WgPort:       wgPort,
-		MTU:          iface.DefaultMTU,
-	}
-
-	relayMgr := relayClient.NewManager(ctx, nil, key.PublicKey().String(), iface.DefaultMTU)
-	e, err := NewEngine(ctx, cancel, conf, EngineServices{
-		SignalClient:   signalClient,
-		MgmClient:      mgmtClient,
-		RelayManager:   relayMgr,
-		StatusRecorder: peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm"),
-	}, MobileDependency{}), nil
-	e.ctx = ctx
-	return e, err
-}
-
-func startSignal(t *testing.T) (*grpc.Server, string, error) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	s := grpc.NewServer(grpc.KeepaliveEnforcementPolicy(kaep), grpc.KeepaliveParams(kasp))
-
-	lis, err := net.Listen("tcp", "localhost:0")
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Fatalf("failed to listen: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	srv, err := signalServer.NewServer(context.Background(), otel.Meter(""))
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	proto.RegisterSignalExchangeServer(s, srv)
-
-	go func() {
-		if err = s.Serve(lis); err != nil {
-			log.Fatalf("failed to serve: %v", err)
-		}
-	}()
-
-	return s, lis.Addr().String(), nil
-}
-
-func startManagement(t *testing.T, dataDir, testFile string) (*grpc.Server, string, error) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	config := &config.Config{
-		Stuns:      []*config.Host{},
-		TURNConfig: &config.TURNConfig{},
-		Relay: &config.Relay{
-			Addresses:      []string{"127.0.0.1:1234"},
-			CredentialsTTL: util.Duration{Duration: time.Hour},
-			Secret:         "222222222222222222",
-		},
-		Signal: &config.Host{
-			Proto: "http",
-			URI:   "localhost:10000",
-		},
-		Datadir:    dataDir,
-		HttpConfig: nil,
-	}
-
-	lis, err := net.Listen("tcp", "localhost:0")
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	s := grpc.NewServer(grpc.KeepaliveEnforcementPolicy(kaep), grpc.KeepaliveParams(kasp))
-
-	store, cleanUp, err := store.NewTestStoreFromSQL(context.Background(), testFile, config.Datadir)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(cleanUp)
-
-	eventStore := &activity.InMemoryEventStore{}
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-
-	permissionsManager := permissions.NewManager(store)
-	peersManager := peers.NewManager(store, permissionsManager)
-	jobManager := job.NewJobManager(nil, store, peersManager)
-
-	cacheStore, err := nbcache.NewStore(context.Background(), 100*time.Millisecond, 300*time.Millisecond, 100)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-
-	ia, _ := integrations.NewIntegratedValidator(context.Background(), peersManager, nil, eventStore, cacheStore)
-
-	metrics, err := telemetry.NewDefaultAppMetrics(context.Background())
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
-	t.Cleanup(ctrl.Finish)
-	settingsMockManager := settings.NewMockManager(ctrl)
-	settingsMockManager.EXPECT().
-		GetSettings(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).
-		Return(&types.Settings{}, nil).
-		AnyTimes()
-	settingsMockManager.EXPECT().
-		GetExtraSettings(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).
-		Return(&types.ExtraSettings{}, nil).
-		AnyTimes()
-
-	groupsManager := groups.NewManagerMock()
-
-	updateManager := update_channel.NewPeersUpdateManager(metrics)
-	requestBuffer := server.NewAccountRequestBuffer(context.Background(), store)
-	networkMapController := controller.NewController(context.Background(), store, metrics, updateManager, requestBuffer, server.MockIntegratedValidator{}, settingsMockManager, "netbird.selfhosted", port_forwarding.NewControllerMock(), manager.NewEphemeralManager(store, peersManager), config)
-	accountManager, err := server.BuildManager(context.Background(), config, store, networkMapController, jobManager, nil, "", eventStore, nil, false, ia, metrics, port_forwarding.NewControllerMock(), settingsMockManager, permissionsManager, false, cacheStore)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-
-	secretsManager, err := nbgrpc.NewTimeBasedAuthSecretsManager(updateManager, config.TURNConfig, config.Relay, settingsMockManager, groupsManager)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	mgmtServer, err := nbgrpc.NewServer(config, accountManager, settingsMockManager, jobManager, secretsManager, nil, nil, &server.MockIntegratedValidator{}, networkMapController, nil, nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	mgmtProto.RegisterManagementServiceServer(s, mgmtServer)
-	go func() {
-		if err = s.Serve(lis); err != nil {
-			log.Fatalf("failed to serve: %v", err)
-		}
-	}()
-
-	return s, lis.Addr().String(), nil
-}
-
-// getConnectedPeers returns a connection Status or nil if peer connection wasn't found
-func getConnectedPeers(e *Engine) int {
-	e.syncMsgMux.Lock()
-	defer e.syncMsgMux.Unlock()
-	i := 0
-	for _, id := range e.peerStore.PeersPubKey() {
-		conn, _ := e.peerStore.PeerConn(id)
-		if conn.IsConnected() {
-			i++
-		}
-	}
-	return i
-}
-
-func getPeers(e *Engine) int {
-	e.syncMsgMux.Lock()
-	defer e.syncMsgMux.Unlock()
-
-	return len(e.peerStore.PeersPubKey())
-}
-
 func mustEncodePrefix(t *testing.T, p netip.Prefix) []byte {
 	t.Helper()
 	b, err := netiputil.EncodePrefix(p)

client/internal/engine_tunsettings.go

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+package internal
+
+func (e *Engine) TunSettings() ([]string, []string) {
+	e.syncMsgMux.Lock()
+	routeManager := e.routeManager
+	dnsServer := e.dnsServer
+	e.syncMsgMux.Unlock()
+
+	var routes []string
+	if routeManager != nil {
+		routes = routeManager.CurrentRouteRange()
+	}
+
+	var searchDomains []string
+	if dnsServer != nil {
+		searchDomains = dnsServer.SearchDomains()
+	}
+
+	return routes, searchDomains
+}

client/internal/iface_common.go

@@ -44,4 +44,5 @@ type wgIfaceBase interface {
 	FullStats() (*configurer.Stats, error)
 	LastActivities() map[string]monotime.Time
 	SetPresharedKey(peerKey string, psk wgtypes.Key, updateOnly bool) error
+	MTU() uint16
 }

client/internal/ipcauth/creds_stub.go

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+//go:build !linux && !darwin && !freebsd && !windows
+
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"net"
+
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
+)
+
+// errUnsupported is returned on platforms with no local peer-identity
+// primitive, so consumers fail closed instead of guessing an identity.
+var errUnsupported = errors.New("peer identity is not available on this platform")
+
+// NewTransportCredentials returns nil: without a peer-identity primitive the
+// daemon cannot authenticate local callers, and the caller must treat that as
+// "authorization cannot be enforced".
+func NewTransportCredentials() credentials.TransportCredentials {
+	return nil
+}
+
+// PeerIdentity always fails on this platform.
+func PeerIdentity(net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
+	return Identity{}, errUnsupported
+}
+
+// ConnIdentity always fails on this platform.
+func ConnIdentity(net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
+	return Identity{}, errUnsupported
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/creds_unix.go

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+//go:build linux || darwin || freebsd
+
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net"
+
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
+)
+
+// NewTransportCredentials returns gRPC transport credentials that expose the
+// caller's kernel-authenticated identity via IdentityFromContext. It returns
+// nil on platforms that have no peer-identity primitive, which the caller must
+// treat as "authorization cannot be enforced".
+//
+// The handshake exchanges no bytes on the wire, so a client dialing with
+// insecure credentials interoperates with a server using these. That keeps
+// older CLI and UI binaries working against an upgraded daemon.
+func NewTransportCredentials() credentials.TransportCredentials {
+	return unixCreds{}
+}
+
+// ConnIdentity extracts the caller's identity from an accepted local IPC
+// connection. It is shared by the gRPC transport credentials and by the JSON
+// gateway, which reads the identity of its own HTTP clients.
+func ConnIdentity(conn net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
+	return PeerIdentity(conn)
+}
+
+type unixCreds struct{}
+
+func (unixCreds) ClientHandshake(_ context.Context, _ string, conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
+	return conn, AuthInfo{}, nil
+}
+
+// ServerHandshake extracts the peer identity and fails closed when it cannot
+// be read, so a connection whose caller is unknown never reaches a handler.
+func (unixCreds) ServerHandshake(conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
+	id, err := ConnIdentity(conn)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+	return conn, AuthInfo{
+		CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
+		Identity:       id,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+func (unixCreds) Info() credentials.ProtocolInfo {
+	return credentials.ProtocolInfo{SecurityProtocol: AuthInfo{}.AuthType()}
+}
+
+func (unixCreds) Clone() credentials.TransportCredentials { return unixCreds{} }
+
+func (unixCreds) OverrideServerName(string) error { return nil }

