From a7f3aaf59e6a7d60ffa24469016c546ecf8cae53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brad Ison <bison@netbird.io>
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 08:23:13 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] [management] Refactor ValidateTunnelPeer principal info
 gathering

This refactors the gathering of info on proxy tunnel peer principals
into its own method to keep the complexity down and make Sonar happy.
---
 management/internals/shared/grpc/proxy.go | 69 ++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/management/internals/shared/grpc/proxy.go b/management/internals/shared/grpc/proxy.go
index a90612397..76663f898 100644
--- a/management/internals/shared/grpc/proxy.go
+++ b/management/internals/shared/grpc/proxy.go
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ import (
 	rpservice "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/service"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/sessionkey"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/idp"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/users"
 	proxyauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/auth"
@@ -1707,34 +1708,7 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) ValidateTunnelPeer(ctx context.Context, req *proto.
 	}
 
 	groupIDs, groupNames := pairGroupIDsAndNames(peerGroups)
-
-	// Resolve the principal: when the peer is linked to a user, the human
-	// is the principal so multiple peers owned by the same user share a
-	// single identity. Unlinked peers (machine agents) are their own
-	// principal keyed on peer.ID. displayIdentity is what upstream gateways
-	// tag spend with — user.Email when linked, peer.Name when not.
-	principalID := peer.ID
-	displayIdentity := peer.Name
-	if peer.UserID != "" {
-		principalID = peer.UserID
-		// Stored column first (cheap, but often empty for OIDC-provisioned users).
-		if user, uerr := s.usersManager.GetUser(ctx, peer.UserID); uerr == nil && user != nil {
-			principalID = user.Id
-			if user.Email != "" {
-				displayIdentity = user.Email
-			}
-		}
-		// IdP enrichment wins when available — the stored email column is a
-		// best-effort cache and is frequently empty for OIDC users. Enrichment
-		// failures must never fail the RPC; we simply keep the stored/peer identity.
-		if s.idpManager != nil {
-			if ud, uerr := s.idpManager.GetUserDataByID(ctx, peer.UserID, idp.AppMetadata{WTAccountID: service.AccountID}); uerr == nil && ud != nil && ud.Email != "" {
-				displayIdentity = ud.Email
-			} else if uerr != nil {
-				log.WithFields(log.Fields{"domain": domain, "user_id": peer.UserID, "error": uerr.Error()}).Debug("ValidateTunnelPeer: IdP user enrichment failed; using stored/peer identity")
-			}
-		}
-	}
+	principalID, displayIdentity := s.getTunnelPeerInfo(ctx, domain, service, peer)
 
 	if err := checkPeerGroupAccess(service, groupIDs); err != nil {
 		log.WithFields(log.Fields{"domain": domain, "peer_id": peer.ID, "error": err.Error()}).Debug("ValidateTunnelPeer: access denied")
@@ -1771,6 +1745,45 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) ValidateTunnelPeer(ctx context.Context, req *proto.
 	}, nil
 }
 
+// getTunnelPeerInfo returns the principal ID and display name for a peer, e.g. a
+// user or peer ID, and peer name or user email.
+func (s *ProxyServiceServer) getTunnelPeerInfo(ctx context.Context, domain string, service *rpservice.Service, peer *peer.Peer) (string, string) {
+	// Resolve the principal: when the peer is linked to a user, the human is the
+	// principal so multiple peers owned by the same user share a single
+	// identity. Unlinked peers (machine agents) are their own principal keyed on
+	// peer.ID. displayIdentity is what upstream gateways tag spend with —
+	// user.Email when linked, peer.Name when not.
+
+	// If the peer isn't associated with a user, return the peer info directly.
+	if peer.UserID == "" {
+		return peer.ID, peer.Name
+	}
+
+	// Otherwise, if the peer is linked to a user, the user is the principal and
+	// if an IdP is available, we gather details on the user from it.
+	principalID := peer.UserID
+	displayIdentity := peer.Name
+	// Stored column first (cheap, but often empty for OIDC-provisioned users).
+	if user, uerr := s.usersManager.GetUser(ctx, peer.UserID); uerr == nil && user != nil {
+		principalID = user.Id
+		if user.Email != "" {
+			displayIdentity = user.Email
+		}
+	}
+	// IdP enrichment wins when available — the stored email column is a
+	// best-effort cache and is frequently empty for OIDC users. Enrichment
+	// failures must never fail the RPC; we simply keep the stored/peer identity.
+	if s.idpManager != nil {
+		if ud, uerr := s.idpManager.GetUserDataByID(ctx, peer.UserID, idp.AppMetadata{WTAccountID: service.AccountID}); uerr == nil && ud != nil && ud.Email != "" {
+			displayIdentity = ud.Email
+		} else if uerr != nil {
+			log.WithFields(log.Fields{"domain": domain, "user_id": peer.UserID, "error": uerr.Error()}).Debug("ValidateTunnelPeer: IdP user enrichment failed; using stored/peer identity")
+		}
+	}
+
+	return principalID, displayIdentity
+}
+
 // checkPeerGroupAccess gates ValidateTunnelPeer by the service's required
 // groups. Private services authorise against AccessGroups (empty list fails
 // closed — Validate() rejects that at save time but the RPC is the security