[proxy,management] Conform the Agent Network endpoint to the LLM gateway protocol (#7154)

[proxy,management] Conform the Agent Network endpoint to the LLM gateway protocol

Reviewed the proxy against Claude Code's published gateway contract. The
transport layer already held up; fourteen gaps sat one layer up, in the model
catalog and in the non-inference endpoints clients call.

Two of them cost money. The catalog carried no claude-opus-5 or
claude-sonnet-5, so an operator could not authorise the models coding agents
default to — those requests denied as not-routable, or priced at zero where a
catch-all carried them. And gateway records pin ParserID "openai" while the
same record serves /v1/messages, so Anthropic responses were read with the
OpenAI parser, which never looks at message_start where input tokens live:
input metered as roughly zero on every stream and cost was skipped entirely.

The rest fix requests refused for structural rather than policy reasons: model
discovery denied for every account with a model allowlist, token counting
denied on Bedrock and mis-parsed on Vertex, startup probes refused and written
into the access log at every session start, and denials rendered in a shape no
LLM client parses. Two changes are additive by design — the deny body keeps
every field it had and adds the vendor's error object alongside, and body-level
identity injection is now gated on the request's dialect so it stops sending
OpenAI-shape fields into Anthropic bodies that reject them.

The end-to-end work turned up one more: the discovery filter treated any slash
in a model id as a gateway prefix, which would have dropped every self-hosted
"Qwen/..." model from the picker.
This commit is contained in:
Maycon Santos
2026-08-23 20:02:33 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent ee253feddf
commit 766fcae3f8
39 changed files with 3094 additions and 154 deletions
+164 -25
View File
@@ -23,9 +23,10 @@ import (
// model the client asks for. The proxy prices off the REQUEST model, not the
// upstream response model, so a made-up model id billed at operator rates lets
// these tests assert exact costs without a real vendor key.
// Sourced from the harness so the counts can't drift from the mock's config.
const (
vllmPromptTokens = 11
vllmCompletionTokens = 2
vllmPromptTokens = harness.VLLMChatInputTokens
vllmCompletionTokens = harness.VLLMChatOutputTokens
)
// pricedEnv is a connected single-provider agent-network deployment pointed at
@@ -162,30 +163,85 @@ func chatOnce(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, env pricedEnv, model, sessionID
break
}
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
if !waitBeforeRetry(ctx, 5*time.Second) {
break
}
}
require.Equal(t, 200, code,
"chat for %s must return 200; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", model, body, env.proxy.Logs(context.Background()))
return body
}
// findAccessLogBySession polls the access-log page for the row carrying sessionID.
func findAccessLogBySession(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, sessionID string) api.AgentNetworkAccessLog {
t.Helper()
var row api.AgentNetworkAccessLog
require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
logs, lerr := srv.ListAccessLogs(ctx)
if lerr != nil {
return false
}
for _, r := range logs.Data {
if r.SessionId != nil && *r.SessionId == sessionID {
row = r
return true
// accessLogIngestWindow is how long a single request's access-log row is given
// to appear before the caller gives up on it.
const accessLogIngestWindow = 30 * time.Second
// accessLogPollInterval is how long the lookup waits between pages. Ingest is
// asynchronous, so the row lands somewhere inside the window rather than on
// any particular poll.
const accessLogPollInterval = 2 * time.Second
// lookupAccessLogBySession polls the access-log page for the row carrying
// sessionID and reports whether it arrived within the window. It never fails
// the test: callers that can recover — by firing a fresh request under a new
// session — need to see the miss rather than die on it.
func lookupAccessLogBySession(ctx context.Context, sessionID string, within time.Duration) (api.AgentNetworkAccessLog, bool) {
deadline := time.Now().Add(within)
for {
// Each poll is bounded by what is left of the window rather than by the
// caller's context: a single stalled request would otherwise hold the
// loop open long past the ingest window it is meant to enforce, and the
// caller would read the delay as a missing row.
if logs, lerr := listAccessLogsBy(ctx, deadline); lerr == nil {
for _, r := range logs.Data {
if r.SessionId != nil && *r.SessionId == sessionID {
return r, true
}
}
}
return false
}, 30*time.Second, 2*time.Second, "session id %q must be recorded in an access-log row", sessionID)
// The wait is bounded by the window as well, so the answer arrives when
// the caller's budget runs out rather than a poll interval later: a
// full interval slept past the deadline reports "no row" up to two
// seconds late, which reads as a slower lookup than the one asked for.
wait := time.Until(deadline)
if wait > accessLogPollInterval {
wait = accessLogPollInterval
}
if wait <= 0 {
return api.AgentNetworkAccessLog{}, false
}
timer := time.NewTimer(wait)
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
timer.Stop()
return api.AgentNetworkAccessLog{}, false
case <-timer.C:
}
// Checked after the wait rather than before the request: a poll issued
// past the deadline carries no budget and would fail on arrival.
if !time.Now().Before(deadline) {
return api.AgentNetworkAccessLog{}, false
}
}
}
// listAccessLogsBy fetches one access-log page under a context that expires at
// deadline, so no single call can outlive the window its caller is polling
// within. The parent's cancellation still applies: the child inherits it.