client/internal/ipcauth/creds_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"runtime"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
+)
+
+var (
+	modadvapi32                    = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("advapi32.dll")
+	procImpersonateNamedPipeClient = modadvapi32.NewProc("ImpersonateNamedPipeClient")
+)
+
+// DefaultPipeSDDL is the security descriptor for the daemon control pipe.
+//
+//	D:P          protected DACL, no inheritance
+//	(A;;GA;;;SY) allow GENERIC_ALL to LocalSystem (the daemon's service account)
+//	(A;;GA;;;WD) allow GENERIC_ALL to Everyone
+//
+// Any local caller may connect, as with a Unix socket at 0666; what a caller may
+// actually do is decided from its token, not from the DACL. Remote callers are not
+// a concern here: winio.ListenPipe creates the pipe with
+// FILE_PIPE_REJECT_REMOTE_CLIENTS, so NPFS rejects connections from other machines
+// before the descriptor is consulted.
+//
+// A deny ACE on the NETWORK SID would not add anything and would break callers:
+// that SID is present in any network-logon token, which includes OpenSSH and WinRM
+// sessions, so it denies administrators driving the CLI over SSH and denies the
+// daemon itself when started from such a session.
+func DefaultPipeSDDL() string {
+	return "D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;WD)"
+}
+
+// NewTransportCredentials returns gRPC transport credentials that derive the
+// caller's identity from the named-pipe client token.
+//
+// The client must connect at SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION for the daemon to be able
+// to read its token, which is what DialNamedPipe does.
+func NewTransportCredentials() credentials.TransportCredentials {
+	return winpipeCreds{}
+}
+
+// ConnIdentity extracts the caller's identity from an accepted named-pipe
+// connection by impersonating the pipe client and reading its token. It is
+// shared by the gRPC transport credentials and by the JSON gateway, which
+// reads the identity of its own HTTP clients.
+func ConnIdentity(conn net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
+	// go-winio's pipe connection embeds *win32File, which exposes Fd().
+	fdConn, ok := conn.(interface{ Fd() uintptr })
+	if !ok {
+		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("connection %T does not expose a pipe handle", conn)
+	}
+	return pipeClientIdentity(windows.Handle(fdConn.Fd()))
+}
+
+type winpipeCreds struct{}
+
+func (winpipeCreds) ClientHandshake(_ context.Context, _ string, conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
+	return conn, AuthInfo{}, nil
+}
+
+// ServerHandshake extracts the connecting client's identity and fails closed
+// when the handle or token cannot be read, so a connection whose caller is
+// unknown never reaches a handler.
+func (winpipeCreds) ServerHandshake(conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
+	id, err := ConnIdentity(conn)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+	return conn, AuthInfo{
+		CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
+		Identity:       id,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+func (winpipeCreds) Info() credentials.ProtocolInfo {
+	return credentials.ProtocolInfo{SecurityProtocol: AuthInfo{}.AuthType()}
+}
+
+func (winpipeCreds) Clone() credentials.TransportCredentials { return winpipeCreds{} }
+
+func (winpipeCreds) OverrideServerName(string) error { return nil }
+
+// pipeClientIdentity reads the connecting client's user SID, usable group
+// SIDs, and elevation state by impersonating the pipe client on this thread
+// and reading the resulting impersonation token.
+func pipeClientIdentity(handle windows.Handle) (id Identity, err error) {
+	// Impersonation is per-thread, so the goroutine must stay on this thread
+	// until RevertToSelf, otherwise an unrelated goroutine could inherit the
+	// impersonated context.
+	runtime.LockOSThread()
+
+	// The thread only goes back to the runtime's pool once it is provably no
+	// longer impersonating the client. If the revert fails, leaving it locked
+	// makes Go terminate it when this goroutine exits, which costs one thread
+	// and keeps a thread running as the client from ever being reused.
+	clean := false
+	defer func() {
+		if clean {
+			runtime.UnlockOSThread()
+		}
+	}()
+
+	if err = impersonateNamedPipeClient(handle); err != nil {
+		clean = true
+		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("impersonate named pipe client: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		// Surface the revert failure only when nothing else failed: leaving
+		// the thread impersonated is worse than the original error.
+		revErr := windows.RevertToSelf()
+		if revErr != nil {
+			if err == nil {
+				err = fmt.Errorf("revert impersonation: %w", revErr)
+			}
+			return
+		}
+		clean = true
+	}()
+
+	// openAsSelf=true opens the token with the daemon's own process context
+	// rather than the impersonated client's, so the open cannot fail because
+	// the client lacks access to its own token.
+	var token windows.Token
+	if err = windows.OpenThreadToken(windows.CurrentThread(), windows.TOKEN_QUERY, true, &token); err != nil {
+		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("open thread token: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if cerr := token.Close(); cerr != nil {
+			log.Debugf("close client token: %v", cerr)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	return identityFromToken(token)
+}
+
+// identityFromToken reads the user SID, usable group SIDs and elevation state
+// out of a Windows token.
+func identityFromToken(token windows.Token) (Identity, error) {
+	user, err := token.GetTokenUser()
+	if err != nil {
+		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("read token user: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	groups, err := tokenGroupSIDs(token)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Identity{}, err
+	}
+
+	return Identity{
+		SID:      user.User.Sid.String(),
+		Groups:   groups,
+		Elevated: token.IsElevated(),
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// tokenGroupSIDs returns the SIDs of the groups the token can actually
+// exercise. Groups that are disabled or marked deny-only are skipped: a
+// UAC-filtered administrator carries BUILTIN\Administrators as deny-only, and
+// treating that as membership would hand every admin account privilege it
+// cannot currently use.
+func tokenGroupSIDs(token windows.Token) ([]string, error) {
+	tg, err := token.GetTokenGroups()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("read token groups: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	var sids []string
+	for _, g := range tg.AllGroups() {
+		if g.Attributes&windows.SE_GROUP_ENABLED == 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+		if g.Attributes&windows.SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY != 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+		sids = append(sids, g.Sid.String())
+	}
+	return sids, nil
+}
+
+func impersonateNamedPipeClient(h windows.Handle) error {
+	r, _, e := procImpersonateNamedPipeClient.Call(uintptr(h))
+	if r == 0 {
+		return e
+	}
+	return nil
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/forward.go

