[client] Derive Windows SSH privilege checks from the token and group membership (#6966)

This commit is contained in:
Viktor Liu
2026-08-12 01:16:37 +09:00
committed by GitHub
parent 95a458801c
commit 052cf5a748
10 changed files with 684 additions and 272 deletions

View File

@@ -16,11 +16,6 @@ var (
ErrPrivilegedUserSwitch = errors.New("cannot switch to privileged user - current user lacks required privileges")
)
// isPlatformUnix returns true for Unix-like platforms (Linux, macOS, etc.)
func isPlatformUnix() bool {
return getCurrentOS() != "windows"
}
// Dependency injection variables for testing - allows mocking dynamic runtime checks
var (
getCurrentUser = currentUserWithGetent
@@ -29,6 +24,9 @@ var (
getIsProcessPrivileged = isCurrentProcessPrivileged
getEuid = os.Geteuid
getProcessElevated = isProcessElevated
getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown = isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown
)
const (
@@ -65,6 +63,13 @@ type PrivilegeCheckResult struct {
RequiresUserSwitching bool
}
// privilegeCheckContext holds all context needed for privilege checking
type privilegeCheckContext struct {
currentUser *user.User
currentUserPrivileged bool
allowRoot bool
}
// CheckPrivileges performs comprehensive privilege checking for all SSH features.
// This is the single source of truth for privilege decisions across the SSH server.
func (s *Server) CheckPrivileges(req PrivilegeCheckRequest) PrivilegeCheckResult {
@@ -75,7 +80,7 @@ func (s *Server) CheckPrivileges(req PrivilegeCheckRequest) PrivilegeCheckResult
// Handle empty username case - but still check root access controls
if req.RequestedUsername == "" {
if isPrivilegedUsername(context.currentUser.Username) && !context.allowRoot {
if isPrivilegedOrUnknown(context.currentUser.Username) && !context.allowRoot {
return PrivilegeCheckResult{
Allowed: false,
Error: &PrivilegedUserError{Username: context.currentUser.Username},
@@ -135,7 +140,7 @@ func (s *Server) checkUserRequest(ctx *privilegeCheckContext, req PrivilegeCheck
needsUserSwitching := !isSameResolvedUser(resolvedUser, ctx.currentUser)
if isPrivilegedUsername(resolvedUser.Username) && !ctx.allowRoot {
if isPrivilegedOrUnknown(resolvedUser.Username) && !ctx.allowRoot {
return PrivilegeCheckResult{
Allowed: false,
Error: &PrivilegedUserError{Username: resolvedUser.Username},
@@ -175,6 +180,42 @@ func (s *Server) resolveRequestedUser(requestedUsername string) (*user.User, err
return u, nil
}
// SetAllowRootLogin configures root login access
func (s *Server) SetAllowRootLogin(allow bool) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.allowRootLogin = allow
}
// userNameLookup performs user lookup with root login permission check
func (s *Server) userNameLookup(username string) (*user.User, error) {
result, err := s.userPrivilegeCheck(username)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return result.User, nil
}
// userPrivilegeCheck performs user lookup with full privilege check result
func (s *Server) userPrivilegeCheck(username string) (PrivilegeCheckResult, error) {
result := s.CheckPrivileges(PrivilegeCheckRequest{
RequestedUsername: username,
FeatureSupportsUserSwitch: true,
FeatureName: FeatureSSHLogin,
})
if !result.Allowed {
return result, result.Error
}
return result, nil
}
// isPlatformUnix returns true for Unix-like platforms (Linux, macOS, etc.)
func isPlatformUnix() bool {
return getCurrentOS() != "windows"
}
// isSameResolvedUser compares two resolved user identities
func isSameResolvedUser(user1, user2 *user.User) bool {
if user1 == nil || user2 == nil {
@@ -183,13 +224,6 @@ func isSameResolvedUser(user1, user2 *user.User) bool {
return user1.Uid == user2.Uid
}
// privilegeCheckContext holds all context needed for privilege checking
type privilegeCheckContext struct {
currentUser *user.User
currentUserPrivileged bool
allowRoot bool
}
// isSameUser checks if two usernames refer to the same user
// SECURITY: This function must be conservative - it should only return true
// when we're certain both usernames refer to the exact same user identity
@@ -253,159 +287,30 @@ func isWindowsSameUser(requestedUsername, currentUsername string) bool {
return strings.EqualFold(reqDomain, curDomain)
}
// SetAllowRootLogin configures root login access
func (s *Server) SetAllowRootLogin(allow bool) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.allowRootLogin = allow
}
// userNameLookup performs user lookup with root login permission check
func (s *Server) userNameLookup(username string) (*user.User, error) {
result := s.CheckPrivileges(PrivilegeCheckRequest{
RequestedUsername: username,
FeatureSupportsUserSwitch: true,
FeatureName: FeatureSSHLogin,
})
if !result.Allowed {
return nil, result.Error
}
return result.User, nil
}
// userPrivilegeCheck performs user lookup with full privilege check result
func (s *Server) userPrivilegeCheck(username string) (PrivilegeCheckResult, error) {
