Revert "Merge main"

This reverts commit 89f95b15482030ed9d3aee8d3caab68c65f43055.
This commit is contained in:
Theodor S. Midtlien
2026-06-08 14:49:58 +02:00
parent 23c82b32ff
commit 0a61d7b20e
148 changed files with 1748 additions and 4314 deletions

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package context
const (
RequestIDKey = "requestID"
AccountIDKey = "accountID"
RoleKey = "role"
UserIDKey = "userID"
PeerIDKey = "peerID"
)

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@@ -16,10 +16,6 @@ type Client interface {
Job(ctx context.Context, msgHandler func(msg *proto.JobRequest) *proto.JobResponse) error
Register(setupKey string, jwtToken string, sysInfo *system.Info, sshKey []byte, dnsLabels domain.List) (*proto.LoginResponse, error)
Login(sysInfo *system.Info, sshKey []byte, dnsLabels domain.List) (*proto.LoginResponse, error)
// ExtendAuthSession refreshes the peer's SSO session deadline using a fresh JWT.
// Returns the new absolute deadline; zero time when the server reports the peer
// is not eligible for session extension.
ExtendAuthSession(sysInfo *system.Info, jwtToken string) (*proto.ExtendAuthSessionResponse, error)
GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetNetworkMap(sysInfo *system.Info) (*proto.NetworkMap, error)

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@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ import (
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
ephemeral_manager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/peers/ephemeral/manager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/integrations/integrated_validator/validator"
ephemeral_manager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/peers/ephemeral/manager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/controllers/network_map/controller"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/controllers/network_map/update_channel"
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ func startManagement(t *testing.T) (*grpc.Server, net.Listener) {
gomock.Any(),
gomock.Any(),
).
Return(true, context.Background(), nil).
Return(true, nil).
AnyTimes()
peersManger := peers.NewManager(store, permissionsManagerMock)

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@@ -607,61 +607,6 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) Login(sysInfo *system.Info, pubSSHKey []byte, dnsLabels dom
return c.login(&proto.LoginRequest{Meta: infoToMetaData(sysInfo), PeerKeys: keys, DnsLabels: dnsLabels.ToPunycodeList()})
}
// ExtendAuthSession refreshes the peer's SSO session deadline on the management
// server using a freshly issued JWT. The tunnel is untouched: no network map
// sync, no peer reconnect. Returns the new absolute UTC deadline (zero time
// when the server reports the field empty).
func (c *GrpcClient) ExtendAuthSession(sysInfo *system.Info, jwtToken string) (*proto.ExtendAuthSessionResponse, error) {
if !c.ready() {
return nil, errors.New(errMsgNoMgmtConnection)
}
serverKey, err := c.getServerPublicKey()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
reqBody, err := encryption.EncryptMessage(*serverKey, c.key, &proto.ExtendAuthSessionRequest{
JwtToken: jwtToken,
Meta: infoToMetaData(sysInfo),
})
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to encrypt extend auth session message: %s", err)
return nil, err
}
var resp *proto.EncryptedMessage
operation := func() error {
mgmCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), ConnectTimeout)
defer cancel()
var err error
resp, err = c.realClient.ExtendAuthSession(mgmCtx, &proto.EncryptedMessage{
WgPubKey: c.key.PublicKey().String(),
Body: reqBody,
})
if err != nil {
if s, ok := gstatus.FromError(err); ok && s.Code() == codes.Canceled {
return err
}
return backoff.Permanent(err)
}
return nil
}
if err := backoff.Retry(operation, nbgrpc.Backoff(c.ctx)); err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to extend auth session on Management Service: %v", err)
return nil, err
}
out := &proto.ExtendAuthSessionResponse{}
if err := encryption.DecryptMessage(*serverKey, c.key, resp.Body, out); err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to decrypt extend auth session response: %s", err)
return nil, err
}
return out, nil
}
// GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow returns a device authorization flow information.
// It also takes care of encrypting and decrypting messages.
func (c *GrpcClient) GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlow, error) {