@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"fmt"
+	"slices"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
+)
+
+// Metadata keys the local JSON gateway uses to forward the identity of its own
+// HTTP client to the daemon. The gateway runs inside the daemon process and
+// re-dials the daemon over the control socket, so without forwarding every
+// JSON request would appear to come from the daemon itself.
+const (
+	// mdFwd marks a request as forwarded by the JSON gateway. It is always
+	// set, even when the gateway could not read its client's identity, so the
+	// daemon can tell "no identity available" apart from "not forwarded".
+	mdFwd         = "x-netbird-fwd"
+	mdFwdUID      = "x-netbird-fwd-uid"      // Unix user ID
+	mdFwdGID      = "x-netbird-fwd-gid"      // Unix primary group ID
+	mdFwdSID      = "x-netbird-fwd-sid"      // Windows user SID
+	mdFwdGroup    = "x-netbird-fwd-group"    // Windows group SID, repeated
+	mdFwdElevated = "x-netbird-fwd-elevated" // Windows, "1" when elevated
+
+	// mdFwdProof proves the forwarded identity was stamped by this process. The
+	// gateway runs inside the daemon, so a secret held in memory is available to
+	// the only legitimate producer and to nothing else.
+	mdFwdProof = "x-netbird-fwd-proof"
+)
+
+// forwardKeys is every metadata key the gateway sets. An HTTP client must never
+// be able to supply one itself: see IsReservedForwardKey.
+var forwardKeys = []string{mdFwd, mdFwdUID, mdFwdGID, mdFwdSID, mdFwdGroup, mdFwdElevated, mdFwdProof}
+
+// forwardProof authenticates the gateway's forwarding metadata. It is generated
+// once per daemon process and never leaves it: it is not written to disk, not
+// logged, and not sent anywhere except over the daemon's own control socket to
+// itself.
+//
+// Without it, trusting a forwarded identity rests on every layer in front of it
+// stripping incoming forwarding keys, and on each key's value shape being
+// distinguishable from an injected one. A single injected group SID or an
+// injected "elevated" flag has the same shape as a legitimate one, so no
+// cardinality rule can catch it. Requiring the proof means metadata that did not
+// come from this process is refused whatever it contains.
+var forwardProof = mustForwardProof()
+
+func mustForwardProof() string {
+	var buf [32]byte
+	if _, err := rand.Read(buf[:]); err != nil {
+		// Continuing would leave the forwarded path authenticated by a
+		// predictable value, which is worse than not starting.
+		panic(fmt.Sprintf("generate identity forwarding proof: %v", err))
+	}
+	return hex.EncodeToString(buf[:])
+}
+
+// IsReservedForwardKey reports whether a gRPC metadata key belongs to the
+// gateway's identity forwarding, and therefore must be dropped when it arrives
+// from outside.
+//
+// grpc-gateway maps "Grpc-Metadata-<key>" request headers into gRPC metadata and
+// joins them ahead of the values its own annotators add. Without dropping these,
+// an HTTP client could hand the daemon "x-netbird-fwd-uid: 0" and be believed,
+// because the daemon trusts forwarded metadata when the transport peer is the
+// (privileged) gateway.
+func IsReservedForwardKey(key string) bool {
+	key = strings.ToLower(key)
+	return slices.Contains(forwardKeys, key)
+}
+
+// ForwardIdentityMetadata encodes an HTTP client's identity for the JSON
+// gateway to forward to the daemon. When known is false only the marker is
+// set, which makes the daemon treat the caller as unidentified rather than as
+// the daemon itself.
+func ForwardIdentityMetadata(id Identity, known bool) metadata.MD {
+	md := metadata.MD{}
+	md.Set(mdFwd, "1")
+	md.Set(mdFwdProof, forwardProof)
+	if !known {
+		return md
+	}
+
+	if id.IsWindows() {
+		md.Set(mdFwdSID, id.SID)
+		if len(id.Groups) > 0 {
+			md.Set(mdFwdGroup, id.Groups...)
+		}
+		if id.Elevated {
+			md.Set(mdFwdElevated, "1")
+		}
+		return md
+	}
+
+	md.Set(mdFwdUID, strconv.FormatUint(uint64(id.UID), 10))
+	md.Set(mdFwdGID, strconv.FormatUint(uint64(id.GID), 10))
+	return md
+}
+
+// CallerIdentity returns the identity to authorize a request against. For a
+// direct connection that is the transport peer's kernel identity. For a
+// request relayed by the local JSON gateway it is the identity the gateway
+// forwarded, since the transport peer is then the daemon itself.
+//
+// A forwarded identity is only honoured when the transport peer is the daemon's
+// own identity and the metadata carries this process's forwarding proof, so
+// forged forwarding metadata gains a caller nothing. A forwarded request that
+// carries no identity is reported as unidentified, never as the daemon.
+//
+// The second return value is false when no identity could be established, and
+// callers MUST fail closed in that case.
+func CallerIdentity(ctx context.Context) (Identity, bool) {
+	id, ok := IdentityFromContext(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		return Identity{}, false
+	}
+
+	// A forwarding key that arrives more than once did not come from the gateway
+	// alone, so nothing about the request can be trusted to describe its caller.
+	// Refusing outright matters because the alternative reading, "not forwarded",
+	// would authorize the request as the transport peer, which on the gateway's
+	// connection is the daemon itself.
+	if duplicatedForwardKey(ctx) {
+		return Identity{}, false
+	}
+
+	forwarded := isForwarded(ctx)
+
+	// Our own process on the other end of the socket is the JSON gateway, the only
+	// thing that dials the daemon from inside it. Such a call must carry a
+	// forwarded identity; without one there is no caller to authorize, and
+	// treating it as the daemon would authorize whatever reached the JSON socket.
+	// Only Linux reports the peer PID, so this is a belt on top of the gateway's
+	// interceptor rather than the sole guarantee.
+	if id.PID != 0 && int(id.PID) == selfPID && !forwarded {
+		return Identity{}, false
+	}
+
+	// Only the gateway's own connection may speak for someone else. Being
+	// privileged is not enough and not the point: the gateway runs inside the
+	// daemon, so it dials as the daemon's identity whatever user that is, which
+	// also covers a rootless container.
+	if !forwarded || !IsDaemonSelf(id) {
+		return id, true
+	}
+
+	// Speaking for someone else additionally requires the proof only this process
+	// holds. Refusing is the only safe reading: the transport peer here is the
+	// daemon itself, so falling back to it would authorize the request as the
+	// daemon. This is also what makes the forwarded values trustworthy once
+	// accepted, so they need no shape checks of their own.
+	if !authenticForward(ctx) {
+		return Identity{}, false
+	}
+
+	return forwardedIdentity(ctx)
+}
+
+// duplicatedForwardKey reports whether any forwarding key carries more than one
+// value. The gateway's interceptor sets each key exactly once and replaces what
+// was already there, so a repeat means a second source supplied it.
+func duplicatedForwardKey(ctx context.Context) bool {
+	md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, key := range forwardKeys {
+		// Group SIDs are legitimately repeated; the rest identify the caller.
+		if key == mdFwdGroup {
+			continue
+		}
+		if len(md.Get(key)) > 1 {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// authenticForward reports whether the request carries this process's forwarding
+// proof, which only the in-process JSON gateway can supply.
+func authenticForward(ctx context.Context) bool {
+	md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	got := mdSingle(md, mdFwdProof)
+	return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(got), []byte(forwardProof)) == 1
+}
+
+// isForwarded reports whether the request carries the JSON gateway marker.
+func isForwarded(ctx context.Context) bool {
+	md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	return mdSingle(md, mdFwd) != ""
+}
+
+// forwardedIdentity decodes the identity the JSON gateway attached.
+func forwardedIdentity(ctx context.Context) (Identity, bool) {
+	md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		return Identity{}, false
+	}
+
+	if sid := mdSingle(md, mdFwdSID); sid != "" {
+		return Identity{
+			SID: sid,
+			// Repeated by design, one value per group, and only reachable once
+			// the forwarding proof has been verified.
+			Groups:   md.Get(mdFwdGroup),
+			Elevated: mdSingle(md, mdFwdElevated) == "1",
+		}, true
+	}
+
+	uid, err := strconv.ParseUint(mdSingle(md, mdFwdUID), 10, 32)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Identity{}, false
+	}
+
+	id := Identity{UID: uint32(uid)}
+	if gid, err := strconv.ParseUint(mdSingle(md, mdFwdGID), 10, 32); err == nil {
+		id.GID = uint32(gid)
+	}
+	return id, true
+}
+
+// mdSingle returns the value of a forwarded key only when exactly one was
+// supplied. The gateway's interceptor sets each key exactly once, so more than one
+// value means something else also supplied it, and the whole identity is treated as
+// unknown rather than picking a winner. Defence in depth behind the gateway's
+// header filter.
+func mdSingle(md metadata.MD, key string) string {
+	if v := md.Get(key); len(v) == 1 {
+		return v[0]
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+// WithForwardedIdentity stamps id onto a context's outgoing metadata for the JSON
+// gateway's call to the daemon, replacing any forwarding keys already present so
+// values supplied from outside cannot survive alongside it.
+//
+// This is deliberately not done with runtime.WithMetadata: grpc-gateway skips its
+// annotators entirely when no request header maps to metadata ("if len(pairs) == 0
+// { return ctx, nil, nil }", runtime/context.go), which an HTTP/1.0 request with no
+// Host header over a unix socket achieves. The daemon would then see an unmarked
+// call whose transport peer is the daemon's own identity, and authorize it as the
+// daemon. A client interceptor runs for every RPC regardless of headers.
+func WithForwardedIdentity(ctx context.Context, id Identity, known bool) context.Context {
+	md, ok := metadata.FromOutgoingContext(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		md = metadata.MD{}
+	} else {
+		md = md.Copy()
+	}
+
+	for _, key := range forwardKeys {
+		delete(md, key)
+	}
+	for key, values := range ForwardIdentityMetadata(id, known) {
+		md[key] = values
+	}
+
+	return metadata.NewOutgoingContext(ctx, md)
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/forward_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
+)
+
+// transportCtx builds a request context as the daemon's transport credentials
+// would: the identity of whoever opened the socket, plus whatever metadata the
+// request carried.
+func transportCtx(id Identity, md metadata.MD) context.Context {
+	ctx := peer.NewContext(context.Background(), &peer.Peer{
+		AuthInfo: AuthInfo{
+			CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
+			Identity:       id,
+		},
+	})
+	if md != nil {
+		ctx = metadata.NewIncomingContext(ctx, md)
+	}
+	return ctx
+}
+
+var (
+	root       = Identity{UID: 0}
+	unprivUser = Identity{UID: 1000, GID: 1000}
+)
+
+// asDaemon pins which identity counts as this process for the duration of a test.
+// Without it the test binary's own uid decides, which silently changes what
+// "the gateway" means.
+func asDaemon(t *testing.T, id Identity) {
+	t.Helper()
+	prevID, prevKnown, prevDelegate := selfIdentity, selfKnown, selfMayDelegate
+	t.Cleanup(func() { selfIdentity, selfKnown, selfMayDelegate = prevID, prevKnown, prevDelegate })
+	selfIdentity, selfKnown = id, true
+	selfMayDelegate = !id.IsPrivileged()
+}
+
+func TestCallerIdentity_DirectConnections(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("no transport credentials is not an identity", func(t *testing.T) {
+		if _, ok := CallerIdentity(context.Background()); ok {
+			t.Fatal("a caller with no credentials must not be identified")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("a direct caller is its transport identity", func(t *testing.T) {
+		id, ok := CallerIdentity(transportCtx(unprivUser, nil))
+		if !ok || id.UID != 1000 {
+			t.Fatalf("got %v ok=%t, want uid 1000", id, ok)
+		}
+	})
+
+	// The whole point of honouring forwarded metadata only from a privileged
+	// transport peer: an unprivileged caller can set any metadata it likes on its
+	// own connection to the daemon socket.
+	t.Run("an unprivileged caller cannot forge an identity", func(t *testing.T) {
+		asDaemon(t, root)
+		forged := metadata.Pairs(mdFwd, "1", mdFwdUID, "0", mdFwdGID, "0")
+		id, ok := CallerIdentity(transportCtx(unprivUser, forged))
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatal("caller should still be identified, as itself")
+		}
+		if id.IsPrivileged() || id.UID != 1000 {
+			t.Fatalf("forged metadata was believed: got %v", id)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestCallerIdentity_GatewayForwarding(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("the gateway's client identity is used, not the gateway's own", func(t *testing.T) {
+		asDaemon(t, root)
+		md := ForwardIdentityMetadata(unprivUser, true)
+		id, ok := CallerIdentity(transportCtx(root, md))
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatal("forwarded identity should be usable")
+		}
+		if id.IsPrivileged() || id.UID != 1000 {
+			t.Fatalf("got %v, want the forwarded uid 1000 and not privileged", id)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("a privileged gateway client stays privileged", func(t *testing.T) {
+		asDaemon(t, root)
+		md := ForwardIdentityMetadata(root, true)
+		id, ok := CallerIdentity(transportCtx(root, md))
+		if !ok || !id.IsPrivileged() {
+			t.Fatalf("got %v ok=%t, want a privileged identity", id, ok)
+		}
+	})
+
+	// A JSON socket the gateway cannot read peer credentials from (a TCP socket,
+	// say) must not make every request look like the daemon itself.
+	t.Run("an unreadable client identity is unknown, not the daemon", func(t *testing.T) {
+		asDaemon(t, root)
+		md := ForwardIdentityMetadata(Identity{}, false)
+		if _, ok := CallerIdentity(transportCtx(root, md)); ok {
+			t.Fatal("a forwarded request with no identity must not be identified")
+		}
+	})
+
+	// grpc-gateway turns Grpc-Metadata-<key> headers into gRPC metadata and joins
+	// them ahead of its annotators' values. If an HTTP client's header survived
+	// that, this is the shape the daemon would see: the attacker's uid 0 first,
+	// the real uid second. The gateway filters those headers out, and reading a
+	// duplicated key as unknown makes the daemon safe even if it did not.
+	t.Run("a duplicated key from an injected header is not believed", func(t *testing.T) {
+		asDaemon(t, root)
+		md := metadata.MD{}
+		md.Append(mdFwd, "1")
+		md.Append(mdFwdUID, "0")    // injected by the HTTP client
+		md.Append(mdFwdUID, "1000") // appended by the gateway's annotator
+		if id, ok := CallerIdentity(transportCtx(root, md)); ok {
+			t.Fatalf("injected uid was accepted: got %v", id)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("a duplicated marker is not believed either", func(t *testing.T) {
+		asDaemon(t, root)
+		md := metadata.MD{}
+		md.Append(mdFwd, "1")
+		md.Append(mdFwd, "1")
+		md.Append(mdFwdUID, "1000")
+		// A repeated marker must not be read as "not forwarded": that would
+		// authorize the request as the transport peer, which on the gateway's
+		// connection is the daemon itself.
+		if id, ok := CallerIdentity(transportCtx(root, md)); ok {
+			t.Fatalf("a duplicated marker was believed: got %v", id)
+		}
+	})
+
+	// The layers in front of this (the gateway's header matcher, and its
+	// interceptor replacing every forwarding key) are what keep outside metadata
+	// from arriving at all. The proof is what the daemon can check for itself, and
+	// it is the only defence that works for a value whose legitimate shape is
+	// indistinguishable from an injected one: a lone group SID, or "elevated".
+	t.Run("forwarding metadata without this process's proof is refused", func(t *testing.T) {
+		asDaemon(t, root)
+		for name, md := range map[string]metadata.MD{
+			"no proof":    metadata.Pairs(mdFwd, "1", mdFwdUID, "0"),
+			"wrong proof": metadata.Pairs(mdFwd, "1", mdFwdUID, "0", mdFwdProof, "deadbeef"),
+			"windows identity without a proof": metadata.Pairs(mdFwd, "1",
+				mdFwdSID, "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001", mdFwdGroup, sidAdministrators, mdFwdElevated, "1"),
+		} {
+			t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+				if id, ok := CallerIdentity(transportCtx(root, md)); ok {
+					t.Fatalf("unstamped forwarding metadata was believed: got %v", id)
+				}
+			})
+		}
+	})
+
+	// A caller that reaches the gateway cannot see the proof, so it cannot append
+	// a group of its own to a genuine forwarded identity: doing so would have to
+	// go through the interceptor, which replaces the whole set.
+	t.Run("a group appended to a stamped identity does not survive the interceptor", func(t *testing.T) {
+		asDaemon(t, root)
+		injected := metadata.MD{}
+		injected.Append(mdFwdGroup, sidAdministrators)
+
+		ctx := WithForwardedIdentity(metadata.NewOutgoingContext(context.Background(), injected),
+			Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001"}, true)
+		out, ok := metadata.FromOutgoingContext(ctx)
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatal("no outgoing metadata")
+		}
+		if groups := out.Get(mdFwdGroup); len(groups) != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("injected group survived: %v", groups)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestIsReservedForwardKey(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, key := range forwardKeys {
+		if !IsReservedForwardKey(key) {
+			t.Errorf("%q must be reserved", key)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// grpc-gateway canonicalises header names, so the check has to be
+	// case-insensitive.
+	if !IsReservedForwardKey("X-Netbird-Fwd-Uid") {
+		t.Error("the check must be case-insensitive")
+	}
+
+	for _, key := range []string{"authorization", "x-netbird", "x-netbird-fwd-uid-extra", ""} {
+		if IsReservedForwardKey(key) {
+			t.Errorf("%q must not be reserved", key)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestForwardIdentityMetadata_AlwaysMarksForwarded(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name  string
+		id    Identity
+		known bool
+	}{
+		{"known unix identity", unprivUser, true},
+		{"unknown identity", Identity{}, false},
+		{"windows identity", Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001", Elevated: true}, true},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			md := ForwardIdentityMetadata(tc.id, tc.known)
+			if got := md.Get(mdFwd); len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "1" {
+				t.Fatalf("marker = %v, want exactly one \"1\"", got)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/identity.go