func listAccessLogsBy(ctx context.Context, deadline time.Time) (api.AgentNetworkAccessLogsResponse, error) {
reqCtx, cancel := context.WithDeadline(ctx, deadline)
defer cancel()
return srv.ListAccessLogs(reqCtx)
}
// findAccessLogBySession polls the access-log page for the row carrying
// sessionID, failing the test if it never lands. Use it for a request whose row
// must exist; where a missing row is a recoverable race, use
// lookupAccessLogBySession and retry.
func findAccessLogBySession(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, sessionID string) api.AgentNetworkAccessLog {
t.Helper()
row, ok := lookupAccessLogBySession(ctx, sessionID, accessLogIngestWindow)
require.True(t, ok, "session id %q must be recorded in an access-log row", sessionID)
return row
}
@@ -319,6 +375,11 @@ func TestPriceChangeUpdatesRecordedCost(t *testing.T) {
outRateA = 0.020
inRateB = 0.050 // 5x / 4x the original, so a repriced row is unmistakable
outRateB = 0.080
// Per-attempt ingest wait, shorter than the default so a request that
// produces no row costs one retry rather than most of the budget, and an
// overall deadline long enough to hold several attempts.
repriceIngestWindow = 20 * time.Second
repriceDeadline = 180 * time.Second
)
env := provisionPricedProvider(t, ctx, "reprice", []api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{
@@ -353,27 +414,61 @@ func TestPriceChangeUpdatesRecordedCost(t *testing.T) {
// reading its cost, so an un-ingested row is never mistaken for "still rate A".
// The expected new input cost is unmistakably higher than rate A, so a
// lingering old-rate row can't satisfy the check.
//
// Every way an iteration can come up short — the request failing, its row not
// landing, or the row still carrying rate A — is a symptom of the same
// in-flight rebuild, so each one retries under a fresh session rather than
// ending the test. Only the outer deadline is fatal.
wantInputB := float64(vllmPromptTokens) / 1000 * inRateB
var repriced api.AgentNetworkAccessLog
var lastSession string
deadline := time.Now().Add(90 * time.Second)
// The cost last read, kept separately: repriced is the zero value on every
// path that gives up, so reporting its cost would say "$0.000000" whether
// the rows were still at rate A or no row was ever read.
var lastCost float64
var sawRow bool
deadline := time.Now().Add(repriceDeadline)
// Everything inside the loop runs under the deadline rather than the
// test's own context. An attempt started just before it would otherwise
// run well past it: the chat container is capped at 90s of its own and the
// row lookup at another 20s, so the loop could report a repricing failure
// nearly two minutes after the window it was given had closed.
repriceCtx, cancelReprice := context.WithDeadline(ctx, deadline)
defer cancelReprice()
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
lastSession = fmt.Sprintf("e2e-session-reprice-b-%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
code, _, cerr := env.client.Chat(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, harness.WireChat, customModel, "Reply with exactly: pong", lastSession)
code, _, cerr := env.client.Chat(repriceCtx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, harness.WireChat, customModel, "Reply with exactly: pong", lastSession)
if cerr != nil || code != 200 {
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
if !waitBeforeRetry(repriceCtx, 5*time.Second) {
break
}
continue
}
row, ok := lookupAccessLogBySession(repriceCtx, lastSession, repriceIngestWindow)
if !ok {
// No row for this request. The proxy now publishes a rebuilt chain
// before the route that reaches it, so a request can no longer be
// served unattributed mid-update; this retry covers the ingest
// window alone. Fire another one under a fresh session.
t.Logf("no access-log row for session %q within %s; retrying under a fresh session", lastSession, repriceIngestWindow)
continue
}
row := findAccessLogBySession(t, ctx, lastSession)
if inDelta(row.InputCostUsd, wantInputB, 1e-6) {
repriced = row
break
}
// Still priced at the old rate — the push hasn't landed yet; retry.
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
lastCost, sawRow = row.InputCostUsd, true
if !waitBeforeRetry(repriceCtx, 5*time.Second) {
break
}
}
require.NotEmpty(t, repriced.Id, "a request after the price change must be priced at the new rate B; last input_cost_usd=$%.6f, wanted $%.6f\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s",
repriced.InputCostUsd, wantInputB, env.proxy.Logs(context.Background()))
lastSeen := "no row was ever read"
if sawRow {
lastSeen = fmt.Sprintf("last input_cost_usd=$%.6f", lastCost)
}
require.NotEmpty(t, repriced.Id, "a request after the price change must be priced at the new rate B; %s, wanted $%.6f\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s",
lastSeen, wantInputB, env.proxy.Logs(context.Background()))
assertOpenAICostAtRates(t, repriced, inRateB, outRateB)
verifyUsageRowForSession(t, lastSession, inRateB, outRateB)
@@ -630,3 +725,47 @@ func inDelta(a, b, tol float64) bool {
}
return d <= tol
}
// TestCustomDatedModelKeepsItsOwnPrice covers the review fix that anchored the
// release-date fallback to Claude ids. Pricing looks every model up through
// that helper, so while it matched a bare trailing date any operator id ending
// in eight digits inherited the rate of its undated sibling — a silent
// mis-bill on models NetBird knows nothing about.
func TestCustomDatedModelKeepsItsOwnPrice(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
const (
baseModel = "internal-llm"
datedModel = "internal-llm-20250101"
baseIn = 0.010
baseOut = 0.020
// An order of magnitude apart, so a row billed at the wrong entry is
// unmistakable rather than a rounding argument.