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@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ type MockClient struct {
SyncFunc func(ctx context.Context, sysInfo *system.Info, msgHandler func(msg *proto.SyncResponse) error) error
RegisterFunc func(setupKey string, jwtToken string, info *system.Info, sshKey []byte, dnsLabels domain.List) (*proto.LoginResponse, error)
LoginFunc func(info *system.Info, sshKey []byte, dnsLabels domain.List) (*proto.LoginResponse, error)
ExtendAuthSessionFunc func(info *system.Info, jwtToken string) (*proto.ExtendAuthSessionResponse, error)
GetDeviceAuthorizationFlowFunc func() (*proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc func() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetServerURLFunc func() string
@@ -66,13 +65,6 @@ func (m *MockClient) Login(info *system.Info, sshKey []byte, dnsLabels domain.Li
return m.LoginFunc(info, sshKey, dnsLabels)
}
func (m *MockClient) ExtendAuthSession(info *system.Info, jwtToken string) (*proto.ExtendAuthSessionResponse, error) {
if m.ExtendAuthSessionFunc == nil {
return nil, nil
}
return m.ExtendAuthSessionFunc(info, jwtToken)
}
func (m *MockClient) GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlow, error) {
if m.GetDeviceAuthorizationFlowFunc == nil {
return nil, nil

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@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package rest
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/url"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
@@ -34,12 +33,6 @@ func (a *ReverseProxyClustersAPI) List(ctx context.Context) ([]api.ProxyCluster,
// NetBird cannot be deleted via this endpoint; the server returns 404 / 400
// for cluster addresses the account does not own.
func (a *ReverseProxyClustersAPI) Delete(ctx context.Context, clusterAddress string) error {
// Guard against the empty input: url.PathEscape("") returns "" which
// would collapse the request URL onto the collection endpoint and
// silently delete nothing (or 405 depending on routing).
if clusterAddress == "" {
return errors.New("clusterAddress is required")
}
resp, err := a.c.NewRequest(ctx, "DELETE", "/api/reverse-proxies/clusters/"+url.PathEscape(clusterAddress), nil, nil)
if err != nil {
return err

View File

@@ -88,17 +88,3 @@ func TestReverseProxyClusters_Delete_Err(t *testing.T) {
assert.Error(t, err)
})
}
// TestReverseProxyClusters_Delete_EmptyAddress guards against an empty
// clusterAddress reaching the wire — that would collapse the URL onto
// the collection endpoint instead of a specific cluster. The client
// must short-circuit with a typed error before any request is issued.
func TestReverseProxyClusters_Delete_EmptyAddress(t *testing.T) {
withMockClient(func(c *rest.Client, mux *http.ServeMux) {
mux.HandleFunc("/api/reverse-proxies/clusters/", func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
t.Fatal("empty clusterAddress must be rejected client-side; no request should reach the server")
})
err := c.ReverseProxyClusters.Delete(context.Background(), "")
assert.Error(t, err, "empty clusterAddress must surface as an error")
})
}

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@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/url"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
@@ -62,12 +61,6 @@ func (a *ReverseProxyTokensAPI) Create(ctx context.Context, request api.ProxyTok
// credentials existed; the plain secret can no longer authenticate any
// new proxy registration.
func (a *ReverseProxyTokensAPI) Delete(ctx context.Context, tokenID string) error {
// Guard against the empty input: url.PathEscape("") returns "" which
// would collapse the request URL onto the collection endpoint and
// silently delete nothing (or 405 depending on routing).
if tokenID == "" {
return errors.New("tokenID is required")
}
resp, err := a.c.NewRequest(ctx, "DELETE", "/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens/"+url.PathEscape(tokenID), nil, nil)
if err != nil {
return err

View File

@@ -129,16 +129,3 @@ func TestReverseProxyTokens_Delete_Err(t *testing.T) {
assert.Error(t, err)
})
}
// TestReverseProxyTokens_Delete_EmptyID guards against an empty tokenID
// reaching the wire — url.PathEscape("") would collapse the URL onto
// the collection endpoint.
func TestReverseProxyTokens_Delete_EmptyID(t *testing.T) {
withMockClient(func(c *rest.Client, mux *http.ServeMux) {
mux.HandleFunc("/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens/", func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
t.Fatal("empty tokenID must be rejected client-side; no request should reach the server")
})
err := c.ReverseProxyTokens.Delete(context.Background(), "")
assert.Error(t, err, "empty tokenID must surface as an error")
})
}