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+// Package ipcauth provides the kernel-authenticated identity of a local IPC
+// (gRPC) caller and the transport credentials that surface it into the gRPC
+// context, so the daemon can authorize individual RPCs by caller identity.
+//
+// On Unix the identity is read from the kernel via SO_PEERCRED (Linux) or
+// LOCAL_PEERCRED (Darwin/FreeBSD). On Windows it is derived from the
+// named-pipe client token. Platforms without a peer-identity primitive get no
+// credentials, and every consumer must fail closed when no identity is
+// available.
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"slices"
+
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
+)
+
+// Well-known Windows SIDs that identify a fully privileged principal.
+const (
+	sidLocalSystem    = "S-1-5-18"     // NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
+	sidLocalService   = "S-1-5-19"     // NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE
+	sidNetworkService = "S-1-5-20"     // NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE
+	sidAdministrators = "S-1-5-32-544" // BUILTIN\Administrators
+)
+
+// Identity is the kernel-authenticated identity of a local IPC caller. The
+// zero value is not a valid identity: consumers must only use one obtained
+// with a true ok/nil error return.
+type Identity struct {
+	// UID and GID are the caller's Unix user ID and primary group ID. Both are
+	// zero on Windows, where SID is authoritative instead.
+	UID uint32
+	GID uint32
+
+	// SID is the caller's Windows security identifier, empty on Unix.
+	SID string
+
+	// Groups holds the caller's Windows group SIDs, captured from the client
+	// token at handshake time. Only groups that are enabled and not
+	// deny-only are captured, so a group listed here is one the caller can
+	// actually exercise. Empty on Unix.
+	Groups []string
+
+	// Elevated reports whether the Windows client token is elevated (running
+	// as administrator, or an administrator with UAC turned off). Always false
+	// on Unix, where privilege is uid 0.
+	Elevated bool
+
+	// PID is the caller's process ID where the platform reports it (Linux's
+	// SO_PEERCRED), and 0 where it does not. It identifies the daemon's own
+	// process dialling itself, which is what the JSON gateway does, and is never
+	// used to grant anything.
+	PID int32
+}
+
+// IsWindows reports whether this identity is a Windows principal (SID-based)
+// rather than a Unix uid/gid principal.
+func (i Identity) IsWindows() bool {
+	return i.SID != ""
+}
+
+// IsPrivileged reports whether the caller is the platform's administrative
+// principal, which is what the daemon requires for changes that cross the
+// user-to-root boundary.
+//
+// On Windows the decision comes from the caller's token rather than from
+// account names or group RIDs: an elevated token, one of the service accounts
+// the daemon itself may run as, or a token with BUILTIN\Administrators
+// enabled. A UAC-filtered administrator has that group marked deny-only, and
+// deny-only groups are dropped when the identity is captured, so such a
+// caller is correctly reported as unprivileged. Domain group memberships
+// (Domain Admins and friends) are deliberately not consulted: they say
+// nothing about what this token may do on this machine.
+func (i Identity) IsPrivileged() bool {
+	if !i.IsWindows() {
+		return i.UID == 0
+	}
+
+	if i.Elevated {
+		return true
+	}
+
+	switch i.SID {
+	case sidLocalSystem, sidLocalService, sidNetworkService:
+		return true
+	}
+
+	return slices.Contains(i.Groups, sidAdministrators)
+}
+
+// String renders the identity for audit logs and denial messages.
+func (i Identity) String() string {
+	if i.IsWindows() {
+		return fmt.Sprintf("sid=%s elevated=%t", i.SID, i.Elevated)
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("uid=%d gid=%d", i.UID, i.GID)
+}
+
+// AuthInfo carries the peer Identity as a gRPC credentials.AuthInfo so
+// handlers can retrieve it from the request context via IdentityFromContext.
+type AuthInfo struct {
+	credentials.CommonAuthInfo
+	Identity Identity
+}
+
+// AuthType identifies the authentication scheme.
+func (AuthInfo) AuthType() string { return "netbird-ipc-peercred" }
+
+// IdentityFromContext extracts the caller's kernel-authenticated identity from
+// the gRPC peer context. The second return value is false when no IPC
+// transport credentials were negotiated, which happens on a TCP daemon socket
+// and on platforms without a peer-identity primitive. Callers MUST fail closed
+// in that case.
+func IdentityFromContext(ctx context.Context) (Identity, bool) {
+	p, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		return Identity{}, false
+	}
+	info, ok := p.AuthInfo.(AuthInfo)
+	if !ok {
+		return Identity{}, false
+	}
+	return info.Identity, true
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/ownedfile.go

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+)
+
+// OpenOwnedFile opens path for reading on behalf of the IPC caller identified by
+// id, and fails unless the opened file is a regular file that id owns.
+//
+// It exists for the paths a local caller hands to the daemon over the IPC. The
+// daemon runs as root, so opening such a path unchecked lets any local user read
+// any file through it. Ownership is the invariant that keeps the daemon from
+// reading, with its own privileges, a file the caller could not read itself: a
+// symlink or hard link planted at the path resolves to a file someone else owns
+// and is refused.
+//
+// The check is made against the open descriptor rather than the path, so
+// swapping the path between the check and the read cannot change the answer.
+//
+// A privileged caller is exempt: it can read the file directly, so refusing it
+// here would protect nothing. The regular-file requirement still applies to
+// everyone, since a fifo or device planted at the path is never a log file.
+func OpenOwnedFile(id Identity, path string) (*os.File, error) {
+	f, err := openForRead(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	if err := checkOwnership(id, f); err != nil {
+		if cerr := f.Close(); cerr != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w (close: %v)", err, cerr)
+		}
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return f, nil
+}
+
+func checkOwnership(id Identity, f *os.File) error {
+	info, err := f.Stat()
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("stat %s: %w", f.Name(), err)
+	}
+
+	if !info.Mode().IsRegular() {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s is not a regular file", f.Name())
+	}
+
+	if IsPrivilegedCaller(id) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	owned, err := fileOwnedBy(id, f)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("read owner of %s: %w", f.Name(), err)
+	}
+	if !owned {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s is not owned by the caller (%s)", f.Name(), id)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/ownedfile_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// otherIdentity is an unprivileged caller that owns nothing the test creates.
+func otherIdentity(t *testing.T) Identity {
+	t.Helper()
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		return Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001"}
+	}
+	return Identity{UID: uint32(os.Geteuid() + 1), GID: uint32(os.Getegid() + 1)}
+}
+
+func TestOpenOwnedFileReadsFileOwnedByCaller(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "gui-client.log")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("hello"), 0600))
+
+	id, err := CurrentProcessIdentity()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	f, err := OpenOwnedFile(id, path)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = f.Close() })
+
+	content, err := io.ReadAll(f)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, "hello", string(content))
+}
+
+func TestOpenOwnedFileRefusesFileOwnedByAnother(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "gui-client.log")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("secret"), 0600))
+
+	_, err := OpenOwnedFile(otherIdentity(t), path)
+	require.ErrorContains(t, err, "not owned by the caller")
+}
+
+func TestOpenOwnedFileRefusesNonRegularFile(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	// The caller owns the directory, so this is the regular-file requirement
+	// talking, not the ownership check.
+	id, err := CurrentProcessIdentity()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = OpenOwnedFile(id, dir)
+	require.ErrorContains(t, err, "not a regular file")
+}
+
+func TestOpenOwnedFileRefusesMissingFile(t *testing.T) {
+	id, err := CurrentProcessIdentity()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = OpenOwnedFile(id, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent.log"))
+	require.Error(t, err)
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/ownedfile_unix.go

