Merge branch 'main' into proto-ipv6-overlay

This commit is contained in:
Viktor Liu
2026-04-17 05:41:53 +02:00
99 changed files with 4694 additions and 930 deletions

View File

@@ -56,6 +56,13 @@ func NewFirewall(iface IFaceMapper, stateManager *statemanager.Manager, flowLogg
return createUserspaceFirewall(iface, nil, disableServerRoutes, flowLogger, mtu)
}
// Native firewall handles packet filtering, but the userspace WireGuard bind
// needs a device filter for DNS interception hooks. Install a minimal
// hooks-only filter that passes all traffic through to the kernel firewall.
if err := iface.SetFilter(&uspfilter.HooksFilter{}); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to set hooks filter, DNS via memory hooks will not work: %v", err)
}
return fm, nil
}

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@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ const (
// rules chains contains the effective ACL rules
chainNameInputRules = "NETBIRD-ACL-INPUT"
// mangleFwdKey is the entries map key for mangle FORWARD guard rules that prevent
// external DNAT from bypassing ACL rules.
mangleFwdKey = "MANGLE-FORWARD"
)
type aclEntries map[string][][]string
@@ -282,6 +286,12 @@ func (m *aclManager) cleanChains() error {
}
}
for _, rule := range m.entries[mangleFwdKey] {
if err := m.iptablesClient.DeleteIfExists(tableMangle, chainFORWARD, rule...); err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to delete mangle FORWARD guard rule: %v, %s", rule, err)
}
}
for _, ipsetName := range m.ipsetStore.ipsetNames() {
if err := m.flushIPSet(ipsetName); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, ipset.ErrSetNotExist) {
@@ -311,6 +321,10 @@ func (m *aclManager) createDefaultChains() error {
}
for chainName, rules := range m.entries {
// mangle FORWARD guard rules are handled separately below
if chainName == mangleFwdKey {
continue
}
for _, rule := range rules {
if err := m.iptablesClient.InsertUnique(tableName, chainName, 1, rule...); err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to create input chain jump rule: %s", err)
@@ -330,6 +344,13 @@ func (m *aclManager) createDefaultChains() error {
}
clear(m.optionalEntries)
// Insert mangle FORWARD guard rules to prevent external DNAT bypass.
for _, rule := range m.entries[mangleFwdKey] {
if err := m.iptablesClient.AppendUnique(tableMangle, chainFORWARD, rule...); err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to add mangle FORWARD guard rule: %v", err)
}
}
return nil
}
@@ -351,6 +372,22 @@ func (m *aclManager) seedInitialEntries() {
m.appendToEntries("FORWARD", []string{"-o", m.wgIface.Name(), "-j", chainRTFWDOUT})
m.appendToEntries("FORWARD", []string{"-i", m.wgIface.Name(), "-j", chainRTFWDIN})
// Mangle FORWARD guard: when external DNAT redirects traffic from the wg interface, it
// traverses FORWARD instead of INPUT, bypassing ACL rules. ACCEPT rules in filter FORWARD
// can be inserted above ours. Mangle runs before filter, so these guard rules enforce the
// ACL mark check where it cannot be overridden.
m.appendToEntries(mangleFwdKey, []string{
"-i", m.wgIface.Name(),
"-m", "conntrack", "--ctstate", "RELATED,ESTABLISHED",
"-j", "ACCEPT",
})
m.appendToEntries(mangleFwdKey, []string{
"-i", m.wgIface.Name(),
"-m", "conntrack", "--ctstate", "DNAT",
"-m", "mark", "!", "--mark", fmt.Sprintf("%#x", nbnet.PreroutingFwmarkRedirected),
"-j", "DROP",
})
}
func (m *aclManager) seedInitialOptionalEntries() {

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
package common
import (
"net/netip"
"sync/atomic"
)
// PacketHook stores a registered hook for a specific IP:port.
type PacketHook struct {
IP netip.Addr
Port uint16
Fn func([]byte) bool
}
// HookMatches checks if a packet's destination matches the hook and invokes it.
func HookMatches(h *PacketHook, dstIP netip.Addr, dport uint16, packetData []byte) bool {
if h == nil {
return false
}
if h.IP == dstIP && h.Port == dport {
return h.Fn(packetData)
}
return false
}
// SetHook atomically stores a hook, handling nil removal.
func SetHook(ptr *atomic.Pointer[PacketHook], ip netip.Addr, dPort uint16, hook func([]byte) bool) {
if hook == nil {
ptr.Store(nil)
return
}
ptr.Store(&PacketHook{
IP: ip,
Port: dPort,
Fn: hook,
})
}

