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[management,proxy] Agent network: per-account LLM gateway (policy, metering, multi-provider) (#6555)
* [agent-network] Shared proto, OpenAPI schema, and generated types * [agent-network] Management: store, manager, synthesizer, policy engine, provider catalog, HTTP/gRPC API Adds the account-scoped agent-network module: provider/policy/budget CRUD and store, the reverse-proxy service synthesizer, policy selection + limit enforcement, the provider catalog (incl. Vertex AI and AWS Bedrock entries), and the management HTTP + proxy gRPC surfaces. * [management] Fix agent-network proxy-peer fan-out on affected-peer recompute The affected-peers resolver loaded only persisted reverse-proxy services, but agent-network services are synthesized on demand and never persisted. As a result the embedded proxy peer was never folded into the affected set when a client's group changed, so the proxy received no network-map update for a newly authorised client and rejected its handshake until a full resync (restart). loadProxyServices now merges the synthesized agent-network services (injected via a registration hook to avoid an import cycle), so proxy peers learn newly authorised clients immediately. * [proxy] Reverse-proxy middleware framework, chain, and request plumbing The per-target middleware chain (slots, dispatcher, mutation gate, metadata merger), body capture, access-log terminal sink, and the proxy wiring that builds + runs chains for synthesized agent-network services. * [proxy] LLM parsers, pricing, and builtin middlewares (OpenAI, Anthropic, Vertex AI, AWS Bedrock) Request/response parsers and SSE/event-stream metering, the embedded pricing table, and the builtin middleware set: request parser, router, policy limit-check/record, cost meter, guardrail, identity inject, response parser. Includes the path-routed providers — Google Vertex AI (keyfile:: service-account OAuth minting) and AWS Bedrock (bearer auth, invoke/converse/streaming, optional /bedrock prefix) — plus the Models allowlist and unmeterable-publisher deny. * [proxy] IPv6 in-place apply and TCP accept-loop hardening on netstack listeners * [agent-network] End-to-end test suite, module docs, and deployment preset * [agent-network] Fix codespell typos and exclude false positives - labelgen word pool: vermillion -> vermilion, racoon -> raccoon. - codespell ignore list: add flate (Go compress/flate package), recordin (a test-local identifier), and unparseable (a valid alternative spelling used consistently across identifiers + a metadata-value constant). * [management] Set LastSeen on injected proxy peer in realstack test (MySQL strict-mode) The injected embedded proxy peer had a PeerStatus with a zero LastSeen, which serializes to '0000-00-00' and is rejected by MySQL in strict mode (SQLite tolerates it). Set LastSeen to a valid time so SaveAccount succeeds on both engines. * [agent-network] Remove e2e shell-script suite from this branch The end-to-end shell scripts under scripts/e2e/ are maintained in a separate testing suite and are not part of this change set. * [agent-network] Polish module docs: remove internal review scaffolding, fix links, verify diagrams Strip PR-review framing, commit references, absolute paths, and stale internal references from the agent-network module docs; fix broken relative links; verify all diagrams against the current architecture. Remove the internal AI-reviewer prompt file. * [management] Refine session expiration handling to support 3-state encoding for SSO deadlines * [agent-network] Relocate agentnetwork package to internals/modules Move management/server/agentnetwork (and its catalog/, labelgen/, types/ subpackages) to management/internals/modules/agentnetwork, alongside the reverse-proxy module, and rewrite all importers. Pure relocation: package names, the synthesizer + affectedpeers registration hook, and store access (shared store.Store) are unchanged, so no import cycle is introduced (affectedpeers still depends only on the agentnetwork/types leaf). * [agent-network] Co-locate HTTP handlers in the module (RegisterEndpoints) Move the agent-network HTTP handlers from server/http/handlers/agentnetwork into the module at internals/modules/agentnetwork/handlers (package handlers) and rename the entrypoint AddEndpoints -> RegisterEndpoints, matching the reverse-proxy module convention. Wiring in http/handler.go updated accordingly.
This commit is contained in:
Maycon Santos
@@ -297,6 +297,109 @@ func TestProtect_SessionCookieGroupsPropagate(t *testing.T) {
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assert.Equal(t, groups, capturedData.GetUserGroups(), "CapturedData groups must be retained after handler completes")
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}
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// stubTunnelValidator implements SessionValidator for the tunnel-peer
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// path. ValidateTunnelPeer returns a fixed response so tests can assert
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// how the proxy maps it onto CapturedData, and records whether the
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// fast-path actually reached management.