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+//go:build !windows
+
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"syscall"
+)
+
+// openForRead opens a caller-supplied path without following a symlink at its
+// final component and without blocking: a fifo planted at the path would
+// otherwise stall the open until a writer appears, and the daemon holds a lock
+// while it collects the file.
+func openForRead(path string) (*os.File, error) {
+	f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_RDONLY|syscall.O_NOFOLLOW|syscall.O_NONBLOCK, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("open %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	return f, nil
+}
+
+func fileOwnedBy(id Identity, f *os.File) (bool, error) {
+	info, err := f.Stat()
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+
+	stat, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t)
+	if !ok {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("no owner information in %T", info.Sys())
+	}
+
+	return stat.Uid == id.UID, nil
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/ownedfile_unix_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+//go:build !windows
+
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"syscall"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// A symlink is the shape the arbitrary-read attempt takes: the caller owns the
+// link, the file it points at belongs to someone else.
+func TestOpenOwnedFileRefusesSymlink(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	target := filepath.Join(dir, "target.log")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(target, []byte("secret"), 0600))
+
+	link := filepath.Join(dir, "gui-client.log")
+	require.NoError(t, os.Symlink(target, link))
+
+	id, err := CurrentProcessIdentity()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = OpenOwnedFile(id, link)
+	// O_NOFOLLOW on a symlink reports ELOOP on Linux/Darwin and EMLINK on FreeBSD.
+	if !errors.Is(err, syscall.ELOOP) && !errors.Is(err, syscall.EMLINK) {
+		t.Fatalf("symlink open: got %v, want ELOOP or EMLINK", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// A fifo would block the open until a writer showed up, stalling the daemon
+// while it holds its lock.
+func TestOpenOwnedFileRefusesFifoWithoutBlocking(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "gui-client.log")
+	require.NoError(t, syscall.Mkfifo(path, 0600))
+
+	id, err := CurrentProcessIdentity()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		_, err := OpenOwnedFile(id, path)
+		done <- err
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case err := <-done:
+		require.ErrorContains(t, err, "not a regular file")
+	case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("opening a fifo blocked")
+	}
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/ownedfile_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
+)
+
+// openForRead opens a caller-supplied path without following a reparse point at
+// it. FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT is the Windows analogue of O_NOFOLLOW: it
+// opens a symlink/junction itself rather than its target, so the regular-file
+// check in checkOwnership refuses a link the caller planted to redirect the
+// read. FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS lets a directory open too (as os.Open does),
+// so a directory planted at the path is refused as non-regular rather than
+// erroring here. The share mode matches os.Open so a log being written stays
+// openable.
+func openForRead(path string) (*os.File, error) {
+	p, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("convert path %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+
+	handle, err := windows.CreateFile(
+		p,
+		windows.GENERIC_READ,
+		windows.FILE_SHARE_READ|windows.FILE_SHARE_WRITE|windows.FILE_SHARE_DELETE,
+		nil,
+		windows.OPEN_EXISTING,
+		windows.FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT|windows.FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS,
+		0,
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("open %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+
+	return os.NewFile(uintptr(handle), path), nil
+}
+
+// fileOwnedBy compares the file's owner SID with the caller's. Files an elevated
+// process creates are owned by BUILTIN\Administrators rather than by the user,
+// but such a caller is privileged and never reaches this check.
+func fileOwnedBy(id Identity, f *os.File) (bool, error) {
+	// x/sys/windows GetSecurityInfo frees the OS buffer itself and returns a
+	// Go-heap copy, so there is nothing to LocalFree here.
+	sd, err := windows.GetSecurityInfo(windows.Handle(f.Fd()), windows.SE_FILE_OBJECT, windows.OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("read security info: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	owner, _, err := sd.Owner()
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("read owner: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return id.SID != "" && owner.String() == id.SID, nil
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/ownedfile_windows_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
+)
+
+// fileOwnerSID reads the owner SID of path the same way OpenOwnedFile does, so
+// the test can construct an Identity that matches (or deliberately does not).
+func fileOwnerSID(t *testing.T, path string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	f, err := os.Open(path)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = f.Close() })
+
+	sd, err := windows.GetSecurityInfo(windows.Handle(f.Fd()), windows.SE_FILE_OBJECT, windows.OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	owner, _, err := sd.Owner()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	return owner.String()
+}
+
+// The allow branch of fileOwnedBy is the SID-equality path the legitimate GUI
+// flow depends on. Running elevated, a created file is owned by
+// BUILTIN\Administrators; an Identity carrying that SID with Elevated=false and
+// no groups is unprivileged by IsPrivileged (which reads the token, not the
+// SID's RID), so this exercises the real GetSecurityInfo equality rather than
+// the privileged-caller shortcut.
+func TestOpenOwnedFileWindowsOwnerMatchAllows(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "gui-client.log")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("hello"), 0600))
+
+	ownerSID := fileOwnerSID(t, path)
+	id := Identity{SID: ownerSID}
+	require.False(t, id.IsPrivileged(), "identity built from the owner SID must be unprivileged for this to test the match path")
+
+	f, err := OpenOwnedFile(id, path)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_ = f.Close()
+}
+
+func TestOpenOwnedFileWindowsOwnerMismatchRefuses(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "gui-client.log")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("secret"), 0600))
+
+	other := Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-9-9-9-9999"}
+	require.False(t, other.IsPrivileged())
+
+	_, err := OpenOwnedFile(other, path)
+	require.ErrorContains(t, err, "not owned by the caller")
+}
+
+// FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT must make OpenOwnedFile refuse a symlink the same
+// way O_NOFOLLOW does on Unix, so a planted link can't redirect the read to
+// another file. Creating a symlink needs a privilege the runner may lack, so the
+// test skips rather than fails when it can't.
+func TestOpenOwnedFileWindowsRefusesSymlink(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	target := filepath.Join(dir, "target.log")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(target, []byte("secret"), 0600))
+
+	link := filepath.Join(dir, "gui-client.log")
+	if err := os.Symlink(target, link); err != nil {
+		t.Skipf("cannot create symlink (privilege not held?): %v", err)
+	}
+
+	id, err := CurrentProcessIdentity()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = OpenOwnedFile(id, link)
+	require.Error(t, err, "a symlink must be refused")
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/peercred_bsd.go

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+//go:build darwin || freebsd
+
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+// PeerIdentity reads the kernel-authenticated identity of the process on the
+// other end of a Unix socket via LOCAL_PEERCRED. The xucred is recorded by the
+// kernel at connect() time and carries the peer's uid and its group list, of
+// which the first entry is the primary group.
+func PeerIdentity(conn net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
+	uc, ok := conn.(*net.UnixConn)
+	if !ok {
+		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("connection is not a unix socket: %T", conn)
+	}
+
+	raw, err := uc.SyscallConn()
+	if err != nil {
+		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("raw conn: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	var cred *unix.Xucred
+	var credErr error
+	if err := raw.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
+		cred, credErr = unix.GetsockoptXucred(int(fd), unix.SOL_LOCAL, unix.LOCAL_PEERCRED)
+	}); err != nil {
+		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("control raw conn: %w", err)
+	}
+	if credErr != nil {
+		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("read LOCAL_PEERCRED: %w", credErr)
+	}
+
+	id := Identity{UID: cred.Uid}
+	if cred.Ngroups > 0 {
+		id.GID = cred.Groups[0]
+	}
+	return id, nil
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/peercred_linux.go

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+//go:build linux
+
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+// PeerIdentity reads the kernel-authenticated identity of the process on the
+// other end of a Unix socket via SO_PEERCRED. The credentials are recorded by
+// the kernel at connect() time and cannot be changed for the life of the
+// connection, so they are not spoofable by the caller.
+func PeerIdentity(conn net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
+	uc, ok := conn.(*net.UnixConn)
+	if !ok {
+		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("connection is not a unix socket: %T", conn)
+	}
+
+	raw, err := uc.SyscallConn()
+	if err != nil {
+		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("raw conn: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	var cred *unix.Ucred
+	var credErr error
+	if err := raw.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
+		cred, credErr = unix.GetsockoptUcred(int(fd), unix.SOL_SOCKET, unix.SO_PEERCRED)
+	}); err != nil {
+		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("control raw conn: %w", err)
+	}
+	if credErr != nil {
+		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("read SO_PEERCRED: %w", credErr)
+	}
+
+	return Identity{UID: cred.Uid, GID: cred.Gid, PID: cred.Pid}, nil
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/pipeserver_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
+)
+
+// PipeServerTrusted reports an error unless the pipe behind conn was created by a
+// principal this client may hand secrets to. Clients call it for a pipe whose name
+// carries no guarantee of its own, which is any name outside the
+// ProtectedPrefix\Administrators namespace: that namespace already restricts
+// creation to administrators and LocalSystem, while a plain name can be created by
+// any local user before the daemon gets there.
+//
+// The decision is made from the pipe object's owner, not from the serving process,
+// because a client cannot open a process running as another user at all, and the
+// legitimate case is precisely an unprivileged client talking to a privileged
+// daemon. Trusted owners are the service accounts, BUILTIN\Administrators, and
+// this client's own user, the last of which is the daemon a user runs themselves
+// as in netstack mode. A pipe owned by anyone else gets no setup key, pre-shared
+// key or SSO prompt out of this client.
+func PipeServerTrusted(conn net.Conn) error {
+	// go-winio's pipe connection embeds *win32File, which exposes Fd().
+	fdConn, ok := conn.(interface{ Fd() uintptr })
+	if !ok {
+		return fmt.Errorf("connection %T does not expose a pipe handle", conn)
+	}
+
+	owner, err := pipeOwnerSID(windows.Handle(fdConn.Fd()))
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if !trustedPipeOwner(owner) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("pipe owned by %s, which is neither an administrator nor this user", owner)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// PipeOwnedBySelf reports whether the pipe behind conn was created by this very
+// user, which is how a client recognises a daemon running as itself. Ownership it
+// cannot read is reported as false.
+func PipeOwnedBySelf(conn net.Conn) bool {
+	fdConn, ok := conn.(interface{ Fd() uintptr })
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	owner, err := pipeOwnerSID(windows.Handle(fdConn.Fd()))
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Debugf("read daemon pipe owner: %v", err)
+		return false
+	}
+	return selfKnown && selfIdentity.SID != "" && owner == selfIdentity.SID
+}
+
+// pipeOwnerSID reads the owner of the pipe object a client is connected to. The
+// handle was opened with GENERIC_READ, which includes READ_CONTROL, so no extra
+// access is needed.
+func pipeOwnerSID(handle windows.Handle) (string, error) {
+	sd, err := windows.GetSecurityInfo(handle, windows.SE_KERNEL_OBJECT, windows.OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("read pipe security info: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	owner, _, err := sd.Owner()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("read pipe owner: %w", err)
+	}
+	return owner.String(), nil
+}
+
+// trustedPipeOwner reports whether a pipe's owner is a principal a client may
+// speak to. An elevated process's objects are owned by BUILTIN\Administrators by
+// default, an unelevated one's by the user, which is why both forms appear here.
+func trustedPipeOwner(owner string) bool {
+	switch owner {
+	case sidLocalSystem, sidLocalService, sidNetworkService, sidAdministrators:
+		return true
+	}
+	return selfKnown && selfIdentity.SID != "" && owner == selfIdentity.SID
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/privileged.go