datedIn = 0.100
datedOut = 0.200
)
env := provisionPricedProvider(t, ctx, "customdated", []api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{
{Id: baseModel, InputPer1k: baseIn, OutputPer1k: baseOut},
{Id: datedModel, InputPer1k: datedIn, OutputPer1k: datedOut},
})
t.Run("the undated id bills at its own rate", func(t *testing.T) {
session := fmt.Sprintf("e2e-session-customdated-base-%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
chatOnce(t, ctx, env, baseModel, session)
assertOpenAICostAtRates(t, findAccessLogBySession(t, ctx, session), baseIn, baseOut)
})
t.Run("the dated id keeps its own rate", func(t *testing.T) {
session := fmt.Sprintf("e2e-session-customdated-dated-%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
chatOnce(t, ctx, env, datedModel, session)
row := findAccessLogBySession(t, ctx, session)
assertOpenAICostAtRates(t, row, datedIn, datedOut)
// Spelled out because it is the regression: inheriting the sibling's
// rate would bill this request at a tenth of its price.
assert.Greater(t, row.InputCostUsd, float64(vllmPromptTokens)/1000*baseIn*2,
"a custom dated id must not inherit the undated entry's rate")
})
}
+455
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@@ -0,0 +1,455 @@
//go:build e2e
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
// Models each catalog surface is registered with in the matrix below. They
// differ per provider so the router's choice is unambiguous: a request that
// lands on the wrong provider record fails the surface assertion instead of
// passing by coincidence.
const (
matrixAnthropicModel = "claude-sonnet-5"
matrixBedrockModel = "anthropic.claude-sonnet-5"
// matrixBedrockPathModel is what a Bedrock SDK client puts in the URL: a
// cross-region inference profile with a release date and version suffix.
// The proxy must normalise it back to matrixBedrockModel to route and price.
matrixBedrockPathModel = "us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5-20250101-v1:0"
// matrixVertexModel differs from the Anthropic record's model on purpose:
// a shared id would leave two routes claiming it and make which one serves
// /v1/messages depend on declaration order.
matrixVertexModel = "claude-haiku-4-5"
matrixVertexProject = "e2e-project"
matrixVertexRegion = "us-east5"
)
// gatewayEnv is a connected client plus a set of provider records, all pointed
// at one mock upstream, so several wire shapes can be driven over a single
// tunnel.
type gatewayEnv struct {
endpoint string
proxyIP string
client *harness.Client
proxy *harness.Proxy
vllm *harness.VLLM
// providerIDs maps the catalog id to the created provider record id.
providerIDs map[string]string
}
// provisionGatewayMatrix brings up one mock upstream and one provider record
// per catalog surface, all authorised for the same group by a single policy.
// Sharing one proxy and client keeps the wire-shape cases to one tunnel setup;
// each case still creates its own session id so its access-log row is findable.
func provisionGatewayMatrix(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context) gatewayEnv {
t.Helper()
vllm, err := harness.StartVLLM(ctx, srv)
require.NoError(t, err, "start mock upstream")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = vllm.Terminate(context.Background()) })
grp, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-gw-matrix"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grp.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-gw-matrix-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grp.Id},
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
require.NotEmpty(t, sk.Key, "setup key plaintext")
// The mock ignores auth, so a dummy credential satisfies each catalog
// entry's auth template. Vertex is the exception: its api_key is a GCP
// service-account keyfile the proxy mints an OAuth token from, and a dummy
// one cannot mint. That is deliberate — the Vertex case below asserts on
// routing, which happens before the token mint.
dummyKey := "sk-gw-e2e"
dummyKeyfile := "keyfile::" + "e2e-not-a-real-service-account-key"
specs := []struct {
name string
catalogID string
apiKey string
models []api.AgentNetworkProviderModel
}{
{
name: "openai", catalogID: "openai_api", apiKey: dummyKey,
models: []api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{{Id: harness.VLLMModel, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.002}},
},
{
name: "anthropic", catalogID: "anthropic_api", apiKey: dummyKey,
models: []api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{{Id: matrixAnthropicModel, InputPer1k: 0.003, OutputPer1k: 0.015}},
},
{
name: "bedrock", catalogID: "bedrock_api", apiKey: dummyKey,
models: []api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{{Id: matrixBedrockModel, InputPer1k: 0.003, OutputPer1k: 0.015}},
},
{
name: "vertex", catalogID: "vertex_ai_api", apiKey: dummyKeyfile,
models: []api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{{Id: matrixVertexModel, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.005}},
},
}
providerIDs := make(map[string]string, len(specs))
ids := make([]string, 0, len(specs))
for _, spec := range specs {
key := spec.apiKey
models := spec.models
prov, perr := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: "e2e-gw-" + spec.name,
ProviderId: spec.catalogID,
UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
ApiKey: &key,
Enabled: ptr(true),
Models: &models,
})
require.NoError(t, perr, "create %s provider", spec.name)
id := prov.Id
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), id) })
providerIDs[spec.catalogID] = id
ids = append(ids, id)
}
// Uncapped token limit: never blocks the handful of tokens driven here, but
// switches on usage metering so consumption and cost land in the row.
