Fall back to the DNS handler chain for route query types a peer cannot resolve

This commit is contained in:
Viktor Liu
2026-07-27 11:31:36 +02:00
parent 1e5b0a5c89
commit 4546908ceb
9 changed files with 1070 additions and 76 deletions
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ import (
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/resutil"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/common"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/fakeip"
iface "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/iface"
@@ -40,6 +39,61 @@ type internalDNATer interface {
AddInternalDNATMapping(netip.Addr, netip.Addr) error
}
// peerAllowedIPs reports the tunnel address a peer is reachable on.
type peerAllowedIPs interface {
AllowedIP(pubKey string) (netip.Addr, bool)
}
// disposition says where a query for a given record type has to be answered.
type disposition int
const (
// dispositionPeer: the routing peer owns the answer. Address records are
// what a DNS route exists for, and their answer programs the routes,
// allowed IPs and firewall sets, so they are never resolved anywhere else.
dispositionPeer disposition = iota
// dispositionPeerFirst: the peer's forwarder resolves the type, and the
// records may only exist inside the routed network, so it has to be asked.
// A peer running a client that predates that support cannot answer, which
// only its reply reveals.
dispositionPeerFirst
// dispositionChain: no forwarder resolves the type, so asking would cost a
// tunnel round trip for a reply that says nothing. Public records for the
// name are still better than none, so the query goes to the rest of the
// chain.
dispositionChain
)
func dispositionFor(qtype uint16) disposition {
switch {
case qtype == dns.TypeA || qtype == dns.TypeAAAA:
return dispositionPeer
case resutil.SupportedRecordQtype(qtype):
return dispositionPeerFirst
default:
return dispositionChain
}
}
// peerCannotAnswer reports whether a forwarder reply means the peer is unable to
// resolve this query type, as opposed to having resolved it and found nothing.
// A forwarder older than the one that learned to resolve non-address types
// answers NOTIMP to all of them, before it even looks at the domain; FORMERR
// covers one that cannot parse the EDNS0 we add to the query.
//
// REFUSED is deliberately not here. It says the peer does not hold the name,
// which happens while the client and the peer disagree about the route set, and
// falling through then would hand the name of an internal-only domain to a
// public resolver. No forwarder version reports a missing record type that way.
func peerCannotAnswer(rcode int) bool {
switch rcode {
case dns.RcodeNotImplemented, dns.RcodeFormatError:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
type DnsInterceptor struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
route *route.Route
@@ -50,7 +104,7 @@ type DnsInterceptor struct {
currentPeerKey string
interceptedDomains domainMap
wgInterface iface.WGIface
peerStore *peerstore.Store
peerStore peerAllowedIPs
firewall firewall.Manager
fakeIPManager *fakeip.Manager
forwarderPort *atomic.Uint32
@@ -226,11 +280,14 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) ServeDNS(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
return
}
// All query types for an intercepted domain are forwarded to the peer's
// DNS forwarder, which owns the name. Falling through to the system
// resolver would let it answer NXDOMAIN for a name it isn't authoritative
// for, poisoning the whole name (including the A/AAAA records the route
// does serve). The forwarder answers NODATA for types it cannot resolve.
qtype := r.Question[0].Qtype
dispose := dispositionFor(qtype)
if dispose == dispositionChain {
d.deferToChain(w, r, logger, "unsupported-qtype")
return
}
d.mu.RLock()
peerKey := d.currentPeerKey
d.mu.RUnlock()
@@ -246,35 +303,32 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) ServeDNS(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
return
}
if r.Extra == nil {
r.MsgHdr.AuthenticatedData = true
}
// Advertise EDNS0 to the forwarder so it may return an Extended DNS Error
// describing why a lookup failed. The OPT is stripped from the reply when
// the original client did not request EDNS0.