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"runtime"
+)
+
+// Fields of the ErrorInfo detail the daemon attaches to a PermissionDenied it
+// raises for an operation that requires root/administrator. Clients match on
+// Reason and Domain rather than on the message text, and render the summary and
+// command themselves so the user gets guidance instead of a gRPC error dump.
+const (
+	// ErrorReasonPrivilegeRequired identifies the detail.
+	ErrorReasonPrivilegeRequired = "PRIVILEGE_REQUIRED"
+	// ErrorDomain scopes the reason to the NetBird daemon.
+	ErrorDomain = "daemon.netbird.io"
+	// ErrorMetaSummary is the one-sentence explanation of what was refused.
+	ErrorMetaSummary = "summary"
+	// ErrorMetaCommand is the command that performs the same operation with the
+	// privileges it needs, ready to copy and run.
+	ErrorMetaCommand = "command"
+)
+
+// The identity of the process evaluating callers, captured once because it cannot
+// change. selfKnown is false when it could not be read, in which case nothing is
+// ever treated as this process. selfMayDelegate additionally requires this
+// process to be unprivileged: see IsPrivilegedCaller.
+var (
+	selfIdentity    Identity
+	selfKnown       bool
+	selfMayDelegate bool
+	// selfPID is this process's PID, used to recognise the daemon dialling itself.
+	selfPID = os.Getpid()
+)
+
+func init() {
+	id, err := CurrentProcessIdentity()
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	selfIdentity, selfKnown = id, true
+	// Only an unprivileged daemon delegates its authority to its own identity.
+	// When it is root or LocalSystem, sharing its identity does not mean sharing
+	// its power: on Windows a filtered and a full token carry the same SID, so
+	// matching there would let a non-elevated shell of an administrator account
+	// act as an administrator, which is the boundary the token check exists to
+	// keep.
+	selfMayDelegate = !id.IsPrivileged()
+}
+
+// IsDaemonSelf reports whether an identity is this very process. The JSON gateway
+// runs inside the daemon and re-dials it locally, so this is what distinguishes
+// the gateway from any other caller, whatever user the daemon runs as.
+func IsDaemonSelf(id Identity) bool {
+	if !selfKnown || id.IsWindows() != selfIdentity.IsWindows() {
+		return false
+	}
+	if id.IsWindows() {
+		return id.SID != "" && id.SID == selfIdentity.SID
+	}
+	return id.UID == selfIdentity.UID
+}
+
+// IsPrivilegedCaller reports whether an identity may make the changes the daemon
+// restricts to the platform administrator. This is the daemon's own rule and
+// cannot be evaluated by a client, which does not know what the daemon runs as.
+//
+// Beyond root/administrator it accepts a caller running as the daemon's own
+// identity when the daemon is itself unprivileged. That keeps a rootless container
+// working, where there is no uid 0 at all, and a Windows daemon in netstack mode,
+// which needs no administrator rights. In those setups a caller sharing the
+// daemon's identity can already rewrite the config files it reads and replace the
+// binary it runs, so refusing it a config change would protect nothing; and an
+// unprivileged daemon cannot hand out a root shell in the first place.
+func IsPrivilegedCaller(id Identity) bool {
+	if id.IsPrivileged() {
+		return true
+	}
+	return selfMayDelegate && IsDaemonSelf(id)
+}
+
+// SelfDelegatesTo returns the identity this process delegates its authority to,
+// and whether it delegates at all. Only an unprivileged daemon does: see
+// IsPrivilegedCaller. It exists so a refusal can name who may actually perform the
+// operation, because on such a host root is neither required nor necessarily
+// available.
+func SelfDelegatesTo() (Identity, bool) {
+	if !selfKnown || !selfMayDelegate {
+		return Identity{}, false
+	}
+	return selfIdentity, true
+}
+
+// PrivilegedActor names the principal a privileged operation requires, for use
+// in messages shown to the user.
+func PrivilegedActor() string {
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		return "administrator privileges"
+	}
+	return "root"
+}
+
+// ElevatedCommand renders a command so that running it grants the privileges the
+// operation needs. Windows has no in-line equivalent of sudo, so the command is
+// returned unchanged and the user is expected to run it from an elevated
+// terminal.
+func ElevatedCommand(command string) string {
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		return command
+	}
+	return "sudo " + command
+}
+
+// UpCommand renders an elevated `netbird up` with the given flags, preceded by a
+// `down`. The down is what makes the command work on a connected client: `netbird
+// up` prints "Already connected" and returns without applying any config flag, so
+// on its own the command would appear to do nothing. It is a no-op, exit 0, when
+// the client is not connected.
+//
+// ";" rather than "&&" so the line can be pasted into any of the shells a user
+// might have: PowerShell 5.1, still the default on Windows Server, rejects "&&"
+// as a syntax error.
+func UpCommand(flags string) string {
+	return ElevatedCommand("netbird down") + "; " + ElevatedCommand("netbird up "+flags)
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/privileged_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+package ipcauth
+
+import "testing"
+
+// The self rule is the one place privilege is granted to something other than the
+// platform administrator, so its two guards matter: it must apply only when the
+// daemon is itself unprivileged, and only to a caller with the daemon's identity.
+func TestIsPrivilegedCaller_SelfRule(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		// self stands in for the process the daemon runs as.
+		self      Identity
+		selfKnown bool
+		caller    Identity
+		want      bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:      "root is privileged whatever the daemon runs as",
+			self:      Identity{UID: 1000},
+			selfKnown: true,
+			caller:    Identity{UID: 0},
+			want:      true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:      "an unprivileged daemon delegates to its own user (rootless container)",
+			self:      Identity{UID: 1000},
+			selfKnown: true,
+			caller:    Identity{UID: 1000},
+			want:      true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:      "an unprivileged daemon delegates to nobody else",
+			self:      Identity{UID: 1000},
+			selfKnown: true,
+			caller:    Identity{UID: 1001},
+			want:      false,
+		},
+		{
+			// The daemon is root on a normal install, so sharing its identity is
+			// already covered by being root; nothing else may match.
+			name:      "a root daemon delegates to nobody",
+			self:      Identity{UID: 0},
+			selfKnown: true,
+			caller:    Identity{UID: 1000},
+			want:      false,
+		},
+		{
+			// Windows netstack mode: the daemon needs no administrator rights.
+			name:      "an unprivileged windows daemon delegates to its own SID",
+			self:      Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001"},
+			selfKnown: true,
+			caller:    Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001"},
+			want:      true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:      "an unprivileged windows daemon delegates to no other SID",
+			self:      Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001"},
+			selfKnown: true,
+			caller:    Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1002"},
+			want:      false,
+		},
+		{
+			// The UAC boundary: a filtered and a full token of the same account
+			// carry the same SID but not the same power, so an elevated daemon must
+			// never delegate to its own SID.
+			name:      "an elevated windows daemon does not delegate to its own SID",
+			self:      Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-500", Elevated: true},
+			selfKnown: true,
+			caller:    Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-500"},
+			want:      false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:      "LocalSystem is privileged on its own merits, not by delegation",
+			self:      Identity{SID: sidLocalSystem},
+			selfKnown: true,
+			caller:    Identity{SID: sidLocalSystem},
+			want:      true, // LocalSystem is privileged on its own merits
+		},
+		{
+			name:      "identities of different kinds never match",
+			self:      Identity{UID: 1000},
+			selfKnown: true,
+			caller:    Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001"},
+			want:      false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:      "an unknown self identity delegates to nobody",
+			self:      Identity{},
+			selfKnown: false,
+			caller:    Identity{UID: 1000},
+			want:      false,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			prevID, prevKnown, prevDelegate := selfIdentity, selfKnown, selfMayDelegate
+			t.Cleanup(func() { selfIdentity, selfKnown, selfMayDelegate = prevID, prevKnown, prevDelegate })
+
+			selfIdentity, selfKnown = tt.self, tt.selfKnown
+			selfMayDelegate = tt.selfKnown && !tt.self.IsPrivileged()
+
+			if got := IsPrivilegedCaller(tt.caller); got != tt.want {
+				t.Fatalf("IsPrivilegedCaller(%v) with daemon %v = %t, want %t",
+					tt.caller, tt.self, got, tt.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// The real process must never accidentally delegate: a test binary running as a
+// normal user is unprivileged, so it may match itself, but nothing else.
+func TestIsPrivilegedCaller_ThisProcess(t *testing.T) {
+	id, err := CurrentProcessIdentity()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Skipf("cannot read this process's identity: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// This process is always allowed to act as itself: either it is privileged, or
+	// it is unprivileged and therefore delegates to its own identity.
+	if !IsPrivilegedCaller(id) {
+		t.Errorf("this process %v was refused its own identity", id)
+	}
+
+	// A caller that is neither root nor this process must be refused, whatever
+	// this process happens to be.
+	other := Identity{UID: id.UID + 1}
+	if id.IsWindows() {
+		other = Identity{SID: id.SID + "9"}
+	}
+	if IsPrivilegedCaller(other) {
+		t.Errorf("an unrelated identity %v was treated as privileged", other)
+	}
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/self_unix.go