enabled := true
pol, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-gw-matrix",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grp.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: ids,
Limits: &api.AgentNetworkPolicyLimits{
TokenLimit: api.AgentNetworkPolicyTokenLimit{
Enabled: true,
GroupCap: 10_000_000,
UserCap: 10_000_000,
WindowSeconds: 60,
},
},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), pol.Id) })
endpoint, proxyIP, cl, px := connectClient(t, ctx, "gw-matrix", sk.Key)
return gatewayEnv{
endpoint: endpoint,
proxyIP: proxyIP,
client: cl,
proxy: px,
vllm: vllm,
providerIDs: providerIDs,
}
}
// connectClient starts a proxy and a tunnel client for the shared account and
// waits until the client can reach the proxy peer, returning the endpoint and
// the proxy's tunnel IP to pin requests to.
func connectClient(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, name, setupKey string) (string, string, *harness.Client, *harness.Proxy) {
t.Helper()
settings, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err, "read settings")
require.NotEmpty(t, settings.Endpoint, "endpoint must be assigned")
proxyToken, err := srv.CreateProxyTokenCLI(ctx, "e2e-"+name+"-proxy")
require.NoError(t, err, "mint proxy token")
px, err := harness.StartProxy(ctx, srv, proxyToken)
require.NoError(t, err, "start proxy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = px.Terminate(context.Background()) })
cl, err := harness.StartClient(ctx, srv, setupKey)
require.NoError(t, err, "start client")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
// The probe resolves the endpoint and its first packet wakes the lazy proxy
// peer, so WaitProxyPeer then observes it connected.
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve endpoint to proxy IP")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
return settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, cl, px
}
// callUntil retries an HTTP call through the tunnel until it returns one of the
// wanted statuses or the deadline passes, absorbing the DNS and tunnel jitter
// the first call through a fresh tunnel can hit. The last status and body are
// returned either way so the caller can assert with real detail.
func callUntil(t *testing.T, call func() (int, string, error), want ...int) (int, string) {
t.Helper()
wanted := make(map[int]struct{}, len(want))
for _, w := range want {
wanted[w] = struct{}{}
}
var code int
var body string
deadline := time.Now().Add(90 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
c, b, err := call()
if err == nil {
code, body = c, b
if _, ok := wanted[code]; ok {
return code, body
}
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
}
return code, body
}
// TestGatewayProtocolProviderMatrix drives one request per wire shape over a
// single tunnel, with a provider record per catalog surface behind it. It is
// the regression net for the routing and parser-selection changes: each case
// asserts the surface the request was metered under and the token counts that
// surface's own usage block carries, so a request parsed by the wrong provider's
// parser meters zero and fails rather than passing on a coincidence.
func TestGatewayProtocolProviderMatrix(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
env := provisionGatewayMatrix(t, ctx)
diag := func() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("\n=== upstream logs ===\n%s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s",
env.vllm.Logs(context.Background()), env.proxy.Logs(context.Background()))
}
t.Run("openai chat completions", func(t *testing.T) {
session := "e2e-gw-openai"
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.Chat(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, harness.WireChat, harness.VLLMModel, "ping", session)
}, 200)
require.Equal(t, 200, code, "openai chat must succeed; body: %s%s", body, diag())
require.Contains(t, body, "chat.completion", "body must be an OpenAI completion; got: %s", body)
row := findAccessLogBySession(t, ctx, session)
require.NotNil(t, row.Provider)
assert.Equal(t, "openai", *row.Provider, "the OpenAI chat path must meter under the openai surface")
assert.Equal(t, int64(harness.VLLMChatInputTokens), row.InputTokens, "OpenAI usage block must be read")
assert.Equal(t, int64(harness.VLLMChatOutputTokens), row.OutputTokens)
})
t.Run("anthropic messages", func(t *testing.T) {
session := "e2e-gw-anthropic"
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.Chat(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, harness.WireMessages, matrixAnthropicModel, "ping", session)
}, 200)
require.Equal(t, 200, code, "anthropic messages must succeed; body: %s%s", body, diag())
row := findAccessLogBySession(t, ctx, session)
require.NotNil(t, row.Provider)
assert.Equal(t, "anthropic", *row.Provider, "the /v1/messages path must meter under the anthropic surface")
// These counts only appear if the Anthropic parser read the response:
// its usage fields are named differently from the OpenAI block.