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type stubTunnelValidator struct {
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called bool
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resp *proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse
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}
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func (s *stubTunnelValidator) ValidateSession(context.Context, *proto.ValidateSessionRequest, ...grpc.CallOption) (*proto.ValidateSessionResponse, error) {
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return nil, errors.New("not used in this test")
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}
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func (s *stubTunnelValidator) ValidateTunnelPeer(context.Context, *proto.ValidateTunnelPeerRequest, ...grpc.CallOption) (*proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse, error) {
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s.called = true
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return s.resp, nil
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}
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// TestProtect_PrivateService_TunnelPeerGroupsPropagate locks the agent-network
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// auth path end-to-end at the proxy edge: a Private service must route through
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// ValidateTunnelPeer and lift the returned peer_group_ids onto CapturedData so
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// the llm_router group-authorisation pass can see them. Regression guard for
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// the failure that surfaces downstream as llm_policy.no_authorised_provider —
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// i.e. a synthesised service that reaches the proxy without private=true (so
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// this path is skipped) leaves UserGroups empty and every request is denied.
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func TestProtect_PrivateService_TunnelPeerGroupsPropagate(t *testing.T) {
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groups := []string{"grp-admins", "grp-users"}
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names := []string{"Admins", "Users"}
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validator := &stubTunnelValidator{resp: &proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse{
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Valid: true,
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UserId: "user-1",
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UserEmail: "user@example.com",
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SessionToken: "tunnel-session-token",
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PeerGroupIds: groups,
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PeerGroupNames: names,
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}}
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), validator, nil)
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kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
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// Private service: no operator schemes — auth gates solely on the tunnel peer.
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require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("agent.example.com", nil, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acct-1", "svc-1", nil, true))
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cd := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
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cd.SetClientIP(netip.MustParseAddr("100.90.1.14")) // CGNAT tunnel source
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var seenGroups []string
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var seenUser string
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handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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c := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context())
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require.NotNil(t, c, "captured data must be present in request context")
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seenGroups = c.GetUserGroups()
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seenUser = c.GetUserID()
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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}))
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lookup := TunnelLookupFunc(func(_ netip.Addr) (PeerIdentity, bool) {
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return PeerIdentity{}, true
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})
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://agent.example.com/v1/chat/completions", nil)
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req.RemoteAddr = "100.90.1.14:5000"
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req = req.WithContext(WithTunnelLookup(proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), cd), lookup))
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "private service must authorise a tunnel peer the validator accepts")
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assert.Equal(t, groups, seenGroups, "ValidateTunnelPeer peer_group_ids must reach CapturedData.UserGroups for llm_router authorisation")
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assert.Equal(t, "user-1", seenUser, "tunnel-peer principal must reach CapturedData")
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assert.Equal(t, groups, cd.GetUserGroups(), "groups must persist on CapturedData after the handler returns")
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}
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// TestProtect_PrivateService_TunnelPeerDenied verifies the deny path: when
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// ValidateTunnelPeer rejects the peer, a Private service 403s and never reaches
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// the upstream handler (no fall-through to unauthenticated pass-through).
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func TestProtect_PrivateService_TunnelPeerDenied(t *testing.T) {
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validator := &stubTunnelValidator{resp: &proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse{
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Valid: false,
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DeniedReason: "not_in_group",
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}}
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), validator, nil)
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kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
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require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("agent.example.com", nil, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acct-1", "svc-1", nil, true))
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cd := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
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cd.SetClientIP(netip.MustParseAddr("100.90.1.14"))
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reached := false
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handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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reached = true
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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}))
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lookup := TunnelLookupFunc(func(_ netip.Addr) (PeerIdentity, bool) {
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return PeerIdentity{}, true
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})
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://agent.example.com/v1/chat/completions", nil)
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req.RemoteAddr = "100.90.1.14:5000"
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req = req.WithContext(WithTunnelLookup(proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), cd), lookup))
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code, "private service must 403 when the tunnel peer is rejected")
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assert.False(t, reached, "denied private request must not reach the upstream handler")
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}
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func TestProtect_ExpiredSessionCookieIsRejected(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
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kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
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@@ -1228,22 +1331,6 @@ func TestProtect_NonOIDCSchemes_PlainHTTP_NotBlocked(t *testing.T) {
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assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code, "PIN-only domain should serve the login page on plain HTTP")
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}
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// stubTunnelValidator records ValidateTunnelPeer calls so a test can
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// assert whether the fast-path reached management.
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type stubTunnelValidator struct {
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called bool
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resp *proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse
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}
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func (s *stubTunnelValidator) ValidateSession(context.Context, *proto.ValidateSessionRequest, ...grpc.CallOption) (*proto.ValidateSessionResponse, error) {
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return nil, errors.New("not used in this test")
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}
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func (s *stubTunnelValidator) ValidateTunnelPeer(context.Context, *proto.ValidateTunnelPeerRequest, ...grpc.CallOption) (*proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse, error) {
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s.called = true
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return s.resp, nil
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}
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// TestProtect_TunnelPeerFastPath_RequiresInboundMarker guards the
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// anti-spoof gate: a request with an RFC1918 source IP arriving on the
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// public listener (no TunnelLookupFromContext attached) must not be
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