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[client] Authorize daemon IPC callers by their local identity (#6967)
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@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
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package daemonaddr
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import (
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"context"
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"net"
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"runtime"
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"strings"
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"google.golang.org/grpc"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
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)
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const (
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// WindowsPipeAddr is the default daemon address on Windows. A named pipe
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// carries the connecting process's token, which loopback TCP does not, so
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// it is the only Windows transport on which the daemon can tell who is
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// calling it.
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WindowsPipeAddr = "npipe://netbird"
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// legacyWindowsAddr is the loopback-TCP address the Windows daemon used
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// before named-pipe support.
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legacyWindowsAddr = "tcp://127.0.0.1:41731"
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pipeScheme = "npipe://"
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// protectedPrefix is the NPFS namespace in which only LocalSystem and
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// members of BUILTIN\Administrators may create a pipe. A daemon running as
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// the service account creates its pipe there so that an unprivileged process
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// cannot pre-create the name, which would keep the daemon from starting and
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// leave callers talking to the squatter. Opening such a pipe needs no
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// privilege, so unprivileged clients still reach the daemon.
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protectedPrefix = `ProtectedPrefix\Administrators\`
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)
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// DialTarget returns the gRPC dial target and transport options for a daemon
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// address. The npipe scheme needs a context dialer because gRPC has no
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// named-pipe resolver; unix and tcp are handled by gRPC itself.
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func DialTarget(addr string) (string, []grpc.DialOption) {
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opts := []grpc.DialOption{grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials())}
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if name, ok := strings.CutPrefix(addr, pipeScheme); ok {
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paths := PipePaths(name)
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opts = append(opts, grpc.WithContextDialer(func(ctx context.Context, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
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return dialPipePaths(ctx, paths)
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}))
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return "passthrough:///netbird-daemon-pipe", opts
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}
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return strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://"), opts
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}
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// PipePath maps an npipe address name ("netbird", from "npipe://netbird") to a
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// Windows named-pipe path (\\.\pipe\netbird). A fully qualified path is left as
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// is.
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func PipePath(name string) string {
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if strings.HasPrefix(name, `\\`) {
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return name
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}
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return `\\.\pipe\` + name
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}
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// PipePaths returns the paths a daemon control pipe may live at for an npipe
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// address name, in the order both sides must try them: the protected name first,
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// then the plain one.
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//
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// The daemon serves the first it can create, which is the protected name when it
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// runs as the service account and the plain one when it runs as an ordinary user,
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// as it does in netstack mode. Clients therefore have to try both, and because a
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// client cannot tell from the name alone who created the pipe, the plain name is
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// only usable once the server's identity has been checked: see
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// verifyPipeServer.
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//
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// A fully qualified path is what the operator asked for and is used as is.
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func PipePaths(name string) []string {
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if strings.HasPrefix(name, `\\`) {
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return []string{name}
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}
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return []string{PipePath(protectedPrefix + name), PipePath(name)}
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}
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// IsProtectedPipePath reports whether a pipe path is in the namespace only an
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// administrator or LocalSystem can create in, which is what lets a client trust
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// such a pipe from its name alone.
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func IsProtectedPipePath(path string) bool {
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return strings.HasPrefix(path, `\\.\pipe\`+protectedPrefix)
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}
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// MigrateLegacy upgrades the pre-named-pipe Windows daemon address to the named
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// pipe, reporting whether it rewrote the address. Existing installs persist the
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// daemon address, so without this an upgraded daemon would keep listening on
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// loopback TCP, where callers carry no identity and privileged operations would
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// have to be refused for everyone. Only the exact legacy default is rewritten:
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// a deliberately chosen custom address is left alone.
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func MigrateLegacy(addr string) (string, bool) {
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return migrateLegacyForOS(runtime.GOOS, addr)
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}
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func migrateLegacyForOS(goos, addr string) (string, bool) {
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if goos == "windows" && addr == legacyWindowsAddr {
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return WindowsPipeAddr, true
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}
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return addr, false
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}
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