assert.Equal(t, int64(harness.VLLMMessagesInputTokens), row.InputTokens,
"Anthropic input_tokens must be read; zero here means the wrong parser ran")
assert.Equal(t, int64(harness.VLLMMessagesOutputTokens), row.OutputTokens)
assert.Positive(t, row.CachedInputTokens, "the Anthropic cache-read bucket must be recorded")
assert.Positive(t, row.CostUsd, "a metered request must carry a cost")
require.NotNil(t, row.ResolvedProviderId)
assert.Equal(t, env.providerIDs["anthropic_api"], *row.ResolvedProviderId,
"a vendor-tagged request must not cross to another provider's record")
})
t.Run("bedrock invoke normalises the path model", func(t *testing.T) {
session := "e2e-gw-bedrock"
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.Bedrock(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, matrixBedrockPathModel, "ping", session)
}, 200)
require.Equal(t, 200, code, "bedrock invoke must succeed; body: %s%s", body, diag())
row := findAccessLogBySession(t, ctx, session)
require.NotNil(t, row.Provider)
assert.Equal(t, "bedrock", *row.Provider, "a native Bedrock path must meter under the bedrock surface")
require.NotNil(t, row.Model)
assert.Equal(t, matrixBedrockModel, *row.Model,
"the inference-profile prefix, release date and version suffix must be normalised away")
assert.Equal(t, int64(harness.VLLMMessagesInputTokens), row.InputTokens)
})
t.Run("anthropic token counting", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.PostJSON(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, "/v1/messages/count_tokens",
fmt.Sprintf(`{"model":%q,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"ping"}]}`, matrixAnthropicModel),
[]string{"anthropic-version: 2023-06-01"})
}, 200)
assert.Equal(t, 200, code, "token counting must route rather than deny; body: %s%s", body, diag())
})
t.Run("bedrock token counting", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.PostJSON(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP,
"/model/"+matrixBedrockPathModel+"/count-tokens",
`{"input":{"converse":{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":[{"text":"ping"}]}]}}}`, nil)
}, 200)
assert.Equal(t, 200, code,
"the Bedrock count-tokens action must route; denying it pushes counting onto the billable inference path; body: %s%s",
body, diag())
})
t.Run("vertex token counting reaches its provider", func(t *testing.T) {
// The dummy service-account key cannot mint an OAuth token, so the
// request stops at the upstream credential. Both outcomes render as
// 403, so the deny code is what distinguishes them: upstream_auth_failed
// means the path resolved to the Vertex route and only the credential
// failed, while model_not_routable would mean the method segment was
// swallowed into the model id and no route ever claimed it.
path := fmt.Sprintf("/v1/projects/%s/locations/%s/publishers/anthropic/models/%s/count-tokens:rawPredict",
matrixVertexProject, matrixVertexRegion, matrixVertexModel)
_, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.PostJSON(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, path,
`{"anthropic_version":"vertex-2023-10-16","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"ping"}]}`, nil)
}, 403)
assert.NotContains(t, body, "model_not_routable",
"the count-tokens method segment must not be parsed as part of the model id; body: %s%s", body, diag())
assert.Contains(t, body, "llm_policy.upstream_auth_failed",
"the request must reach the Vertex route and fail only at the credential; body: %s%s", body, diag())
})
t.Run("connection warming probe", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.Get(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, "/api/hello", nil)
}, 200)
assert.NotEqual(t, 403, code,
"the warm-up probe carries no model and must not be refused as unroutable; body: %s%s", body, diag())
})
t.Run("unknown model denies in the caller's error shape", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.Chat(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, harness.WireMessages,
"claude-not-a-real-model-9", "ping", "e2e-gw-unknown")
}, 403)
require.Equal(t, 403, code, "a model no provider claims must still be refused; body: %s%s", body, diag())
// The NetBird fields stay where they were for existing consumers.
assert.Contains(t, body, "llm_policy.model_not_routable", "the deny code must be preserved")
// And the vendor's own envelope rides alongside, so the client can show
// the reason instead of an unexplained API error.
assert.Contains(t, body, `"type":"error"`, "an Anthropic caller must get the Anthropic error envelope")
assert.Contains(t, body, "permission_error", "403 must map to the vendor's permission error type")
})
}
// TestModelDiscoveryWithModelAllowlist covers gateway model discovery on an
// account that restricts models, which is the configuration that broke: the
// listing carries no model, and the per-model allowlist fails closed on an
// undetermined one, so discovery denied for exactly the accounts using the
// feature. It also asserts the allowlist still refuses a model outside it, so
// the exemption cannot be read as a way around the gate.
func TestModelDiscoveryWithModelAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
vllm, err := harness.StartVLLM(ctx, srv)
require.NoError(t, err, "start mock upstream")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = vllm.Terminate(context.Background()) })
grp, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-gw-discovery"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grp.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-gw-discovery-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grp.Id},
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
require.NotEmpty(t, sk.Key, "setup key plaintext")
// One provider enumerating a single model, while the upstream's own listing
// advertises two. The proxy must serve the shorter list.
dummyKey := "sk-discovery-e2e"
prov, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: "e2e-gw-discovery",
ProviderId: "openai_api",
UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
ApiKey: &dummyKey,
Enabled: ptr(true),
Models: &[]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{
{Id: harness.VLLMModel, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.002},
},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create provider")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), prov.Id) })
// The model allowlist is what makes this a regression test: without a
// guardrail enabled, discovery was never gated in the first place.
var gr api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest
gr.Name = "e2e-gw-discovery-allowlist"
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled = true
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models = []string{harness.VLLMModel}
guard, err := srv.CreateGuardrail(ctx, gr)
require.NoError(t, err, "create guardrail")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteGuardrail(context.Background(), guard.Id) })
enabled := true
pol, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-gw-discovery",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grp.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{prov.Id},
GuardrailIds: &[]string{guard.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), pol.Id) })
endpoint, proxyIP, cl, px := connectClient(t, ctx, "gw-discovery", sk.Key)
diag := func() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("\n=== upstream logs ===\n%s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s",
vllm.Logs(context.Background()), px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
t.Run("listing is served and bounded by policy", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return cl.Get(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, "/v1/models?limit=1000", nil)
}, 200)
require.Equal(t, 200, code,
"discovery must not be refused because the request carries no model; body: %s%s", body, diag())
assert.Contains(t, body, harness.VLLMModel, "the authorised model must reach the picker")
assert.NotContains(t, body, harness.VLLMUnlistedModel,
"a model the policy does not authorise must not be offered; body: %s", body)
})
t.Run("allowlist still refuses a model outside it", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return cl.Chat(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, harness.WireChat,
harness.VLLMUnlistedModel, "ping", "e2e-gw-discovery-blocked")
}, 403)
require.Equal(t, 403, code,
"exempting model-less endpoints must not exempt inference; body: %s%s", body, diag())
assert.True(t,
strings.Contains(body, "llm_policy.model_blocked") || strings.Contains(body, "llm_policy.model_not_routable"),
"the refusal must name a model policy code; body: %s", body)
})
t.Run("allowlisted model still routes", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return cl.Chat(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, harness.WireChat,
harness.VLLMModel, "ping", "e2e-gw-discovery-allowed")
}, 200)
require.Equal(t, 200, code, "the allowlisted model must still be served; body: %s%s", body, diag())
})
}
+242
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
//go:build e2e
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
// The cases in this file cover behaviour that arrived from code review, after
// the gateway-protocol end-to-end tests were written. Each had unit coverage
// only; none needed a new harness capability, which is why they belong here
// rather than on a manual checklist.
