[management, proxy] Enforce strict base64url decoding for JWT validation (#7554)

management/server/auth/session.go

@@ -3,9 +3,11 @@ package auth
 import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 )
 
@@ -52,6 +54,22 @@ func (s *SessionStore) RegisterToken(ctx context.Context, token string, expiresA
 }
 
 func hashToken(token string) string {
-	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(canonicalizeToken(token)))
 	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
 }
+
+// canonicalizeToken re-encodes the JWT signature segment so noncanonical
+// spellings of the same signature map to one stable cache key.
+func canonicalizeToken(token string) string {
+	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
+	if len(parts) != 3 {
+		return token
+	}
+
+	sig, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
+	if err != nil {
+		return token
+	}
+
+	return parts[0] + "." + parts[1] + "." + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sig)
+}

management/server/auth/session_test.go

@@ -2,10 +2,15 @@ package auth
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"encoding/base64"
 	"errors"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
+	"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
@@ -131,3 +136,49 @@ func TestHashToken_StableAndDoesNotLeak(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Len(t, a, 64, "sha256 hex must be 64 chars")
 	assert.NotContains(t, a, "tokenA", "raw token must not appear in hash")
 }
+
+func TestSessionStore_NoncanonicalSpellingIsRejectedAsReplay(t *testing.T) {
+	privateKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodRS256, jwt.MapClaims{
+		"sub": "user",
+		"exp": time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix(),
+	})
+	canonical, err := token.SignedString(privateKey)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	parts := strings.Split(canonical, ".")
+	require.Len(t, parts, 3)
+
+	// A 256-byte RSA signature (256 mod 3 == 1) leaves unused bits in the final
+	// base64url character; flip one without changing the decoded signature.
+	const alphabet = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-_"
+	last := strings.IndexByte(alphabet, parts[2][len(parts[2])-1])
+	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, last, 0)
+	require.Equal(t, 0, last&3, "unexpected canonical RSA signature encoding")
+
+	equivalentSig := parts[2][:len(parts[2])-1] + string(alphabet[last|1])
+	equivalent := parts[0] + "." + parts[1] + "." + equivalentSig
+	require.NotEqual(t, canonical, equivalent, "spellings must differ as strings")
+
+	// Same decoded signature bytes, so they verify as the same JWT.
+	canonicalSig, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	altSig, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(equivalentSig)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, canonicalSig, altSig, "spellings must decode to identical signature bytes")
+
+	// The replay-cache key must be identical for both spellings.
+	assert.Equal(t, hashToken(canonical), hashToken(equivalent),
+		"noncanonical spelling must map to the same replay-cache key")
+
+	s := newTestSessionStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	exp := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+
+	require.NoError(t, s.RegisterToken(ctx, canonical, exp), "first claim should succeed")
+	err = s.RegisterToken(ctx, equivalent, exp)
+	require.Error(t, err, "alternate spelling must be treated as a replay")
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTokenAlreadyUsed)
+}