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[management, client, proxy] add expose NetBird-only services over tunnel peers (#6226)
Adds a new "private" service mode for the reverse proxy: services reachable exclusively over the embedded WireGuard tunnel, gated by per-peer group membership instead of operator auth schemes. Wire contract - ProxyMapping.private (field 13): the proxy MUST call ValidateTunnelPeer and fail closed; operator schemes are bypassed. - ProxyCapabilities.private (4) + supports_private_service (5): capability gate. Management never streams private mappings to proxies that don't claim the capability; the broadcast path applies the same filter via filterMappingsForProxy. - ValidateTunnelPeer RPC: resolves an inbound tunnel IP to a peer, checks the peer's groups against service.AccessGroups, and mints a session JWT on success. checkPeerGroupAccess fails closed when a private service has empty AccessGroups. - ValidateSession/ValidateTunnelPeer responses now carry peer_group_ids + peer_group_names so the proxy can authorise policy-aware middlewares without an extra management round-trip. - ProxyInboundListener + SendStatusUpdate.inbound_listener: per-account inbound listener state surfaced to dashboards. - PathTargetOptions.direct_upstream (11): bypass the embedded NetBird client and dial the target via the proxy host's network stack for upstreams reachable without WireGuard. Data model - Service.Private (bool) + Service.AccessGroups ([]string, JSON- serialised). Validate() rejects bearer auth on private services. Copy() deep-copies AccessGroups. pgx getServices loads the columns. - DomainConfig.Private threaded into the proxy auth middleware. Request handler routes private services through forwardWithTunnelPeer and returns 403 on validation failure. - Account-level SynthesizePrivateServiceZones (synthetic DNS) and injectPrivateServicePolicies (synthetic ACL) gate on len(svc.AccessGroups) > 0. Proxy - /netbird proxy --private (embedded mode) flag; Config.Private in proxy/lifecycle.go. - Per-account inbound listener (proxy/inbound.go) binding HTTP/HTTPS on the embedded NetBird client's WireGuard tunnel netstack. - proxy/internal/auth/tunnel_cache: ValidateTunnelPeer response cache with single-flight de-duplication and per-account eviction. - Local peerstore short-circuit: when the inbound IP isn't in the account roster, deny fast without an RPC. - proxy/server.go reports SupportsPrivateService=true and redacts the full ProxyMapping JSON from info logs (auth_token + header-auth hashed values now only at debug level). Identity forwarding - ValidateSessionJWT returns user_id, email, method, groups, group_names. sessionkey.Claims carries Email + Groups + GroupNames so the proxy can stamp identity onto upstream requests without an extra management round-trip on every cookie-bearing request. - CapturedData carries userEmail / userGroups / userGroupNames; the proxy stamps X-NetBird-User and X-NetBird-Groups on r.Out from the authenticated identity (strips client-supplied values first to prevent spoofing). - AccessLog.UserGroups: access-log enrichment captures the user's group memberships at write time so the dashboard can render group context without reverse-resolving stale memberships. OpenAPI/dashboard surface - ReverseProxyService gains private + access_groups; ReverseProxyCluster gains private + supports_private. ReverseProxyTarget target_type enum gains "cluster". ServiceTargetOptions gains direct_upstream. ProxyAccessLog gains user_groups.
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@@ -1739,3 +1739,97 @@ func TestCheckRestrictions_IPv4MappedIPv6(t *testing.T) {
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connOutside := &fakeConn{remote: fakeAddr("[::ffff:192.168.1.1]:5678")}
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assert.NotEqual(t, restrict.Allow, router.checkRestrictions(connOutside, route), "::ffff:192.168.1.1 not in v4 CIDR")
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}
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// TestRouter_PlainHTTP_RoutesToPlainChannel verifies that a plain (non-TLS)
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// connection lands on the plain HTTP channel when the router was built
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// with WithPlainHTTP, leaving the TLS channel untouched.
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func TestRouter_PlainHTTP_RoutesToPlainChannel(t *testing.T) {
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logger := log.StandardLogger()
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addr := &net.TCPAddr{IP: net.IPv4(127, 0, 0, 1), Port: 443}
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router := NewRouter(logger, nil, addr, WithPlainHTTP(addr))
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router.AddRoute("example.com", Route{Type: RouteHTTP})
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ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
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require.NoError(t, err, "test listener bind must succeed")
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defer ln.Close()
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ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
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defer cancel()
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go func() {
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_ = router.Serve(ctx, ln)
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}()
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// Plain HTTP request (no TLS handshake byte).
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go func() {
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conn, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", ln.Addr().String(), 2*time.Second)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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_, _ = conn.Write([]byte("GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com\r\n\r\n"))
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}()
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plainListener := router.HTTPListenerPlain()
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require.NotNil(t, plainListener, "plain listener must be exposed when WithPlainHTTP is set")
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acceptDone := make(chan net.Conn, 1)
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go func() {
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conn, err := plainListener.Accept()
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if err == nil {
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acceptDone <- conn
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}
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}()
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select {
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case conn := <-acceptDone:
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require.NotNil(t, conn)
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_ = conn.Close()
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case <-router.HTTPListener().(*chanListener).ch:
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t.Fatal("plain HTTP request leaked into TLS channel")
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case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
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t.Fatal("plain HTTP connection never reached plain channel")
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}
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}
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// TestRouter_TLS_StaysOnTLSChannel_WhenPlainEnabled verifies that the
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// presence of a plain channel does not divert TLS traffic — TLS still
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// goes to the TLS channel as before.
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func TestRouter_TLS_StaysOnTLSChannel_WhenPlainEnabled(t *testing.T) {
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logger := log.StandardLogger()
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addr := &net.TCPAddr{IP: net.IPv4(127, 0, 0, 1), Port: 443}
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router := NewRouter(logger, nil, addr, WithPlainHTTP(addr))
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router.AddRoute("example.com", Route{Type: RouteHTTP})
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ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
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require.NoError(t, err, "test listener bind must succeed")
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defer ln.Close()
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ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
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defer cancel()
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go func() { _ = router.Serve(ctx, ln) }()
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// Send a TLS ClientHello.
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go func() {
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conn, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", ln.Addr().String(), 2*time.Second)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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tlsConn := tls.Client(conn, &tls.Config{
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ServerName: "example.com",
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InsecureSkipVerify: true, //nolint:gosec
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})
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_ = tlsConn.Handshake()
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_ = tlsConn.Close()
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}()
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select {
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case conn := <-router.httpCh:
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require.NotNil(t, conn, "TLS conn should land on the TLS channel")
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_ = conn.Close()
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case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
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t.Fatal("TLS conn never reached the TLS channel")
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}
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}
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