// TestNonInferenceEndpointsAreAuthorised covers the two review findings on the
// endpoints that carry no body: the per-model lookup must be authorised
// against the same allowlist that bounds the listing beside it, and only a read
// method may claim the non-inference exemption that skips the token pre-flight.
func TestNonInferenceEndpointsAreAuthorised(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
env := provisionDiscoveryProvider(t, ctx)
t.Run("lookup of an authorised model succeeds", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.Get(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, "/v1/models/"+harness.VLLMModel, nil)
}, 200)
assert.Equal(t, 200, code, "an allowlisted model must remain reachable; body: %s", body)
})
t.Run("lookup of an unauthorised model is refused", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body, err := env.client.Get(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, "/v1/models/"+harness.VLLMUnlistedModel, nil)
require.NoError(t, err, "request must reach the proxy")
assert.Equal(t, 403, code,
"a model the policy does not authorise must not be confirmed by the detail lookup; body: %s", body)
})
// A write must not claim the exemption that lets the listing skip the token
// pre-flight. The body names no model on purpose: that is what a request
// probing for the exemption looks like, and it is the case the method gate
// exists to refuse. (A POST that does name a model is a different thing —
// it routes and meters as the inference request it is.)
for _, path := range []string{"/v1/models", "/v1/models/" + harness.VLLMModel, "/api/hello"} {
t.Run("write to "+path+" is refused", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body, err := env.client.PostJSON(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, path,
`{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`, nil)
require.NoError(t, err, "request must reach the proxy")
assert.NotEqual(t, 200, code,
"a write to a non-inference path must not be served unmetered; body: %s", body)
})
}
// A request carrying the sub-agent attribution headers must still be served
// and metered normally. Asserting the ids themselves is not possible yet:
// the parser lifts them onto the request's metadata, but nothing persists
// them, so they have no queryable surface to check against.
t.Run("sub-agent headers do not disturb the request", func(t *testing.T) {
sessionID := fmt.Sprintf("e2e-session-agentid-%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
code, body, err := env.client.PostJSON(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, "/v1/chat/completions",
fmt.Sprintf(`{"model":%q,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"Reply with exactly: pong"}]}`, harness.VLLMModel),
[]string{
"x-session-id: " + sessionID,
"x-claude-code-agent-id: agent-child-7",
"x-claude-code-parent-agent-id: agent-root-1",
})
require.NoError(t, err, "request must reach the proxy")
require.Equal(t, 200, code, "the request must succeed; body: %s", body)
row := findAccessLogBySession(t, ctx, sessionID)
assert.Positive(t, row.InputTokens, "the request must still be metered normally")
})
}
// TestDatedModelIdRouting covers both halves of the dated-id rule that review
// tightened: a dated id still reaches an undated registration, but a route
// pinned to one dated build must never serve a different one.
func TestDatedModelIdRouting(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
const (
undated = "claude-sonnet-9"
datedA = "claude-sonnet-9-20250101"
datedB = "claude-sonnet-9-20250202"
)
t.Run("a dated id reaches its undated registration", func(t *testing.T) {
env := provisionModelProvider(t, ctx, "dated-undated", "anthropic_api", undated)
sessionID := fmt.Sprintf("e2e-session-dated-%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.Chat(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, harness.WireMessages, datedA, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
}, 200)
require.Equal(t, 200, code, "a pinned release of a registered family must route; body: %s", body)
row := findAccessLogBySession(t, ctx, sessionID)
assert.Positive(t, row.InputTokens, "the dated request must price at the registered rate, not zero")
})
t.Run("a route pinned to one dated build refuses another", func(t *testing.T) {
env := provisionModelProvider(t, ctx, "dated-pinned", "anthropic_api", datedA)
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.Chat(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, harness.WireMessages, datedA, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
}, 200)
require.Equal(t, 200, code, "the exact dated id must still route; body: %s", body)
code, body, err := env.client.Chat(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, harness.WireMessages, datedB, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
require.NoError(t, err, "request must reach the proxy")
assert.Equal(t, 403, code,
"a provider pinned to one dated build must not serve another; body: %s", body)
})
}
// TestBedrockInferenceProfilesReachTheUpstream covers the startup lookup a
// Bedrock client makes. The proxy forwards it to the configured upstream rather
// than denying it, so what comes back is the upstream's answer — never a
// NetBird policy rejection.