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+//go:build !windows
+
+package ipcauth
+
+import "os"
+
+// CurrentProcessIdentity returns this process's identity as the daemon would
+// see it if this process connected to the local IPC. It lets a client (the UI)
+// decide up front whether a privileged operation can succeed, without a
+// round-trip and without duplicating the rules: the answer comes from the same
+// Identity.IsPrivileged the daemon applies.
+func CurrentProcessIdentity() (Identity, error) {
+	return Identity{
+		UID: uint32(os.Geteuid()),
+		GID: uint32(os.Getegid()),
+	}, nil
+}

client/internal/ipcauth/self_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package ipcauth
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
+)
+
+// CurrentProcessIdentity returns this process's identity as the daemon would see
+// it if this process connected to the local IPC. It lets a client (the UI)
+// decide up front whether a privileged operation can succeed, without a
+// round-trip and without duplicating the rules: the answer comes from the same
+// Identity.IsPrivileged the daemon applies to the token it reads off the pipe.
+func CurrentProcessIdentity() (Identity, error) {
+	// A pseudo-token, so it must not be closed.
+	token := windows.GetCurrentProcessToken()
+
+	user, err := token.GetTokenUser()
+	if err != nil {
+		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("read token user: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	groups, err := tokenGroupSIDs(token)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Identity{}, err
+	}
+
+	return Identity{
+		SID:      user.User.Sid.String(),
+		Groups:   groups,
+		Elevated: token.IsElevated(),
+	}, nil
+}

client/internal/lazyconn/activity/listener_bind.go

@@ -119,15 +119,16 @@ func (d *BindListener) ReadPackets() {
 	}
 
 	d.peerCfg.Log.Debugf("removing lazy endpoint for peer %s", d.peerCfg.PublicKey)
-	if err := d.wgIface.RemovePeer(d.peerCfg.PublicKey); err != nil {
-		d.peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to remove endpoint: %s", err)
-	}
-
 	_ = d.lazyConn.Close()
 	d.bind.RemoveEndpoint(d.fakeIP)
 	d.done.Done()
 }
 
+// CapturedPacket is unused in userspace bind mode: first-packet reinjection is kernel-only.
+func (d *BindListener) CapturedPacket() []byte {
+	return nil
+}
+
 // Close stops the listener and cleans up resources.
 func (d *BindListener) Close() {
 	d.peerCfg.Log.Infof("closing activity listener (LazyConn)")

client/internal/lazyconn/activity/listener_bind_test.go

@@ -45,10 +45,6 @@ type MockWGIfaceBind struct {
 	endpointMgr *mockEndpointManager
 }
 
-func (m *MockWGIfaceBind) RemovePeer(string) error {
-	return nil
-}
-
 func (m *MockWGIfaceBind) UpdatePeer(string, []netip.Prefix, time.Duration, *net.UDPAddr, *wgtypes.Key) error {
 	return nil
 }
@@ -68,6 +64,10 @@ func (m *MockWGIfaceBind) GetBind() device.EndpointManager {
 	return m.endpointMgr
 }
 
+func (m *MockWGIfaceBind) MTU() uint16 {
+	return 1280
+}
+
 func TestBindListener_Creation(t *testing.T) {
 	mockEndpointMgr := newMockEndpointManager()
 	mockIface := &MockWGIfaceBind{endpointMgr: mockEndpointMgr}
@@ -207,8 +207,9 @@ func TestManager_BindMode(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	select {
-	case peerConnID := <-mgr.OnActivityChan:
-		assert.Equal(t, cfg.PeerConnID, peerConnID, "Received peer connection ID should match")
+	case ev := <-mgr.OnActivityChan:
+		assert.Equal(t, cfg.PeerConnID, ev.PeerConnID, "Received peer connection ID should match")
+		assert.Nil(t, ev.FirstPacket, "Bind mode does not capture packets: reinjection is kernel-only")
 	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
 		t.Fatal("timeout waiting for activity notification")
 	}
@@ -266,8 +267,8 @@ func TestManager_BindMode_MultiplePeers(t *testing.T) {
 	receivedPeers := make(map[peerid.ConnID]bool)
 	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
 		select {
-		case peerConnID := <-mgr.OnActivityChan:
-			receivedPeers[peerConnID] = true
+		case ev := <-mgr.OnActivityChan:
+			receivedPeers[ev.PeerConnID] = true
 		case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
 			t.Fatal("timeout waiting for activity notifications")
 		}

client/internal/lazyconn/activity/listener_udp.go

@@ -3,11 +3,13 @@ package activity
 import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
+	"slices"
 	"sync"
 	"sync/atomic"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/bufsize"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/lazyconn"
 )
 
@@ -20,6 +22,8 @@ type UDPListener struct {
 	done     sync.Mutex
 
 	isClosed atomic.Bool
+
+	capturedPacket []byte
 }
 
 // NewUDPListener creates a listener that detects activity via UDP socket reads.
@@ -46,9 +50,13 @@ func NewUDPListener(wgIface WgInterface, cfg lazyconn.PeerConfig) (*UDPListener,
 }
 
 // ReadPackets blocks reading from the UDP socket until activity is detected or the listener is closed.
+// The first packet that triggers activity is captured so it can be reinjected through the real
+// transport once it is established. Without this, kernel WireGuard's handshake initiation would be
+// dropped and WG would only retry after REKEY_TIMEOUT.
 func (d *UDPListener) ReadPackets() {
 	for {
-		n, remoteAddr, err := d.conn.ReadFromUDP(make([]byte, 1))
+		buf := make([]byte, int(d.wgIface.MTU())+bufsize.WGBufferOverhead)
+		n, remoteAddr, err := d.conn.ReadFromUDP(buf)
 		if err != nil {
 			if d.isClosed.Load() {
 				d.peerCfg.Log.Infof("exit from activity listener")
@@ -62,20 +70,24 @@ func (d *UDPListener) ReadPackets() {
 			d.peerCfg.Log.Warnf("received %d bytes from %s, too short", n, remoteAddr)
 			continue
 		}
-		d.peerCfg.Log.Infof("activity detected")
+		d.capturedPacket = slices.Clone(buf[:n])
+		d.peerCfg.Log.Infof("activity detected, captured %d bytes for reinjection", n)
 		break
 	}
 
-	d.peerCfg.Log.Debugf("removing lazy endpoint: %s", d.endpoint.String())
-	if err := d.wgIface.RemovePeer(d.peerCfg.PublicKey); err != nil {
-		d.peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to remove endpoint: %s", err)
-	}
-
-	// Ignore close error as it may return "use of closed network connection" if already closed.
+	// Leave the peer in place. ConfigureWGEndpoint will UpdatePeer with the real endpoint;
+	// removing the peer here wipes kernel WG's staged queue and drops the user packet that
+	// triggered activation.
 	_ = d.conn.Close()
 	d.done.Unlock()
 }
 
+// CapturedPacket returns the first packet that triggered activity, or nil if none was captured.
+// Safe to call after ReadPackets returns.
+func (d *UDPListener) CapturedPacket() []byte {
+	return d.capturedPacket
+}
+
 // Close stops the listener and cleans up resources.
 func (d *UDPListener) Close() {
 	d.peerCfg.Log.Infof("closing activity listener: %s", d.conn.LocalAddr().String())

client/internal/lazyconn/activity/manager.go

@@ -19,17 +19,25 @@ import (
 type listener interface {
 	ReadPackets()
 	Close()
+	CapturedPacket() []byte
+}
+
+// Event reports activity on a managed peer. FirstPacket is the bytes that triggered activation,
+// captured for reinjection through the real transport.
+type Event struct {
+	PeerConnID  peerid.ConnID
+	FirstPacket []byte
 }
 
 type WgInterface interface {
-	RemovePeer(peerKey string) error
 	UpdatePeer(peerKey string, allowedIps []netip.Prefix, keepAlive time.Duration, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key) error
 	IsUserspaceBind() bool
 	Address() wgaddr.Address
+	MTU() uint16
 }
 
 type Manager struct {
-	OnActivityChan chan peerid.ConnID
+	OnActivityChan chan Event
 
 	wgIface WgInterface
 
@@ -41,7 +49,7 @@ type Manager struct {
 
 func NewManager(wgIface WgInterface) *Manager {
 	m := &Manager{
-		OnActivityChan: make(chan peerid.ConnID, 1),
+		OnActivityChan: make(chan Event, 1),
 		wgIface:        wgIface,
 		peers:          make(map[peerid.ConnID]listener),
 		done:           make(chan struct{}),
@@ -116,12 +124,12 @@ func (m *Manager) waitForTraffic(l listener, peerConnID peerid.ConnID) {
 	delete(m.peers, peerConnID)
 	m.mu.Unlock()
 
-	m.notify(peerConnID)
+	m.notify(Event{PeerConnID: peerConnID, FirstPacket: l.CapturedPacket()})
 }
 
-func (m *Manager) notify(peerConnID peerid.ConnID) {
+func (m *Manager) notify(ev Event) {
 	select {
 	case <-m.done:
-	case m.OnActivityChan <- peerConnID:
+	case m.OnActivityChan <- ev:
 	}
 }

client/internal/lazyconn/activity/manager_test.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package activity
 
 import (
+	"bytes"
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
 	"testing"
@@ -25,10 +26,6 @@ func (m *MocPeer) ConnID() peerid.ConnID {
 type MocWGIface struct {
 }
 
-func (m MocWGIface) RemovePeer(string) error {
-	return nil
-}
-
 func (m MocWGIface) UpdatePeer(string, []netip.Prefix, time.Duration, *net.UDPAddr, *wgtypes.Key) error {
 	return nil
 }
@@ -44,6 +41,10 @@ func (m MocWGIface) Address() wgaddr.Address {
 	}
 }
 
