Revert "Merge main"

This reverts commit 89f95b15482030ed9d3aee8d3caab68c65f43055.
This commit is contained in:
Theodor S. Midtlien
2026-06-08 14:50:26 +02:00
parent 23c82b32ff
commit 0a61d7b20e
148 changed files with 1748 additions and 4314 deletions
-90
View File
@@ -1227,93 +1227,3 @@ func TestProtect_NonOIDCSchemes_PlainHTTP_NotBlocked(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code, "PIN-only domain should serve the login page on plain HTTP")
}
// stubTunnelValidator records ValidateTunnelPeer calls so a test can
// assert whether the fast-path reached management.
type stubTunnelValidator struct {
called bool
resp *proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse
}
func (s *stubTunnelValidator) ValidateSession(context.Context, *proto.ValidateSessionRequest, ...grpc.CallOption) (*proto.ValidateSessionResponse, error) {
return nil, errors.New("not used in this test")
}
func (s *stubTunnelValidator) ValidateTunnelPeer(context.Context, *proto.ValidateTunnelPeerRequest, ...grpc.CallOption) (*proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse, error) {
s.called = true
return s.resp, nil
}
// TestProtect_TunnelPeerFastPath_RequiresInboundMarker guards the
// anti-spoof gate: a request with an RFC1918 source IP arriving on the
// public listener (no TunnelLookupFromContext attached) must not be
// allowed to take the tunnel-peer fast-path. Without this gate a public
// client whose source IP happens to fall inside an RFC1918 range could
// bypass the configured auth scheme by colliding with a known tunnel
// IP.
func TestProtect_TunnelPeerFastPath_RequiresInboundMarker(t *testing.T) {
validator := &stubTunnelValidator{
resp: &proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse{
Valid: true,
SessionToken: "should-not-be-used",
UserId: "user-1",
},
}
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), validator, nil)
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
// Request from an RFC1918 source IP on the public listener — no
// TunnelLookupFromContext attached. The fast-path must reject this
// and fall through to the PIN scheme (which renders 401 on plain
// HTTP for a non-authenticated request).
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "100.64.0.5:5000"
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
assert.False(t, validator.called,
"ValidateTunnelPeer must not be invoked when the request lacks the inbound TunnelLookup marker")
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code,
"without the inbound marker the request must fall through to the operator auth scheme")
}
// TestProtect_TunnelPeerFastPath_TakesPathWithInboundMarker verifies
// the positive side: a request marked as overlay-origin (carrying the
// TunnelLookup context value) and matching a tunnel-IP range does take
// the fast-path and reach management.
func TestProtect_TunnelPeerFastPath_TakesPathWithInboundMarker(t *testing.T) {
validator := &stubTunnelValidator{
resp: &proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse{
Valid: true,
SessionToken: "tunnel-session-token",
UserId: "user-1",
},
}
mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), validator, nil)
kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
lookup := TunnelLookupFunc(func(_ netip.Addr) (PeerIdentity, bool) {
return PeerIdentity{}, true
})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "100.64.0.5:5000"
req = req.WithContext(WithTunnelLookup(req.Context(), lookup))
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
assert.True(t, validator.called,
"ValidateTunnelPeer must run when the request carries the inbound TunnelLookup marker")
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code,
"a successful tunnel-peer validation must forward to the next handler")
}