func TestBedrockInferenceProfilesReachTheUpstream(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
env := provisionModelProvider(t, ctx, "infprofiles", "bedrock_api", "anthropic.claude-sonnet-5")
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.Get(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, "/inference-profiles", nil)
}, 200)
assert.Equal(t, 200, code, "the lookup must reach the upstream; body: %s", body)
assert.NotContains(t, body, "llm_policy.",
"the proxy must not answer a control-plane lookup with a policy denial")
assert.Contains(t, body, "inferenceProfileSummaries",
"the upstream's own answer must come back untouched")
}
// provisionDiscoveryProvider brings up one mock-backed provider enumerating a
// single model, with an allowlist guardrail in effect, plus a connected client.
func provisionDiscoveryProvider(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context) pricedEnv {
t.Helper()
env := provisionModelProvider(t, ctx, "noninference", "openai_api", harness.VLLMModel)
var gr api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest
gr.Name = "e2e-noninference-allowlist-" + fmt.Sprint(time.Now().UnixNano())
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled = true
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models = []string{harness.VLLMModel}
guard, err := srv.CreateGuardrail(ctx, gr)
require.NoError(t, err, "create guardrail")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteGuardrail(context.Background(), guard.Id) })
enabled := true
_, err = srv.UpdatePolicy(ctx, env.policyID, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-noninference",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{env.groupID},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{env.providerID},
GuardrailIds: &[]string{guard.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "attach guardrail to policy")
return env
}
// provisionModelProvider brings up the mock, one provider under the given
// catalog id enumerating exactly one model, an authorising policy, and a
// connected proxy + client.
func provisionModelProvider(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, name, catalogID, model string) pricedEnv {
t.Helper()
vllm, err := harness.StartVLLM(ctx, srv)
require.NoError(t, err, "start mock upstream")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = vllm.Terminate(context.Background()) })
suffix := strings.ToLower(name)
grp, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-gwr-" + suffix})
require.NoError(t, err, "create group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grp.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-gwr-" + suffix + "-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grp.Id},
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
require.NotEmpty(t, sk.Key, "setup key plaintext")
dummyKey := "sk-gwr-e2e"
prov, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: "e2e-gwr-" + suffix,
ProviderId: catalogID,
UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
ApiKey: &dummyKey,
Enabled: ptr(true),
Models: &[]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{
{Id: model, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.002},
},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create provider")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), prov.Id) })
enabled := true
pol, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-gwr-" + suffix,
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grp.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{prov.Id},
Limits: &api.AgentNetworkPolicyLimits{
TokenLimit: api.AgentNetworkPolicyTokenLimit{
Enabled: true,
GroupCap: 10_000_000,
UserCap: 10_000_000,
WindowSeconds: 60,
},
},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), pol.Id) })
endpoint, proxyIP, cl, px := connectClient(t, ctx, "gwr-"+suffix, sk.Key)
return pricedEnv{
providerID: prov.Id,
groupID: grp.Id,
policyID: pol.Id,
upstream: vllm.URL,
endpoint: endpoint,
proxyIP: proxyIP,
client: cl,
proxy: px,
}
}
+16
View File
@@ -54,3 +54,19 @@ func run(m *testing.M) int {
return m.Run()
}
// waitBeforeRetry pauses between attempts of a polling loop and reports
// whether the caller should keep going. A cancelled context ends the loop
// where a plain sleep would keep retrying against it: every call fails
// instantly once ctx is done, so the loop would spend its whole remaining
// window sleeping between failures nobody is waiting for any more.
func waitBeforeRetry(ctx context.Context, d time.Duration) bool {
timer := time.NewTimer(d)
defer timer.Stop()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return false
case <-timer.C:
return true
}
}
+209
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
//go:build e2e
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
// streamedModel is priced high enough that a mis-metered request is obvious in
// the recorded cost, and named so it cannot collide with another test's route.
const streamedModel = "e2e-streamed-model"
const (
streamInRate = 0.010
streamOutRate = 0.020
// The cache-read bucket is priced separately from input, so a run that
// folded the two together fails the per-bucket assertions below.
streamCacheReadRate = 0.001
)
// TestStreamingResponseMetersInputTokens is the end-to-end guard for the
// metering bug this endpoint's gateway-protocol work fixed.
//
// On a streamed answer the input-token count exists only in the opening
// message_start event; every later frame reports output. A response read with
// the wrong vendor's parser — the shape a gateway record produces when it names
// one API surface and serves another — never looks at that event, so input
// metered as zero and the bulk of the bill silently vanished. Nothing in the
// suite sent stream: true before this test, so the whole branch went unrun.
//
// The provider points at the mock's streaming listener, which answers every
// request as SSE with token counts that differ from the buffered surface. That
// difference is the point: passing these assertions is only possible if the
// stream accumulator ran.
func TestStreamingResponseMetersInputTokens(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
env := provisionStreamingProvider(t, ctx, "anthropic_api")
sessionID := fmt.Sprintf("e2e-session-stream-%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
code, body := chatStreamUntil(t, ctx, env, harness.WireMessages, streamedModel, sessionID)
require.Equal(t, 200, code, "streamed chat must succeed; body: %s", body)
assert.Contains(t, body, "message_start",
"the client must receive the event stream itself, not a buffered rewrite of it")
row := findAccessLogBySession(t, ctx, sessionID)
assert.Equal(t, harness.VLLMStreamInputTokens, int(row.InputTokens),
"input tokens live in message_start; zero here is the bug this test exists for")
assert.Equal(t, harness.VLLMStreamOutputTokens, int(row.OutputTokens),
"output tokens ride message_delta and supersede the message_start seed")
assert.Equal(t, harness.VLLMStreamCacheReadTokens, int(row.CachedInputTokens),
"the Anthropic cache bucket rides message_start too, and only its own parser reads it")
// The Anthropic surface bills cache reads additively, so the input bucket
// prices the full input count rather than a remainder.