result := s.CheckPrivileges(PrivilegeCheckRequest{
RequestedUsername: username,
FeatureSupportsUserSwitch: true,
FeatureName: FeatureSSHLogin,
})
if !result.Allowed {
return result, result.Error
}
return result, nil
}
// isPrivilegedUsername checks if the given username represents a privileged user across platforms.
// On Unix: root
// On Windows: Administrator, SYSTEM (case-insensitive)
// Handles domain-qualified usernames like "DOMAIN\Administrator" or "user@domain.com"
func isPrivilegedUsername(username string) bool {
// isPrivilegedOrUnknown reports whether the given username represents a
// privileged user, or on Windows an account whose privilege could not be
// determined.
// On Unix: root.
// On Windows: well-known service accounts, built-in Administrator accounts,
// and members of the local Administrators group; handles domain-qualified
// usernames like "DOMAIN\user" or "user@domain.com". An account that cannot be
// resolved or evaluated is reported as privileged.
//
// Use this to refuse privileged accounts, never to grant them anything: the
// undetermined case is safe for a refusal and unsafe for a grant.
func isPrivilegedOrUnknown(username string) bool {
if getCurrentOS() != "windows" {
return username == "root"
}
bareUsername := username
// Handle Windows domain format: DOMAIN\username
if idx := strings.LastIndex(username, `\`); idx != -1 {
bareUsername = username[idx+1:]
}
// Handle email-style format: username@domain.com
if idx := strings.Index(bareUsername, "@"); idx != -1 {
bareUsername = bareUsername[:idx]
}
return isWindowsPrivilegedUser(bareUsername)
}
// isWindowsPrivilegedUser checks if a bare username (domain already stripped) represents a Windows privileged account
func isWindowsPrivilegedUser(bareUsername string) bool {
// common privileged usernames (case insensitive)
privilegedNames := []string{
"administrator",
"admin",
"root",
"system",
"localsystem",
"networkservice",
"localservice",
}
usernameLower := strings.ToLower(bareUsername)
for _, privilegedName := range privilegedNames {
if usernameLower == privilegedName {
return true
}
}
// computer accounts (ending with $) are not privileged by themselves
// They only gain privileges through group membership or specific SIDs
if targetUser, err := lookupUser(bareUsername); err == nil {
return isWindowsPrivilegedSID(targetUser.Uid)
}
return false
}
// isWindowsPrivilegedSID checks if a Windows SID represents a privileged account
func isWindowsPrivilegedSID(sid string) bool {
privilegedSIDs := []string{
"S-1-5-18", // Local System (SYSTEM)
"S-1-5-19", // Local Service (NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE)
"S-1-5-20", // Network Service (NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE)
"S-1-5-32-544", // Administrators group (BUILTIN\Administrators)
"S-1-5-500", // Built-in Administrator account (local machine RID 500)
}
for _, privilegedSID := range privilegedSIDs {
if sid == privilegedSID {
return true
}
}
// Check for domain administrator accounts (RID 500 in any domain)
// Format: S-1-5-21-domain-domain-domain-500
// This is reliable as RID 500 is reserved for the domain Administrator account
if strings.HasPrefix(sid, "S-1-5-21-") && strings.HasSuffix(sid, "-500") {
return true
}
// Check for other well-known privileged RIDs in domain contexts
// RID 512 = Domain Admins group, RID 516 = Domain Controllers group
if strings.HasPrefix(sid, "S-1-5-21-") {
if strings.HasSuffix(sid, "-512") || // Domain Admins group
strings.HasSuffix(sid, "-516") || // Domain Controllers group
strings.HasSuffix(sid, "-519") { // Enterprise Admins group
return true
}
}
return false
return getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown(username)
}
// isCurrentProcessPrivileged checks if the current process is running with elevated privileges.
// On Unix systems, this means running as root (UID 0).
// On Windows, this means running as Administrator or SYSTEM.
// On Windows, this means the process token is elevated (administrators, SYSTEM).
func isCurrentProcessPrivileged() bool {
if getCurrentOS() == "windows" {
return isWindowsElevated()
return getProcessElevated()
}
return getEuid() == 0
}
// isWindowsElevated checks if the current process is running with elevated privileges on Windows
func isWindowsElevated() bool {
currentUser, err := getCurrentUser()
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to get current user for privilege check, assuming non-privileged: %v", err)
return false
}
if isWindowsPrivilegedSID(currentUser.Uid) {
log.Debugf("Windows user switching supported: running as privileged SID %s", currentUser.Uid)
return true
}
if isPrivilegedUsername(currentUser.Username) {
log.Debugf("Windows user switching supported: running as privileged username %s", currentUser.Username)
return true
}
log.Debugf("Windows user switching not supported: not running as privileged user (current: %s)", currentUser.Uid)
return false
}