+func (m MocWGIface) MTU() uint16 {
+	return 1280
+}
+
 // GetPeerListener is a test helper to access listeners
 func (m *Manager) GetPeerListener(peerConnID peerid.ConnID) (listener, bool) {
 	m.mu.Lock()
@@ -86,11 +87,15 @@ func TestManager_MonitorPeerActivity(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	select {
-	case peerConnID := <-mgr.OnActivityChan:
-		if peerConnID != peerCfg1.PeerConnID {
-			t.Fatalf("unexpected peerConnID: %v", peerConnID)
+	case ev := <-mgr.OnActivityChan:
+		if ev.PeerConnID != peerCfg1.PeerConnID {
+			t.Fatalf("unexpected peerConnID: %v", ev.PeerConnID)
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(ev.FirstPacket, []byte{0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05}) {
+			t.Fatalf("unexpected first packet: %v", ev.FirstPacket)
 		}
 	case <-time.After(1 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("timed out waiting for activity")
 	}
 }
 

client/internal/lazyconn/env.go

@@ -3,24 +3,57 @@ package lazyconn
 import (
 	"os"
 	"strconv"
+	"strings"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 )
 
 const (
-	EnvEnableLazyConn      = "NB_ENABLE_EXPERIMENTAL_LAZY_CONN"
+	EnvLazyConn            = "NB_LAZY_CONN"
 	EnvInactivityThreshold = "NB_LAZY_CONN_INACTIVITY_THRESHOLD"
 )
 
-func IsLazyConnEnabledByEnv() bool {
-	val := os.Getenv(EnvEnableLazyConn)
-	if val == "" {
-		return false
+// State is the tri-state local override for lazy connections read from the environment.
+type State int
+
+const (
+	// StateUnset means no local override; defer to the management feature flag.
+	StateUnset State = iota
+	// StateOn forces lazy connections on, overriding management.
+	StateOn
+	// StateOff forces lazy connections off, overriding management.
+	StateOff
+)
+
+// EnvState reads NB_LAZY_CONN and returns the local override state.
+func EnvState() State {
+	return ParseState(os.Getenv(EnvLazyConn))
+}
+
+// ParseState interprets a lazy-connection override value (from the environment or an MDM
+// policy). It accepts the on/off aliases plus any value strconv.ParseBool understands
+// (true/false/1/0). An empty or unrecognized value returns StateUnset so that the
+// management feature flag remains in control.
+func ParseState(raw string) State {
+	if raw == "" {
+		return StateUnset
 	}
-	enabled, err := strconv.ParseBool(val)
+
+	normalized := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(raw))
+	switch normalized {
+	case "on":
+		return StateOn
+	case "off":
+		return StateOff
+	}
+
+	enabled, err := strconv.ParseBool(normalized)
 	if err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to parse %s: %v", EnvEnableLazyConn, err)
-		return false
+		log.Warnf("failed to parse lazy connection value %q (from %s env or MDM policy): %v", raw, EnvLazyConn, err)
+		return StateUnset
+	}
+	if enabled {
+		return StateOn
 	}
-	return enabled
+	return StateOff
 }

client/internal/lazyconn/env_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+package lazyconn
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestEnvState(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		value string
+		set   bool
+		want  State
+	}{
+		{set: false, want: StateUnset},
+		{value: "", set: true, want: StateUnset},
+		{value: "on", set: true, want: StateOn},
+		{value: "ON", set: true, want: StateOn},
+		{value: "true", set: true, want: StateOn},
+		{value: "1", set: true, want: StateOn},
+		{value: " on ", set: true, want: StateOn},
+		{value: "off", set: true, want: StateOff},
+		{value: "OFF", set: true, want: StateOff},
+		{value: "false", set: true, want: StateOff},
+		{value: "0", set: true, want: StateOff},
+		{value: "auto", set: true, want: StateUnset},
+		{value: "garbage", set: true, want: StateUnset},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		name := tt.value
+		if !tt.set {
+			name = "unset"
+		}
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Setenv(EnvLazyConn, tt.value)
+			if !tt.set {
+				os.Unsetenv(EnvLazyConn)
+			}
+
+			if got := EnvState(); got != tt.want {
+				t.Fatalf("EnvState() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

client/internal/lazyconn/manager/manager.go

@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ type managedPeer struct {
 
 type Config struct {
 	InactivityThreshold *time.Duration
+	// ReconcileAllowedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its wake endpoint is
+	// armed. The activity listener creates the wake peer with the overlay /32 only; without the
+	// routed prefixes WireGuard would not steer subnet-bound traffic to the wake endpoint, so an
+	// idle routing peer could never be woken by that traffic. Optional; nil disables the reconcile.
+	ReconcileAllowedIPs func(peerKey string) error
 }
 
 // Manager manages lazy connections
@@ -56,6 +61,9 @@ type Manager struct {
 	peerToHAGroups map[string][]route.HAUniqueID // peer ID -> HA groups they belong to
 	haGroupToPeers map[route.HAUniqueID][]string // HA group -> peer IDs in the group
 	routesMu       sync.RWMutex
+
+	// reconcileAllowedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its wake endpoint is armed.
+	reconcileAllowedIPs func(peerKey string) error
 }
 
 // NewManager creates a new lazy connection manager
@@ -73,6 +81,7 @@ func NewManager(config Config, engineCtx context.Context, peerStore *peerstore.S
 		activityManager:      activity.NewManager(wgIface),
 		peerToHAGroups:       make(map[string][]route.HAUniqueID),
 		haGroupToPeers:       make(map[route.HAUniqueID][]string),
+		reconcileAllowedIPs:  config.ReconcileAllowedIPs,
 	}
 
 	if wgIface.IsUserspaceBind() {
@@ -130,8 +139,8 @@ func (m *Manager) Start(ctx context.Context) {
 		select {
 		case <-ctx.Done():
 			return
-		case peerConnID := <-m.activityManager.OnActivityChan:
-			m.onPeerActivity(peerConnID)
+		case ev := <-m.activityManager.OnActivityChan:
+			m.onPeerActivity(ev)
 		case peerIDs := <-m.inactivityManager.InactivePeersChan():
 			m.onPeerInactivityTimedOut(peerIDs)
 		}
@@ -201,7 +210,7 @@ func (m *Manager) AddPeer(peerCfg lazyconn.PeerConfig) (bool, error) {
 		return false, nil
 	}
 
-	if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(peerCfg); err != nil {
+	if err := m.armActivityListener(peerCfg); err != nil {
 		return false, err
 	}
 
@@ -288,7 +297,7 @@ func (m *Manager) DeactivatePeer(peerID peerid.ConnID) {
 
 	m.inactivityManager.RemovePeer(mp.peerCfg.PublicKey)
 
-	if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
+	if err := m.armActivityListener(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
 		mp.peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to create activity monitor: %v", err)
 		return
 	}
@@ -465,6 +474,31 @@ func (m *Manager) close() {
 }
 
 // shouldDeferIdleForHA checks if peer should stay connected due to HA group requirements
+// armRoutedAllowedIPs re-applies the peer's routed allowed IPs onto its freshly armed wake
+// endpoint. The activity listener creates the wake peer with the overlay /32 only, so without
+// this the routed prefixes would be missing and traffic to a routed subnet could not wake the
+// idle routing peer. It is a no-op when no reconciler is configured.
+// armActivityListener (re)arms the peer's wake endpoint via the activity manager and then
+// re-applies its routed allowed IPs, so traffic to a routed subnet can wake an idle routing
+// peer. The routed prefixes must be re-applied after the wake endpoint exists because the
+// listener creates it with the overlay /32 only.
+func (m *Manager) armActivityListener(peerCfg lazyconn.PeerConfig) error {
+	if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(peerCfg); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	m.armRoutedAllowedIPs(&peerCfg)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) armRoutedAllowedIPs(peerCfg *lazyconn.PeerConfig) {
+	if m.reconcileAllowedIPs == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if err := m.reconcileAllowedIPs(peerCfg.PublicKey); err != nil {
+		peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to reconcile routed allowed IPs on wake endpoint: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
 func (m *Manager) shouldDeferIdleForHA(inactivePeers map[string]struct{}, peerID string) bool {
 	m.routesMu.RLock()
 	defer m.routesMu.RUnlock()
@@ -513,13 +547,13 @@ func (m *Manager) checkHaGroupActivity(haGroup route.HAUniqueID, peerID string,
 	return false
 }
 
-func (m *Manager) onPeerActivity(peerConnID peerid.ConnID) {
+func (m *Manager) onPeerActivity(ev activity.Event) {
 	m.managedPeersMu.Lock()
 	defer m.managedPeersMu.Unlock()
 
-	mp, ok := m.managedPeersByConnID[peerConnID]
+	mp, ok := m.managedPeersByConnID[ev.PeerConnID]
 	if !ok {
-		log.Errorf("peer not found by conn id: %v", peerConnID)
+		log.Errorf("peer not found by conn id: %v", ev.PeerConnID)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -536,7 +570,7 @@ func (m *Manager) onPeerActivity(peerConnID peerid.ConnID) {
 
 	m.activateHAGroupPeers(mp.peerCfg)
 
-	m.peerStore.PeerConnOpen(m.engineCtx, mp.peerCfg.PublicKey)
+	m.peerStore.PeerConnOpenWithFirstPacket(m.engineCtx, mp.peerCfg.PublicKey, ev.FirstPacket)
 }
 
 func (m *Manager) onPeerInactivityTimedOut(peerIDs map[string]struct{}) {
@@ -577,7 +611,7 @@ func (m *Manager) onPeerInactivityTimedOut(peerIDs map[string]struct{}) {
 
 		mp.peerCfg.Log.Infof("start activity monitor")
 
-		if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
+		if err := m.armActivityListener(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
 			mp.peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to create activity monitor: %v", err)
 			continue
 		}

client/internal/lazyconn/support.go

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/hashicorp/go-version"
+
+	nbversion "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
 )
 
 var (
@@ -11,7 +13,7 @@ var (
 )
 
 func IsSupported(agentVersion string) bool {
-	if agentVersion == "development" {
+	if nbversion.IsDevelopmentVersion(agentVersion) {
 		return true
 	}