wantInput := float64(harness.VLLMStreamInputTokens) / 1000 * streamInRate
wantOutput := float64(harness.VLLMStreamOutputTokens) / 1000 * streamOutRate
wantCacheRead := float64(harness.VLLMStreamCacheReadTokens) / 1000 * streamCacheReadRate
assert.InDelta(t, wantInput, row.InputCostUsd, 1e-6, "input cost must price the streamed input tokens")
assert.InDelta(t, wantOutput, row.OutputCostUsd, 1e-6, "output cost must price the streamed output tokens")
// The total, not merely a positive number: input and output alone are
// positive, so a cache bucket parsed and then never billed would pass any
// weaker assertion. The gap is 7e-6, well outside the delta.
assert.InDelta(t, wantInput+wantOutput+wantCacheRead, row.CostUsd, 1e-6,
"the recorded cost must be every bucket the surface bills, cache reads included")
}
// TestStreamingOnGatewayTypedProvider drives the same streamed Anthropic call
// through a provider record whose catalog id names the OpenAI surface — the
// exact misconfiguration that hid the bug, since gateway records commonly pin
// one parser while the upstream serves another shape entirely.
//
// The router must choose the parser from the request path rather than the
// record's provider id, or the Anthropic usage block goes unread and input
// meters at zero all over again.
func TestStreamingOnGatewayTypedProvider(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
env := provisionStreamingProvider(t, ctx, "openai_api")
sessionID := fmt.Sprintf("e2e-session-stream-gw-%d", time.Now().UnixNano())
code, body := chatStreamUntil(t, ctx, env, harness.WireMessages, streamedModel, sessionID)
require.Equal(t, 200, code, "streamed chat through a gateway record must succeed; body: %s", body)
row := findAccessLogBySession(t, ctx, sessionID)
assert.Equal(t, harness.VLLMStreamInputTokens, int(row.InputTokens),
"a record typed openai_api must still read the Anthropic usage block it is actually serving")
assert.Equal(t, harness.VLLMStreamOutputTokens, int(row.OutputTokens),
"output tokens must survive the surface mismatch too")
assert.InDelta(t, float64(harness.VLLMStreamInputTokens)/1000*streamInRate, row.InputCostUsd, 1e-6,
"the request must be priced on the surface it spoke, not the one the record names")
}
// provisionStreamingProvider brings up the mock, one provider pointed at its
// streaming listener under the given catalog id, a policy authorising it, and a
// connected proxy + client.
func provisionStreamingProvider(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, catalogID string) pricedEnv {
t.Helper()
vllm, err := harness.StartVLLM(ctx, srv)
require.NoError(t, err, "start mock upstream")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = vllm.Terminate(context.Background()) })
name := "stream-" + catalogID
grp, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-" + name})
require.NoError(t, err, "create group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grp.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-" + name + "-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grp.Id},
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
// Deleting the group does not delete the key it auto-joins, so the key
// needs a cleanup of its own.
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().SetupKeys.Delete(context.Background(), sk.Id) })
require.NotEmpty(t, sk.Key, "setup key plaintext")
dummyKey := "sk-stream-e2e"
cacheRead := streamCacheReadRate
prov, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: name,
ProviderId: catalogID,
UpstreamUrl: vllm.StreamURL,
ApiKey: &dummyKey,
Enabled: ptr(true),
Models: &[]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{{
Id: streamedModel,
InputPer1k: streamInRate,
OutputPer1k: streamOutRate,
CacheReadPer1k: &cacheRead,
}},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create provider")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), prov.Id) })
enabled := true
pol, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-" + name,
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grp.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{prov.Id},
Limits: &api.AgentNetworkPolicyLimits{
TokenLimit: api.AgentNetworkPolicyTokenLimit{
Enabled: true,
GroupCap: 10_000_000,
UserCap: 10_000_000,
WindowSeconds: 60,
},
},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), pol.Id) })
endpoint, proxyIP, cl, px := connectClient(t, ctx, name, sk.Key)
return pricedEnv{
providerID: prov.Id,
groupID: grp.Id,
policyID: pol.Id,
upstream: vllm.StreamURL,
endpoint: endpoint,
proxyIP: proxyIP,
client: cl,
proxy: px,
}
}
// chatStreamUntil drives one streamed chat, retrying to absorb the tunnel and
// DNS jitter a first call through a fresh peer can hit.
func chatStreamUntil(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, env pricedEnv, kind, model, sessionID string) (int, string) {
t.Helper()
var code int
var body string
deadline := time.Now().Add(90 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
c, b, cerr := env.client.ChatStream(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, kind, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
if cerr == nil {
code, body = c, b
if code == 200 {
break
}
}
if !waitBeforeRetry(ctx, 5*time.Second) {
break
}
}
if code != 200 {
t.Logf("=== proxy logs ===\n%s", env.proxy.Logs(context.Background()))
}
return code, body
}