Revert "Merge main"

This reverts commit 89f95b15482030ed9d3aee8d3caab68c65f43055.

management/internals/shared/grpc/conversion.go

@@ -6,11 +6,9 @@ import (
 	"net/netip"
 	"net/url"
 	"strings"
-	"time"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	goproto "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
-	"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb"
 
 	integrationsConfig "github.com/netbirdio/management-integrations/integrations/config"
 
@@ -187,38 +185,9 @@ func ToSyncResponse(ctx context.Context, config *nbconfig.Config, httpConfig *nb
 		response.NetworkMap.SshAuth = &proto.SSHAuth{AuthorizedUsers: hashedUsers, MachineUsers: machineUsers, UserIDClaim: userIDClaim}
 	}
 
-	// settings == nil → field stays nil → "no info in this snapshot", client
-	// preserves the deadline it already had. settings non-nil → emit either a
-	// valid deadline or the explicit-zero "disabled" sentinel via
-	// encodeSessionExpiresAt.
-	if settings != nil {
-		response.SessionExpiresAt = encodeSessionExpiresAt(
-			peer.SessionExpiresAt(settings.PeerLoginExpirationEnabled, settings.PeerLoginExpiration),
-		)
-	}
-
 	return response
 }
 
-// encodeSessionExpiresAt encodes a server-side deadline into the 3-state wire
-// representation used on LoginResponse, SyncResponse and
-// ExtendAuthSessionResponse. See the proto comments on those messages.
-//
-//   - deadline.IsZero() → returns &Timestamp{} (seconds=0, nanos=0): the
-//     "expiry disabled or peer is not SSO-tracked" sentinel; the client clears
-//     its anchor.
-//   - deadline non-zero → returns timestamppb.New(deadline): the new absolute
-//     UTC deadline.
-//
-// Returning nil ("no info, preserve client's anchor") is the caller's job —
-// only meaningful on Sync builds where settings were not resolved.
-func encodeSessionExpiresAt(deadline time.Time) *timestamppb.Timestamp {
-	if deadline.IsZero() {
-		return &timestamppb.Timestamp{}
-	}
-	return timestamppb.New(deadline)
-}
-
 func buildAuthorizedUsersProto(ctx context.Context, authorizedUsers map[string]map[string]struct{}) ([][]byte, map[string]*proto.MachineUserIndexes) {
 	userIDToIndex := make(map[string]uint32)
 	var hashedUsers [][]byte

management/internals/shared/grpc/conversion_test.go

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
 	"net/netip"
 	"reflect"
 	"testing"
-	"time"
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 
@@ -201,29 +200,3 @@ func TestBuildJWTConfig_Audiences(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
-
-// TestEncodeSessionExpiresAt pins the wire encoding the client's
-// applySessionDeadline depends on:
-//
-//   - zero deadline  → &Timestamp{} (seconds=0, nanos=0): the explicit
-//     "expiry disabled or peer is not SSO-tracked" sentinel.
-//   - non-zero       → timestamppb.New(deadline): the absolute UTC deadline.
-//
-// The third state (nil pointer = "no info in this snapshot") is the caller's
-// responsibility on the Sync path when settings could not be resolved; the
-// helper itself never returns nil.
-func TestEncodeSessionExpiresAt(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("zero deadline encodes as explicit-zero sentinel", func(t *testing.T) {
-		got := encodeSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
-		assert.NotNil(t, got, "must not return nil; nil means 'no info', not 'disabled'")
-		assert.Equal(t, int64(0), got.GetSeconds())
-		assert.Equal(t, int32(0), got.GetNanos())
-	})
-
-	t.Run("non-zero deadline round-trips", func(t *testing.T) {
-		deadline := time.Date(2030, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 0, time.UTC)
-		got := encodeSessionExpiresAt(deadline)
-		assert.NotNil(t, got)
-		assert.True(t, got.AsTime().Equal(deadline))
-	})
-}

management/internals/shared/grpc/proxy.go

@@ -978,7 +978,6 @@ func shallowCloneMapping(m *proto.ProxyMapping) *proto.ProxyMapping {
 		Mode:               m.Mode,
 		ListenPort:         m.ListenPort,
 		AccessRestrictions: m.AccessRestrictions,
-		Private:            m.Private,
 	}
 }
 