hadEdns := r.IsEdns0() != nil
if !hadEdns {
r.SetEdns0(dns.DefaultMsgSize, false)
}
query, hadEdns := peerQuery(r)
upstream := net.JoinHostPort(upstreamIP.String(), strconv.FormatUint(uint64(d.forwarderPort.Load()), 10))
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), dnsTimeout)
defer cancel()
reply := d.queryUpstreamDNS(ctx, w, r, upstream, upstreamIP, peerKey, logger)
reply := d.queryUpstreamDNS(ctx, w, query, upstream, upstreamIP, peerKey, logger)
if reply == nil {
return
}
// The peer owns the name but its forwarder cannot resolve this type. No
// capability is announced anywhere, so the round trip above is the probe.
if dispose == dispositionPeerFirst && peerCannotAnswer(reply.Rcode) {
d.deferToChain(w, r, logger, "peer-rcode-"+dns.RcodeToString[reply.Rcode])
return
}
if ede, ok := resutil.ExtractEDE(reply); ok {
resutil.SetMeta(w, "ede", fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", ede.InfoCode, ede.ExtraText))
resutil.SetMeta(w, resutil.MetaKeyEDE, fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", ede.InfoCode, ede.ExtraText))
}
if !hadEdns {
resutil.StripOPT(reply)
}
resutil.SetMeta(w, "peer", peerKey)
resutil.SetMeta(w, resutil.MetaKeyPeer, peerKey)
reply.Id = r.Id
if err := d.writeMsg(w, reply, logger); err != nil {
@@ -282,6 +336,30 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) ServeDNS(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
}
}
// deferToChain hands the query to the next handler in the chain and asks the
// chain to soften the negative verdict of whatever answers instead. The
// resolvers below cannot prove a name inside the routed network absent, so their
// NXDOMAIN must not reach the client: it would be cached for the name and every
// type under it, taking the addresses this route does serve with it.
func (d *DnsInterceptor) deferToChain(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg, logger *log.Entry, reason string) {
logger.Tracef("continuing to next handler for domain=%s type=%s reason=%s",
r.Question[0].Name, dns.TypeToString[r.Question[0].Qtype], reason)
resutil.RequestSoftNegative(w)
// Carried to the chain's response log line: without it the answer looks like
// it came from the fallthrough resolver on its own.
resutil.SetMeta(w, resutil.MetaKeyDeferredBy, "dns-route")
resutil.SetMeta(w, resutil.MetaKeyDeferredReason, reason)
resp := new(dns.Msg)
resp.SetRcode(r, dns.RcodeNameError)
// Set Zero bit to signal handler chain to continue
resp.MsgHdr.Zero = true
if err := w.WriteMsg(resp); err != nil {
logger.Errorf("failed writing DNS continue response: %v", err)
}
}
func (d *DnsInterceptor) writeDNSError(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg, logger *log.Entry, reason string) {
logger.Warnf("failed to query upstream for domain=%s: %s", r.Question[0].Name, reason)
@@ -621,3 +699,26 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) debugPeerTimeout(peerIP netip.Addr, peerKey string) str
return fmt.Sprintf(" (peer %s)", nbdns.FormatPeerStatus(&peerState))
}
// peerQuery builds the query sent to a peer's DNS forwarder and reports whether
// the client itself advertised EDNS0. EDNS0 is added so the forwarder can return
// an Extended DNS Error describing an upstream failure, and the OPT is stripped
// from the reply again when the client did not ask for it. The client's message
// is left untouched: it may still be handed to the next handler in the chain,
// and neither the OPT nor the AD bit is ours to put on the wire on its behalf.
func peerQuery(r *dns.Msg) (query *dns.Msg, hadEdns bool) {
query = r.Copy()
hadEdns = query.IsEdns0() != nil
// AD tells the forwarder we understand authenticated data. Only set when the
// client sent no additional section of its own, so we never overrule what it
// asked for.
if len(query.Extra) == 0 {
query.MsgHdr.AuthenticatedData = true
}
if !hadEdns {
query.SetEdns0(dns.DefaultMsgSize, false)
}
return query, hadEdns
}