View File

@@ -145,15 +145,8 @@ type Manager struct {
mssClampEnabled bool
// Only one hook per protocol is supported. Outbound direction only.
udpHookOut atomic.Pointer[packetHook]
tcpHookOut atomic.Pointer[packetHook]
}
// packetHook stores a registered hook for a specific IP:port.
type packetHook struct {
ip netip.Addr
port uint16
fn func([]byte) bool
udpHookOut atomic.Pointer[common.PacketHook]
tcpHookOut atomic.Pointer[common.PacketHook]
}
// decoder for packages
@@ -986,21 +979,11 @@ func (m *Manager) trackInbound(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, ruleID []byt
}
func (m *Manager) udpHooksDrop(dport uint16, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte) bool {
return hookMatches(m.udpHookOut.Load(), dstIP, dport, packetData)
return common.HookMatches(m.udpHookOut.Load(), dstIP, dport, packetData)
}
func (m *Manager) tcpHooksDrop(dport uint16, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte) bool {
return hookMatches(m.tcpHookOut.Load(), dstIP, dport, packetData)
}
func hookMatches(h *packetHook, dstIP netip.Addr, dport uint16, packetData []byte) bool {
if h == nil {
return false
}
if h.ip == dstIP && h.port == dport {
return h.fn(packetData)
}
return false
return common.HookMatches(m.tcpHookOut.Load(), dstIP, dport, packetData)
}
// filterInbound implements filtering logic for incoming packets.
@@ -1479,28 +1462,12 @@ func (m *Manager) ruleMatches(rule *RouteRule, srcAddr, dstAddr netip.Addr, prot
// SetUDPPacketHook sets the outbound UDP packet hook. Pass nil hook to remove.
func (m *Manager) SetUDPPacketHook(ip netip.Addr, dPort uint16, hook func(packet []byte) bool) {
if hook == nil {
m.udpHookOut.Store(nil)
return
}
m.udpHookOut.Store(&packetHook{
ip: ip,
port: dPort,
fn: hook,
})
common.SetHook(&m.udpHookOut, ip, dPort, hook)
}
// SetTCPPacketHook sets the outbound TCP packet hook. Pass nil hook to remove.
func (m *Manager) SetTCPPacketHook(ip netip.Addr, dPort uint16, hook func(packet []byte) bool) {
if hook == nil {
m.tcpHookOut.Store(nil)
return
}
m.tcpHookOut.Store(&packetHook{
ip: ip,
port: dPort,
fn: hook,
})
common.SetHook(&m.tcpHookOut, ip, dPort, hook)
}
// SetLogLevel sets the log level for the firewall manager

View File

@@ -202,9 +202,9 @@ func TestSetUDPPacketHook(t *testing.T) {
h := manager.udpHookOut.Load()
require.NotNil(t, h)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("10.168.0.1"), h.ip)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(8000), h.port)
assert.True(t, h.fn(nil))
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("10.168.0.1"), h.IP)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(8000), h.Port)
assert.True(t, h.Fn(nil))
assert.True(t, called)
manager.SetUDPPacketHook(netip.MustParseAddr("10.168.0.1"), 8000, nil)
@@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ func TestSetTCPPacketHook(t *testing.T) {
h := manager.tcpHookOut.Load()
require.NotNil(t, h)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("10.168.0.1"), h.ip)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(53), h.port)
assert.True(t, h.fn(nil))
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("10.168.0.1"), h.IP)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(53), h.Port)
assert.True(t, h.Fn(nil))
assert.True(t, called)
manager.SetTCPPacketHook(netip.MustParseAddr("10.168.0.1"), 53, nil)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
package uspfilter
import (
"encoding/binary"
"net/netip"
"sync/atomic"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/uspfilter/common"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
)
const (
ipv4HeaderMinLen = 20
ipv4ProtoOffset = 9
ipv4FlagsOffset = 6
ipProtoUDP = 17
ipProtoTCP = 6
ipv4FragOffMask = 0x1fff
// dstPortOffset is the offset of the destination port within a UDP or TCP header.
dstPortOffset = 2
)
// HooksFilter is a minimal packet filter that only handles outbound DNS hooks.
// It is installed on the WireGuard interface when the userspace bind is active
// but a full firewall filter (Manager) is not needed because a native kernel
// firewall (nftables/iptables) handles packet filtering.
type HooksFilter struct {
udpHook atomic.Pointer[common.PacketHook]
tcpHook atomic.Pointer[common.PacketHook]
}
var _ device.PacketFilter = (*HooksFilter)(nil)
// FilterOutbound checks outbound packets for DNS hook matches.
// Only IPv4 packets matching the registered hook IP:port are intercepted.
// IPv6 and non-IP packets pass through unconditionally.
func (f *HooksFilter) FilterOutbound(packetData []byte, _ int) bool {
if len(packetData) < ipv4HeaderMinLen {
return false
}
// Only process IPv4 packets, let everything else pass through.
if packetData[0]>>4 != 4 {
return false
}
ihl := int(packetData[0]&0x0f) * 4
if ihl < ipv4HeaderMinLen || len(packetData) < ihl+4 {
return false
}
// Skip non-first fragments: they don't carry L4 headers.
flagsAndOffset := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(packetData[ipv4FlagsOffset : ipv4FlagsOffset+2])
if flagsAndOffset&ipv4FragOffMask != 0 {
return false
}
dstIP, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(packetData[ipv4DstOffset : ipv4DstOffset+4])
if !ok {
return false
}
proto := packetData[ipv4ProtoOffset]
dstPort := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(packetData[ihl+dstPortOffset : ihl+dstPortOffset+2])
switch proto {
case ipProtoUDP:
return common.HookMatches(f.udpHook.Load(), dstIP, dstPort, packetData)
case ipProtoTCP:
return common.HookMatches(f.tcpHook.Load(), dstIP, dstPort, packetData)
default:
return false
}
}
// FilterInbound allows all inbound packets (native firewall handles filtering).
func (f *HooksFilter) FilterInbound([]byte, int) bool {
return false
}
// SetUDPPacketHook registers the UDP packet hook.
func (f *HooksFilter) SetUDPPacketHook(ip netip.Addr, dPort uint16, hook func([]byte) bool) {
common.SetHook(&f.udpHook, ip, dPort, hook)
}
// SetTCPPacketHook registers the TCP packet hook.
func (f *HooksFilter) SetTCPPacketHook(ip netip.Addr, dPort uint16, hook func([]byte) bool) {
common.SetHook(&f.tcpHook, ip, dPort, hook)
}