management/internals/shared/grpc/proxy_clone_test.go

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-package grpc
-
-import (
-	"reflect"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
-)
-
-// authTokenField is the only per-proxy field that shallowCloneMapping must NOT
-// copy from the source, since callers assign it individually after cloning.
-const authTokenField = "AuthToken"
-
-// TestShallowCloneMapping_ClonesAllFields populates every exported field of
-// ProxyMapping with a non-zero value and verifies the clone carries each one
-// (except AuthToken). It uses reflection so adding a new field to ProxyMapping
-// without updating shallowCloneMapping fails this test.
-func TestShallowCloneMapping_ClonesAllFields(t *testing.T) {
-	src := &proto.ProxyMapping{}
-	populated := populateExportedFields(t, reflect.ValueOf(src).Elem())
-	require.NotEmpty(t, populated, "ProxyMapping should expose fields to populate")
-
-	clone := shallowCloneMapping(src)
-	require.NotNil(t, clone, "clone must not be nil")
-
-	srcVal := reflect.ValueOf(src).Elem()
-	cloneVal := reflect.ValueOf(clone).Elem()
-
-	for _, name := range populated {
-		srcField := srcVal.FieldByName(name).Interface()
-		cloneField := cloneVal.FieldByName(name).Interface()
-
-		if name == authTokenField {
-			assert.Zero(t, cloneField, "AuthToken must not be cloned; it is set per proxy after cloning")
-			continue
-		}
-
-		assert.Equal(t, srcField, cloneField, "field %s must be carried over by shallowCloneMapping", name)
-	}
-}
-
-// populateExportedFields sets a non-zero value on every settable exported field
-// of the struct and returns their names.
-func populateExportedFields(t *testing.T, v reflect.Value) []string {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	var names []string
-	typ := v.Type()
-	for i := 0; i < v.NumField(); i++ {
-		field := v.Field(i)
-		structField := typ.Field(i)
-
-		if structField.PkgPath != "" || !field.CanSet() {
-			continue
-		}
-
-		setNonZero(t, field, structField.Name)
-		names = append(names, structField.Name)
-	}
-	return names
-}
-
-// setNonZero assigns a deterministic non-zero value based on the field kind.
-func setNonZero(t *testing.T, field reflect.Value, name string) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	switch field.Kind() {
-	case reflect.String:
-		field.SetString("non-zero-" + name)
-	case reflect.Bool:
-		field.SetBool(true)
-	case reflect.Int, reflect.Int8, reflect.Int16, reflect.Int32, reflect.Int64:
-		field.SetInt(7)
-	case reflect.Uint, reflect.Uint8, reflect.Uint16, reflect.Uint32, reflect.Uint64:
-		field.SetUint(7)
-	case reflect.Ptr:
-		field.Set(reflect.New(field.Type().Elem()))
-	case reflect.Slice:
-		field.Set(reflect.MakeSlice(field.Type(), 1, 1))
-	case reflect.Map:
-		field.Set(reflect.MakeMapWithSize(field.Type(), 0))
-	default:
-		t.Fatalf("unhandled field kind %s for field %s; extend setNonZero", field.Kind(), name)
-	}
-}