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@@ -3086,24 +3086,6 @@ components:
- enabled
- auth
- meta
allOf:
# When private=true, access_groups must be present and non-empty,
# and the service mode must be "http". The bearer-auth mutex is
# enforced at the service-validation layer
# (validatePrivateRequirements) because it sits in a nested
# ServiceAuthConfig and isn't cleanly expressible here.
- if:
required: [private]
properties:
private:
const: true
then:
required: [access_groups]
properties:
access_groups:
minItems: 1
mode:
const: http
ServiceMeta:
type: object
properties:
@@ -3191,23 +3173,6 @@ components:
- name
- domain
- enabled
allOf:
# Mirror of the Service conditional: when private=true the
# request must carry a non-empty access_groups list and the
# mode must be "http". The bearer-auth mutex is enforced at the
# service-validation layer (validatePrivateRequirements).
- if:
required: [private]
properties:
private:
const: true
then:
required: [access_groups]
properties:
access_groups:
minItems: 1
mode:
const: http
ServiceTargetOptions:
type: object
properties:

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

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@@ -52,14 +52,6 @@ service ManagementService {
// Executes a job on a target peer (e.g., debug bundle)
rpc Job(stream EncryptedMessage) returns (stream EncryptedMessage) {}
// ExtendAuthSession refreshes the peer's session expiry deadline using a fresh JWT.
// Same JWT validation pipeline as Login (including jwt.UserID == peer.UserID check),
// but does not redo the network-map sync. Only valid for SSO-registered peers where
// login expiration is enabled. The tunnel remains up.
// EncryptedMessage of the request has a body of ExtendAuthSessionRequest.
// EncryptedMessage of the response has a body of ExtendAuthSessionResponse.
rpc ExtendAuthSession(EncryptedMessage) returns (EncryptedMessage) {}
// CreateExpose creates a temporary reverse proxy service for a peer
rpc CreateExpose(EncryptedMessage) returns (EncryptedMessage) {}
@@ -141,15 +133,6 @@ message SyncResponse {
// Posture checks to be evaluated by client
repeated Checks Checks = 6;
// 3-state session deadline. Carried on every Sync snapshot so admin-side
// changes propagate live without a client reconnect.
// field unset (nil) → snapshot carries no info; client keeps the
// deadline it already had
// set, seconds=0 nanos=0 → explicit "expiry disabled" or peer is not
// SSO-registered; client clears its anchor
// set, valid timestamp → new absolute UTC deadline
google.protobuf.Timestamp sessionExpiresAt = 7;
}
message SyncMetaRequest {
@@ -261,31 +244,6 @@ message LoginResponse {
PeerConfig peerConfig = 2;
// Posture checks to be evaluated by client
repeated Checks Checks = 3;
// 3-state session deadline; same encoding as SyncResponse.sessionExpiresAt.
// field unset (nil) → no info; client keeps any deadline it had
// set, seconds=0 nanos=0 → explicit "expiry disabled" / non-SSO peer
// set, valid timestamp → new absolute UTC deadline
google.protobuf.Timestamp sessionExpiresAt = 4;
}
// ExtendAuthSessionRequest carries a fresh JWT to refresh the peer's session deadline.
// The encrypted body of an EncryptedMessage with this payload is sent to the
// ExtendAuthSession RPC.
message ExtendAuthSessionRequest {
// SSO token (must be a fresh, valid JWT for the peer's owning user)
string jwtToken = 1;
// Meta data of the peer (used for IdP user info refresh consistent with Login)
PeerSystemMeta meta = 2;
}
// ExtendAuthSessionResponse contains the refreshed session deadline.
message ExtendAuthSessionResponse {
// 3-state session deadline; same encoding as SyncResponse.sessionExpiresAt.
// In practice ExtendAuthSession only succeeds for SSO peers with expiry
// enabled, so this carries a valid timestamp on the success path. The
// 3-state encoding is documented here for symmetry with Login/Sync.
google.protobuf.Timestamp sessionExpiresAt = 1;
}
message ServerKeyResponse {