management/internals/shared/grpc/server.go

@@ -821,80 +821,6 @@ func (s *Server) Login(ctx context.Context, req *proto.EncryptedMessage) (*proto
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// ExtendAuthSession refreshes the peer's SSO session expiry deadline using a
-// fresh JWT. The same JWT validation pipeline as Login is used. The tunnel
-// stays up; no network map sync is performed. The new deadline is returned
-// in ExtendAuthSessionResponse.SessionExpiresAt.
-func (s *Server) ExtendAuthSession(ctx context.Context, req *proto.EncryptedMessage) (*proto.EncryptedMessage, error) {
-	extendReq := &proto.ExtendAuthSessionRequest{}
-	peerKey, err := s.parseRequest(ctx, req, extendReq)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	//nolint
-	ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, nbContext.PeerIDKey, peerKey.String())
-	if accountID, accErr := s.accountManager.GetAccountIDForPeerKey(ctx, peerKey.String()); accErr == nil {
-		//nolint
-		ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, nbContext.AccountIDKey, accountID)
-	}
-
-	jwt := extendReq.GetJwtToken()
-	if jwt == "" {
-		return nil, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "jwt token is required")
-	}
-
-	var userID string
-	const attempts = 3
-	for i := 0; i < attempts; i++ {
-		userID, err = s.validateToken(ctx, peerKey.String(), jwt)
-		if err == nil {
-			break
-		}
-		if i == attempts-1 {
-			break
-		}
-		log.WithContext(ctx).Warnf("failed validating JWT token while extending session for peer %s: %v. Retrying (idP cache).", peerKey.String(), err)
-		select {
-		case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond):
-		case <-ctx.Done():
-			return nil, ctx.Err()
-		}
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if userID == "" {
-		return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unauthenticated, "jwt token did not yield a user id")
-	}
-
-	deadline, err := s.accountManager.ExtendPeerSession(ctx, peerKey.String(), userID)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.WithContext(ctx).Warnf("failed extending session for peer %s: %v", peerKey.String(), err)
-		return nil, mapError(ctx, err)
-	}
-
-	// Success path normally returns a non-zero deadline. A defensive zero
-	// would still encode as the explicit "disabled" sentinel rather than nil,
-	// so the client clears any stale anchor instead of preserving it.
-	resp := &proto.ExtendAuthSessionResponse{
-		SessionExpiresAt: encodeSessionExpiresAt(deadline),
-	}
-
-	wgKey, err := s.secretsManager.GetWGKey()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed processing request")
-	}
-	encrypted, err := encryption.EncryptMessage(peerKey, wgKey, resp)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed encrypting response")
-	}
-	return &proto.EncryptedMessage{
-		WgPubKey: wgKey.PublicKey().String(),
-		Body:     encrypted,
-	}, nil
-}
-
 func (s *Server) prepareLoginResponse(ctx context.Context, peer *nbpeer.Peer, netMap *types.NetworkMap, postureChecks []*posture.Checks) (*proto.LoginResponse, error) {
 	var relayToken *Token
 	var err error
@@ -918,12 +844,6 @@ func (s *Server) prepareLoginResponse(ctx context.Context, peer *nbpeer.Peer, ne
 		Checks:        toProtocolChecks(ctx, postureChecks),
 	}
 
-	// settings is always non-nil here, so we never emit nil — encoder returns
-	// either a valid deadline or the explicit-zero "disabled" sentinel.
-	loginResp.SessionExpiresAt = encodeSessionExpiresAt(
-		peer.SessionExpiresAt(settings.PeerLoginExpirationEnabled, settings.PeerLoginExpiration),
-	)
-
 	return loginResp, nil
 }
 

management/internals/shared/grpc/validate_session_test.go

@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func generateSessionKeyPair(t *testing.T) (string, string) {
 
 func createSessionToken(t *testing.T, privKeyB64, userID, domain string) string {
 	t.Helper()
-	token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(privKeyB64, userID, "", domain, auth.MethodOIDC, nil, nil, time.Hour)
+	token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(privKeyB64, userID, domain, auth.MethodOIDC, nil, time.Hour)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	return token
 }
@@ -394,10 +394,6 @@ func (m *testValidateSessionProxyManager) ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(_ context.Cont
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (m *testValidateSessionProxyManager) ClusterSupportsPrivate(_ context.Context, _ string) *bool {
-	return nil
-}
-
 type testValidateSessionUsersManager struct {
 	store store.Store
 }
@@ -405,24 +401,3 @@ type testValidateSessionUsersManager struct {
 func (m *testValidateSessionUsersManager) GetUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) (*types.User, error) {
 	return m.store.GetUserByUserID(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, userID)
 }
-
-func (m *testValidateSessionUsersManager) GetUserWithGroups(ctx context.Context, userID string) (*types.User, []*types.Group, error) {
-	user, err := m.store.GetUserByUserID(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, userID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, err
-	}
-	if len(user.AutoGroups) == 0 {
-		return user, nil, nil
-	}
-	groupsMap, err := m.store.GetGroupsByIDs(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, user.AccountID, user.AutoGroups)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, err
-	}
-	groups := make([]*types.Group, 0, len(user.AutoGroups))
-	for _, id := range user.AutoGroups {
-		if g, ok := groupsMap[id]; ok && g != nil {
-			groups = append(groups, g)
-		}
-	}
-	return user, groups, nil
-}