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@@ -52,13 +52,6 @@ type ManagementServiceClient interface {
Logout(ctx context.Context, in *EncryptedMessage, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*Empty, error)
// Executes a job on a target peer (e.g., debug bundle)
Job(ctx context.Context, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (ManagementService_JobClient, error)
// ExtendAuthSession refreshes the peer's session expiry deadline using a fresh JWT.
// Same JWT validation pipeline as Login (including jwt.UserID == peer.UserID check),
// but does not redo the network-map sync. Only valid for SSO-registered peers where
// login expiration is enabled. The tunnel remains up.
// EncryptedMessage of the request has a body of ExtendAuthSessionRequest.
// EncryptedMessage of the response has a body of ExtendAuthSessionResponse.
ExtendAuthSession(ctx context.Context, in *EncryptedMessage, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*EncryptedMessage, error)
// CreateExpose creates a temporary reverse proxy service for a peer
CreateExpose(ctx context.Context, in *EncryptedMessage, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*EncryptedMessage, error)
// RenewExpose extends the TTL of an active expose session
@@ -201,15 +194,6 @@ func (x *managementServiceJobClient) Recv() (*EncryptedMessage, error) {
return m, nil
}
func (c *managementServiceClient) ExtendAuthSession(ctx context.Context, in *EncryptedMessage, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*EncryptedMessage, error) {
out := new(EncryptedMessage)
err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, "/management.ManagementService/ExtendAuthSession", in, out, opts...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return out, nil
}
func (c *managementServiceClient) CreateExpose(ctx context.Context, in *EncryptedMessage, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*EncryptedMessage, error) {
out := new(EncryptedMessage)
err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, "/management.ManagementService/CreateExpose", in, out, opts...)
@@ -275,13 +259,6 @@ type ManagementServiceServer interface {
Logout(context.Context, *EncryptedMessage) (*Empty, error)
// Executes a job on a target peer (e.g., debug bundle)
Job(ManagementService_JobServer) error
// ExtendAuthSession refreshes the peer's session expiry deadline using a fresh JWT.
// Same JWT validation pipeline as Login (including jwt.UserID == peer.UserID check),
// but does not redo the network-map sync. Only valid for SSO-registered peers where
// login expiration is enabled. The tunnel remains up.
// EncryptedMessage of the request has a body of ExtendAuthSessionRequest.
// EncryptedMessage of the response has a body of ExtendAuthSessionResponse.
ExtendAuthSession(context.Context, *EncryptedMessage) (*EncryptedMessage, error)
// CreateExpose creates a temporary reverse proxy service for a peer
CreateExpose(context.Context, *EncryptedMessage) (*EncryptedMessage, error)
// RenewExpose extends the TTL of an active expose session
@@ -322,9 +299,6 @@ func (UnimplementedManagementServiceServer) Logout(context.Context, *EncryptedMe
func (UnimplementedManagementServiceServer) Job(ManagementService_JobServer) error {
return status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, "method Job not implemented")
}
func (UnimplementedManagementServiceServer) ExtendAuthSession(context.Context, *EncryptedMessage) (*EncryptedMessage, error) {
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, "method ExtendAuthSession not implemented")
}
func (UnimplementedManagementServiceServer) CreateExpose(context.Context, *EncryptedMessage) (*EncryptedMessage, error) {
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, "method CreateExpose not implemented")
}
@@ -520,24 +494,6 @@ func (x *managementServiceJobServer) Recv() (*EncryptedMessage, error) {
return m, nil
}
func _ManagementService_ExtendAuthSession_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
in := new(EncryptedMessage)
if err := dec(in); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if interceptor == nil {
return srv.(ManagementServiceServer).ExtendAuthSession(ctx, in)
}
info := &grpc.UnaryServerInfo{
Server: srv,
FullMethod: "/management.ManagementService/ExtendAuthSession",
}
handler := func(ctx context.Context, req interface{}) (interface{}, error) {
return srv.(ManagementServiceServer).ExtendAuthSession(ctx, req.(*EncryptedMessage))
}
return interceptor(ctx, in, info, handler)
}
func _ManagementService_CreateExpose_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
in := new(EncryptedMessage)
if err := dec(in); err != nil {
@@ -627,10 +583,6 @@ var ManagementService_ServiceDesc = grpc.ServiceDesc{
MethodName: "Logout",
Handler: _ManagementService_Logout_Handler,
},
{
MethodName: "ExtendAuthSession",
Handler: _ManagementService_ExtendAuthSession_Handler,
},
{
MethodName: "CreateExpose",
Handler: _ManagementService_CreateExpose_Handler,

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@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ message SendStatusUpdateRequest {
bool certificate_issued = 4;
optional string error_message = 5;
// Per-account inbound listener state for the account that owns
// service_id. Populated only when --private is enabled and the
// service_id. Populated only when --private-inbound is enabled and the
// embedded client for the account is up. Field numbers >=50 reserved
// for observability extensions.
optional ProxyInboundListener inbound_listener = 50;